The postcold war era, despite all of the headlines about it, unpleasant news, has been the most prosperous and the most stable in World History. And the basis of that has been peace in europe. The two greatest worlds that the wars in World History began in europe. And establishing nato shortly after world war ii provided the basis for building a global stability system, and that was a path to global prosperity. Im telling you this because our interests are in maintaining that. That is the vital interest of every american. And right now we have the worlds second greatest military power with one of the Worlds Largest economies changing borders in europe by force. Explicitly saying he wants to upend that security order. That is a vital threat to our interests. And part of the confusion in washington and globally on this is because we have a president who claimed that the crisis in europe was a regional crisis. He just didnt get it. Now, one of the reasons he didnt get it is because his predecessor had us engaging in the middle east in ways were beyond our capacity. In that way im sympathetic, that we can do everything we might want to do. But we have a vital interest in stopping putin in europe. So i think the next president should have a different policy than the current president. Also, this objective of ours to deter putin to stop them in ukraine in which is the current battleground, is very much within our capacity. We and the eu together Something Like gdp 17 times that of russia. We remain by far the worlds leading military power. We have the ability to stop putin in ukraine without involving american troops by using a combination of our economic power, our diplomatic power, and not our military men but our military equipment. So what i would like to see the next president do is say explicitly my job is to reaffirm the Transatlantic Relationship with europe, strengthen nato, help the eu to strengthen itself which is also in americas interest and to stop a power in the plan from upending this world. We do that, a simple Statement Like that will remove most of the power of moscows massive disinformation campaign. American leaders and european leaders are saying what point evidence tells us everyday that is going on in ukraines Donald Boesch is not separatist, its not a civil war, its a horrible war led, finance, staffed and equipped for moscow. Certainly newspapers will begin to get this straight. And with that once we acknowledge that we can develop the policy is relatively modest with her means with the means to stop it and secured the basis of global stability and prosperity. And, one more point, watching originally week west respond to clear aggression only encourages the longerterm danger to the United States which is an economically powerful and militarily china. Who has been pursuing some of its own aims and the south china seas. I think ive said enough. All good policy depends on good analysis, the fundamentals. Weve heard or allusion to great military power, less economic power but still important intentions, not only in this panel at in the previous two panels. But i do want to dwell, before ask you to go into more specifics about exactly how the policy should be where theres more robust containment whether its the titles were given for this panel, i do want to go into the analysis by asking basically three questions simultaneously but all deeply interrelated. So the first question is whether the current dilemma, the current confrontation we have between you in and russia is driven primarily by Vladimir Putin and his global strategy for, as general breedlove said, or become, recognized as a major world powe power or what is powr what is the dimension and and i was shocked at the size myself, i did into question earlier, his need for political survival. Existential threat that democracy, the west so the question is, is a driven primary by Vladimir Putin and the circle around him and his agenda, their agenda, or is it a driven primary by mistake in u. S. And european policies doing during either or both the Obama Administration as several speakers have said, or the bush 43 administration as other speakers have mentioned . This of course includes nato expansion some of the other things, support for the color revolutions. These two questions of course raise the question of what the lessons of history and what the consideration of grand strategy as you put it will an archive of folk recession, how these play into. These are the three questions of an analytical sort for which i ask you to come back and spell out in greater detail the policies that you outlined already, all for someone to figure out what it did and i will come back to ask you for the first 100 days, if anything special is to be done than. So we went in what order to do good the first time . We just ended im going to mix it up. Evelyn first. All right. Then will, and then john because john just had the last word the second time. So i think its important to understand what or a lease for me i have to first start with what i determined objectives. Its the group around you never wanted to keep them in power, to keep themselves in power. Number two is a sort of been touched upon, to ensure that russia is regard and is indeed playing a role as a great power equal to all the other great powers of the world. Number three which is related to one into is that this gremlin that building is against regime change. Hes against it because it touches on number one, his desire to stay in power, and his perception rightly or wrongly that america and the west is actually interested in seeing his regime change which, of course, can become a self fulfilling prophecy if they continue along the road that hes on. But is also related to wanted to demonstrate that russia is a great power which we see point out in the context of syria. So those are the objectives of the kremlin and i think that its always important to bear in mind. The Foreign Policy the kremlin is now advancing is also a reaction to the fact that kremlin no longer deliver on the economic deal that he made with the people when he came to power first in 2000. Hes now switch forces to the nationalist force. Is going to make the russian people feel good about