Good morning. And welcome everyone in the studio as as the audience turning in virtually. Im connor savoy, senior fellow at the csu us project on prosperity and development. Thank you for joining me today to discuss a new book published by my long time colleague and friend dan, who is a Senior Vice President and director of the project on and development and holds the schreier chair here at csis. His work is oriented around us leadership in building a more democratic and prosperous world. Among his many other contributions, he was an architect of the build act, helped contribute to the reauthorization of the Us Export Import Bank in 2018 and was an of prosper for a Us Initiative to deepen the uss commercial and Development Engagement in africa. Hes been a leading voice on the role and future of the World Bank Group and u. S. Leadership in the multilateral. Prior to csis he held leadership roles at the u. S. Agency for International Development and the World Bank Group earlier in his career. He also worked in commercial banking at citibank in argentina and Investment Banking at what is now deutsche bank, danske the american imperative reclaimed and Global Leadership through soft power is the first decade. Its first book in decades to look at americas power through the lens of Great Power Competition. It calls for supporting broad based economic growth, supporting Good Governance and anticorruption, long term training, differentiating our approaches in middle income countries, and fragile and stronger u. S. Leadership in. The multilateral system. Dan, i want to congratulate you on a great book. Its been a its been a long and im very proud to host you today. So welcome and why dont we dive right in . Thanks. Thanks, connor. Thanks for having im really pleased to be doing this this has been a long time coming. Ive been in washington for 20 years. Ive been at ccs for 12. Ive watched the rise of china over the last 12 years. But ive also watched the and the progress in many developing countries. And so its not grandparents developing world and at the same time in a period of Great Power Competition with china and their sidekick russia. And so i think that we have to offer alternative enable an alternative because china in partnership russia can fill voids that we leave they can fill voids in vaccines. We saw this with covid. They close the Digital Divide through huawei, zte. They can build bridges, build ports and airports so to the extent we dont want to do that, will do that to the extent that we dont want to provide and support the development of Reliable Energy such gas. China will do that for them. To the extent that we fill trade, china will fill that as well so. At the same time, russia, which is doesnt have the same kind of heft as china is a is a major global disrupter, put it mildly. Their illegal invasion of ukraine has has global implications. And its in our interest to make sure that ukraine wins the war. But also, ukraine also is financially successful as a stable democracy and full member of the European Union and nato. I want to come back to ukraine in a little bit, but maybe lets start out with, i think of the things that strikes me about the book. Is there this sort of cold war parallel, you a lot about how the Kennedy Administration saw a real challenge to our ability to engage in developing countries in the early 1960s that led to the peace that led to usaid using cold war. You know, how do you of see this as a as a competition right now . Is it analogous . Is it a little different . How do you kind of where do you see the similarities indifference . I sort of dodged this, b, and so i think in the book sort of edged up to the idea of this is potentially a second cold war. I did an inward radio interview last week where somebody said they disagreed with me in the book because i sort of hem haw on this issue of whether its a second cold war or not. And finished, i submitted the manufacture for the book in march of 2010. March, february, march 2020 to the world also since evolved. I think unfortunately in a not great way in the last 12 plus months. So i we need to see this certainly as revisiting our soft power in an age of Great Power Competition and perhaps thats a safer place. I think what i worry about is if i say its second cold war, some folks kind of bristle at that and sort of dont want us to kind of and i think the framing of is perhaps creates a problem but i do think that if you look at in history you look at the emergence of the Marshall Plan that was a result of the coup in czechoslovak hockey in 1948, which was sort of the dawn of the cold war and was a direct response to sort of National Security concerns and Foreign Policy concerns at the time. If you look at the reorganization of aid in that early 1961 or the foreign assistance of 1961, it was a reaction to our perceived shortcomings during sort of the the First Quarter or so of the of the cold war, where this book called the ugly american, which was published in 1958, which i think of a book thats been more influential Foreign Policy in that john kennedy bought a copy for every member of the senate. Kennedy bought 100 copies of the book and gave one to every member of the us senate and. That book caused a revolution in thinking in the United States about how we ought to engage the developing world. It caused it. It brought about the reorganization of the of for our foreign aid it a rejiggering of u. S. A. The initiative called the alliance for progress for the americas. It created the peace