And just kind of strung up there and the dutch ship, the flagship of this, you know, task force is built to commercial damage control standards, even socalled low threat environment, somebody may get the hands control standards. How do we deal with these problems with the allies not just technically but in terms of what they are able to survive in terms of threats . If i had that answer as clearly as i would like to we would probably say we have the answers. We are in the bit of discovery. I think you are discovering that. You have outlines a few of the things that come about. What kind of equipment and capabilities do our allies have . We need to understand that and you dont really find those issues until you bring them together. We are still coming back the marines come back to sea we welcome them back and they have a capability as they move ahead on ground operations over the years in iraq and afghanistan. We didnt move at the same pace and stay as synchronized as we should have. The discovery that you described we are putting an antenna on here that makes us compatible with our Ground Forces. We will get that capability, understand it and put it into the programming system and we will install that as a pay load for command and control and also for coordination. What do we need for the allies as i just described we use your antenna as an example. The tracking processes, if you will, and capability and planning capability would be great for the navy and marine corps. Back to air and sea battle how do we use that with allies . Is it compatible . Do we step it up and have maybe two different modes, one would be internal and one would be allied in that regard. With regard to how do we baseline survivalability and elements, we have to figure that out right now, what kind of ships we put into a joint force entry scenario. That ship is built to commercial standards in many of its elements. We wouldnt put that in as one of the first ships to do forcible entry. That is a 600 million ship. The uss america is over 4 billion. There is a scaling that we need to consider in all of that. But i summarize with saying thats why we do bold alligator and those are the lessons learned. We will put it into our programming. One quick follow up because we talked a lot about china and the allies. I want to ask for update on how the russian navy is behaving and what extent you are continuing to see them seek to be provocative in the difficult year we have had with them. I will leave it with that. They are not as busy on the surface domain. Out at sea many ships we see i recognize as something i learn, a few of my commanding days. They are building new frigates. They are not out and about so much. They are pretty active up in the air. They are long range flights and reconnaissance probably more active than they have been in a decade in that regard. They have operating money, clearly. They are out and about. They are operating professionally as always. They have probed up in the alaska area. We responded and they acted professionally. So far so good in that regard. But i would call them more busy, more operations. Their focus is on the under sea and then the surface and the air. That is what i have seen. Thank you. Lets take two questions here in the fourth row. Lets see if we can respond and then we have time for one wrap up round. These two right here. How are you doing with operations and how are you managing that . If we could add this one. Correspond for the central news agency. I am wondering how important or how less important rule taiwan plays in the states policy. Also, i know that taiwan is expecting to get Technical Support from state. I think tempo, we have vincent on a deployment now. Her deployment will be close to nine months. That is not sustainable. We have right now the macon island those are the two big, i guess them she is on a deployment well over eight months. When sequestration hit us it was sudden. We stopped work on some of the projects in the ship yards. The bush just got back and she had a fairly long deployment. When you stopped work like you did then, those on deployment stood to watch, we are trying to get these guys up and in the ship yards. They are up there on watch. They come home and now it is tear turn to go on deployments. Theirs a longer while we get these guys back in. This is taking about two years. Thats the kind of impact you have that has second and third order effects. It effects the Nuclear Carriers also. Those are the public ship yards. Those are the federal employees we hire. When you dont have a predictable budget when you do negotiations for the big deck with the private ship yards, they are not going to if you will, spool up to be ready in time. You dont have the work orders done. This is all slowed down. We have another year. Vincent will be out there about 8 1 2 months. Of this longer deployments. When you get into the p 3, p 8, severing deployments, 6 1 2 months. My target is 7 months. I think that is sustainable with our people, our maintenance and our training. What we can provide which i think is reasonable and sensible, gives us that presence and the ability to react to spooal up and react as necessary. We need a stable budget. We need the current budget and time to bring the ship yard capacity to where it needed to be before. Thats just how long this stuff takes in second or third order effects. With regard to taiwan, we have responsibilities