Transcripts For CSPAN2 Tonight From Washington 20130111 : vi

Thank you very much, and thank you very much for everyone showing up this afternoon. Those were very generous comments and i am honored to be here today. At the stimson center, an institution named for and inspired by a man who helps guide the nation through some of the most difficult challenges that we have ever faced. And an organization that i remember calling upon for guidance and assistance on many occasions particularly when i was working for sam nun who i had the pleasure to work with for about 17 years. And i remember spending at the old office north of Dupont Circle many a day talking to bury and mike and the team of experts on proliferation issues, loose nukes, chemical and biological warfare issues. So its a Great Institution and its an honor to come back here. Little did i know two months ago, approximately two months ago when we got together and talked about this, how good stimson was and it really is today i realized how good they are. Two months ago when we picked this date, little did i know that it would be the week afghanistan that a certain president from a certain country would be in town. I remember conversations along the light of oh just going to be a formal gathering. Just a few of us will get together and here i see cspan and that not of a lot of faces i see that i know both in and out of the government. I knew your background but i didnt know how good you were until today. All kidding aside, it is great to be here and talking about what really is a very important subject, no matter what day of the of the weekend wet week of the month or year it is. Henry stimson reminded me a lot of sam nunn. Like henry stimson, sam still does have a long and illustrious career in public surface but stimson did and he approached in the same way sam did and that is in a very classical and nonpartisan manner. I think mr. Simpson, stick secretary stimson were alive today he would be taking the lead with his trademark judicious approach to the issues of afghanistan. He would be studying, he would be analyzing the challenges we now face in afghanistan. Now he probably would speak this week are asked to take on the role of sigar. But i know henry stimson. In all seriousness, the position i was offered back in june as the special and spec or general for afghan reconstruction was both a challenge and an opportunity of a lifetime and its one topic im excited to talk about and im cited to be here this afternoon to talk about her issues. The conflict in afghanistan is quite arguably our foremost foreignpolicy issue and challenge facing us today. The United States has spent more money to rebuild afghanistan than it has been on the reconstruction of any other single nation, including germany, all in world war ii. In fact, we have spent about 28 million every day to rebuild and reconstruct afghanistan. Nearly 90 plus billion we have already appropriated for afghanistan relief and reconstruction is designed to build and strengthen the Afghan National Security Forces, promote selfgovernance and foster Economic Development. It is my job and the job of my nearly 200 auditors, investigators, inspectors and other professional staff to make certain that this money is spent wisely, effectively, efficiently and protected from waste, fraud and abuse. To help you understand the challenges we face at sigar and that my sister inspector inspecr generals face and their role as well is what our country faces in afghanistan, let me start by telling you a little story. A story about one of our inspection laws. In the far north of afghanistan, boring cushy cspan is cut news province. Although initially one of the more peaceful parts of the country, in recent years conduits has seen an increase insurgent activity. It is also the site of a major nato supply run so maintaining security and safety of that province is critical to our National Security interest. In 2008 fortunately the department of defense obligated over 70 million to construct an Afghan National Army Garrison there that would house 1800 Afghan National army troops and their advisers. This was a multibuilding garrison. It was supposed to be completed in june of 2009 at within april 2010, it still was not completed. To make matters worse, the construction had been completed that had been completed had major problems. Roofs were sagging or collapsing because the contractor had used improper welding and priming techniques. Worse yet the sites were constructed on unstable soil and because the contractor did not adequately prepare the site and stabilize the soil and construct its proper foundation, the buildings were collapsed. They were literally sinking into the ground causing structural failure and making them unusable. In 2010, we inspected the sites. We found the province and we told the Defense Department to fix fix it. They promised to do so. However, last year we returned and we found the site in deplorable conditions. Although some structures have been fixed, the underlying problems of the collapsible soil had not. As a result of the soil and stability, buildings had failed, holdings had sunk, holes had developed in more facilities faced the likelihood of structural failure. We saw gaping holes in buildings because of the structural failures, so large you could stick your arm through the sides of the walls of the buildings. The sinkholes were so bad that the transformers and Electrical Systems used to supply power to the facilities were about to collapse. Moreover, even those facilities that didnt have deficiencies were not being used for the intended purpose, or not used at all. Now like to report that the contract is responsible for this