Transcripts For CSPAN2 North Korea Nuclear Program 20170609

CSPAN2 North Korea Nuclear Program June 9, 2017

So thank you all for sticking around for our panel and im sure it comes as no surprise that we would be discussing north korea today given the increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula and the north korean policy review. That President Trump has just completed. sover north korea watchers, when he 17 has been an interesting year. The President Trump decided to review policy for north korea shortly after his inauguration and he came back with a policy that emphasizes maximum pressure and engagement but there has been signals on what exactly the United States let me looking for from north korea before entering into negotiations. South korea also has a new president. He has expressed an interest in talking to the North Koreans but again, under what conditions still remains somewhat an openended question and of course in north korea weve seen a number of Ballistic Missile tests already in 2017 including some new systems. And all of this is leading up to the summit that trump and moon j in will hold in washington dc later this month so to help make sense of all these developments, i am fortunate to have with us today Michael Ellman and suzanne dimaggio. Going to start today with mike ellerman, mike is a senior fellow for missiledefense and astute for International Studies area he has spent some time at Allen Hamilton and spent time working on cooperative threatreduction programs and i would be remiss if i didnt add he has written several excellent pieces for arms control today. I would encourage you to look at. And his full bio is available in your program. Then we move on to suzanne dimaggio, suzanne is a senior fellow at the new america vision, he has years of experience working on diplomatic initiatives on a range of issues including nonpercolation and International Security with countries like north korea. Shes at the society and she is most recently in pyongyang in february and she has been with the North Koreans this past month to open dialogue. I will turn it over to mike to get the discussion started. Great, thank you chelsea and thank you to the Arms Control Association for the opportunity to speak here today. Im going to try to keep my comments as brief as possible and kelsey has agreed to kick me if i go over my time. It would be good entertainment for tv, anyway. So i want to focus on making three essential points instead of kind of rehashing the different systems and such that north korea is currently developing and i want to highlight them for a reason and i hope this comes out at the end. One, we seen this new pattern of missile testing under the regime of kim jongun. His grandfather, under his reign from 1984 to 1994, i know he began before 1984 but they started missile testing in 1984. He conducted a total of i think it was 15 tests or about 1 and a half missile tests. Kim jong il under his reign there were 16 or so tests which includes a few satellite launch attempts but they came in clusters. In 1998, you saw that typo nonone and in 2006 the thai food onto along with another number of others fired in a single day and in 2009 you saw a cluster of testing. In both instances this would be inconsistent with testing to develop new systems, even though they were attempting to develop the satellite launch as it turns out to be. But its seems that the rationale for testing was to train troops, to create operational readiness and for political purposes. Especially the july 2006 testing. Under kim jongun, weve seen this rampup of testing. Hes now done at last count 78 missile launches. There may have been more that failed, i dont know but i think the number is right around there. At 13 or 15 tests per year. Thats consistent with a Missile Development program. Compare that to say what iran is doing. Ran on average test read five missiles a year, they make minor modifications and test them out. They use them in wargames. That is far less and its not enough testing to develop a new capability in the short period of time and when i say a short period im talking 3 to 5 years. So its clear to me and what weve seen is a number of new systems emerge and ill talk about them in a moment but what is clear is north korea is trying to create new capabilities and theyre going about it in a reasonably technically valid way. The second point i want to make is that weve seen north korea move bond the legacy skype technology. All the missiles up until kim jongun came to power were basically powered by either the start or note on engine. It includes the space launcher, which we use is no dominance gun technology. You can see it resulted in a very large system that could in principle be converted into an icbm. It would still have to be tested as an icbm to prove it as a missile but also to validate the reentry technologies. And warhead survivability. This would be an immobile missile, launched from a fixed site. It would be vulnerable to preemption. You would probably have fewer number in preparation time on the order of days, not ours. In 2016, weve seen the emergence of three new Propulsion Systems and i think this is very important. One, weve seen the most it on, this is a very different engine, much more sophisticated than the scud note on technology. Its derived from the old soviet era post27 four fs six technology, its a retired system now but it appears that north korea was able to import the engines at least if not more technology. All this technology by the way comes from either the mccabe or this i have designed euros. Mccabe is the builder of russias summary launch missiles, they make the engines for i think almost every mckay of missile. And they had a very close working relationship so off until a few months ago, i thought that was the primary Procurement Network were north korea. With this new engine that we see in the moose it on, even though that missile has failed a number of times i think its out of 60 launches its had one apparent success and one partial success. It uses a different type, Higher Energy fuel, its a more