, not just connecticut. Which is the most worrisome. None connecticut as well. I think it is important to recognize we did not choose this vector. Our adversary stick. We have to respond. What that demands is the u. S. National security space community, particularly the United StatesSpace Command and a space for us considered new strategies, operational cons concepts and technologies. What this panel is do is provide insights regarding what sort of Technological Solutions might be the most helpful and how this ties back to core mission imperatives, especially in an era where our adversary is not just waiting, but they are accelerating their activities to compound the challenges that we have to face. I am tickled pink to have the folks we have on stage. To my left is dave rockefeller. I go back to way back with everybody. Rock is that director of training operation. Stationed in headquarters United States space for space in colorado. Next to rock is ms. Stacy kubicek, the Vice President for Mission Solutions at lockheed martin. Thank you stacy for joining us. You all are familiar with general chilton, inc. For him to joining us on this panel. To put everyone in perspective historically. Everyone in this room, i do not see any youngsters here. It was not that long ago you cannot say space and offense in the same sentence together. I have to share a story. Im at the air force academy, giving a lecture to a group of cadets who are focused on space force. At the end of my comments, one of the cadets asked a question about. Do you envision there being war in space. Immediately, i went of course. One of, i will not have to say, but in a former astronaut is sitting in the back of the room and as a mentor and he jumps up and goes you cannot say that. Sure i can. It is an Academic Institution and a second we will fight in space. That happened down dish that is how everyone was from a policy perspective to not talk like this. We do not want to see conflict in space. Like a said, we are where we are at with respect or adversaries. Let me kick this off with the question to above rock and general chilton. They openly testified that certain chinese capabilities are causing us concern. Not go through a long list. You know they are. China is not the only active. The russians are out there. Theyre going the semi. What do oc as the most serious threat to our space asset . There is obviously the a sats. There are other elements too. Where is your thoughts . Thank you for the opportunity. It is good to see you again. [laughter] i was remembering the discussion you asked when youre talking about general chilton gave you a check ride. I got my Weapon School instructors sitting there. I have mark in my head right now. I speak in a more deliberate pace because i do not want to hear that. I will answer that question this way. When u. S. Space command thinks about protection and defense, we think about it as a twoparty problem. Protection and defense of u. S. And required allied and commercial Space Systems is a primary task requirement for us, laid out an unified command plan , the president give us that command. All of us have a mission to defend the joint force. I will insert 2 ways. There is hopefully no single threat factor that warrants preparation, planning Capability Development and where needed test demonstration and operational demonstration over one another. I will highlight a few concerns on the protection and defense of u. S. Allied and commercial systems. The cso we are illuminated the awareness of the cyber threat victor demonstrated by the russians. Ew threat vectors, which we have been aware for some time. You seem prominently discussed openly, a new thing Russian Federation leaders focused on commercial and not just u. S. Systems. This represented concern. Those are things we work through planter. Some of your companys plan in detail with. To ensure we have an ability to respond. The direct dissent is a big concern. It is the most, from my instructor of capability standpoint is the most disconcerting over the past few years. Incredibly responsible, reckless to the point where we come of United States government are waking up russian astronauts to get to the safe escape with the space station. Irresponsible on many levels. We concern because as the chief said, 1500 pieces of debris. We are tracking more that overtime. He continues to be a problem and represents a challenge sustainability of the domain. If a u. S. Aircrafts shutdown, we have to shoot done on other aircraft, immediate results on the ground. Eliminated from the battle space. These will last for years, depending on the orbit they will last on decades. We will have to contend with them. I thought the highlight of the maneuvers the iss has to take, in conjunction concerns we had was noteworthy. That is a big concern. Not the only vector though. I recommend everyone look at. We wring our hands about Intelligence Community and challenge of classification. Look at the dia security challenges report. It is very thorough and a fact all document of what we assess our adversaries in the prc, particularly the pla and Russian Federation for capability. If you keep reading on to the next page the threat for space my second answer is intuition from space, we have a responsibility as a Space Force Guardian and Space Command to prepare for threats to the joint force. The threat to the joint force is concerning. If you look at the document, it is reflecting national defense. If you look at the prc has built in their see for us it is built to find, fix and kill maritime and air force. We can after resilience you want. That will do nothing about that problem. If you continue reading to the last page. It talks about research and testing of the prc, focus on spacebased kinetics. That is delivery from space to the ground. The example provided, that you remember from 18 months ago. Fractional orbital bombardment that the prc did. Those concerned me greatly. Our joint force say we are