Transcripts For CSPAN3 American Foreign Policy And Internati

CSPAN3 American Foreign Policy And Internationalism December 19, 2015

I will introduce you to the panelists in just a moment. Two highprofile scholars reduced similar arguments about the history of u. S. Foreignpolicy. Both contend that a distance with great and troubling consequences exist between the foreignpolicy elites, the antimoral military machine, and the american people. Both assigned a good deal of influence to particular members of that elite, to demonstrate how u. S. Foreignpolicy not merely advances the interests of an elites, but how such. Nfluence because anderson did not do much digging in archives to sustain his argument, he assigns an inordinate amount of influence to an elite he obviously despises. Nonetheless, the reception of his work, even when negative, suggest theres a genuine desire among scholars for discussion, if not arguments about the domestic context and ethical applications of american foreignpolicy. Nothing betteres or genuinely realistic analysis of american foreignpolicy. When he offers her declarations ,hat are the dominant narrative and the construction of the narrative has made it nearly inevitable that americans will continue to accept a consilium regarding the nations role in the world. Anderson is vigorous, if not always convincing in his description of the dominant narrative. What he fails to consider judiciously are the critiques of this narrative. Perhaps a decision has to be made between studying those in power in those who critique those in power. ,hristopher Mcknight Nichols and historian who studies the United States and the world at Oregon State University illustrates the we do not need to make that choice. Peril,book, promise and america, the dawn of the global age, he enlarges our field of historical vision when looking at the origin and trajectory of american imperialism. A history not simply of american imperialism, the rather analysis of the way americans question and actively oppose exercising American Power in the world. As opposed to the group of likeminded thinkers that american tags is the foreignpolicy elites, nichols anonstrates a constant understanding of a group that includes pragmatist, politicians. Conspiracy betray a of institutional imperialism existing and in intellectual and ideological vacuum, he argues a critique of american imperial ambitions have been and continue to be part of an american heritage. Alone in hisr from ability to study in tandem domestic and Foreign Policy action. We are fortunate to have scholars who have contributed mightily to a body of work that incorporates the effect of personality, global rhetoric, and American Intellectual culture into the history of americans debating war, peace, isolationism, and internationalism. Let me introduce our panelists. Lears. Yers editor of a magazine. And the author of numerous books, including rebirth of a nation, the making of modern america. Michaela hoenicke moore, associate professor of history and director of graduate studies at the university of iowa, the author of most recently, know your enemy, the debate on nazi is an from 1933 to 1945. And a scholar that looks at the confluence of politics and policy, michael kazen. Kazin. The author of many books that portray the social history of the left in the United States, including how the left changed the nation, a godly hero, the life of William Jennings bryan, and america divided, the civil war of the 1960s. With that, i will open up to the roundtable and invites jackson to start us off. Professor lears thank you for and, helpful framework generous one as well. That i want to talk just a little here about chriss book, and how it overlaps with mine and my own interests, particularly with my interests as a public intellectual in promoting contemporary debate about foreignpolicy, enlarging the debate over foreignpolicy from the relatively narrow boundaries in which it has been confined, i think, and remains confined for the most part. Points ofriss book the richness of whats been polemically dismissed as the isolationist tradition. Its cosmopolitanism first of all, engagement with the world and refusal of the kind of ostrich like posture that has been charged with assuming. Its deepso points out roots in american political culture, and the commitment to sustaining a republic and resisting the drift towards empire. Conviction that government are incompatible, republican empire. This is a way of pointing up a yet still cosmopolitan critique of american foreignpolicy we can turn to, it seems to me, in times of political controversy cite as Authority Without bowing and critically to it. Ist is book also does underscore the fatuity of the dualisms that have plagued and still plague foreignpolicy debates. Dualitys i have tried for years to criticize in my own work, going back to the late 19th century, by carrying forward into the 21st. The first dualism, of course, is the one between isolationist and internationalists, or interventionists. I think thats pretty straightforwardly unsustainable, when you look at the people that populate his book, William James, randolph bourne, certainly jane addams, Charles Beard. None of these people were head in the sand xenophobes. On the contrary, they were concerned with engaging the world in many nonmilitary ways, welcoming immigrants, for example, as right off bourne and in his classic inspiring essay, transnational america, which goes so much against the grain of the dominant culture. In the 1910s, when he wrote it. They are engaged with the world and many nonmilitary ways. Engagey are willing to with it in military ways when necessary, and only when necessary. They put the burden of proof for military intervention on the would be war makers, which is where it belongs. Not on the advocates of peace. That duality, it seems to me, other panelists can talk about him and chris, im sure, well talk about it. But i think he explodes it very effectively. In promise and peril. The other duality i want to address at a little greater length is