corps and created the green berets. So these were all things that were a direct result of the book, the ugly american. I would say weve had several moments since since the 1960s at the end of the cold, there were some rejiggering of our instruments, ation to respond to, the fall of the berlin wall and then would say after 911, there have been some some adjustments as i would argue, that were at moment in this period of Great Power Competition or whatever we want to call it, we want to call it a second cold war. And theres some baggage with that, that the National Imperatives of engaging a resurgent china in a a disrupter in russia require us to go back to the drawing board on our soft power instruments to respond to this new challenge that were finding. So i think, you know, as were as im to you, dan, i mean, one of the things that really comes out is the imperative us using our soft power tools and using them better. I mean, what do you see as the importance now for soft power and why do you think development and by diplomacy are overlooked when the us looking at how it engages in the world . So if you believe that were in an age of Great Power Competition, then most of our Great Power Competition is not going to play out in beijing or moscow. Its going to play out in tanzania, its going to play out in guatemala. Its going to play out in the Pacific Island states. Its going to play out in central asia. Its going to play out in ukraine. These are developing with a series of hopes and aspirations and interests. And to the extent we dont meet the hopes and aspirations these countries. Theyll take their business to china or theyll take their business russia in some instances. And to the extent we dont engage in a number of different fields that are not in the non militaries fear, they have the ability today because of their economic, because of chinas economic heft to be able to fill voids that we leave. So im all for through strength im all for a strong u. S. Military and a strong intelligence capacity. But i believe most of this competition is not a military competition. Its a non military competition. One of the things that i know has come up since put out the book, since it was published last youve and youve done a lot of these discussions, this idea of, you know, implicit in the this discussion uschina in the developing and other regions is the idea that youre that you could be suggesting that they need to pick a side how do you address that how do you think about this interplay between the us and china and what how do we have to think about that . How do we have to frame it when were engaging in developing countries . So in my heart, id like them to pick a side, but i think in reality, in most instances thats going to be very, very difficult today and that in that late nineties, Something Like hundred and 20 out of 200 countries, the number one trading partner was United States and about 60, the largest trading was china. Today, out of 200 or so developing countries about 120 countries. Their largest trading partner is china. And were the number one trading partner for about 60. So its going to be very difficult to say to some country where theyre one trading partner is Mainland China. You have to pick a side and stop with Mainland China. So i think its not its not serious. So i think we need to be realistic about at the same time, there are things cant just say to countries, dont take sinovac vaccines if were not going to offer an alternative vaccine, dont take chinese made ventilators if were not going to offer a ventilator, dont take chinese infrastructure or, energy, infrastructure. If not going to enable long term, we dont have to meet china dollar for dollar, but its just not serious for us to say to countries that have developed beyond a certain Level Development have their own agency, have their own choices today and can have lot more freedom of action for to say dont take the vaccines, dont take the infrastructure and dont close Digital Divide with our way. We have enable an alternative. So let me go that so infrastructure is one of the ways that weve seen china really ramp up its presence in developing countries through the belt and Road Initiative what do we need to do to offer a credible alternative to chinese infrastructure . My view is that to the extent that there building farm to market roads in the middle of nowhere if they want to go knock themselves out and do that. Thats then theres some areas where we ought to be competing with china on infrastructure, whether its us through the Asian Development bank or japan or the australians or turkey or brazil. Thats fine. Then theres a subset of what might be described as commanding heights where we just dont want them to build it, where they a dual use say an airport or a port or its kinds of Technology Like 5g and controlling 5g do we should not one Mainland China to control the digital rails of the future in developing countries in the unholy trinity, huawei, zte and alipay. So thinking about digital in particular you know weve talked a lot over the years about how a aid and Development Institutions did a lot enable cell phone telephony in developing countries and most countries leapfrogged they people never had a landline they only have a cell phone. So when youre thinking about closing Digital Divide, what what do we need to do what do you see as the opportunity on that so the u. S. And the west helped create kind of version 1. 