thoroughly integrated in the joint force from space perspective in a decade. People do not realize how fundamental the integration is. The joint force is reliant on space capability. The ability to change the coming of the marine corps made relies on the ability to mass, deliver present precision fires, find targets before the adversary finds you, not of it can get done without space. It is a 2 piece problem for protection and defense. Im worried we focus on. Protection defense of allied systems. Im concerned about the protection and defense of the joint force from a pernicious incapable prc and Russian Federation. General on your thoughts. Threats to space capability. The chinese spent the 90s studying how we fight wars. Youre one of the people they study for sure and how you planned operations for desert storm directive freedom. One of the things you targeted early on was the Communications Capability of strategic level, talk to operational level and tactical level of our adversaries. Disconnected those, which left the tactical level wondering what they should do next and operational level blind. The chinese said we cannot take on the u. S. Force on force. We will go after that ability to do Operational Command and control down tactical. If i within today, with the capabilities they have, in a conflict i would want to blind u. S. Commanders by taking away anything they can get from a reconnaissance aspect. I would make them unable to communicate with their operational level command and tactical forces. Blind and mute. All u. S. Air, land and naval forces. In the area of operation. I think that extends to hawaii and western pacific. I would want immediate feedback before i took my next step as to whether or not i was successful. Or if i fail. Before he took the next step in my operation. Cyber is important, but cyber is hard to test and prove it will work. A cyber effort can be used by our adversaries, but i do not think they will rely on them to cross the street. More likely, they will use them to break the american will at home to support the defense of taiwan. By making life uncomfortable for the citizen. Today, groundbased directed energy or however we apply directed energy from the chinese, however they might do it. Does not prevent key capabilities to geosynchronous orbit. They can disrupt. I do not know if they can destroy it, but they can make things difficult and our consultations. If im going in blind and make mute u. S. Forces, im going to rely on direct a sets and coat orbiting a sets to go after those keynotes. While i am doing a cyber attack to disrupt commandandcontrol elements in the terrestrial domain. And then i would do that because i need immediate feedback on whether im successful before proceed. I would rate direct ascent, coorbital as the most serious threat, followed by directed energy and cyber attack. That is very good and leads to a followon discussion in the context of how do we counter that which rapidly gets us into a discussion of preemptive attack means to negate this physical means. Perhaps using nonlethal, which gets us to the cyber discussion. Which is interesting because to take what you said, if i understand it right, what can be assured of measuring is lethal direct ascent. We talked about before, if you go against an adversary and you are going into adversary acts, and you are physical force is reliant upon the success of a cyber up, you have to have feedback. Either that or a hell of a lot of trust before you put your body in the threat space. For commanders to have confidence the effects will be achieved. I do not see much of that happening on either side. There is a deterrent piece here. We ought to think about. I would suggest we have we as a nation and as a military have been too quick to dismiss lethal options, which just gives aid and comfort to our adversaries. As opposed to increasing uncertainty in our adversaries mind, that we might. That is another discussion. Inks those insights and getting the thought process going. Kind of a followon, but all of what is important about what we were discussing his notion of Space Situational Awareness. General salzman talked about it in his see no. What are some key areas we need to focus energy and resources onto realize the Space Situational Awareness necessary to assure us we have a good handle on whats going on . It is a good question. They mentioned eloquently about it. I need to be simple in my view. My boss, the commander of u. S. Space command has made it number one priority for closing gaps. The reason is a straightforward. There used to be a phrase that 90 of saa snowing whats going on. I will be honest that the network we built, it is entirely rearward looking was the term used by the cso. It is based off of observations in the past to protect orbital destination the future. That is why everything comes back with the element associated with that. Uncertainty volume associated. A lot can happen. As a result, i am reminded that when chilton was air force base commander. There are three things when we put space surveillance at the time. There are 3 things that drive. The first is custody. We do not have the level of custody we need to provide a level of accuracy associated with indications, warning, threat determination, hostile intent and ability to target. We are largely based on the next step, which is capability relying on systems based off 2 principal phenomenon. 