Spring. Live coverage on cspan2. This is expected to get started in just a couple of moments. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] we are live at the Hudson Institute for discussion on effective preparedness, response and recovery from biological and chemical threats. At a long discussion includes the Blue Ribbon Study PanelBlue Ribbon Study Panel on biodefense but among those you will hear from former connecticut senator Joe Lieberman secretary tom ridge, former senator tom daschle and former hhs secretary Donna Shalala. This is expected to start momentarily. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] again we are live at the Hudson Institute this morning waiting for the start of the discussion on biodefense but it should get underway in a couple of moments. While we have a second we will tell you about some of the other Live Programming coming up. Beginning at 10 eastern on cspan well go live to the Brookings Institution for discussion on the Iranian Nuclear talks looking at diplomatic components of a credible do. Irans objectives and concerns and the politics of the United States. After the program for panelists will take audience questions. Bent on cspan3 at 10 30 a. M. The center for strategic and International Studies will host a discussion on defense and National Security undersecretary brad carson will talk about the armies of vision for the role of land power in future operations. He will also talk about the armies approach to innovation and technology. That is on cspan3 starting at 10 30 a. M. Eastern. At noon on cspan the alliance for Health Reform talks about Health Care Costs. Since 2013 theres been a deceleration in spending for private health care insurance, medicare and hospital care. This briefing will discuss Health Care Costs and the prospects of the future, also costcutting strategies. Thats on cspan again starting at noon eastern. More on the Iran Nuclear Negotiations from the World Affairs council. That is at 6 30 p. M. Eastern on cspan. To hold a discussion on hold or disciplined for an Iranian Nuclear deal. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] folks, were going to convene in about three minutes. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] everyone take your seats, please. Everyone take your seats, please. Appreciate that. Well, good morning, ladies and gentlemen. On behalf of the Blue Ribbon Study Panel on biodefense, we welcome you to the fourth public hearing related to our collaboration with the Hudson Institute. I think its very important for us to publicly express once again our deep appreciation for the sponsorship of this panel, and, frankly, the resources they provide to us to take on will be considered to be a very very Critical Mission as we take a look at our ability to identify and respond to one of the more sinister threats that exist out there, whether its dont have us by Mother Nature or isil or a nationstate or whom ever that actor or actors may be. So again we are deeply appreciative of the Hudson Institute. And while this is the last Public Meeting we will conduct year there will be some private meetings here as we develop a series of recommendations to submit to the congress of the United States are both shortterm and longterm activities recommendations relative to the ability of this country to identify and respond to those kinds of threats. Today we confront a very troubled world and it becomes more challenging every week. While many issues threaten our nation, biological and chemical threats are among the most sinister. Alqaeda, isil and other terrorist groups have voiced their desire to obtain and use biological and chemical weapons. And lone actors crude terrorist camps with agents like ricin are reported regularly. Further the ongoing ebola crisis reveals significant gaps in u. S. Public health and medical preparedness. Last years Chemical Attacks in syria prompted a serious consideration of our own ability to respond to domestic chemical terrorism and an influenza pandemic continues to lurk. It is clearly necessary to consider our current ability to defend against such threats and provide the health and welfare of our citizens. I am privileged to cochair this panel with one of my friends senator Joseph Lieberman who unfortunately will not join us today, is a little bit under the weather, and we will proceed without his wisdom and his council but he has been so involved in the first three meetings and obviously, will be involved as we develop a set of recommendations to centerville. Just for the benefit of the audience am ever grateful that shes been a think enough of this panel to becoming a today i would like to outline what we tried to do in dividing our efforts alone three four for specific panels, issues that relate to our effort. The first panel we held several months ago was a threat awareness. We took a look at the potential risks associated with biological and chemical threats that can afflict potentially catastrophic consequences. We discussed the risks posed by the states, a nationstate and individual actors its first panel was just about the general nature of threat awareness. Obviously, the second panel was prevention and protection. And so we asked a series of panels to give us their overview on everything from biological arms control and cooperation with bilateral multilateral agreements, to First Responder protection and agricultural defense. Ever took a look and assess our people and pandemic influenza