sophisticated engine. With that type of technology, you can now building principal a road mobile icbm. And the presumption has been that the musudan engines would be the main have not been tested but theyve been paraded by the North Koreans. Weve seen, and this is very puzzling to me. I still havent quite been able tofigure out exactly what an engine this is , in the september of last year, they did a ground test of a what they called an 80 ton thrust engine. Statements that came out after the test were that it was destined for use on a satellite launcher. And then earlier this year, i think it was in march , they tested the same engine but they attached for steering or premier engines to it that operate in parallel. And they adjusted that this would be used for a new capability and they basically said be prepared and lo and behold, two weeks ago they tested the host on 12, an intermediate range system. It flew to a very High Altitude of i think it was 22, 2100 kilometers but only about 500 kilometers range. If flowing on a standard trajectory, this missile could reach ranges of 4000 to 4500 kilometers. In other words, its a real intermediate range missile. Its not clear if that was the first test launch of this particular missile. There may have been one or two that occurred before the failed, its uncertain that this point. Mostly because the intelligence agencies around the world have been less than forthcoming for us poor souls that rely on open source footage. We will talk about why this new missile is really important along with musudan but we see north korea expand the on current technologies, we seen them employ solid propellant motors for the the new land mobile system launched out of a canister on a track vehicle. I think theyre in the first steps of mastering the production of solid propellant but i believe it indigenously produced. It was probably designed locally. It is not a copy of any known system, although it shares central features of all firstgeneration summary launch missiles but its two stages, its about 1 and a half meters in diameter,about nine meters long , there are technical reasons why you come to that design solution so i dont think they copied this from anyone but its a worrying trend that since they masterfully the solid propellant technologies, they can make any missile of any size and any range that they want in the future. It will just take a lot of time and ill discuss that a bit ontimelines for an icbm. This hs 12 , the engine that powers it, its a little unclear to me. Its certainly not from the Design Bureau or ks. It appears to be consistent with the rd 250 engine that was developed by cusco, thats another russian concern. Its now called an air demarche. Its thepremier engine manufacturer for space launch vehicles in russia. This engine was used for a number of medium lift space launch vehicles but also for the r 36 so i think he called it the ss nine icbm. Which was produced in of all places the ukraine back when they were part of the soviet union. This means that north korea probably has an expanded network for illicit procurement. This is really worrying to me for two reasons. One, this engine in particular could be the basis for an icbm but two, we now know they probably have expanded their procurement capacity beyond macao. Therefore we dont know how large it is anymore, we dont know when else they may have so predicting what systems they could develop in the near term is now complicated by this diverse location of sources of technology. The other thing i would note is that because hs 12 is a new system and its important, the outrage that we always associated with any missile launch, i think we need to stop or start looking at those launches which are most consequential versus those that are just kind of standard and politically oriented. I dont worry if a test a new scott or a scott or an ode on type system. I do worry and i think its important when they test musudan or this 12. I would preserve my Political Capital to express sanctions or other punitive measures or preventative measures and reserve those for the missiles that matter like hs 12, like musudan. Those are moreimportant and even satellite launches. I think we should rethink how we express our concerns about what north korea is doing. I want to wrap up with timelines or an icbm because thats what everyone seems to be interested in these days. Its always challenging to forecast the future. A lot of things can change area but if they wanted a nearterm solution meaning something that would be operationally viable at the end of 2018, 2019, they could try to transform the satellite launcher into an icbm. It have to release the upper stages with something they tested and then validate the design as well as the new technology so you could see something for what i call emergency use probably 2019 or so. In a more practical approach would be to use either the loss on 12 or musudan engines to create a mobile icbm. They need to continue testing and more fully develop the intermediate range capability but with a few more successful flights of the loss on 12 i think from a technical perspective they could move towards icbm testing. When they could create that capacity and operationalize it depends on what the requirements of north korea proposes on their systems, how reliable doesnt need to be . 