Thank you very much for your patience and waiting for us to get done with the vote. Mr. Child, lets hear your testimony. Thank you. Chair woman hartzler, Ranking Member speier, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss capability gaps in the Afghan NationalSecurity Forces. As the Deputy Inspector general for overseas Contingency Operations i manage the dod oversight for Operation Freedom Sentinel in afghanistan. As the chair of the interagency southwest asia joint Planning Group i helped coordinate oversight over the several Inspector Generals in afghanistan. I serve a similar role for Operation Inherent resolve. The iraqsyria counter isil mission. I describe my role in more detail in my written state. Regarding Afghanistan Security forces my observations are based on oversight and recent published reports. We view this as two fold. Balancing the requirements to provide near term fighting capability against a longer term need to build the afghans capacity to sustain their fighting forces. In building Effective National institutions shortcomings in afghan sustaining capacity are a recurrent them into the oversight work and i would like to highlight three examples. Supply and maintenance, property accou accountability and key commodities. For many years, u. S. And nato partners emphcized growing the operation and pushed supplies to the afghanistan units rather than requiring units to pull supplies based on need and validated requirements. The result is the afghans have little experience are demanddriven support system. A recent asis assessment found the Afghanistan Forces were unable to properly forecast their requirements. We reported in 2015 that the ministry of defense and interior didnt have the ability to control the vehicles secured by the u. S. And coalition partners. The longterm solution should be the implementation of a strategy to place officials to maintain equipment and train afghans to conduct their own maintenance with a goal of achieving full afghanistan responsibility for maintenance in 2021. In april of 2015, we found a lack of adequate internal controls to manage fuel and ammunition. We reported deficiency in control regarding fuel for the inte interior ministry. We found there was no reasonable assistance that all u. S. Funded fuel valued at 38 million was used for its intended purpose. Future dod ig work in 2016 will include assessments of u. S. Efforts to build an independent Afghanistan Security forcess and intelligence capabilities. We will soon evaluate the progress of u. S. Special Operation Forces in training, advising, and assisting the afghan Security Forces. We will send a team of Intelligence Specialist to assess progress this month in developing effective Afghan Intelligence operations. Looking forward my office is engaged in a review of current programs and operations to identify future oversight work as lead Inspector General for Operation Freedom Sentinel. As you recall congress created the call for overseas operations in the 2015 National Defense authorization act. The igs of the department of defense, department of state, and United States state agency for International Development execute the lead ig plan mandate which was enacted to improve all of government oversight and Contingency Operations. We appreciate the support of this committee, subcommittee, as we discharge our oversight responsibilities and i look forward to your questions. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Child. To start the questions, mr. Abizaid, i was wondering what is the rational for beginning to draw down before the upcoming summer fighting season and before a new u. S. Administration has an opportunity to conduct its own assessment of the mission and needed troop levels . So my understanding of the draw down timeline is not that it will begin in the summer of 2016. The president has directed that general campbell try to keep at the 9800 level through as much of 2016 as possible so we can do in the train, advise and assist commission and the Ct Commission to get the most out of what week. The rational for the draw down to the 5500 is about how we set ourselves up for a future sustainable presence in the country at key locations outside of kabul. The fact we will maintain facilities in other areas are key differences between the plan that was originally approved and the one that president obama revised and i think that provide us the kind of flexibility we need to adjust the mission accordingly. Very good. Thank you, colonel michael, Afghanistan Security forces have capability gaps and these include the essential foundational activities that professional millitaries need in order to be efficient, effective and lethal. What limiting factors are precluding the andsf from sufficiently and effectively establishing these capabilities . Maam, i would say there is not anything specifically i would not say there is anything specifically that is limiting them. This capability just takes time. First there is time and depth of the material and time and training. As we look specifically at the past, we are feeling the a29. There is four platforms in the country and four more will there by april. There is a total of eight more that will show up after that. So part of it is securing the equipment on time and the other part is training that capability, developing pilots is something that takes, you know, it takes a lot of specificity and time. How will the development of these capabilities be affected by the upcoming draw down to 5500 u. S. Troops . Maam, the 5500 also has the capacity to maintain, train, advise and assist the Afghanistan Air force and in addition we are focused on train, advise and assistance to the Security Forces. Mr. Breedlove, in your professional opinion, how did you believe the Afghan Taliban would