with a treaty with them. We will honor those responsibilities. We have a process worked out with our department of state as to how we interact and the both for human capital, if you will, intellectually and then exercise and what we can provide for assistance. We are living up to that. We are continuing with that and expect to do. It is the taiwan relations act. That is our commitment. Lets take two more and see how we are doing on time. Take them together if we could and then ask the admiral to wrap up. Good morning, admiral. Im the army fellow here at brookings. I want to ask you to talk a little bit about your level of comfort or discomfort with an army that looks to be going well below 490, maybe 450 as the active force. I know yo you can take this last question here. You talked a lot about cooperation with china and i was hoping you could talk a little bit about the navys goal for cooperation and capabilities of our ally and treaty partners in the asian pacific. I share concerns with regard to the sizing of the army because we are a supporting element of that in the joint force. What i mean by that is if we are going to resize any of the services, really the center piece of the land force, the army, then what is the construct behind that . And what are we going to agree will be the limitations of our operations out there . And what is the tendency to do that . What has been in the past we have said we are not interested in doing this, that or the other thing. The world gets a vote and the size of Stability Operations because clear indicator is as we move anything from army armor out to hilos out to all of that we can we are the kind of fill in behind all of that. We are seeing all of that right now with operations in afghanistan. So i think we need to do this in a careful deliberate manner. We did our own right sizing of our personnel. It was 1 . We laid off 3 or 1 , 3,000 folks. The effect on morale and the trust factor was huge. So what we can expect collectively of any of our Ground Forces and any of our services to size the force yet make sure we maintain our trust i think is important and i think it is a joint issue that we all need to understand. So the size, the readiness, the psyche and the morale of the ground force is a joint issue we all ought to be deconcerned wit as we do this. I think in the asia pacific allies interaction i think the concept of collective self defense is a clear item that im watching and this is with japan. Where that can take us, if it goes according to the plan set up by the japanese government then they can share with us in Ballistic Missile defense. It is defensive in nature. They have all of the censors, weapons command and control that we have. Next would be counter mind. Very defensive, collective in that regard. Required a little bit more coordination would be operating with our Carrier Strike group and assuming one of those missions of defense of the Carrier Strike groups. All of the rules of engagement for that and the caveats associated. Korea, we will see where we want to go in that regard. That is a matter of what korea is comfortable with regarding coordinated operations especially at sea. Right now it is very tentative as they are feeling their way through how much they would want to proceed in that regard. When it comes to missions i would say Ballistic Missile defense. Counter mind there are opportunities there. We have demonstrated the deterrent effect of Coalition Operations about two years ago where we did the International Exercise and 20 something countries came and demonstrated their interest and their capability and their commitment to keeping the strait open. Th it was a great deterrent effect and changed the behavior of the iranian navy. Please everyone join me in thanking admiral. Tonight on cspan 3 American History tv with discussions on u. S. Strategy in vietnam, the impact of the jazz age on modern america, americas role in the world and James Madisons role in writing the u. S. Constitution. Throughout campaign 2014 cspan has brought you more than 130 candidate debates from across the country. Tonight watch cspans live Election Night coverage to see who wins, who loses and which party will control the house and senate. Our coverage begins at 8 00 p. M. Eastern with results and analysis. You will see candidate victory and concession speeches. Throughout the night and into the morning we want to hear from you with your calls, Facebook Comments and tweets. Campaign 2014 Election Night coverage on cspan. Next a conference on asia with a panel focusing on Energy Security discussing the challenges of todays environment, rising demand in costs and some of the alternative energy sources. The event previewed some of the issues on the agenda next week in burma and the Asia Pacific Economic cooperation meetings. The center for strategic and International Studies hosted this event. I know people are still coming in. It looks like they are getting coffee and coming in in a second. Our next panel is on Energy Security in asia. I think we all know the Energy Narrative picture in asia has changed very dramatically over the last decade at least in part because of the rapid Economic Growth. So we have two great four great panelists to join us here today and who will give us brief overviews of the situation from their perspective and then have a discussion involving the audience. So our first speaker is jonathan alkind the