You very much for coming. It is always somewhat artificial, two people that know each other well. To do an interview in public like this. Why should i ask a question i can ask her over the breakfast table . On the other hand, one doesnt really normally discuss the Japanese Naval strategy in over 1941 the breakfast table. So its as good as any opportunity as any to discuss this a little bit further. And one of the things that i find most interesting about the book, and revealing and possibly for many readers in this country also, is that it tackles a myth about pearl harbor. And one of the myths is, which was, of course, very much encouraged in the immediate postwar period, not only the japanese themselves but also by the american administration, is that japan had been hijacked by by the militarists, by the military, and the civilians really were not to blame for what happened. It was a kind of militarist cue, coup, and the middle the japanese people and the emperor himself were really sort of duped by the militarist embarking on this reckless adventure. What would you say to that particular myth . Eri hotta that it was a very easy and convenient myth. Because it disengaged quite a few people who were actually responsible in reality, and of course for the japanese nation as well, to think that the war could have been averted was too painful a question to ask, i think. And that was sort of selfperpetuating myth that the japanese themselves to very easily to after the war after having lost so much. Ian buruma in your book, you also describe why its wrong to think of it in term of the civilians being duped. Because some of the civilians politicians, not least the Prime Minister so much of the time, the prince, was actually to a large extent responsible for what happened, even though he saw it would lead to a disaster. Can you Say Something about that . Eri hotta right. The fact that the decisionmaking responsibility , was shared between civilians and the military is hard to sort of imagine. Because people just take it for granted that the military took over. But it was not the the case. Because the leaders actually met over 70 times in the one year up to the pacific war and discussed the alternatives and different steps to be taken, and those conferences were called liaison conferences. And that was not for anything that was called because it was function was to civilian and military strategies and policies and create sort of a unified voice. So civilian politicians cant really say they didnt really have any say. Because they did have equal say in those conferences. Ian buruma so they got along with it even though they had a great misgiving. Eri hotta they gradually diluted themselves into thinking, we can say this much, but then some kind of diplomatic breakthrough will happen, and it will sort of nullified all of the militaristic steps they were taking. When all of this is going on, the military leaders had to put up a unified front to preserve their face and appease young officers who were strategizing and thinking always about expanding the field of influence. It was also dangerous with rivalry, the navy and the army were always fighting with each other for a bigger budget. Army think the navy and within themselves were very much divided within clicks and sympathies. You cant talk about the military voice as one and militaristic, so that is another myth. Ian buruma which leads me to say, there is always tremendous content consent. On the one hand, on the surface, theres consensus. But actually behind the scenes , there was tremendous rivalry and his services and differences. Eri hotta it was power bargaining. Ian buruma i am trying to think of it, it escapes me now. Theres a japanese expression for the top guys being driven by the middleranking people who were more radical. Japanese] [speaking ian buruma yes. Could you explain . Eri hotta i think the translation would be Something Like a retainers taking on the load. Does that make sense . Ian buruma ok. Relatively the lord complete authority and principle but actually weak and sort of driven in to a more radical position by hot heads who were in the middle ranks. Eri hotta it justifies our power as well by indicting we can need leaders as weak kneeded leaders as ineffective basically. So i think the young leaders, for the first half of the 1930s 36, theyruary 1963 were really driven by a desire to renovate the japanese policy and also to strengthen the imperial system and so on. Everything was done in the name of salvaging the emperor, if influences that japan under put japan under tremendous economic strain and economic considerations cannot be separated in this period. Like any other part of the world. So i think there were hotblooded soldiers and officers who were ready to perceive to mobilize, so it was perceived by the leaders who had to be appeased. There was also a state of fear about what could happen to them as well. Ian buruma it is also again myth ofdestroys another japan as a sort of authoritarian society, which on one hand has some truth. On the other hand the , authorities were often not really in control. Coupentioned the 1936 which may not be immediately clear to everybody. It all, a number of ranking officers often from the was particularly hit by depression, and that is where people are often really hungry and the daughters had to be sold into prostitution and that sort of thing. The military officers at the time, they were not unique in this in the world, believed the people responsible for this plight were the capitalists, the bankers, the elite, the establishment. And they wanted to, they were radicals of the right. They wanted to stage a coup to make the emperor into a kind of dictator which he wasnt, and set up a fascist state. Even though a lot of people, the admirals and joe and so on pleased them and admired the sincerity and so one, for the more conservative members of the establishment including the imperial household, i am told they went too far. , they didnt disagree with the aims necessarily, but didnt like the means. And so this was a clear case of young people in the middle ranks driving the people in authority into positions they may not have wanted to be. Eri hotta right. I think the fact that the emperor was so affected by the experience of the failed coup which nearly toppled him is important