America, this is just under one hour. Welcome, everybody. We have a large crowd listening to us, and also cspan tv is broadcasting this as well and i want to welcome their viewers. The purpose of todays webinar is over will discuss a point issue today called no daylight u. S. Strategy of israel attacks on iran. We think the chances of an Israeli Military campaign against Iranian Nuclear facilities has been rising, and it is important for the white house, the pentagon, the state department and other parts of the u. S. Government to consider what the u. S. Should do if israel initiates a military campaign against Irans Nuclear facilities. Certainly the Biden Administration seems very attentive to this possibility. The commander of our mideast forces, Central Command as well. Of course israel is now a part of centcom. It is something that jinsa recommended about five years ago. Seems to be going there next for a lifetime. The secretary and the chairman of the joint chiefs, alan alston, secretary of defense, we have been getting a lot of attention from our military folks. It is clear the acquisition is nervous about the strike. We have two members of our avon task force issued this report with us today. I will introduce them briefly, but then i want to give a brief summary of the report and then i will ask each of them questions. And of course we welcome any questions from the audience. Please send them in. First i want to introduce general charles wald. Chuck, general wald is a former Deputy Commander of the United States european and was responsible for developing the Operation Enduring freedom and afghanistan. He also served as director of Strategic Planning and policy that the u. S. Air force headquarters, chief of the u. S. Air force combat terrorism center. I could go on and on. He was an air force pilot for 35 years. And he is also a distinguished fellow with jinsa. Our other speaker today is elliott abrams. Also a member of our Iran Task Force project. He is a senior fellow middle east studies at the council of Foreign Relations here in washington, d. C. And served as Deputy Assistant to the president and national secured advisor and national secured advisor in the restrictions of president george h. W. Bush where he supervised policy in the middle east for the white house. He also has been a Trump Administration he served as special representative for iran and from venezuela. Let me just highlight a few key points of our report before we go to for questions. Probably a lot of our listeners know where the Iranian Nuclear program is. In recent months they reached 84 Nuclear Enrichment and there on the verge of becoming a Nuclear Threshold state. There is no evident, at least it doesnt seem that the iranians here a u. S. Military strike to prevent a nuclear iran. And i think if israel does take military action, it would really represent a failure of over three decades of u. S. Policy. Every president of the United States have said the United States will act to prevent a nuclear iran that it seems were getting very close to that very eventuality. Also, obviously much of that has been a lot of focus with this new Israeli Government on views of settlements, obviously, as we see today with judicial reform, but i think this has escaped a lot of peoples notice, that this is probably the most hawkish Israeli Security cabinet israel has had when it comes to iran. Some might remember when a lot of people thought israel let attack Iranian Nuclear facilities about a decade ago, a little over a decade ago, that there were folks in the security cabinet that opposed it. The Prime Minister is not a commanderinchief like the u. S. President. For major operations, you need the support of the security cabinet. And this particular security cabinet, seems especially hawkish on iran. There seems to be raising, growing Iranian Nuclear program on the verge of becoming a Nuclear Threshold state, doesnt seem to be a credible u. S. Military option. And the israelis seem very focused on this and certainly politically seem more cohesive. The government is more cohesive and coherent than probably any other is really government is on being tough and willing to prevent a nuclear iran. Let me just highlight a few key points. Where we are today. Then i think that if the report lays out it focuses more about what the u. S. Should do the day of and the day after Israeli Military campaign, but it also addresses a few things which should be done before. And i think we have learned from the ukraine issue that it is important to prepare for these things and not wait because everything is tougher once things begin. I think the report recommends for the day before, consistent u. S. Statements supporting and making clear that the u. S. Is supportive of making israel the tools it needs for defensive action including air refueling tanks, assistant guided munitions, more f35s, more air and Missile Defenses, so on, an issue that the air force has been recommending for many years. Secondly, just focusing on the key highlights, on the day of, the report recommends that our top priority should be making clear that israels action is consistent with enduring u. S. Policy, and that the u. S. Fully supports israels selfdefense needs and their security, that there should be no daylight between the u. S. And israel. Certainly with this administration they might have once israel did strike, assuming that israel will, we are not predicting they will, but we are saying that if they will, that really the two countries interests