There are an array of options and that is certainly one that is there. We are going to turn to membership for questions. Im told to remind you it is on the record. We ask you wait for a microphone. It will bring it to you. Speak directly into the microphone, stand stand up, tell us your name, affiliation and limit yourself to one question. Lets start over here with this gentleman. Hello. My memory on this may be hazy, but i was on the defense policy board at the time of the earliest crises. Somehow or another at the time the cold war was ending they made it possible for some of their records to be made available to us. One of the things i was surprised, for those of us who saw the records, where it took about a year to persuade the russian and chinese to get into this. They were very much afraid of the american response and they didnt want to go to war with america again. That was certainly an opening. I should back up and say, it was my opinion then that we simply had to send a person of great stature over there. You have to keep in mind, maintaining face and stature were important in the world. If youre going to send somebody , dont send the assistant secretary however able he may be. Send somebody who also has the recognition and stature in the world. And happened and i knew at the time to people who had been asked by him to come over. One was the secretary general of the un, the egyptian who has now passed away, and the other was president carter. My suggestion was, knowing president s as i did, i thought none of them would like to have that done, to to be undercut by somebody who seems to have more knowledge on the subject then you do. If anybody will do it, you will do it. Well, that wasnt really going to work and it doesnt usually work that way very often. I said, why not say, we are not inviting anybody to go but nor will we stand in the way. If there is someone of sufficient stature, step aside aside and let them come. So your point is, someone of a high standing needs to be well he did go and he got an agreement. Well lets ask about that. How high does the representative of the United States need to be in these negotiations . I think that has to be up to the president to decide that. Any suggestion david hamburg makes on his experience and tremendous contribution to humanity, i would take seriously , and i would hope whoever the president is would take that seriously. I think thats a president ial call. I would just add, and we alluded to this, this regime has a pretty robust history and the report lays out the cycle that weve all been in for many years, for decades now, and there is certainly meant to present in the report a sense of of urgency and a specific statement that the next president , whoever he or she may be will be tested very early with this capability. Part of the idea of this was to propose at least a framework that might be used as a new Administration Takes over. We are not the only ones in town doing it, by the way. No hands on the side of the room so ill go to the gentleman there and come forward. Stanley ross, unaffiliated, but formally a humble assistant of state secretary. I asked my question from this advantage of not having read the report which i will do tonight. Does it address deterrence and whether he gets it, thinking specifically of us in scenario that is very worrisome when you talk about him using his Nuclear Umbrella which he feels he can take conventional action with impunity. Can you address that in the report . I would say this is the core which is the deterrence and defense. As these capabilities develop, he may believe, mistakenly, he is able to aggress at some levels and cover that with his nuclear arms. A nuclear blackmail scenario. Our recommendation are explicitly designed to dissuade him of that false impression. We propose, new abilities in some submarine warfare, the mantra of the 25000 men and women of the u. S. Forces is that they need to be ready to fight tonight and thats absolutely true. That might require not only a defensive action but also proactive action. It may also require strikes into korea itself if we are aggress against with a sufficient magnitude. Its important to recognize we do not enjoy a condition of destruction with north korea and we will not consent to that arrangement. We have a question from new york. Please tell us your name and affiliation. Herbert from the american china society. When the United States has been confronted with this kind of thing in the past, we negotiated our way out of it. First of all we were free to negotiate very early on when faced with it which is not been the case here because of opposition within administration and with congress. We went after serious threats in argentina and brazil and we talked them out of it. We managed to get the South Africans to stop. We then had israel, india, pakistan and iran. At every stop, negotiations achieved unless a lessening of the threat. When it came to north korea we have tried to do some serious negotiations. Negotiations have failed most of the time because the North Koreans failed to fulfill. This is a negotiating situation. A negotiating situation, what are our minimum criteria . Well, its not to come up with your hands out and agreed to get rid of your Nuclear Manufacturing capability. Thats not a negotiating situation. You have to start with no advance criteria and then you have to look at what it is in north korea that they are after. They are paranoid, remember we in invaded north korea william were when we were defending south korea. Did you have a question. Yes we can start by recognizing that as a country offering to send an ambassador and maybe mr. Trump after the election and get started dealing with them as a serious country, not just simply a threat. Do you want to comment on that . We make it clear that negotiation with north korea is one of our top goals. Weve said this morning communication is enormously important. We also made it clear in the report that we recommend we have informal discussions with them. We do believe you cant sit down and negotiate with them while they are continuing to Test