being part of the federation based on making russia great again. And that means that what it is essential if this isnt 19 such a perspective on russias role in europe in particular, europe and central asia so with regard to his periphery, that clashes drug with what our perspective is with regard to russias role in the international system. Because the kremlin sees that the countries in particular around its periphery did not have a full sovereignty, that have limited sovereignty, that the government has right to exercise control over those territories indirectly or directly but primarily indirectly politically, economically but also with force. From our perspective we believe that sovereign states not only have the right to defend their territories but that the people within the sovereign states have the right to determine their government and if youd like to be democratic and determine their own futures, their institutional affiliations, we support that. That is a value that we hold dear and runs into direct conflict with the criminal. I think thats at the root of whats going on, and ill stop there. Thank you. I dont have a brief for putin or his aggressive actions, but i think the question is is that what is driving are not driving . I think, you know, it takes two to tango. I think we have to acknowledge that thereve been actions on both sides that are not made the relationship what it needs to be or could be. And so i think we have to acknowledge that our behavior in the postcold war era in support of that and no one less than general breedlove wrestler lives as long as his arm of things that we did that provoked the security dilemma inside of russia and caused them to do for themselves. This is a country that has been invaded multiple times in which most recently happened in the lives of people still alive and russia, that is a reality i dont think we should ignore come and americans again, the cold war for most americans is ancient history but the experience of world war ii is not for russia. Something we have to be careful. I want to kind of talk about the beginning of the end of the cold war. George h. W. Bush. He was pressured by staffers at one point to go to berlin as the wall was falling, and he said so that the gross portrait he said what would i do if i went to berlin . Dance on the wall . We not only danced on the wall but we danced over the wall and we danced right up to the reporter. I think we need to kind of go back to the kind of wisdom of h. W. , which is to kind of understand how these engagements, how these even choices by other states are going to affect us and to really try to calibrate or effect them to try to calibrate properly so that we are focused on achieving things that are positive. I think there are positive ways to heal relationship and that would be good for both of us. Again, so for example, evelyn talked about letting other countries choose to institutional affiliations. That sounds great and i think thats a good ideal, but that doesnt, we could also choose our affiliations. So, for example, with ukraine or georgia or other countries that i want to join nato we have to ask is that good for our safety . Its not a club that has open membership. Its a club that the club should decide who gets to be in and we should think again about what might be the consequences of this is policy. Dont extend and it appeared we are still in analytical face. John, the question is a primarily putin driven, primarily mistakes of the u. S. And perspective history, the causality of present the limit and the underlying factors before you can make policy . I recommend to everyone in this room to read the end of the bar empire, a book about the last year or two of the soviet union. The reason why is that in talks between russians and ukrainians in late 1990, early 1991, you have the most liberal russians weve seen in the past generation or two generations, or for that matter centuries to yeltsin and gorbachev both telling them the leader of ukraine that if you decide of a referendum and be independent of us, we will have to worry about protecting our russians, not just our russians in ukraine but our russian speakers. Thats point number one. Telling do a certain phenomenon we see today which are the precondition for criminal aggression whether among liberal russians in 19901991. Second data point, nato expansion as the conversation not a reality was not taking place in 1991 and 1992. If you look back and see what soviet union imploded, that within weeks or days actually of the demise of the soviet union, you had frozen conflicts. Now, the frozen conflict model is a model of criminal aggression today. It predates nato enlargement. Will okay, data. 3, cry me. Wended russia take crimea . At the end of the 18th century. Question, wended russia take eastern poland . Central pole . At the end of the 18th century. I dont think its unreasonable to ask the question if we did not enlarge nato would the front today between russia and the west be in warsaw or in kiev . I agree with will that the russians do not like nato enlargement is that i dont disagree that this place upon traditional russians historical sensitivities but the same nation that combines of being invaded multiple times is that same nation that has invaded other countries more than multiple times. And even someone whos contemplation we disposed of putin right now, henry kissinger, has said that Russian Security is contingent upon insecurity of its neighbors. Is that an acceptable solution for us . Is not acceptable for us . I dont have any doubt that poland being and nato, a strong member, is very much in our National Interests. So i think that even if you have questions about nato enlargement in the 90s you have to say it probably makes sense. The reason why it probably makes sense is because those internal russian tendencies which were supercharged in soviet times never died. And we see the Imperial Russian tendencies today and those are very much not in americas interests. Judy. Well, i agree with what john has said. And i dont buy the argument that what we are seeing for putin today is because of quote mistake in u. S. Or european policies. I dont think you are mistaken policies. I think they are