50 percent, 75 percent, 95 percent like the us or russian systems. Thats an open question. Thats why its difficult to project a timeline with any real fidelity but assuming they want something thats at least as reliable thats successful most of the time, you can define most asyou wish , but i think you would see at least a dozen flight tests, 75 percent of them being successful. Then they would be operationally viable in my view, granted it would be under a relaxed criteria. That could occur in 2020 the earliest, 2021 is a more likely date assuming everything went well for them. You could stretch out even further. It might be good for emergency use if they were being attacked by 2020. The third option they have is to use this new solid propellant technology. Its one thing to make solid rocket motors the size that you see in the k 11 or pukguksong one or two but its another thing to build a 25, 30 ton rocket motor for a first stage or icbm. Typically it takes countries 5 to 12 years to move from the size you see in the k and 11 to an icbm size. So its a longterm project that north korea would have to embark upon to create an icbm based on solid technologies. Therefore, i would be very surprised if they had something that was operational by 2025. I think the more likely date would be 2030. It will result in a lot of embarrassing mistakes. Such is the future of Missile Development, we seen it with blue son so i think that will be a longterm project. Most likely in viable systems, this is based on either the musudan or hs 12 technology. They said that we could see that as a, the next president takes positive steps after 2020, if not from its someone else. So i will conclude their and leave room for questions, comments, outrage, whatevers back you might. Those of you in suspense in the back, we had it on time. Now to talk about how we might be able to address the rising tension and to think about the options for engagement going forward, im going to send it over to you. First let me extend my thanks to the Arms Control Association. To kelsey, kingston, everyone. Its such an Important Organization at this moment. Maybe more important than ever and if you are supporting them, urge you to do so. Thats my pitch and let me focus. I want to focus first on mostly the policy options for the us. The administration now has completed its policy review and for all intents and purposes it seems like it was a fairly cohesive interagency review. It declared that the end of dictation is over. I think an actual funeral was held here in washington. And that a policy of maximum pressure and engagement was replacing it. Frankly to me it still seems very unclear if this new policy is really much different from the old policy or if its just, theyve been given a new wardrobe. That being said, there appears to be several key elements to this policy as far as i can see, one is that it puts back on the table all options, including military action. More aggressive action. For example, just today we know that there are naval maneuvers happening in the area of north korea and so for the first time in two decades it includes two us aircraft carriers. Also, the joint rok us military exercise that just happened in april included navy seals and special teams that reportedly was focused on socalled decapitation exercises. So this does seem like a little bit of a ratcheting up on that side of the equation. During his visit to the nation in march, secretary tillersons statement hinted at the possibility of a preemptive strike. He also stated that all options are on the table when questioned about a military option, opening a door to the idea of preventive war. The problem with this approach as we rely on it exclusively is that when you threaten the use of force, you have to be prepared to use it. Its a major risk, the fact that we do not know how the North Koreans would retaliate , we would imagine that they would respond in one way, shape or form and that could escalate. It could inflict mass casualties. Severe damage to our allies, south korea as well as to our other ally japan. And potentially to us forces that are based in the region. And this leads out the question how would beijing react . It could be to regional war, fullscale war. We all know there is really no military solution to the north korea issue and i feel very strongly about that. Secondly elements i see is a greater reliance on china to mount more pressure against north korea, at least rhetorically. China of course is pyongyangs biggest trading partner, last year i think 90 percent of the total trade came from, was china including most of north koreas food and Energy Supply so it is a very unique position. I think today the Un Security Council is considering a new resolution, additional sanctions. While japan, south korea and the us are pushing for more sanctions area it seems china is resisting and is instead pushing for dialogue and an emergency meeting of the un sc. That happened last weekend is continuing today. President trump recently tweeted that china is trying hard to reign in north korea and the us envoy to the us nikki haley stated beijing is using a back channel to try to stop the dpr k from testing. This indicates, this is worrisome to me because it indicates do they not have direct channels . Youve heard rumors of worsening relationships between the fact that kim jongun since hes gained power has not visited beijing. Hes not met the chinese president so we really have to question whether or not a reliance on china to help solve this issue is a wise approach. Im very skeptical about it and of course chinas National Interests are not necessarily aligned with ours. When it comes to north korea, we could go through a whole litany of things, everything from a fear that the downfall could lead to a massive refugee influx. A collapse could allow us troops to have direct access to the chinese border and of course the recent implementation of that. Thats threatening to the chinese. The third element of this new policy i see is an emphasis on more sanctions. President obama, his administration also focused on sanctions as well so its not necessarily new. The fact is that this approach hasnt worked so far. In fact, i would argue as was outlined in the previous presentation, as we layered on more sanctions, weve seen them steadily accelerating the progress on the Nuclear Missile program. There was a study done by researchers recently at mit that found us sanctions imposed against north korea have been largely unsuccessful at curbing the countrys illicit procurement because in part north korea has been able to adapt area theres a growing capacity to work around sanctions. So could sanctions and pressure on north korea alone resolve a Nuclear Issue . Very unlikely. I think even if we look at the case of iran, extensive san

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