merge or converge, which is that focus on the success of an israeli strike , a focus on deescalation. That means specifically that the u. S. Should warn iran beyond undue retaliation on israel and against iranian proxies, bringing down the 100,000 plus of rockets and missiles it has in its arsenal facing israel. Also, on the day after, the Task Force Recommends immediate and comprehensive resupply for israel, prioritizing air and Missile Defense interception with precision guided munitions, and spare parts. There also should be some of the terry deployments by the United States to the region. Finally i will just add another recommendation of our group is to plan with israel, the United States should plan with israel or offer iran a diplomatic offramp to figure out a better solution to Irans Nuclear program instead of allowing iran to return to the Nuclear Threshold. I left out the recommendations, just wanted to highlight one or two from the day of the day after. Let me turn to you, elliott. First i wanted to ask you, how do you see before we get into what the u. S. Should do, how do you see the reason why we are talking about an israeli strike is because of the the assumption seems to be that the u. S. Will not do it if it comes to that. I wanted to know if you could address that issue, how you would look at you as deterrence against iran. Amb. Abrams you mentioned the centcom commander. I have the line here, he said in march i know when i look at iran, i believe they are undeterred. I think that is where we started and how the israelis start. They dont seem to be deterred. If you look at the way they continue to build their nuclear program, they seem to think we can, but want. They seem to think the israelis dont have the capacity. That is very dangerous, obviously, because that is precisely the kind of situations that can lead to war. One of the purpose of this report is to talk through deterrence. What does it mean in this situation . One of the things we say can report, and you said it just now, four or five president s interval have said that this will not happen. You will not permit it to happen. President biden has said he said look at a Nuclear Weapon under my watch. Which has another year and a half to go or fiveandahalf years to go, which is a long time. The question then becomes, well, how do we do that . Assuming the president is serious, knowing the credibility of the United States, president of the line here, how do we first of all do turkey run from moving those final steps that could lead to some kind of military engagement . Secondly, if we get to that point, we should not make the assumption that the book is written. We know exactly what happens on day one and a two and day 5 we dont. No one does. The level of violence can be very high, or significantly lower, which is of what we want and the length of any conflict can also be longer or shorter. The lower or shorter, the better. The only way to do that is to think it through now, which is what were trying to do in the report. I would say right now, just to get directly to your question, i dont see that the Biden Administration really has an iran policy. They had one, going back to the j. C. P. O. A. But we are two and half years in. There is no evidence that we will get there or that iran wants to get there. Now what . We have been sitting around for a year and a half. It has been pretty clear that returning to the j. C. P. O. A. Is not going to happen. So, what is the policy . How do you stop iran from moving towards a Nuclear Weapon . I dont think the administration has ever actually answered that question, what is land be plan b . Mr. Makovsky some critics of the trumpet said that. What is plan b after withdrawal . Senator menendez was interviewing interviewing then special envoy there and said, what is our plan b . Seems like that question hasnt really been answered since. Amb. Abrams i would say in defense of the Trump Administration, we had a plan b if plan a was the j. C. P. O. A. Which was greater and economic pressure on iran. We already did that for about a year and a half at the end. The theory was that if trump had been reelected, you could say to the iranians, ok, the pressure will increase more. Remember at the end of the Trump Administration, their National Reserves that they could reach, that werent frozen, or down to 4 billion which is nothing for a country of 70 to 80 million. If we could say there will be four more years of this, or lets negotiate a real solution to this, a real turn away from everything weapons program. I would say, would it have worked . We would never know. But the successor administration changed the policy and said, lets go back to the j. C. P. O. A. Mr. Makovsky i want to turn to charles wald. Chuck, you spent 35 years, he cannot mistaken, you were a commander of sand, also, so you know the region extremely well. I know you have been there many times. Do you see a connection first evolved to u. S. Response or the lack of response to provocations . Jensen did research earlier this year saying that came out a couple of months ago, Something Like 80 attacks by iranian proxies against iraq and syria during the Biden Administration, and i think we have retaliated four times. The wall street journal subsequently wrote an article about this as well. How do you see that . Do you see it as a signal to the iranians of what we might or might not do on the nuclear side . Jinsa general wald first of all, i would like to say that i agree with the ambassador totally. Number