We split the panels up so that this panel will address the papers on u. S. And chinese strategy and interests in the asiapacific region. And also u. S. China military issues. And the next panel will cover economics, global issues and politics. Scott kennedy will chair that session. We had a number of participants who helped write the papers or who joined us in study groups to review the papers. So this is a representative group, its clearly not everyone who was involved, but some of the key authors in each of the papers were going to address in the panels, body glazer, my colleague at css, senior director of the China Project will talk about the asiapacific papers. Were going to ask the panelists not to summarize the papers but to identify between the american and chinese papers the issues of convergence, divergence and some recommendations. My friend will present on the asiapacific strategy after bonnie. Then well shift to the military relationship, David Finkelstein and the member from the Chinese InternationalSecurity Studies will address the areas of convergence and implications of what we identified and analyzed in military spheres. As dr. Henry said, we endeavored to make these papers that would be based on the u. S. National interest and u. S. Strategy on our side and on the Chinese National interest and chinese strategy on the chinese side. We did these in consultation with each other, meaning that for example on the asiapacific paper, bonnie and i and colleagues talked about structuring the themes and what key issues to address. But we were very clear on several things, no veto on the other side of this paper. It had to be an honest and forthright explanation of interest and strategy from that countrys perspective. We informed and talked to our governments but the u. S. Government and the Chinese Government did not review or approve these papers. Theyre independent. We are all independent scholars. And so what weapon presented is not u. S. Or china government policy, but we think it represents a pretty good consensus point about how these issues are viewed in each country. Of course, there are multiple views about military affairs, global issues, north korea, in both china and the United States. But we have for each of these papers three authors on the american side, three authors on the chinese side, and a group of somewhere between 6 and 15 other experts who weighed in. And on the asiapacific paper, for example, and i think this is true for the military paperwork tlrve , there was an awful lot of consensus from experts hailing from thinktanks across the ideological spectrum. Its quite interesting, between the u. S. And china papers, there were some common themes. One was that we should strive to avoid becoming adversaries. That was consistent for both sides. There was a theme in all the papers that we should seek out and try to build patterns of cooperation between the u. S. And china where we can on every area, military, asiapacific issues and so forth. And many of the papers concluded that the United States and china need a substantive, honest and farreaching Strategic Dialogue where each side doesnt coverup its fundamental interest and concerns and presents those and goes from there to see what can be done. There are obvious strategic and structural differences to come out of these papers. These are not differences that can be involved with a different theyre historic. We spent a lot of time on the history of these issues for our countries. For example, there are between the two papers on the asiapacific some different assumptions about the future orientation of the Korean Peninsula. Its not just disagreement over tactics in north korea, but how the u. S. And china each view the Korean Peninsula and where it is going in the longer term. There are some fundamental differences in terms of the South China Sea or the first island chain that encompasses japan and taiwan and the philippines and the eastern and South China Seas about what it means to have influence control denial. This is not a small issue. There were differences about how strong american alliances should be. Very basic differences. Not so much about the validity of alliances but how strong should the alliances be in asia. There were differences about what china should be doing to a sort of sovereignty. Not channels over sovereignty per se, but what china should be able to do to a certain sovereignty and what is destabilizing and what is not. There were big differences on both sides, i think, dave will say more about what constitutes a reasonable and acceptable level of defense capabilities. I dont think either side drew that yardstick exactly the same, via the other side. And there are with differences in how we think about the future structure or order of east asia. There was more enthusiasm on the chinese side about the bipolar u. S. china relationship to manage asia. There was much less enthusiasm on the u. S. Side. But even within the two sides there was debate and disagreement. Im going to let my colleagues go into more detail on these areas. And just conclude for now by saying, i think when you read the papers, youll find that these are papers that sort of stand the test of time. That are not based on today or tomorrows news about the g20 or the north korea problem, although we can talk about that. And in some ways, they may be a useful model for what a Strategic Dialogue would look like and how to address the fundamental issues and find ways to minimize the cooperation. But be realistic about the fundamental differences we have unearthed. So with that ill turn it over to bonnie to address the first asiapacific paper. Let me quickly add, we printed out as many papers as we thought we would have audience, this being fourth of july week. We were about 50 short. So this is online as well. So you can get it online and check it out in chinese and in english, i think. So with that, bonnie, thank