Good morning everybody. Thank you for being here today and jim miller president and ive had involvement with Missile Defense over a number of decades. Starting on capitol Hill Services committee in the late 80s and early 90s. And continuing on through my time including undersecretary defense of the obama ministration. We have a great panel here today. Youve already met some jericho who is senior fellow here in International Security program at csis. Tom will talk about in particular his important missiledefense next steps. Doctor greco, thank you for being here today as well. Scientists in the Senior Security program. Also support we will. Guest that and a number of other issues i think. Our third panelist today Major General retired ron. Director strategy plans and policy for norad. Then also has up several commands for an air defense and at one point was director of tests for the Missile Defense agency as well. It is a great group. I want to thank you general especially for coming today and for i just want to say a couple of words and we will turn to the panelists. Indeed as mentioned earlier by senator sullivan, the Trump Administration is picking up a major review of muscle defense posture and policy. If we go back to the 2010 missiledefense review conducted by the last administration i think it is notable that it placed the defense of yours homeland as the number one priority for Missile Defense. Our allies and partners can contribute to missiledefense for defense of their own key assets and population to support our deployed forces. No one else can do the job or should do the job of defending the United States for us. It also made clear the prior review of the Obama Administration that all missiledefense system is aimed at north korea and iran and that is not intended to affect strategic instability with russia or china. One of the recommendations in toms report would say, they shipped that focus a little bit and include the ability to engage listed missiles in very limited numbers russia and china and we will talk about that issue and potential implications. But clearly as we talk about this the driving consideration is north koreas continued missile testing the continued efforts on the Nuclear Program and reality that while north korea poses an uncertain threat to the us today, it does pose a threat today and it is likely to grow in the coming months and years. Missile defense is not the only part of the us approach the problem but it is a fundamental part. Currently, a lot of improvements under way in the system. And we give credit to and for the modified kill vehicle for improvements to command and control and sensors as well. A lot of work underway. One of the questions we want to discuss is whether the case is appropriate on the qualitative side and if there any places that we missed period of quest we want to chip discuss as we get to the panel whether we should be looking today to grow the system beyond that current 44 groundbased interceptors that are deployed and that we would like ready for operations as necessary. These will be among the issues we discussed. It will be among the issues that the new Administration Defense will have to discuss and i think will get a good start today. Well start with tom. All right well good morning. I am thomas karako. I would also like to thank jim and the other panelists for joining and also thanks sullivan for coming out this morning. As jim mentioned i will give an overview. A report of missiledefense 2020. And on the basis that the nda and president ial the administration will be looking at missiledefense policy, pasta and strategy. And also by explicit president ial direction. The relative balance between homeland and regional. And you know, every month or so north korea lately seems to be doing something new in terms of missile development. And there are other new threats out there as well. I think that given the circumstances we find ourselves in, i would not be surprised to see a relative rebalancing in the near term in favor of homeland. At least relative to where we have been in recent years. And we kind of hope this report will layout options. Kind of a roadmap for how one might do that. Before i get started i want to acknowledge a couple of folks including my coauthors, ian williams and wes rumbaugh who are both here. We put a lot of work into this effort. And i want to thank the many smart people in and out of government who let us spend their air it has been going on for a while. Also for those root who kindly gave us their time and finally to the csis ideas lab. Particularly carolyn who put together some great graphics to help us communicate some of this stuff. Let me say that, you know one of the reasons we wanted to put this report together, i think that the conversational homeland Missile Defense remain unfortunately too polarized and misinformed. It is understandable it is hard to keep track of all of the different kinds of kill vehicles and all the Different Things in development. Gb eye has its own rules as well. It is one of our secondary purposes here. And to serve as a compilation and a guide for the perplexed on the complexity. Bring things together in one place. But i think the problem with how this is frequently discussed runs a little deeper. Including with a lot of historical baggage. Unfortunately it tends to confuse the debate. And i think with respect to homeland Missile Defense in particular, the discussion is too frequently divided between on the one hand cheerleaders, who do not think take sufficient account of the difficulties of some of the things. And on the other side, kind of folks slithering or deriding. I think that both a better understanding of the past and the Current Program of record might help mollify some of that. So we tried to do three things. A reference guide of where things have been. Secondly benefits of a lot of those. And third make some of our own findings and recommendations. So as not to take the lead i will just add think the Current Program the gmd and related systems in a range of reliability, capability and capacity improvements relative