two is, military people dont make policy diplomats. So we have people like the ambassador who are articulate. But it is very simple to me, the ambassador mentioned deterrence. Deterrence is two things believability or capability, and the will to do it. I dont think we have any doubts that we have capability in conjunction with say, a military response from israel. The will part is the problem. I will leave that for the ambassador to get that part figured out. But i think we have to do some things to show that there is an unwillingness or reluctance and none acceptability to the iranian activity. The Qassem Soleimani assassination, illegal. Was it a huge signal that it was a big deal, it showed the gumption and the will of the United States to not put up with what he was doing. But as you mentioned, 80 different attacks that could be attributed to the iranians. They have got i have heard and read, 19 different organizations around israel that are apathetic to iran or are branches of iran. This goes on and on. What happens eventually is you dont have the credibility, the hammer to make the diplomacy that people like ambassador abrams are so good at doing. So, i think again, i dont want more. I dont think most military people are of that two. They want to avoid it. But there are actions you have to take that are somewhat unpalatable for some people. Recently we have sent f35s to the region, we sent a Naval Military cruiser to the region. They sent m16s today to the region. So they are beefing up the tactical level. I think the f35 is not as big a problem or any of the other aircraft. My belief is, again, you have to demonstrate a will to be ready to go if you have to. As you mentioned almost a decade ago, israel was ready to go. There was some reluctance in the u. S. Senate and the administration at the time to do much about it. But word got out that yes, we will eventually be there. I would recommend to people likely ambassador if you are doing the diplomatic intervention with the iranians, to tell them we have a military plan, we intend to use it with everything that we have short of Nuclear Weapons themselves. I have said before, i think we should deploy bombers to the region as a show of force. We ought to fly the farmers in the region. I also think we need to have a stronger approach to the gcc countries so they can be contributing to the air defense of the region. That is another part that doesnt get talked about a lot. I think the only thing the iranians would listen to its strength and the fear that if their action doesnt stop, and there has to be action taken to stop the development of a Nuclear Weapon that the United States and israel goes in, we will be there with them and we will be sustained with them. The other thing that doesnt get mentioned much is Ballistic Missile testing and the capability that iranians have been building. They have the capability. I think many people dont doubt there will. They have actually got, innovate, better capability to, i guess, assert there will than we do. But i think we have to be a lot stronger. It is difficult times right now in israel, difficult times here, but israel is our closest, most common ally i think, in the world. And iran needs to know we would be there and ready to go if we have to. Mr. Makovsky on chucks last point, elliott, you raise a few things and they want to follow up on them. Let me start with the last point check raised, which is that our report raises the idea that one of the most important things the United States could do if israel strikes is to put out a statement and communicate that we stand with israel and there is no daylight. Hence the title of the report. And we make the argument that the more there is no daylight, the greater the chance of deescalation. If america chose daylight with israel, no matter what our policy may have been the day before the attack, once such a campaign commences, if we do show daylight, it could invite the iranians to escalate, retaliate greatly and have a wider conflict in the region. I dont know if you could address that issue. Amb. Abrams i think thats correct, because again, this book is unwritten. We do not know if this ever happens. What exactly does it look like . If there is an Israeli Attack on a couple of Iranian Nuclear sites, does iran respond by hitting an Israeli Nuclear site . Does it respond by playing for israeli civilians and trying to kill as many people as it can . Does it respond by going for unitary airbases in israel . By trying to order hezbollah to send everything it has down into israel . Those are the decisions that would have to be made. I think all of those decisions are effective by their understanding of where the United States is. The Supreme Leaders understanding, the Iranian Militarys understanding. Israel and lebanon, they have got decisions to make. If they feel the United States and israel are closely aligned, and the United States is going to step in, it will matter. Do they try to close the strait of hormuz . The iranians . Do they attack gulf arab nations . Again, those are questions that i think they wont answer for themselves until they can do a costbenefit analysis. They need to have a view of issue do. If their view is that the americans dont want to do anything, they want to stay as far out of this as they can and it is open season if their view is that the americans are escalationdominant so lets be quite careful, then the size of the conflict and the length of the conflict is diminished. The damage done to us and our