Their many years of experience and distinguished service. General norton schwartz, formern chief of sdtaff of the air force and president and ceo of his executives for National Security. Admiral james stavridis, former commander at u. S. European command and u. S. Southern and currently again at the Fletcher School of law and a diplomacy at tufts university, and frequent appearance on various liberal media outlets. Oe dr. Christopher lamb, Deputy Director of the i institute for National Strategic studies at the National Defense university. More than anything else that goldwaternichols act wouldsulti result of escanglating concern c the conflict and in the country about the effectiveness of u. S. Military operations. The vietnam war, and to the Hostage Rescue Mission in irannd and the flawed invasion of grenada all pointed to deep systemic problems in our defense enterprise and needed to be of bothor the saksake our war fighters at our National Security come in particular goldwaternichols focus on ensuring unity of command and approvinimproving the ability or forces to operate jointly. Have p as weve explored in previousman hearings many questions remain about the ballot our military io striking between court military competitiveness, competencies and joint experience. But as it relates to combats, t effectiveness there is no doubtu as one former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff put it, no other nation can match our ability to combine forces on the battlefield and fight jointly. Dt the subject of todays hearingds relates directly to the many steps goldwaternichols took over the unity of command. The law made unified commandersm explicitly responsible to the president and secretary of defense for the performance ofee missions and preparedness of thei fr commands. It also renewed the joint chiefs of staff from the operational chain of command and Preventative Services for moving force in an out of regional commands without approval. Geographic Combatant Commanders were given the ability to issuel authoritative direction on allad aspects of operations, jointl training and logistics, intro change of command, and personal. Within their assigned areas of responsibility. These steps were effective in establishing clear lines of command authority and responsibility that translated to a more effective fightingwe 1rce than we had in thehe 1980s. However, 30 years later we havev to take a hard look at this command structure in light ofuc current threats and how our model of war fighting has mo war fig the United States confronts thee most most diverse and complex array war iisis since the end of world war ii from rising competitors like china, powers like russia,e the growing asymmetric capabilities of missions ranging from iran to north korea, persistence of radical islamist extremism and the emergence of new domains of warfare such as space and cyberspace. These threats cut across our acs regional operational structurepc as embodied by geographic combatant c commands. So we must ask, whether the current combatant command structure best enables us to succeed in the strategico environment of the 21st century. Should we consider an alternative structures that are organized less around geographyt than trent regional and functional missions . At the same time as numerous witnesses have observed while combatant commands were originally envisioned as the wat fighting arm of the military, the department of defense, that function is largely migrated to joint task forces, specially on an ad hoc basis in response to emerging contingencies. This suggests that people havele identified a shortcoming in the current design and have adopted measures to work around the system as we see quite often. This chip in for our efforts ton evaluate and reimagine the our combatant commands. E the e, the same time combatant commands have come to put a very importantan piece time diplomatc functions. Developnts argue these developments argue for changes in structure of combatant commands. At a minimum and would call intl question a top heavy and bloated staff of structures that we seet in the combatant commands. Time and again during these hearings wine have heard how dramatic increases in civilian and military staffs have persisted, even as resourcesn available for war fighting functions are increasingly strained. As former undersecretary of defense for policy Michele Flournoy pointed out earlier this week, combatant commands staf cf have grown to 38,000 people. That is nearly three divisions worth of staff and just the combatant commandsju alone. We have to ask if this is trulyy necessary and whether it is improving our war fighting capabilities. At the same time we have to examine whether you are duplicative functions and the joint staff combatant commandsa and subordinate commands thatli . Can be streamlined. That includes the question ofe i whether we really need all ofthe the current combatant commands. For example, do we really need soh and northcom and a southcom . Do we really need a separate africom headquartered in germany when the vast majority of its, h forcesen reside within as we have to revisit the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs, of the chairman and a member of the joint chiefs of staff, goldwaternichols strengthened the joint staff and operation sr management expense of the service. Has that gone too far or not far enough . Y of defse rober from a sect oft defense robert gates raised this issue when he testified before this committees because his frustration with the military services lack of responsiveness to currentf neerational requirements. Ur wit many of our witnesses have discussed whether the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff have sufficient statutory the stity to