too. Hisuse that affected passiveness and perhaps diffidence in putting his foot down in 1941. He talks about it after the war that he thought that if he had tried to veto the war decision, he might be japan would have 1936, ietat, which in didnt say anything. Factt also speaks for the that he thought this was possible, which is in the constitution as clear as he claims. Ian buruma the idea would have been, they could have made a case if he was badly advised, they would have replaced him with his eri hotta one of the brothers. Ian buruma younger brother who was much more radical. Eri hotta yes, he was popular. He was an army officer. Ian buruma what about the other myth, which is the japanese people were duped by the militarists is the sort of mainstream myth. The rightwing nationalist, which is still here, is that japan was trapped, sort of forced in to attacking pearl harbor. They were surrounded by western colonial powers. The a, b, c, d, my country, were involved in this. America, britain eri hotta china. Ian buruma china and the netherlands. Japan asserts its right to defend its interests in east asia, and that included spreading into china and so on, and they were surrounded by western powers who did not want japan to have its moment in the sun. They were drifting with economic boycotts and that sort of thing. They had no sort of choice. They had to do it. You can also talk about that. The americans this is the myth again the americans forced their hand by the famous [indiscernible] abc, thereright, the is sort of a classic explanation for many of the more origins there. I think heiser germany, they complained about encirclement, and that was very much on the japanese mind as well. The fact that the wartime government made use of that the Prime Minister gave a speech on the day of the pearl harbor attack that japan was reluctant. Eri hotta ian buruma the Prime Minister. Eri hotta he was. Japan entered the war. Reluctantly despite all the nations past efforts of trying to achieve peace in east asia. It went handinhand with this larger regional asian peace, the cause of the japanese taken sort of by in the end, and in effect, abused, but it was quite useful at the time as well. And useful to make them believe themselves they were fight fighting they were fighting for the right cause too. I think the marriage was quite strong. Who would really want to die for the wrong cause . You want to believe that, and it you are ordinary citizens did not have much access to real information about the china role or about japanese imperialism, i dont think its hard to imagine how appealing that narrative might have been. Ian buruma it had a kernel of truth too of course. Its true, unlike nazi germany, japan was fighting a war against other imperial powers. And george kennedy, the one person who actually criticized the u. S. Diplomacy in retrospect and said they should have recognized japanese interests more than they did, and you could the whole problem stems from the fact since the middle of the 19th century, japan was rather forced to be open up by American Business people. The japanese saw it as their only chance to survive as an independent nation and not be colonized by western powers. That meant having their own empire, but it was late in the game. Understand sort of why it was felt that they had their right to an empire just as the europeans had their empire. It,hotta i can understand it is understandable, but it is not an excuse either. And had relative peace democratic experiment in the 1930s. This wholehearted attraction to liberal internationalism, the league of nations, which japanese more than anybody took seriously, i think it is a shame it had to go down that way. And of course, in understanding the broader frame of mind, it is useful to look at racism, colonial imperialism. Those are not triggering postwar or even mediumterm causes of war. The causes for the war had more to do with japanese ambitions in east asia, rivalries for the control of china with, you know, competing against the United States and the russians as well. And the idea that, the fact that they had been quite lucky in the past war probably affected the military mindset. Perhaps this reckless war too could somehow be won. And japans past wars had been applauded by the west. In fact, teddy roosevelt, when the japanese into the russians, talked about the plucky japanese, and so did the british. It could be seen as a kind of, not a dress rehearsal, because it was the real thing. It was a kind of pearl harbor at that time, and it succeeded admirably. Eri hotta the americans said that. Ian buruma the americans better than the russians. Eri hotta the fact that operation or barroso was a barbara rosa was a surprise attack, but the freak nature, stealth nature of the attack had to do with the fact that it was so dramatic and the fact that the america was attacked on its soil, very heavily japanese populated island, ironically. I think that it just became part of the american psyche and the collective historical narrative and became a symbol and sort of departed from it, real significance over time. Ian buruma so with the american othersjohn dowry amongst , he didnt necessarily condone the attack on pearl harbor. In fact, he said he didnt. But he his analysis is that one , of the reasons that the americans were so shocked by this event, and so outraged, the idea of infamy and so on, was that it played into you see it in so many western movies, the treacherous indians, who are always attacking from nowhere the brave pioneers. ,then suddenly these redskins screeching war cries, and i think his analysis, i think it was war without mercy, but i can remember. It is one explanation why the americans white is still such a strong myth in america, this treacherous attack. Was it meant to be treacherous . Or was it a screwup . Eri hotta there is a huge debate about the delay in court and aiding the diplomacy to the white house in coordinating the diplomacy to the white house. But it was not a declaration of war, really. You cant really argue the stealth of the attack has ofained, and the sort treacherous nature, we have not been affected in his mind. The fact that they could do this and mobilize the nation, of course it had something to do with that legacy, but there is something to be said about this comparison to the indians