you. Thanks, mike. And this is a very interesting project. I would urge you all to read these papers very carefully. And its a privilege to be part of this. We have a very short period of time, each speaker, so im just going to hit on the highlights and if theres time for q a we can go into greater detail. For some of the convergences and divergences, both of these on the asiapacific security say that there is a need for a rulesbased order. So thats a good start. We should have rules. There are differences over not only what those rules should be, but whether or not the International Communities that allow welcome from chinas participation in the process of shaping the rules. So the u. S. Papers are quite clear on that score saying america is not calling on china to simply sign onto the rules written in the past but understands that the International Community will draw these rules up together and china will draw in the process. The chinese paper is very skeptical of the u. S. Willingness to do that. It says whose rules are these . How can these rules be defined in light of the changing situation, et cetera. So a lot of suspicion. And i think you find throughout the chinese paper and the asiapacific security that there is a lot of skepticism about u. S. Willingness to include china. Even though i would underscore that i think the current administration, prior administrations have welcomed china to be a responsible stake holder in this rulesbased order. And that goes far back as far as the george w. Bush administration who coined that phrase. Secondly is Regional Security and architectural alliances. And the chinese paper very much contends that the u. S. Alliance system is increasingly targeting china. And it calls for the United States to give up that attempt to build this sort of antichina coalition. And it states that those who try to open a rather secure system rather than the Alliance System. But says china can tolerate the alliances as long as they are not targeted at china. So a little bit of ambiguity there ultimately whether alliances can be part of the system, but it does the bottom line is that the u. S. Led Alliance System can coexist with an increasingly influential china in the region if the u. S. Gives up the effort. Now, for the u. S. , this paper doesnt portray in any way the alliances as aimed at china. And it talks about the allies as the basis of our regional position. It lists several threats that are alliances that were trying to deal with. Such as north koreas emerging missile and Nuclear Capabilities and maritime conflicts. Very different discussion of alliances. When i was at the rollout in may in china, the chinese version of this, madam fuying talked about the concern in the Regional Security architecture. So i think that this really is a difference that the u. S. And the chinese have about whether or not the alliances should be part of this rulesbased order going forward. Third, both identify areas of concern. Pretty much the same, as you would expect. North korea, taiwan, mare thyme issues. On north korea, the u. S. Paper claims that china doesnt recognize the new level of threat posed by the kim jongun regime. Events that have transpired in the last couple of days and months really provide evidence of that. The United States is, i think, incredibly concerned about the launch of an icbm by north korea. Very upset about how u. S. Citizens are being treated. Of course, the most recent being, the very tragic death of otto warmbier. So i think that the chinese paper in some ways recognizes the danger, but insists that the problems just cant be addressed through sanctions alone and diplomacy is necessary. But i do sense a real gap between the two countries in terms of their assessment of the urgen urgency. The u. S. Paper has some interesting policy recommendations in this regard, calling for not only more dialogue but for specifically on noncombative operations, weapons proliferation, closing loopholes in usca sanctions. The chinese paper doesnt have any of these very specific areas of potential cooperation. And i would underscore the need for Crisis Response in the event of instability in north korea and something that the u. S. Has tried to do with china for several administrations as well. There are solutions put fwarmd by both sides and i want to highlight some of the divergences and comment on them. Both avoid disputes of military content. Though the paper focuses much more on this than the chinese newspaper to manage differences. Of course, we would know that he does talk monoabout our finances. And then the chinese purse officers a u. S. Led Alliance System. This is interesting and we should consider theres been recall in the back of a trilateral music dialogue that was supposed to take place back in 2009 and for various reasons did not. It should be considered once again. Ways that we can offer trying to reassure citizens about our alliances engaged in the trilateral goals. So as mike mentioned, the chinese authors do not rule out a g2. They say a either a g2 or through other forms of security cooperation, china and the u. S. Need to establish a joint vision for the region that is inclusive and based on mutual consensus. I think that would be a very, very different thing to do. I dont know if we can establish a joint vision, but certainly the u. S. Paper and reflecting the mainstream views in the u. S. Rule out such a g2 arrangement. The u. S. Paper says that washingtons not interested in the condominium that would apply a greater relationship. And finally, the chinese newspaper calls to adhere for the components of the new type of power relationships. It says we should adhere to the principles, no confrontation, Mutual Respect and win win cooperation. And i think accurate ly we ae looking at where the Trump Administration has come to after the first several months in power, that americans, in general, dont like a Bumper Sticker phrase. And