perform the strategic intraegration by the department of defense all too often seems to d do poorly, grte integrating priorities comean efforts and resources across regions, across domains of military activity, and across time. And balancing shortterm and longterm requirements. Ed question has been raised whether the chairman should beai placed in the chainrm of command with the Service Chiefs and . Combatant commanders reporting to him. We have heard testimony in favor and against. I look forward to exploring this further today. These are critical questions about our Defense Organizations that have direct bearing on thea effectiveness of u. S. Military a operations, and as a consequence on the well being of our warfighters. We are wicked and to look at thh blekaitis or so, ask toughche questions, challenge old assumptions and embrace new solutions if and when you. Need. I think our witnesses again i look forward to the testimony. Senator reed. Take it very much mr. Chairman. Let me join you in welcoming the witness. Ive had the privilege of working with generalhe schwartz, admiral stavridis, and dr. Lamb, your service to the defensee department now as an analyst and i deeply appreciate it. H thank you very much, gentlemen for joining us today. Gentlem as the chairman has said weveiv undertaken a very rigorous under his direction review of the goldwaternichols, and we heard just a few days ago from secretary of defense, former secretary of defense Michele Flo Flournoy about one of the issues and that was in her words over the years the qdr has become a bottom up that includes hundreds of participants that consumes many hours rather than a topersp down leadership exercised that sets clear priorities that makes tough choices and allocates risks. I would the witndo things i would hope the witnesses will talk abouts e with this wplhole planning ceocess, the formal process como in from a process and we ca improve it. Thats just one of thee items. Theres a long and i think a lon important list of topics that we coulcould discuss. Thor the rolite and deferred a scientific of the joint chiefs of staff including whether the militaperatireplace the chain of command for military operations. Improving the employment and synchronization of military capabilities for combatant commands, defense agencies and field activities. Efficiencies and provide senir militaryand leaders more timely recommendations. In previous hearings, our witnesses have observed better capitalizing on the gains achieved through those improvements may require significant changes to enter agency National Security structure and processes, as well ,s this was made by jim walker the godfather, if you will, of the Goldwater Nichols. No matter how you transform the defense department, it is quite broken. And the problems that confront this nation require an interagency response. Executed ato National Security mission by itself is long going, we do not have the ability to integrate everything that exists. I think it is important to keep that in mind. And the chairman, again, let me commend him for beginning this process with the department of defense. I hope it is a catalyst on the issue for serious review by other committees and other agencies about how, together, we can improve security in the u. S. Thank you. Senator mccain welcome, general schwartz. General schwartz thank you, sarah mccain and Ranking Member reid for improving dods internal governments and Defense Organization by the Goldwater Nichols reforms. It is a privilege to return to his room and offer a few related ideas on how to improve performance in the department of defense. It is a special pleasure to sit beside the finest flag officer of my generation, jim. While there are many issues that warrant petition, resource allocation and overhead reduction and joint credentialing of military personnel and the potential for consolidation, among others, i wish to focus this morning on the three that i am persuaded that hold the greatest promise for particularly positive outcomes. They are the role and authority in the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff rightsizing supervising Combatant Commanders and jcs is insufficient for the. Demands of our times. While it is true delegatedted authority from the secretary off defense is alternative, there a should be non doubt in the armid forces, that about the directivi authority of the chairman. Subject to the close and continuing scrutiny and oversight of the secretary of defense. Strategic guidance for force employment. Force allocation tradeoffs between combatant command andwen establishing Strategic Priorities for the armed forces should not be the result of bureaucratic negotiation. Or the exquisite application of personal persuasion. Per but arent the product of strategic leadership. This capacity is constrained by the chairmans inability too executive authority on behalf of the secretary ofsecr defense and remedy i suggest is to place the chairman in the line of supervision between thep secretary and his or hermbat Combatant Commanders. Combatant commands are mom plexl entities none of which are alike. Some with regionalich responsibilities and some with functional roles. The command strives to serve both peacetime, Crisis Response and warco fighting obligations. The composition of the come plat tant command staff clearly reflect inherent tension in excessively Broad Mission array. Peacetime administration, deterrents, training and Partner Engagement versus maintainingeru capacity to conduct complex Contingency Operations in peace and in war. The prolive race of resource directorates, j8s, joint intelligence centers, j2s,ecur Security Assistance programcall offices, typically j4s, partner entities, typically j3s and result of this expansive