problem were held accountable. But that is not the case. Instead, finding time and time again for some inexplicable reason, which they still havent been able to provide an occasion for, the Defense Department released the contractor from all further obligations under the contract, including all warranties to fix all the problems and pay the contractor in full. Now i tell you this story not because i think the reconstruction effort in afghanistan will rise or fall, defeat or fail with what happens in one Army Garrison base in one small province in afghanistan. The reason i am telling you the this story is because its indicative of problems we face and we find time and time and again when we do audits and inspections in afghanistan. And the problems that we found at kunduz are indicative of larger problems and indicative of poor causes of the problems we have found in afghanistan and that is what i want to talk to you about today. Excuse me. These problems, these core issues can be boiled down to five separate but interrelated issues. First inadequate planning, second poor Quality Assurance, third, poor security, fourth, questionable sustainability and lastly, corruption. Lets talk about inadequate planning. We are at risk now of wasting billions of dollars if the agencies charged with implementing new programs and constructing new facilities do not first answer some basic questions. Now i have been in washington for 30 some years. I almost fell off the stage. [laughter] i came from ohio. And maybe i keep this midwestern approach to issues, the basic simple questions that you would ask if you are buying a house, buying a car or trying to lecture your daughter on what school to go to. Simple questions, logical questions. These questions arent being asked or i should say arent being answered in afghanistan. Questions such as are these programs and buildings needed . Have you asked the afghans if they want them . Have you coordinated with any of the other organizations working for either the u. S. Government or the International Community . Have we designed them to meet any specific needs that the afghans have . And have we designed them in such a way that they can be sustainable in the future . Quite often, we find the answers to these questions are no. For example, when we asked the government officials why they had built the garrison in kunduz and how they discern the location and the way it was built, we got blank stares. There was no plan or justification documents that could provide these answers. In fact, as we reported in 2011 and another report, the department of defense did not have a longrange construction plan for its entire 11. 4 billion construction program. Now, just so you dont think were picking on dod, a. I. D. Is no better. As far as we can tell, they have a hard time grasping what they constructed and even where they are located. And i would ask you to go to our web site in the next month or two and you are going to see an interesting audit and the findings i believe are going to be, we are missing a number of buildings that we thought we had dealt in afghanistan. I dont know where they went, but they be they were never built. The second issue that we are facing has to do with Quality Assurance. It is our job at sigar to conduct oversight of the reconstruction effort, but it is also the responsibility of the agencies, the implementing agencies, to monitor the progress and to do the Due Diligence before you turn them over to the afghans government. We are unfortunately finding that agencies often, often fail to fully implement their Quality Assurance programs. Lets go back to the kunduz garrison. We found that Quality Assurance process was virtually nonexistent during the first nine months of the project. The most critical ninemonth. As a result there was no way to verify if improper materials were substituted or if foundations were constructed with any type of Quality Assurance. We have seen this problem in the areas in afghanistan from Development Programs to Capacity Building initiatives to building construction. One of the worst examples unfortunately that we uncovered they have resulted in the loss of american servicemen. That involved a multimillion Dollar Program intended to protect highway culverts from improvised explosive devices. We filed that no Quality Control was done and as i reported recently in a letter i sent to the commanders in the field in an Emergency Management letter, many of the greats were missing. Many of the greats were poorly installed in such a way that they failed to prevent ieds from being put underneath the highways. They have resulted in the death of u. S. Coalition afghan forces. Now this matter is still ongoing and it has grown in scope. I have got to give credit to general allen and many of the military officers who brought this to our attention because they thought it was localized. But we have since found out this may be widespread throughout the country. We dont know what the ultimate resort results are and it has turned into a criminal investigation. The third problem i want to focus on has to do with security and the key issue that we are facing. Because without adequate security, reconstruction either comes to a hault or if it continues, it does so without the necessary oversight. The point in fact we were told the reason there have been no oversight in the first nine months at kunduz was because of the security situation there, that nobody felt it was safe enough to visit the site. This problem is not limited just to the United States. For example we know that the world bank has failed to properly monitor some of its programs such as the Afghanistan Reconstruction trust fund, because