Nuclear Weapons and missiles. We have to have a freeze at some point. That ought to be the aim of the negotiation but we can sit down and Start Talking to them if they make it clear they will sign up in principle like all the other will have to under the 2005 framework which they agreed to once. Then we then we can discuss all of these things. We make it clear in the report that we are willing to talk about forced dispositions and exercises. Thats all in the report. We are willing to talk about arm control and i think we all have to remember that the North Koreans had a huge threat against our ally, south korea before they even have a nuclear program. There was a Severe Threat on the conventional side. All of those things can be put on the table and should be put on the table but you have to get to the table first, and you have to get to the table with some hope of achieving a freeze on some of these very dangerous developments. We have a question over here. The morning. Thank you for invitation. Jj greene, National Security correspondent. There are those who think north korea already has achieved a militarization of a weapon. We see they continue to test Delivery Systems. While the concern about the possibility of a deployment of a Nuclear Weapon on top of a missile at some point is of great concern, i wonder what your thoughts are about the test phase which is, if they do have a weapon, when they get to the point that they start testing, because thats a huge risk. Anything could go wrong as with anything theyve tested and deployed later. That is a lot closer to us now than them protecting something and launching it later. I wonder what the panel thinks about where we are now in that process and what your thoughts would be on preparing for the possibility and some idea on what to do. Thank you. Thanks jj, ive looked at north korea as almost not having a test phase in terms of the way they have developed their systems specifically which is basically operationally, and they are very content with putting a system out there, firing it and having it failed but learning each time. You can see, just as weve observed the progress they have made, and i would agree, although i dont know but certainly they are making progress with the submarine lunches that are indicative of progress and all of that is what greatly motivated the task force to focus on the urgency with which this is required to be addressed, and the likelihood in the very near future that he is going to have this capability. He wont go through a test phase. From my perspective i would treat it all is operational right now and be able to address it from a threat perspective as he continues to go through these tests because they can be and they are very, very threatening. Front row, right here. Im from the naval postgraduate school. Im an anthropologist by training. I look at this from a human standpoint. One of the changes that i have observed, i came to the pentagon 40 years ago when the admiral was a lieutenant. I met him at the naval academy. Yes, yes, come on, asked the question. What i want to mention is a change of language where both the Vice President and secretary of defense, last spring, used the word relationships. I think this whole question of trying to build relationships rather than going in and saying weve got all this strike, how are you going to do with it. Its a real shift if we are going to move into recognizing how important relationships are. The question i have is how do you start putting that in military education so that you dont have the sense that if youre in the military you fight and if youre in the state department you try to work it out. Sounds like a good question to me. She knew you when you were a lieutenant. I would say certainly from my perspective, what i have observed, and im a few years removed now, but during my time as an officer there was a number number of people in the military, in the pentagon working on the relationship aspect of this. The strong preference from the military is we would rather not fight. We certainly can but our preference would be to have a peaceful outcome, to be led by astute policy and doctrine and even astute politics so that we dont get to a point where we have to use the weapons. I think the military, certainly in the last several decades has moved to an understanding of the relationships. Not that its moved away from the ability to fight but the importance of. [inaudible] we are in a much different place than we were a few years ago and this is a great example. I believe the most important relationship in the 21st century century is the one between u. S. And china. Its driven principally by the fact that though the two biggest economies in the world. We to figure out how to make this work. If this region destabilizes, our economies go bad very, very quickly. It has four of the five largest economies in the world in this region. That is compelling motivation to try to get this right. Part of this is our relationship with china which is enormously complex. You cant just pull one piece out and say do this. Thats why think what they said earlier was so important. We have to understand this from the chinese perspective. What are their concerns him goals. That said, we cannot get to a point where this young leader puts a Nuclear Weapon on top of a missile and puts the United States and our people under attack. That is a line in the sand that cannot be crossed. Next question, we invite Task Force Members to join in the discussion, comments if youd like. Lets go to the back of the room. Could i add one thing to that other. That was just made. Mike has said over and over again that the biggest challenge we face is our economy and our fiscal problems. That is a military leader saying that. Bob gates said at least on two occasions that he would take money out of the budget to beef up the state department if he had the ability to do it. I dont think the type of military wanting to fight and this date department wanting to make a deal, i dont think thats correct on either count. That is common perception and i think its wrong. A question in