react if the forces were able to target the Afghan Taliban directly as part of the Counterterrorism Mission and outside of the current policy in only extremist type situations . I think the best way i would rephrase is it we have seen how the insurge and particularly the talibans react when we had u. S. Coalition agents in the fight backed up by their own air support and we saw adjustments with how they approach their tactics. With your specific question, i dont think we would see much change as far as the fight on the ground. I think the fighters on the ground will adjust. They are an adaptable enemy. They will adjust to their environment. As we saw this year and same as we saw them adjust when u. S. Combat forces were more aggressive than previous years. It doesnt stop them from fighting. At best we may see hesitation among some operations. We may see changes in how they maneuver but i think at a tactical level that would bow the most we were expecting to see. At a senior level, i dont think it would have much impact. Most of the Senior Leaders are not in the country anyway. Would direct targeting bring them to the table quicker and provide additional breathing room to the andsf and the Afghan Government . In my opinion, that could be a factor, one of many tools that could be applied. But in and of itself i dont think that is enough. It would have to be one of many tools to help change their belief that they still have the time to win this fight. Thank you. And has the department of defense made adequate progress in establishing oversight and accountability mechanisms within its command governance to minimize opportunities or identify quickly if they occur fraud, waste and abuse activities that have plagued certain aspects of the departme departments execution over the years . Very briefly, no. Partly because they dont have the resources for doing so. I think i note in my longer statement, which i offered to be made part of the record, that we have even noted some of the task forces setup to fight corruption have had to be abolished because there are no resources so i would say no. Mr. Child . I believe from our oversight is they have established systems but the problem is implementing fully the systems. I would offer three examples. They have begun the process of moving the afghans to electronic pay and information system. They have, the department, improved the process for identifying, training the proper both military and civilian advisors to conduct the train, advise and assist. And they have increased the enforcement of the commitment lede letters. But again i would not say that they have adequately progressed in that. This is part of a process. I think there are also co complicating factors that are important to consider. You have illiteracy and general campbell said 70 of the problems he saw was based on leadership, both selecting and relieving commanders and Senior Leaders is based on these factors rather than compensation. And i dont think we have the stability of the advisors because the tours are nine months to a year. The Contractor Force is the institutional memory in afghanistan and that is a challenge. And finally as mr. Sop pointed out the insecurity of afghanistan to have both the department and oversight agencies checked, kicked the tires, beat down the range properly, at the proper level to check, we really are dependent on the afghans and their reporting. Without i without implementing those systems where we can better defect where the money is used there is not adequate progress. But i do believe systems have been identified and probably put in place and will provide that progress. Thank you. Ranking member speier, questions . Thank you. I want to apologize to all of the witnesses. Many of the members who were here earlier wanted to be able to stay but because this is a get away day people schedule for such they have to make planes. I think this hearing is so important it should be held as a full committee hearing. We are spending so much money in afghanistan. From the testimony we have heard today, there is virtually no accountability. But lets get through a couple of the points that you have made. Colonel michael, you said in your statement significant longterm capability gaps remain in the areas of andsf leadership. Rotary wing aviation, intelligence collection and dissimination, closed air. That is a significant indictment. If it is not improved in 2016 what are you going to do differently or recommend be done differently . The key thing to highlight is that it is a process. We talk about there is capability gaps in leadership. But it is something that is being developed over time both at the tactical level and the co level. The main thing to reinforce is we have been building this force since 2009. When we started this, this was the american fight. We were in the lead. Pulling i know all of that. The question is we have been there for a very long time now. At some point, if we dont put conditions on money coming in the spigot always being turned off, and never being turned off, then we are not going to get the kind of results we are looking for. If you dont develop a plan, and specific expectations that will take place in 2016, we will be there indefinitely with no success and with the American People literally pulling out their hair saying what are we doing here. I dont think your answer frankly is adequate. Let me and all of there others of you. If 2016 is as bad as 2015 what would you recommend be done differently . I would start with saying the capability gap you identified are the capability gaps that are among the most sophisticated aspect of the force we are still trying to build. Which is part of how we got to the drawdown and we are planning now the 38,000 3,000 but they assume full responsibility for the