response and our capability to respond to future pathogen. The third panel involved expert to talk to us about surveillance and detection, and understanding of the biodefense required in this critical area. We took a look existing technology and its effectiveness. We examined the challenges associated with Early Detection and early diagnosis. And we took a very interesting look at a human and animal interface as relates to our charge on this Blue Ribbon Panel. Entity weve got a very very lengthy group today subject Matter Experts to talk to us about response and recovery capability. And so we think weve covered the waterfront from threat awareness to response and recovery and everything in between, and it will be our mission today, Ken Weinstein and Donna Shalala and tom daschle and i think Jim Greenwood will join us later to submit to the congress of the United States a series of recommendations and hopefully we will be in a position to be out there advocating for these recommendations on a personal basis as well. So as weve done with every panel and every meeting, we normally begin with a unique perspective. And to this extent we have mike rogers, former congressman obviously if youre for me with the Hudson Institute, even if the work is done and the World International community, terrorism and the like we think his perspective to commence this final panel would be very helpful. So congressman mike rogers, and you for joining us. The floor is yours. Well thank you, governor, secretary. A lot to get on a card. I will caution thats funny, really, it is. You can laugh. Its different enough inside you bet. Its a lot better last night i discovered that as secretary, mike. Thank you very much. Exactly. But i do praise the the opportunity and appreciate the work of the panel and i want to say i have been with hudson now for a couple of months and the intellectual firepower there is both inspiring, and ive learned a tremendous you come in fairly well schooled and you realize youve got a long way to go and hang out with my fellow colleagues at the Hudson Institute. They are doing really, really powerful work. I just thought i would tell you our journey all of it on how we in a bipartisan way got to the bar to build and the popup bill on issues that we saw coming up that we didnt believe were going to be addressed because it just is hard to get peoples attention about something you cant see or you can touch and necessarily but, you know, the devastating consequences. There are many a nights as chairman of House Intelligence Committee you dont sleep for things that you know. Often centered around our threat matrix of bioterror attacks and our ability to respond in a way that i think would be completely appropriate. So anna eshoo and i started in 2006 after a series of investigative is too strong but at least inquiries into the status of terrorist at least attempting in their interest in obtaining bioweapons. What we found was there was a high degree of interest in obtaining weapons but were in the middle of the conflict in iraq. We were busy in the middle of the conflict in afghanistan at that point. And the focus was not just necessarily where it needed to be. So looking back at the white house at the time the Bush Administration collectively with an issue, mike rogers republicans working with the white house, we agreed that we need to have a special fund our effort to try to produce countermeasures in a mark where there was no marketplace for. That was the biggest problem. Theres only one single customer in reality for these countermeasures. So i dont care if its radiological exposure. I dont care if its smallpox on a large scale, bubonic plague which would seeing strong interest in terrorist organizations trying to weaponize the bubonic plague and try to find Delivery Systems for them. We realized we needed to have something on a larger magnitude to both stockpiles of this than to try to push it up to our First Responders or in communities where First Responders could gain access. Thats really how this started and you can imagine with all of the of the challenges facing the United States it was hard to get peoples attention on this. I credit yeah and as you again, my partner in this, and the white house person yes this is something were going to have to do with anna eshoo in the levels of threat we see, even given all the other things we are. The one challenge we had subject to its passage was trying to get full funding for. So we got plenty of authorization money set aside for these countermeasures, and it was very, very tempting as you know, governor ridge, that that money was just too tempting to be moved somewhere else for what they would proceed bigger parties. And begin because the enemy was not knocking on our door with the bubonic plague or smallpox or fillin the blank we know they were interested we know they had aspirations to use it. We knew they had aspirations to put it together but we didnt have enough to say, you know within 30 days or 60 days or 180 day something bad is going to happen with these biological weapons. It always became a backseat issue. Weve had some successes along the way, however, with medical countermeasures. Hhs just signed contract with emergent, about 31 million for the new and improved anthrax countermeasure. And a lot of attention paid to it but there was a recent there was a lot of attention paid to it. Because we watched a terrorist pay a lot of attention to it. So we wanted to make sure