0 of the internet in, many developing countries and was also an enabler through the series of obscure but important institutions called Development Finance institutions like the International Finance corporation, what was then called the overseas private corporation, the series of European Development financiers and institutions to enable that the cell phone revolution thats happened over the last 20 years. And theres most people in the developing world, whether its afghanistan or africa and countries in, africa or southeast asia, they all have to to cell phone, telephony and. Thats changed the world for the better. What youre seeing now is this next generation of high Speed Internet net, which has been accelerated because of covid. Everybody was in their basement for a year, whether they were in rural maryland. They were in moldova, malaysia or mali. And there was a realization that all needed high Speed Internet that high Speed Internet is the new electricity. And so this is this is going to happen and so were either going there, either people are going to close this new Digital Divide of high internet, either through Mainland China or through weiwei, zte and alipay or some coalition or somebody else. I would strongly prefer that some coalition, somebody else that requires us general, a little bit more together, it means us working with allies like south korea, finland and sweden. It means having sort of a strategy, how were going to use development, finance institutions. It probably means having being a little bit more thoughtful, tangible how we use our aid agencies to kind of prime the pump for some of this stuff. Some of this is about making sure that various stakeholders show up and on for certain kinds of infrastructure and my hope is, is to the extent countries pick weiwei is in zte for socalled 5g technology, which is sort of the latest technology thats being used that we can fight to the extent we lose in some instances. We need to get ready six g or the next generation so that we can supplant Mainland China because it is just not in our interest because of either values and most importantly, sort of the vacuuming, vacuuming up of data, information thats going directly to beijing thats being used for all sorts bad purposes. So let me let me take this. You mentioned allies in your last answer. You know your book is entitled the american imperative. And, you know, i think some some not me may look at this and say, oh, this is little bit of an America First argument that youre trying to make here. And i think its a its know how how do you kind of what do you say to that where do allies where how do you kind of think about the role from that perspective in the world . Nothing significant the United States has ever done have been able to do by ourselves so have needed friends and partners to accomplish anything of any significance. The cold war confronting big challenges like hiv response to covid thats required sort of leading a coalition. And to the extent that weve been able to do sometimes were not a great sometimes were a little bit of a flaky ally and friend. We need to a better job of that. I would say that one of our greatest strengths is the that weve got a big network of friends and allies and so i think we need to make sure that were being a good friend and a reliable friend. Stuff you learned in kindergarten. But we also so we we anything we want to accomplish in sort of this responding to, closing the Digital Divide, making sure. That the next pandemic were not all in our basements for a year making sure that mainland doesnt control the imf or the secretary general shape of the u. N. Or so the commanding heights of the multilateral system. We need to work with our friends. And so this is not an America First book. This a book that says we to this is an internationalist book that says we need to work with our friends that we have a big challenge. I think think theres a consensus in washington that we have a big problem with russia and we have a big with china. I dont believe theres a consensus yet in washington about what the heck to do it. And so i wrote the book as a contribution to. Say, heres some thoughts about some things we could do if we could respond, to china and russia and. If you believe that most of our competition, not about night vision goggles and Battleship Ships and missiles, those are all really important things. As i said, i believe in peace through strength. Then we need to come up with look at a variety of spheres. Think about what were going to do and how were going to burden share. And in some ways, development is about helping countries become wealthy enough and hopefully free that they join the community of market. You know, free, free nations that are market democracies that are willing to burden share on big challenges is and also to join you know this is a big set of words but the liberal international the and i dont mean liberal of progressive sort of that the or the set of rules and arrangements that were set up after World War Two. We want countries develop and then become burden sharers in the system that was set up after war two. The system has set up after World War Two is a great thing. And so i see development. If you say what my agenda is and i think what many people in washington would say is help countries to have freedom of action be, have own, have their own agendas in, the world, but also to decide their own that its in their interest ultimately participate in the existing liberal international order, not go off with china and try and set up some new new arrangement that were not