the one between realism and idealism. This is one that historians have struggled with. But also contemporary policymakers, for many, many years as far back as i can remember. Onut my intellectual teeth Norman Graber and Robert Osgood and others who use that framework. And i think it is its inadequacy ought to be immediately apparent when you consider how often the idealistic rhetoric of spreading democracy has been used to conceal familiar imperial aims of creating markets and investment opportunities. List, fromown the the philippines and latin asiaca down to southeast and the middle east. In more recent times. Hand, we can look at the realism side and see that the realistic definitions of national interests, socalled, have often been inflated to ,ustify carpet bombing hanoi for example. Or assassinating salvador ali and a as the selfproclaimed realist Henry Kissinger made clear. So what you see, i think in both realism and idealism, is a common thread. There are too many isms. But exceptionalism. I will say it. And that is particularly evident, i think, in contemporary political debates. In Hillary Clintons memoirs, which, for my sins, i was assigned to review. I learned a lot. Through that long slog of 600 pages. Exceptionalism, as you know, is the belief that america has a divinely ordained mission to reorganize the world in its own image. That of course, is a departure from the older notion that america should simply be of example to the rest of the world. And that is a much more defensible definition of exceptionalism. At hillary look Clintons Campaign autobiography, hard choices, you see a very clear example of exceptionalism thinking in its current, and sophisticated form. Becomes a series of rescue missions, staged opportunities for heroism, worthy of hollywood. Mobs of brown skinned extras look up to see helicopters in the sky. We are saved, the americans arrived. ,uch are the dreams that hover an, in our political unconscious. Allowing our leaders to redefine war as to military intervention. This is, i think, the stateoftheart interventionists thought. It involves the triumph of family, which leads to the failure of imagination. That is, the inability to conceive of the multipolar world where some nations might prefer to go their own way. The inability to acknowledge the legitimacy of other nations interest, unless they merged with the u. S. Interest. View. His is a point of it has particularly been present in contemporary advocates of soft power. Im thinking of annemarie slaughter, samantha power, and Hillary Clinton herself. All of whom claim to have transcended the realist idealist debates. By in fact, remain besotted providential list fantasy. They are allegedly pragmatic and turns out to be at least as ideologically driven as the zealots they implore. Its a model of determinism and freedom, secular residue of providential list ideology. And its held with as much religious fervor and is little regard to contrary evidence as cases derided by selfstyled liberal pragmatists. There is, at least, at the heart of it, a belief that americas values are her greatest source of strength. One might agree with that in principle. I certainly do. Forwhat it ends up doing the advocates of soft power is to allow moral imperatives in, military power to be twinned. This is how United States stays on the right side of history. Remember that phrase. Im sure youve heard it already. I think youll be hearing a lot in the coming months, and even years. Phrase, i believe, that historians should challenge at every opportunity. And that is the belief that history has a discernible direction. And the nations must align themselves with it. But, i personally dont believe that any serious historian believes that. That is a relic of the 19th century grand narratives, whether were talking about marxist or liberal or national narratives. So much of the soft hours transcended idealistic duality, want to finish my comment by returning to the tradition , which i would like to read chris and the pragmatic realist position. Pragmatic, in the sense that it judges policy ideas by their consequences. Pragmatism is nothing if not consequential. Including the historical evidence of the consequences. Thus, we have at the dawn of this pragmatic critique, William James on the disastrous consequences of the policy of benevolent assimilation in the philippines. Which he details that great and passionately. , williameorge cannon fulbright on the consequences of fighting fervid anticolonial nationalists in the jungles of vietnam. Example,ve another though before i turn to that example, want to point out how completely american policymakers and pundits have forgotten the disasters in vietnam, particularly disasters of counterinsurgency. The term hearts and minds, which first arose as a term of ironic derision of American Military policy, it was plucked out of lbjs speeches by the filmmaker peter davis, and turned into the famous documentary film hearts and minds. The point was to show in that film how indifferent, of course, the american invaders were to the actual lives, not to mention, the hearts and minds of the asian people whose country they were laying waste to. So counterinsurgency has resurfaced. The level of amnesia in Washington News sometimes simply breathtaking. But David Petraeus and others have been celebrated as having written the book, when in fact, lot ofve gone back to a the old failed policies without anyone seeming to notice. So these are two other examples of these pragmatic realist traditions. The limit give one further example of it now, who i think is not a consistent pragmatic but is by any means, not consistent by any means, is barack obama. Res a moment in a mamas in obamas second administration, when he is being importuned by clinton, samantha others on theice, need to arm the moderates in syria. Arming the moderates. And what obama does, to his everlasting credit, is to ask for examples of instances when the u. S. Had backed insurgency that could be considered a success. Doubt, he had the recently catastrophic invasion