to where we are today. And as well as think some policy and budgetary adjustments would be in order in the forthcoming mdr. There has been a lot of backandforth policy wise and problematic wise over the last 20 years or so. In the report we deliberately try to highlight and emphasize the continuity. On the one hand there strategic continuity but also the programmatic continuity. On the strategic side i think, go back and read president clintons speech in 2000. The one where he said he was not going to decide to deploy national Missile Defense. Then look at the speech of president george w. Bush gave in 2001. Announcing withdrawal from the and not in terms of the exact assessment of that readiness but in terms of the strategic rationale. The idea of being very simply that we are not unwilling to accept complete vulnerability to certain kinds of threats. We are unwilling to really accept and rest deterrence value with respect to certain kinds of actors like north korea. And on the programmatic side i think appreciating the lineage and evolution of todays program is also important. Looking at really the roots of gmd and nmd. I think one can really appreciate some of the real ability issues of ek bees and silos today. If you dont appreciate that in many respects theres delete event prototype design put together in the 90s under abm treaty restrictions. And furthermore the 2002 decision to have a limited defense capability in two years with little choice but to embrace a kill vehicle still under development. Furthermore, to adopt a lot of legacy cold war systems that had not been designed for this in short order and put them to use. So ever since then we are still i think kind of waiting. A true design turn on the kill vehicle. But instead of it being life extending the program in different ways. I think the conversations are a result of some of these things suffer from a weird dynamic. A old dichotomy. That regional missiledefense is good and effective but homeland missiledefense is bad. And the perception extends beyond the particular systems to the mission itself. Regional missiledefense is effective so goes the argument. You can take it as an article of faith that homeland Missile Defense is impossible. Ill send the other side that the cheerleaders who do not acknowledge some of the issues out there, do not do the issue justice either. So we tried to be fair and candid in both directions. Means we get criticized from both sides. I will just say there are 11 shortcomings. But i think that the path forward, you heard that about that this morning and jim mentioned just now about the rkv really is a good one and especially it begins to, the dichotomy i mentioned is important. Because the path will leverage a lot of that testing and Development Taking place in original system and applying it forward. So that commonalities between the atmospheric kill vehicle on one side and the atmospheric kill vehicle on the other side. Let me start to walk through a little bit of this. Jim mentioned the bmdr. This is just a general view. It will be taking place with nsm as well as an ekv. But this is the historical emphasis between homeland and regional really going back to 1999. Those fluctuated a lot. There was a big surge especially for the Capital Investments for the deployment back in 2002. And but its not just the gmd its kind of the overall emphasis. And in a Historical Perspective this is i think senator sullivan mentioned this is all relative modesty in terms of the number of interceptors we are talking about. If you look on the far right that is 2017. That will be in the ground by the end of this year. Compare that for instance to the clinton administration. Three phases of the clinton administration. 100 to 250. Before that the g pals whose job it was to go after limited threat of 10 to 100 rvs. And after that, the sdi phase 1 safeguard an sentinel and that sort of thing. But in the overall context, i think you see that modesty. Sorry i keep looking for the keyboard down here. The other context here is a legislative environment. And this past Year Congress went back and updated the 1999 national missiledefense act which was 17 years old. If you acronyms were in there. First but we dont talk about national Missile Defense anymore in so many words. And this is talking future tense about you know we ought to deploy and we have done that. And i think congress correctly has gone in and updated this. I think unfortunately, there has been a lot of hyperventilating about the update. That is my way of thinking proves that schools do not teach a sentence programming anymore. All the focus has been on the adjectives which are limited. But no one i think has sufficiently appreciated is a complete sentence. And that the subjects and objects of defense in that sentence have changed. It is no longer about really national missiledefense territory but also as you can read, allies and forces. And, you know, the word may not apply in the same movies to think about this in 1999 or in sort of the g pals kind of context. I actually think you take a look at these adjectives and compare them to the 2010 bmdr and theres a lot of continuity. If you go back we see a surge from in the 2004 timeframe but just within the past 10 years, as we heard about from this morning and i hope you can hear. This is specifically the homeland element that we have broken out. This is kind of a fallen tree graph. Those are the five dems as well as actual spending as we heard this morning. 