1 is optical, which is measuring light reflected off a satellite in get a lot of information from that. I do not want to diminish it. The second is radar. , which you get a more accurate position state factor of where it is. Where that primary focus of my network has been derived from his dual Mission Systems largely built around the network to defend the United States. The optical sites we have because we sometimes do people too many favors by publishing too much. We are in a place where it can be difficult for them to get the information they need. The capability is the second one. An optical signature of metric data does not provide the capability i need to determine threat indications to intent and ability to target for disruption. You have to improve the capability. The last piece, in terms of the three css capacity. We are in the process of shifting from, and im excited to hear about the success of this development agencies. Were shifting from a permissive force design. That is what i grew up on to a war fighting force. We are not there. Were getting there. As a result, capacity was not the principal force determined. The ability to fight in the domain that was not the principal determinant. It was based off efficiency. What is the capability we can build, to cover on the missions with the least in possible . Those decisions when were made, when you looked at them this winning architecture, there were 2 more radars that covered the seven seven hemisphere. Theres were shut down because of costs. When you Start Talking about capacity, i have to have enough to survive in conflict and deliver the indications, warning and targeting and capabilities. That capacity is something we are focused on. Those have coherence about her management. Right now, the tools we have do not talk about decisionsupport age. They do not provide Battle Management at the right levels to effectively assess those things and develop options to face adversary. Im with the general on this, i am not interested in the name, it needs to be delivered. If deliver the first three with about her management, he did not give me much, because i did not use it. I think those are the 4 cs i focus on on space demand awareness, integrated capabilities docket is more nuanced. Those are the things i focused on. We need to get right fast. A quick followon. The budget says 18 million for commercial space. This is for data for space domain awareness. Can you comment on the relevance . We rely on and have a joint commercial operations underneath u. S. Space command that relies on and integrates many of the systems that some of the audience is put together. It is a competition based off of the needs we have a cover gaps for location if youre using terrestrial base sensors, location matters. It highlights performance and capability to get offer it after it. I get updates on my cell phone on interests im concerned about from that center. We are able to measure those against what we have on the classified room to make assessments of what that is. Obviously, coherence can bring those together. And produce 1 solution at various levels of classification to deliver it not just information of what, but what next. That is what Battle Management delivers we need to get to. We will know it is not just 18 million for commercial. Space force gets after this. If you get custody, you show the same thing. . In orbit to maintain custody. You have to have a system for orbit. We are in the process for geosynchronous space situation is awareness. We will get ready to get fielded at the engineer for launch. For position at some of that information we talked about. Things like deep space radar capability will provide a level of capability. I do not want to make it sound like it is not getting attention. I am simply saying is the service, air chief used to say im building the air force for 4 from now. The general is building the space force in three or four chiefs. My boss is next year or two. Im not interested in how hard it is, i am interested in results. Clicks cocom there. Cocom there. Let me bring you into the conversation. We heard Space Situational Awareness has got demands on data. Can you talk about how Software Solutions may be assisting in some of the challenges that they face . We start thinking about data. The exciting thing for me is not about the different assets and that the general. It has to be a holistic picture and and and. That is where data starts coming into play. There is a lot of data coming in. We are talking about 18 million going towards commercial data alone. Data is only is only as good as what you. The health and created. If you have data from it, and we are not able to do in does not make us better. It does not allow us to defend against the threat and increasing threats. It does not allow us to operate. It does not help us. Software is a critical component for that. How can software be critical component . Theres so many ways. One of the biggest things that ai and ml cannot be underestimated in what it can help provide. I am going to caffe caveat that they cannot do it with everything. There is critical component for humans. Our resources are not unlimited. Along software to do some of the things that can help to get some of that information to the war fighter quicker, or we can is a good aspect. Another thing is from a reactionary standpoint. I think about the different operations sites what they need to make this quickly into that effectively without them having to go to site with all that data. You flipped out, how can we get ahead of the threat . That is where software can be critical when we think about Predictive Modeling. We do a lot of things with digital points. When you start thinking we were talking about ms. Warnicks and capabilities. Those are legacy systems. When we are modernizing systems, how can we use Predictive Modeling to say what is the threat going to look like in one year, 2 your, 3 year or six months. Hackable use those tools to prepare war fighters for what they need to do and make decisions effectively. Very good. Wonderful insights. Separate but related topics. When i things general salts argues for his Space Force Needs to deny first mover advantage on orbit. So far, went away space force decided to proliferate and disaggregate Future Systems is the manner in which he is going to approach the challenge i am interested in their thoughts about how the disaggregation and ability to maneuver and deters our adversaries. It is an important part of strategy, disaggregation and prolife