the back the room. Im a reporter with congressional quarterly. Mr. Mauling, when when you talk about the potential preemptive military strike, would that be envisioned as strikes on north koreas sites recognizing that its now developing mobile missiles or would these be test that you alluded to earlier, or strikes, to destroy missiles launched in the sky. If thats the case, are you talking about developing new types of Missile Defense capabilities . We address this from the standpoint, actually, im not overly fond of the word preemptive, really from a selfdefense perspective. Meaning, if we believe they are very close to developing this capability which can threaten us , it is important for us to develop the capability to defend ourselves which could theoretically take out launch capabilities on the launchpad or take them out once they are launched. Certainly that is a part of that. The Missile Defense capabilities that actually will be deployed in the region on our u. S. Navy ships are part of that as well as the Japanese Selfdefense force in the maritime selfdefense force. We also urge the continuing evolution of those regional selfdefense capabilities to neutralize that, but it is to prevent that threat from actually being effective either before its launched or after its launched. We are very clear in the report that certainly could include attacks in north korea. There is a handrail at the second table. Yes, sir. Gilbert from the forum. My question is, there there hasnt been a word mentioned about russia and no mention of china with its weak implementation of the march 2 un agreement. If russia and china are not involved in these actions, what besides defense and deterrence is intended to make it clear to them that the u. S. Takes the situation very seriously . Are there further steps expected . The Un Resolution that we have alluded to in one of the pillars of our report in terms of forcing it strictly was voted on and four by russia. We mention russia throughout the report. They are part of the five party talks and we recommend they are part of the Six Party Talks if north korea joins. We made it clear that russia has to be part of this and its clear that was the feeling of the panel. I dont think anybody has any questions about that. Can we also say a word on u. S. Sanctions policy . Its often said that the policy ought to be integrated into the broader leverage of american power. I commend to you on the contribution to the task force and it was very clear that it would be enforced strictly, which china signed on to, and we hope they sign onto with that. If they dont, the standing regional mechanism that can enforce what we are obliged to do under un obligation is important. There are also other sanctions to this policy. This is an area where u. S. And chinese interests overlap, in shutting down north koreas network of illegal and destabilizing activities. It happens in china and Southeast Asia and it confronts our allies in the region. These are areas where we should devote considerable attention to try to get on the right side of this. Lastly, we need to be prepared to enforce or exert, put in place new unilateral sanctions. If necessary these are steps that the United States will take they dont faces tough restrictions as around dozen thats not acceptable. We need to increase the pressure in order to get them to come to the table. It may seemed like its just simple. This is a great example of the sanctioned world which we thought we knew something about in 2006 and 2007. We are at a we are at a level now we couldnt even imagine back then. The same is true with the 2270 sanctions. These are enormously complex. There are countries in the world addressed in the report who are ignoring the sanctions but the physical aspect of sanctioning and keeping this material out work from flowing out of a country like north korea, particularly on the chinese border where china has not been as active as we would like them to be in enforcement of these sanctions, even though they signed up for it when the un voted on. Back against the wall, the gentleman had his hand up for a while. Im jonathan from brookings. My query is more in the context, not to fault the council but this is either the fourth or fifth study group that the council has undertaken related to north korea over a number of years. Obviously this is a problem that alludes easy solution. My query is this, i want you to connect the dots if you can. Its already been alluded to the fact that its not a change of regime goal and yet when i think about what in essence the study group is urging north korea to do, the only way i can conceive of this is either the end of the regime as we know it or a transformation in the internal structure of the regime and leadership that is almost unimaginable in a dynasty that is almost 70 years standing. Is it appropriate therefore to pose the issue of whether not by design in the report but the ultimate outcome you presume the end of north korea as we know it . Thank you for that question. I just mentioned that when i was asked to start this project, the first book that i picked up was no exit. You also mentioned there had been Previous Task force reports, many of which have done some serious work. I want to reemphasize that flexibility in the consideration and dedication of our task force were remarkably engaged, remarkably unified in the need for progressive and serious report. We think this is an important case study for how u. S. Policy ought to be made. With respect to regime change, the position of the report is that we do not take steps to intentionally cause the collapse of the regime which is most likely to occur for internal reasons. That having been said, if this new ultimatum, this new proposal isnt sufficient and they can tune you to defy their un obligations and dont make progress on the steps, the next president ial administration will have to take a serious look at that. We have to look at policy review and that includes questions that do undermine the viability of the regime. As mike said, its not permissible to allow the north korean regime to exist that