of libya in mind, and the toppling of omar gaddafi, which left the entire region and even greater chaos that started in. So we asked secretary clinton this question. This is his first administration. Towards the end of his first administration. And she could not provide one single instance. She could not provide one. This i consider a high point of his presidency. For once, i pragmatic concern for consequences that actually shaped policy. You know, a lot of people say when they talk about pragmatism, philosophers in particular, that has nothing to do with history. But its always forwardlooking. I dont believe that. I believe you can have it historically informed pragmatic. Which i think obama just informed in that instance. But the pragmatic realist tradition is realist in the sense that it recognizes that the tears of influence matter, that proximity matters. The nothing could be more appropriate to our world than the idea of the nations have a more legitimate interest in what is happening near their borders then of events occurring half a world away. Interventionists dismiss the concept of spheres of influence as obstacles to the global march of democracy. Asiapacific which reasserts the United States additional leadership role in asia. Sk, why should the chinese why shouldnt the chinese view this as a threat . Why shouldnt china claim a leadership role in its part of the world . And in the demonization of prudent of Vladimir Putin. Im not a fan of the man, but theres been a refusal to see him blocking the eastern advance of nato in the light of russian history. After have to remember that the eastern advance of nato is itself a betrayal of the bush and ministrations pledge to the russian government. In the early 1990s. So far, the only mainstream critic coming forward to question the demonization of Vladimir Putin is ironically, Henry Kissinger himself. Reliablelism is more in european settings than in the rest of the world. Thats true for a lot of realists, unfortunately. Thats why they have such a bad reputation. The demonization of Vladimir Putin is not a policy, but an alibi for one. We have to be careful about both of these worlds these words, pragmatism and realism. I realize how easily misunderstood they are. Nevertheless, i think this tradition is real, and i think it has many powerful embodiments. Still, it remains to be seen what role pragmatic realism might play in contemporary Foreign Policy debate. Thehas to technology s luk dim as we approach the 2016 present will campaign. But to the extent that we, as public election rules, have become aware of this rich tradition and its continuing relevance, we only debt of gratitude to christopher nickel. Cristina nichols. Christopher nichols. Thank you. [applause] be a memberglad to of this distinct panel. Of all the conferences and annual meetings that i attend on its alwayssis, very rewarding to come to this conference. In the years after the terrorist ,ttacks of 2001, we heard a lot as we do now coming president ial election cycles about the american people. What they felt, what they thought, what they were demanding. That would they wanted revenge, that they were usually freedom loving, innocent and brave, but were now outraged and calling for action. , like franking sinatra in the manchurian candidate, its just not true. You may recall that in that movie about the korean war, sinatra was with his comrades, hes a soldier, and he and his comrades had all been brainwashed by the chinese communist, with the extra twist identicalommunist are at the highest level of the american government. So sinatra finds himself looking at from nightmares in which he remembers what actually happened , and he rejects the official mcfalls version as he recognizes with these words. Its just not true. Because everyone is repeating it. And thats what i felt about the supposed popular outcry in this country for revenge and for action. ,t the time, all around me first in north carolina, then in even in washington and new york, people were grieving. A were in mourning. They were not calling out for airstrikes. Some people turned to their faith in different religions, which i recall this distinctly, led them to want to surrender to a higher power. To leave things to god. To not act rashly out of fear. And a desire for revenge. I recall people reaching out to others, reinforcing the bonds of respect and care for one another, a tender but nonetheless valid form of patriotism and solidarity. ,nd turning towards the world wanting to learn more about afghanistan and the different peoples come at the groups, linkages. Its history. I remember as a college teacher, so many young people redoubling their efforts and commitments to internationalizing this country. Learnabroad for study and , not deterred by official rhetoric that made the world sounded dangerous place, including the european allies, which you will recall, were actually vilified at the time by Donald Rumsfeld and others. Let me just say, it was not instigated by me or encouraged. In other words, even in the movements,an antiwar i witnessed a lot of resistance, dissents, talk back, down, skepticism as to whether the war with afghanistan was going to be effective against terrorists, and whether was called for at all. People were challenging the war. That perpetuate the myths that perpetual war delivers either National Security or local democracy. These voices came only from the military, from retired generals. And then soon from soldiers returning from duty. And then, this country elected the first African American president , and my fellow europeans expressed enthusiasm by awarding him the Nobel Peace Prize, and you know what happened then. He reminded them that ours is a military alliance and other quaker meeting. But what also happened was the publication of his book, promising peril, which offers an intellectual history of the u. S. And the world. Period, thetical transition to postworld war i and pacifism and revisionism. Im not the only one or the first on

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