there continues to be enormous discomfort with new models of the power relations including the co points. So again, the u. S. Shares the goal of avoiding conflict. But we worry interest on corp issue xwou i corporation issues thank you for your leadership. So you impressed me and encourage me. In the past oneandahalf years, we have been working together and thinking together. So, of course, when talent up no matter how wages are honored differently, share the vision and divergence and convergence is some sort of reality. So we need to get through some sort of very accurate reality checking. Finally, we have to get back to the history to use the history as some sort of very interesting studying point. You have a very positive security anchor here in the region. No matter how china, the china will benefit a lot from the americans very steady and constructive on the chinese side. Second, of course, if we had to look at some sort of a potential ri risk, we are causing a collision between the two powers. Then the element will create or drive back the divergence. Then well have to say, its not a status, its an issue. So theres a lot of speculation across middle east asia for the moment where we have to transition. I have to say its the fallacy. You read some sort of recently published book. Its call ed everything that china inhabits. Its very simply from a historical special circumstancetive. Its a tributary, but most welleducated scholars, that kind of system subpoena not necessary for this. So where 20 years ago, 30 years ago, they faced some sort of disparity. It is significantly diminished but the u. S. Remains where dump in the power week this is the biggest trade in u. S. Foreign relations now because a lot of the interest is now in a condition where we are competing off the past taking solutions and methodologies, but the promise if we get back to some sort of centerpiece to be behind the strategy, then well prefer to see and its also veried a cat and reasonable. And then well see this in the asiapacific. Of course, this place is a very important tasting ground as i mentioned to have a serious examination of chinas Foreign Policy interaction or the strate strategy where we see people suffering for days. But i consider the china methodology in the region. And the region remains largely as some sort of a china power position. I consider chinas policy has been very consistent and smart. Now, why . Its very hard for china just to have a tvery successful transfom to power. China remains vulnerable at large. So in the region, were going to consider some sort of ways to compete a place then the point is we consider no matter how we diverge, but the strategy and policy should be oriented where the future oriented is not just in our history, we are oriented that ends a lot of speshlation. But we are overpaid and that will be getting us into a conflict. So the harvard professor is set to be a sensationalist. We consider u. S. And china to jointly create a new moldening of the new power relations. Conclusively, i have to say that this presents a very interesting challenge for us. So, on the one hand, we have to balance the points to set up a tradition in inspiring points. It is not an easy job. So from the chinese side, its not how we can just envision some sort of power stories between the u. S. China in the region, but how china cant overcome some sort of adherence. This happened before china became a real popular part in the region. Let me stop there. Thank you very much. You contrasted the papers well in eight minutes and fit in three book reviews. So well done. I appreciate it. Thank you. Over to the military side of this panel to david. Okay, thank you to john for participating. And thank you to michael and scott kennedy. Three of us comprise the military and defense writing team, myself, Armitage Associates and fill saunders from National Defense university. All three engaged in this in our personal and private capacities and id be remiss if i didnt state anything i said today reflects the views of cna or any sponsors. I think if they were on the dais with me, im sure they would provide the same caveats. So as you heard were not supposed to summarize our papers. Ours is 25, 26 pages long. You can take a look at it. But i feel a need to at least provide you a sense of our overall assessment. And the reason i feel a need to do that, our assessment of the state and trends in u. S. China Military and defense relations, is because this is a major area where the u. S. And chinese side did have some convergence. Recognizing some of the positives and recognizing some of the negatives. So let me give you a gisting of the u. S. Assessment of the state of being. And it goes like this. At the moment, the relations between the u. S. And chinese militaries are more stable than they have been in decades. The two militaries are engaged in a widerange and unprecedented number of interactions from the strategic level down to the tactical level that theyve never done since relations were established in 1980. Both militaries are working together at Risk Reduction to ensure that highly contentious issues do not result in miscalculation. And the u. S. Team assesses that neither military seeks a conflict nor sees it in their nations interest to resolve differences between us by military means. However, all is not necessarily well in the military and defense dimensions of the u. S. china relationship. The u. S. Writing team adjudged that the competitive aspects of the military and defense relationship are growing and intensifying. Both sides have deepening rp i concerns about the others defense. As well as the uncertainty over each others future intentions. The competitive dimensions are most intense in the Asia Pacific Region where traditional u. S. Predominance in the maritime and Aerospace Military domains and chinas expanding offshore reach and increasing military capabilities are intersecting.