that we had stockpiles of countermeasures around the country that could address a problem if it happened to survivability rate in those cases would go, is astronomical. That money will also be used to test the prophylactic capability of anthrax after measures pick we think that there can both be prophylactic treatment which easy now and our response treatment to anthrax. In other words, if somebody gets exposed, there is an opportunity that we can have a vaccine that could say that persons life. So all of that to me has been its been a slog a work in progress, but i think we have made some progress. And i know anna eshoo with susan brooks, a republican from indiana, signed a letter to the chairman recently requesting i think 400 some Million Dollars in additional money to the fund. I think if they can get anywhere near it i think it would be a success story. We are going to have to continue to do this to try to stay ahead of the threat. The last thing we want to do is have a successful biological attack in the United States, or with our allies, in not be in a position to respond. We saw the panic across europe, across the United States really across asia, the middle east africa about ebola. This is something that we knew had the possibility to happen but were not willing to stand up and try to prepare ourselves for the eventuality that it might happen. And so there was a lot of chasing our tail in the beginning. If you watched the with the government reacted they reacted which is great the problem is that a lot of catching up to do in a way which an advantage of if both pop and barda pieces of legislation have been fully funded and operational. This was a bipartisan problem on full funding to it started in the Bush Administration. That money got yanked away and its continued into this administration and again its just hard to get peoples attention on something that sounds really bad but i cant see. With that mr. Chairman a be willing to take any questions with advice of counsel, of course. Surrounded by lawyers. I know youre very reserved. I think we all have several questions. I would like to dig a little deeper with regard to the observation you made in terms of generating bipartisan support not on the authorizations i put on the appropriations side. As chairman of the House Intelligence Committee you obviously were far more familiar with the intent, the aspirations and the capabilities of the terrorist organizations is because of your role and under multiple briefings that you requested you learned a great deal from each briefing. And against our challenge is that in a democracy as we talked a little about at this point we are much more reactive than printed. Youre saying that the challenge that people understand but since its not a needed and its not visual, rallying congressional support around and issue or an organization that is critical to this by defense countermeasures and chemical countermeasures is very, very difficult to do you have any recommendations in that regard as to how this panel may take our recommendations and approach the congress of the United States to elevate not only their interest but also their ability and the willingness to take some of these are conditions because they are bipartisan, a political recommendations, take them seriously as if we can change relationships between entities, change the funding streams can any thoughts in that regard . Yeah, i think anytime a number is educated on the aspirational interest of terrorists, thats a good day for an outcome of trying to get ahead of the problem. So i think the report will be important to that end, and i would use this as an opportunity to get senior staffers to get members of congress clued in on to the aspirational nature of terrorist attempts. In some cases its gone beyond aspirational intent. We sing the use of chemical weapons. We know people are committed to using them. We have seen the procurement from isis individuals into beasts, we believe of obtaining at least chemical weapons, if not gain access into what research may been done on biological weapons. And so thats a very dangerous combination. In addition any radiological material that may have, a lot of people are afraid of of the nuclear bomb, and we should be but a radiological dirty bomb is much more in the capabilities of a terrorist organization than a nuclear bomb, certainly at this point. That is concerned. And so i think if members get clued in and senior staff get clued in as to what the threat level really is i think its easier for them to start making these decisions. Theres going to be a lot of priorities, especially on defense but we have been robbing Maintenance Programs on carrier groups and aircraft and heavy machinery, tanks, to pay for other things in the military. So the pressure is going to be on the defensive side. We had to make this a Public Health issue i think here in america and try to get it out at the defense stream as best as we can. And activity of that magnitude even so, think of the radiological bomb that has the impact of eight square blocks. For a small amount of until burst in a way that produces an outcome that they desire. Most of the impact of that is fear and chaos but its not actually damage. And so this is the problem that we confront. Can we sustain psychologically in the United States or economically an attack that even that small magnitude . Or a small magnitude biological attack of smallpox, or we know they have this strong interest