acting assistant secretary for International Affairs at the department of energy. Jonathan, the floor is yours. Thank you very much. Thank you very much, murray. Ladies and gentlemen, it is really a pleasure to be here at csis today. I see one of the dilemmas of having a beautiful new building is that the world outside you get reminders that the world outside is out there and a distraction it certainly is. It is in my view very fitting that we have this discussion about Energy Security in the asian frame at this time. And also in this place because between challenges and opportunities that one sees emerging in asia and those that one sees emerging in the United States over the last several years, one could say that the two are the most dynamic pieces of the Global Energy scene at present. The United States and our companies have worked together with the countries and companies of asia on Energy Issues for quite a long time, nonetheless i think it is worth take ag step back and looking at kind of the current state of play in terms of context that provides the back drop to our discussion on this panel. In 1977 u. S. Crude oil imports amounted to 67 . It rose as high as 70 a few years ago. Dramatically then in the period of this new young century we have seen an important change. In 2013 Domestic Crude Oil production in the United States amounted to nearly 10 Million Barrels a day and it looks like now for the foreseeable future the imports of crude oil into the United States will be on a downward trend and not an upward trend that is true so very recently. In asia one sees dramatic growth in crude Oil Consumption and other energy consumption. According to adb, the Asian Development bank net oil imports in the Asia Pacific Region will rise to more than 25 Million Barrels a day by 2035. That is close to the current crude oil output of the middle east. Within that the International Energy asia foresees 75 by the same time period of 2035. These statistics i think are useful as framing on the oil side because they speak to the importance of investment and trade across boundaries and between different regions of the Global Energy world. One can see similar interesting changes happening in total demand. If you look at some of the data back to the 1970s. In 1977 the United States accounted for 31 of global Oil Consumption. Today we see the orders of magnitude have roughly reversed with United States consuming roughly 30 of production. So i wont go further into this context but i will just under score that whether one looks at coal with the dramatic rise of coal combustion in china and other Asian Countries or whether one looks at oil or natural gas with increasing global trade of liquefied natural gas one sees very, very Dynamic Growth all across asia. And that is an important back drop to our topic today. If i look from the u. S. Perspective at how we are engaging with our partners in asia i would call out several different features. One is that the United States is committed to working with our partners, our friends, our allies from around the globe to enhance Energy Security for all involved. In may of this year the g7 Energy Ministers met in rome for the purpose of a renewed focus on Energy Security as an issue that had kind of receded from view for a period of time and then reemerged into the forefront of our focus. A second piece of the u. S. Energy policy that i would emphasize at the outset is a focus on accelerating a transition to a low carbon economy. In june of last year president obama rolled out his Climate Action plan which calls for important steps that will significantly alter over a long horizon the profile of u. S. Energy consumption and use. In addition the president s Climate Action plan called for steps to make our Energy Systems and our economy more broadly significantly more resilient to a changing climate because this is the reality that we already are experiencing. And, third, we are engaging with International Partners on this agenda, as well. Let me give just a couple of examples before i close. One, in the context of apec the United States has worked very closely with partners from all around the Asia Pacific Region focusing on energy development, Energy Security and energy sustainability. For example, the Energy Working Group under apec is pursuing now goals of reducing Energy Intensity by 45 across all of the economies of apec. By 2035 based on 2005 levels doubling the share of Renewable Energy in the apec Economies Energy mix by 2030. And collaborating on the phase out of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies. In the International Energy agency which counts among members several asian partners. The membership of the iea has been seeking to increase our engagement with other nonmember countries across asia. One particular example that i would give in this context are the conversations about a new form of a nonmember affiliation between iea and key partners including china and india. This is the idea still under development of an Association Relationship between those nonmembers and iea. This is motivated by our general sense, again, that the dynamism in the asian Energy Context is one that calls for significantly increased engagements. We are also working bilaterally with important partners all across asia. I will not, in view of time, go into details here. I will simply highlight three well, lets call it four in view of Prime Minister mod