assigned mission set. And, over time, the war fighting role of the combatant commandsat has evolved to almost exclusive use, some would suggeste, s excessive use of joint task forces up to and including fourstar led joint task forces to execute assigned missions. The simple question in my mind is, can a combatant command no c matter how welltailored perform each and every associated task with equal competence. I dont think so. And the attempt to infuse greater interagency heft into the combatant commands has in mm experience detracted from theas core operational focus and either peacetime or in conflict. How have we squared the tension between combatant commands peacetime and wartime roles . I would argue by againain, exsensitive use of joint task force organizations. To execute operational missions. It is my conviction that the efficacy of the task force Employment Model is beyond dispute. The National Counterterrorism joint task force demonstrates conclusively in my mind, the enduring value of standing, mature, welltrained, and equipped joint task forces. It may well be that High Performance parallels exist forr National Joint task forces in the surface maritime and air domains as well. What we should continue, however, or what i should say we discontinue, is the proliferation of joint task forces in each combatant command with the attendant Service Components and headquarters staff. Task force 510 in the Pacific Command might qualify however, as an exception to the rule. In short, mr. Chairman, we need to have within the armed forces a strategic leader who can exercise executive authority. We need to aggressively tailor combatant command headquarters h composition to its core mission or missions and refrain from creating subordinate joint task forces out of Service Headquarters and finally we need to drive toward employment, highly proficient joint task forces or combatant command employment. Thank you, chairman mccain, Ranking Member reed and members of thed. Committee for your attention this morning. I trust my presentation will assist in advancing the noble cause of goldwaternichols reform. Thank you,ls sir. Admiral stavridis. Chairman, mccain, Ranking Member reed, other distinguished members. Pleasure to be back withad you d to be here with general schwartz who was not only a service chief but a Combatant Commander asf, b well as being director of the joint staff. There is no one who can talk more coherrently to this issues as well as him. To my good friend dr. Chris lam who i think can best addressaddr questions of strategy and planning senator reed raise ad t momentha ago. Ag io. Spent 37 years in uniform. I spent probably a decade of that in the pentagon. I wish i had been at sea during those years but in that time i managed to serve on the staff of the secretary of defense, secretary of the navy, chief of Naval Operations and chairman oa the joint chiefs of staff. So i have sort of seen insideies the building and as senator mccain mentioned i was twice a Combatant Commander, once in europe and once in Southern Command, latin america and theis caribbean. So im going to simply walk into four or five ideas that think might be interesting for this committee to discuss and debate. None of these are fully firmed ideas but i think they relate to the objective of what theate committee, i think very correctly seeks to do as we sit here, kind of three decades after goldwaternichols. And they all relate in one way or another to how the department is organized. The so i will start with one i think is controversial but ought to bh considered, that is do we need a cyber force for the United States . I would invite you to think about where we were 100 years ago. We had an army, a navy, and a marine corps. Did we have an air force . Of course not. We barely flew airplanes one onl years ago. I would argue today it feelsago. Like that moment a few years after the beach at kitty hawk and my thought is, clearly we need a Cyber Command. I think were moving in thatcomm direction. But i think its time to think about whether we want to accelerate that process because our vulnerability process, becae our vulnerabilities in the cyber do s d for them. Some part of our response will have to be done by the department of defense. And the sooner we have not only a Cyber Command, but in my view, a cyber force small, capable i think will be well served. I think we should have a discussion. Of they, to the question interagency. And the power of how to bring those parts of the government together, i think an interesting organizational change to consider would be to at each of the regional combatant commands to have a ambassador is a u. S. Or perhaps some other senior diplomat. Would continue to need a military deputy, and order to conduct military operations. But a great deal of what combatant commands do is diplomatic in nature, and i think having a senior representative from the interagency present would be salutory. This is been tried, and i think it would be an effective an interesting idea to consider to look at combatant commands. Thirdly, and the chairman mentioned this, in my view, geographically, we have too many combatant commands. We have six today. I think we should seriously consider merging north and south com and emerging u com and africa com. There are obvious deficiencies in doing so, operational additional benefits that derive. And i think finally, it is a way to begin reducing what has been correctly identified as the bloat in the operational combatant command staffs. Would associate myself with general schwartz and a number of others who have testified with the idea that we should consider independent, general staff in strengthening the role of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff. Practice, as a