24 percent decline over the past decade. For the top line but then some deeper cuts for, and here we will go a little deeper now into gmd. And these are components of gmd. Lets go down and defined this. I can say about 50 graphs in the book. They all kind of look like that. Now let me, the keyboard again. Let me walk through the chapter and intercepted development and a chapter on sensors and that sort of thing. Im going to go through a little bit of this. Let me just prepare the long view of interceptors, the lineage really where we are today. One limitation of the gbi fleet today is, a lot of different kind of interceptors going on. It is also the case and you can look at here you have c1, c2s. And relative friendly to other deployed systems today. Unfortunately the c twos dont have ondemand communication to the ground for instance. The e kvs of today. There is also unfortunately shortcoming of the three stage booster. That the intention to go out and get a twostage booster was never done. They were looking for a selectable way to get at that flexibility. What it basically means is you are not able to buy more time and fire later. You have to fire sooner because all three stages have to burn out before the kill vehicle can be released. And especially if you are operating from alaska. That is going to limit you. Let me also move now to the mdas three stages. And the categories, what it really is, this year being the 44 gbis in the ground, the c twos and dd block ones. The centerpiece really the r kv. We will talk a little more about, although our kv is not a dramatic departure it is that kind of design turn and in some ways it should have happened is decade ago. But it never did. The good news is that theyre not starting from scratch. Theyre going back to leveraging a lot of the parallel of this been going into other programs but the idea is to make things far simpler, more module are cheaper and have fewer points of failure. These are the kinds of reliability issues. And also the rkv will reduce the kind of diversity in the fleet. It just shows in a chart how many different types are in the fleet. And a lot of discrimination algorithms have been floating around and draw upon all of that. So its not going to be starting from scratch. Then further on the future the advanced section is the mlkv which is far behind in relative where the plan was. Multiple kill vehicles atop a single booster to compensate for some of the discrimination challenges and really improve your capacity. Unfortunately the timeline for that is currently 2021 . Pretty far out to the right in terms of that. This chart right here is actually kind of the centerpiece of whats going on and what the agency currently plans. We call this the skittles chart. You can taste the rainbow and see a lot of different muscle movements of whats happening there. The green at the bottom is a c1. That was put back in 2004, the red is the ce2. And then the blue is a ce2 plus and orange, Pay Attention to the orange that is the rkv. Testing in 2018 and potentially deployed in 2020. Now, as i said this is the best snapshot of whats going on. What is intended to be going on. We would point out a couple of shortfalls. One is what is likely currently to be a big gap between things that will be put in place this year, the 44 by 17. After that we are going to presumably wait. Sit and wait. Until the rkv comes around. That could have caused later on. It could especially if rkv goes to the right. It can kind of retard some of the efforts to increase capacity in the near term. And it might unfortunately hurt rkv later on. A second limitation is that as we heard earlier, notwithstanding a recommendation in 2013, by the department of defense, to go out by some operational and test, that was not done. After get to 44 we will go down. Every time we test something that we have to pull it out of the ground to test it is wellness operational. That starts to adamantly begin to get the next generation. That is the current picture and that is why think is one of the simple reasons why you are here and folks are talking about the importance of capacity. Instead of going down, we go down i think by at least four, if not more. Just in the next couple of years. And then before rkv comes online. Again, the schedule you are hearing 2024 rkv and it may be too ambitious. And if it is too ambitious it could be more important. In the third limit is unfortunately, mda i think is planning to put the rkv on some of the oldest boosters. And that perhaps for cost and it might reduce some of their effectiveness. All right, lets talk into testing. Im sure well have a little discussion about this right now. I want to walk especially through, forcible dust and is as of the testing budget. There is some reason good reason why the testing budget has gone down so much. They had to go back past 2010 and figure out, take apart the e kv, find out some of the problems and put it back together again. And so some of this is one of the overall top line reduction pressure and some of it has to do with that choice. But i think there really is the case, this is one of those, probably maybe the best instance of a mischaracterization of the testing record of gmd overall is with the test. With maybe that one exception that i mentioned. That they went back and had to fix the i u. This is not hightechnology. One of these failures is because of a silo cover not opening. In the missile not coming out. You know . That is a sort of thing that, its not about the kill vehicle is about the kind of difficulty. So i think mda has the past couple of years, been much more forthright about articulating some of these failures and the true cause of them. So sensors, you know, no Missile Defense system is better than the sensors that tell it where to go and what to kill. And we have what we call the mother of all testing charts in here. That not only kind of go through the full 31 flight intercept tests and what became of them. The failure, explanations and things like that. But also what sensors want involved. And you really see some of the late 1990s, to where we are today are pretty consistent with an increase as more early running raters are stitched in. As aegis and other things are brought in. You see a lot more of that. And that i think is a good thing. There is probably a lot more to do on the sensor side. Probably the single most important thing that we recommend on the sensor set is a spacebased probably infrared tracking and information sensors. Get the field of view from which you can inform not only gmd, but all of these other programs as well. Overall, you know, vice admiral searing has characterized the test record. As a kind of, nothing you wouldnt expect from a