were or the native americans, shall i say. Ian buruma the redskins. [laughter] eri hotta in movies. Ian buruma in movies. Not the word we had would have used at the breakfast table. Eri hotta it speaks for the disproportionate asymmetrical nature of the war that was being fought. And i think thats why after 9 11 it was tempting for people to use this analogy of the being much like pearl very under you know, resourced power could overtake a giant, however momentarily. I think that is another analogy. Ian buruma perhaps to carry on slightly from what we were talking about before, another analysis is this japanese intellectual who is no longer with us, who started a communist and ended up ultra rightwing nationalist. But his phrase was the 100 year war, and that pearl harbor was part of a war that actually started in the 1860s when japan was opened up by Commodore Perry and his gunships. Ever since, even though there were periods of peace and truth, ever since, japan has been fighting back against western dominance. Is there some truth to that . Eri hotta yes, if you look at the whole history in terms of civilization crash clash, that is very tempting and easy to attempt to explain all the political events that took place. In the meantime, reduce everything to these worldviews. Of course these things affect , ones thinking and act as part of the mind. But you cant really say japan went to war because of the racism. Of course, we can disquiet individual beliefs and how people might have reacted to different situations differently , or even certain leaders might have held onto certain beliefs more strongly than the others. It just doesnt explain the whole picture efficiently in my eyes. I can see how it could be tempting. Ian buruma my role here is to be the right wing japanese nationalists. [speaking simultaneously] did they doso why this . Why did they think it would work . Why did they hope even with the mastermind of the attack on pearl harbor, admiral mia moto yamoto, who had been a harvard and the u. S. Embassy in washington, he knew the west very well, and he was a very sophisticated man who warned the government it was reckless to do it. I know that he was a gambling man, and he was probably vain enough to think he was the man to do it if anyone. But what did they hope to get out of that . Eri hotta i think in the end it was a gamble. But they felt they had been cornered into the situation, they justified it in terms of the possibility that something diplomatic could be worked out after infecting a great deal of damage on the Pacific Fleet of the United States. But even though the war was being declared in the name of the failure of diplomacy, the expected the american side to approach japan with diplomatic solutions. So japan did not have any exit plans. Ian buruma shock and awe . Eri hotta shock and awe. Right. The russo japanese war, japan also did not have an exit plan their either. It was because of Theodore Roosevelts intervention and his intervention in peacemaking efforts, they just got away winning it. It was not a straightforward thing. Ian buruma japan almost and grabbed. They were bailed out by a banker in new york who had escaped this russiamitic attack in and was no friend of the russians. And White Russian officers who were then taken prisoner by the japanese introduced the japanese to the protocols of [indiscernible] this they put two and two together and said, we have got to keep jews on our side, it was the conclusion, which is why the japanese during world war ii refused to hand over them to the nazis. But i think we are getting close to question time. The last question perhaps i , think im right in saying that in america, pearl harbor has become this sort of mythical occasion which is used over and and, not least after 9 11 so on. But in japan, when people think of world war ii, pearl harbor is not the first thing that comes to mind. Eri hotta no, it would be the bombings of hiroshima and august i that come tok mind. Which tends a lot to be forgotten or not discussed. But it has been almost 70 years, nearly 70 years since the end of the war, and that sort of collective experience is becoming thinner and thinner. So i dont really say they have this strong attachment to any of the bombings, including abombing, despite that they get taught in school much more effectively than they are about japans role. Not really we have discussed that. It is why so many japanese intellectuals, often people are , not fascists or militarists, applauded the attack on pearl harbor in 1941. Decemberpartly because it came as relief. They had been fighting china. Even though the official propaganda was they were liberating asia, they were getting deeper and deeper into what is known as the quagmire. People felt shamed and embarrassed about it i think. Now, more people know if they think about world war ii at all in japan, they know more about the atrocities committed against the chinese then they know about pearl harbor. So a lot of intellectuals in 1941 felt at last we are giving the west a bloody news bloody nose. This is the proper war. This is the worker should have been fighting to begin with and not our fellow agents. Eri hotta that is right. Quite a few of them had firsthand experience, and that is why we have this complex. They have this ingrained inferiority complex more than others. Ian buruma those are always the worst. Eri hotta yes, tends to be. Ian buruma this is an argument against issues for people to study abroad. [laughter] ian buruma it is a bit like, what is his name, daniel ortega, who picked up antiamerican rhetoric in berkeley, california. I think it is 6 00, so perhaps we could open it up to questions. And i will field the questions. Shall i do it . If you dont mind. We have microphones set up on either side. I just asked when i call on you you proceeded to the microphone and please identify yourself. Iancan address eri or in with your question. Well start with the gentleman over here. Hi, i am noah smith from Stony Brook University and the worst dressed person in the room. I actually had a couple of questions, but one of my questions is one things you guys , didnt discuss was in 1939, japan tried attacking the soviet union, and it was a lot bigger of an operation than most people realize. They were soundly defeated. The soviets sent in a bunch of tanks and cr