policies as john said that are in the u. S. National interests and their policies we should continue to support. They are in line with our values, and bind with the helsinki final act, in line with most generally accepted principles respect for borders. I mean, russia doesnt agree with it but maybe the only nation in europe that doesnt. So i dont think that we should lower our values or lower the policies that we support because of what russia believes that affect only way we have been mistaken in recent years is not responding strongly enough and russia has acted. I think in those cases ukraine, some of the georgia, those have been mistakes and we havent been strong enough. The problem is if we were to adopt is, im not saying that youre arguing that are in what appeared is but i think it just emboldens putin, emboldens any russian leader to just keep going. How far is it going to go if we changed and we say thats okay, i know russia doesnt like it so maybe we change our policies. In fact, i go in the other direction which is i think in terms of georgia and ukraine, we opted after with a u. S. Policy of never shipped for both of them as soon as we can get it. Because i think thats the way, for though i think its an interest of both of them in the alliance. They both really wanted. Weve always maintained an open door policy but i think it sends a very strong signal as well that this is the path were going to take. Just one of the things i than it expected a local i think john although i think john has answered the. We spent a lot of time during the 90s and into the 2000 working with russia, natorussia council. We have gone over and above what we shouldve had to do to try to make it clear. I remember a discussion and the 90s about russia becoming a member of nato. I mean, we have in so many ways shown that they should not we cant change the perception but we didnt ignored. We took it seriously and would try to bring them along. It clearly didnt work but i dont think that means we should change our policy. Just a footnote of history as we agree to factor in history, the longerterm, remember that when nato, after the iron curtain fell and after russia became the Russian Federation rather than the soviet union and offered a special relationship to russia with nato and they accepted it and there were some significant actual changes in the 1990s. But my roll is not primarily that of historic or commentator. This panel, simply sort of 15 minutes late is now scheduled to go until 2 30 p. M. Will have to leave it to 20 time that. Im saying that because im reserving 30 minutes for the audience comments and discussion. Probably start with general breedlove. All right. Now the third round is, you already all over did to your policies, but in the framework of engagement versus restraint versus containment, id like you to spell out a little bit more, and i also, especially those who have congressional background also to ask the question okay, what kind of policies would congress sustained and agree to . Of the key questions are, please, those of you who, well, everybody advocates renewed engagement in this is general breedlove put out. If we can find areas of common interest when we can get a good deal, of course, but thats an obvious apple pie and motherhood, but if you advocate, i think im addressing this to you because if you are advocating renewed engagement based on the analysis you said, largest advocating restraint but in either case what they want to see, what would you expect to see from the russian side as the response, a positive response or to show the policy is working . In one area should the u. S. Pullback from the wrong things its done in the past . If so, what to be seen as a sign of weakness . And finally, welcome let me stop right there. Im glad you talked about engagement and restraint nothing mutually exclusive because they are not. I think we should be restraint in some areas to make sure that we are not actually creating selffulfilling prophecies for, and a different direction. But i also think that we should be engaged. We should find areas of mutual interest to start to build some of that relationship back, including counterterrorism, counter proliferation efforts on trying to maintain stability that ultimate i think is in both of our interests in the long run. I think we should do that. We have to find ways and the general talked about different kind of lower level discussiodiscussio ns. I think those are helpful and fruitful. I also think that we need to come i think we need to kind of stop talking about russia as, the way would you as a potential superpower. We dont need to rub it in the knows that theyre not anymore but i think we should pop is probably something the American Public this is the cold war again. This is a country that has a fraction of the military power of the United States. They spend about 66 billion. The United States spends about 600 billion. I mean, the population of russia is a lot smaller than United States and europe combined. Our wealthy allies in europe are far superior in terms of the economic capability than russia. So doesnt mean that there are not danger do i do what is that unrealistic given my plea for realism o of have to put in a proper context and that means there are opportunities because they also to acknowledge our interests in that region. And john talked about old europe and the first wave of expansion and the next wave, i think we can be pretty clear about where our vital interest do stand with regards to the current allies versus the issue of expanding further now, these are generalities. I like it to be specific as we discussed on the phone. All these questions we agreed on and sent around. The time to think about it. So what specifically, what pullback, but of the specific actions which have for the next president take what would you expect from the president side . What would you expect specifically . I wouldve quietly and diplomatically but surely take off the table the notion of expanding it to include would be seen as a unilateral concession could would not . How what happens is its a twobarrel question. The shotgun is how would you be seen in moscow . Would be seen as weakness . Look, i think america is a gr