security environment in 2015 and despite very real challenges that we anticipated as expected. The drawdown at 5500 does anticipate those gaps will read that we can make up those gaps over time. I do not they did is indefinite investment. What should we do differently . I think 2016 will be as bad and i support the a judgment ahead of the national intelligence. I have four suggestions. Number one fully support to ensure that general nicholson has the resources to combat that very day assessment. And what his needs are to bring him back and explain to this committee for what those needs are. For an end to see what is going on. This congress should require the department of state for those that iraq and stack their programs for what succeeded in what has and. Inquiry paying for those programs . They have never really done that. With the state department in secretary of defense. Is to ask them to raki and stacked all programs at a minimum just give me some of the Success Stories and why and they cannot do it. All i got back was balloons and kites is happy talk. Were happy helping the military. Great. What program . If your budget budget is so limited you can find everything beloved type and security which is the most important . I with the status of the Congress Needs to do. They have to come up with real measurements of success. To spend that appropriation amassing real measurements of success. With a radiance state that is something they should hold their feet to the fire. I cannot argue especially in terms of agencies but that is beyond my expertise of the Oversight Organization to address the achsah policy with a policy is decided and objectives are declared to see how that is implemented. To provide the general the opportunity after his assessment to be clear what he thinks to do his job in likewise it is important to discharge responsibilities. Then they may change the policy in when they do is my job to see how that is implemented. There were two issues brought up this morning. That i would take we should get a handle. Money being spent on fuel to afghanistan to testify there is no accountability. To be sold on the black market is that effective . To be precise there is a reasonable assurance that it was used for the proper purpose. We could not pin down more precisely to have direct funding is that will address some portion of the concern paying for troops that are not there. So those that are in provinces that we dont time the ability to send personnel to audit would suggest we have no way of knowing. Is it if they are found shooting as members of the ascii and Armed Services . It is certainly the fact there are troops because it has been a tough year in they were able to hold their own. But how all the others are we paying for . Is we have established as a mechanism to redress. I feed my colleague mentioned we have a program now therere but it hasnt been implemented. To mention in the statement that is supposed to have all the great data and could not give a said the users. So we are relying on the afghans who have the incentive to lie because they can collect the money to fill in in the data we dont have the people of the ground. With fellow lovell of the core from the brigade is we have no visibility. So at the core level at looks good to go over to the pentagon to understated what is going space in afghanistan. That is the parent problem. The matter how the Mighty Systems it is garbage did in in the garbage out. Particularly in the country where there is no incentive but my concern is we saw were there are paper divisions and apparently if you listen to the afghan officials to explain the problem. And how many of those are just paper . We pay for the salaries of each and every afghan soldier. Correct . We and our allies. We pay the bulk of that. I have many questions i will yield back. We are in discussing a forget decision today but little whole region of the world with the situation of the trans regional threat hallowed do you assess that region as a whole right now . El level is very high. So has the president s forces with the breeze above assessment indicated target them. To be sure we akkad that ability wherever they show up. Today we talk about the individual country but it is a regional issue looking at the spectrum from what i understand libya is worse than syria but there isnt as much as reporting because the press cannot get there. It cannot be over exaggerated. With the potential all out war that is very concerning to me. We need to make sure we keep our friends as strong as day qb to bring about stability. And talk about those individual thing this not just a of a process then seems to be broken bader procure assistant. And as they are trade with the air force base in if the nets have gone as planned so where we sit today to the three years from now. The rest is that 2018. But they should all be there right now. It will take three years from now because of those delays to get the pilots trained so they can help carry out the fight. Silicate as a result of the lawsuit is that correct . With a written statement in the footnotes. Its possible to do calculate how much that costas by delaying the Program Three years . I assume there are some costs involved . We could take ill luck. But the situation along the ground if you can get the equipment that our soldiers in friends need to carry out the fight situations all across where contractors are salinas in preventing us from getting men and women the equipment that they need. Would that change the fight . Is a possible lead happen in september 28 may have had a different outcome . But that maneuver operations is much better for closer support stick these lawsuits are costing us more is the point. The at wed we pulled down the troops that 5500 when we pulled the soldiers out, how many