it has determined that sending personnel outside of kabul is too risky. As the military draws down, we too find that there are fewer places that we can go to safely in afghanistan to monitor projects. Just last week, some of the inspectors who identified the problems and kunduz reported to me that they were unable to travel to a number of sites to inspect because of the security situation. We are working to find ways around this. Its not insurmountable but its difficult because the best oversight is an american who is trained in oversight out there. We are trying to Design Systems that can take that into consideration we are hoping that the Government Agencies will contract to build and create these programs to do the same thing. If anything this problem could grow over the years to come. The fourth problem area deals with sustainability. By this i mean do the afghans have the financial and technical capabilities and the will, the political will, to operate and maintain the facilities and the programs that reconstruction has worked on as we have done in reconstruction over the last 10 years. The numbers tell a story. The Afghan Government brings in total revenues per year of only 2 billion. It will cost approximately 4 billion just to sustain the Afghan Security forces. Now if you bring in the rest of the Afghan Government programs, we are talking about approximately 10 more billion dollars a year. Thats a financial problem that the International Community is stepping up to the plate to help the afghan economy with. As we recently reported there are other issues. The Technical Capability of the Afghan Government is in question. And we have found that the Afghan Government will likely be incapable of fully sustaining facilities for the Afghan National Security Forces after the 2014 ambition and that includes that infamous kunduz Army Garrisonbased. Moreover, the Afghan National Security Forces, and we have shown in another audit, lack the Technical Skills needed to operate and maintain critical facilities such as the water supply, Wastewater Treatment and power generation. Finally, there is the problem of corruption. Corruption in afghanistan is corrosive, being away at its reputation in the world and that the fate of the Afghan People and their leaders, Government Programs and policies. According to transparency international, anna stanice perceived as having the worst public corruption, worst public corruption in the world tied with those favorites north korea and but corruption is not just an afghan problem. Through our investigative work and our audit work we have uncovered schemes by contractors of and u. S. Government officials who engage in bribery, theft and other forms of fraud. Is it is too soon for us to know whether the problems and kunduz were the result of rivalry or corruption. Our criminal agents are looking at that right now. But we need to acknowledge the role that corruption plays in undermining the overall reconstruction efforts and the credibility of u. S. And afghan efforts now and in the foreseeable future, even after the drawdown of u. S. Troops in 2014. Now i have laid out what we see is some of the biggest problems facing reconstruction. I dont want to sound pessimistic. [laughter] i am actually a very optimistic guy. That is why it took the job. I want to talk about how we at sigar and how the u. S. Government is going to address those issues and why sigar is actually unique and has a unique position to really make an impact on the problems that i just identify. Now first of all just so you know, sigar is the only agency in the entire United States government, my little 200 person outfit is the only agency that has just one sole mission, to protect and promote the effectiveness of reconstruction in afghanistan. We only have one and thats good because we can focus our attention solely on that important mission. Although sigar cigars a temporary agency, theres a possibility we will be around after the 2014 troop drawdown. Sigar is the only agency that has given the authority empowered by congress to look at projects across government lines. We are not limited like they aig, Inspector General aid program, the state or dod. We are specifically instructed by congress to look across the government. If you do reconstruction in afghanistan ,com,com ma we can look at that program. We also have unique hiring authority. In essence everyone who works for me works at will so i can hire and also remove employees based upon specific needs and need requirements. All of our employees have to sign up for the possibility of working in afghanistan. So its a unique crowd that we bring. We also have as a result the single largest oversight presence of any u. S. Government agency in afghanistan. We have approximately 60 people on the ground right now including the largest cadre of auditors and criminal investigators, more than any other ig, more than any other fbi but its not just her size in our mandate or unique authorities that is important. Its how we and how i view our mission and how are agency views our mission. When i joined sigar, i made it clear on the first day i got there that you should view this as a mission calm, not as a job. If you view this as a job, if you view it as a place to retire and play, you should leave because i only want people and its a term i use, with fire in the valley because belly because we have a limited amount of time to do good in reconstruction in afghanistan. I abuse that fire in the belly speech so much that my chief of staff has coined a new term called 50 fire in the belly. Aphis be memos and you know something, it worked. I am proud of my 200 agent auditors and investigators because they all hav