Questions that this one has answered. Berlin battle, operational and tactical level of war. This one is operational tactical and strategic level of war. Battle, built to deal with the known. This is to deal with the unknown. Unknowable and constantly changing. Probably trying to solve the battle with a fight out number to win. And this one wins in a complex world. Now, not only do each of those words have a very specific meaning, if you look at the battle, the implied task is to win, you had to fight. If you look at when in the complex world, the focus here is winning. The focus is on winning. In fact you may not have to fight to win. But, a qualifying mark, but as soon as i say that, people say, i love that idea. Winning without fighting. But the only way you could possibly win without fighting, is it must be absolutely clear to everybody involved that if you do fight, you will absolutely win. So it has to be clear to everybody that if there is a fight, there is no doubt who is going to win. Once you cross that threshold, then you may have a chance to win without fighting. Because a lot of people say, i like the idea of winning without fighting. I want to buy that kind of army. I want to win without fighting because it sound cheaper. It can be smarter. No, youve got it all wrong. If you want an army that can win without fighting, you have to buy an army that can absolutely win the and in fact it has to be absolutely clear to people. So to clear an army that can win without fighting may mean you need a more capable army that if you only want an army that can fight to win. Because you have to be able to have the deterrence capability and the way you lead that army has to leave no doubt in anybodys mind that you can win any fight anywhere any time in the unknown world that is unknowable and constantly changing. Once have you an army that can do that, you can deter people from fighting. Thats a very capable army. So actually cheaper army may be well i maybe just bite one that can fight and win. So a lot of people dont understand the relationship between winning without fighting, means you absolutely have to have the capability to win the fight if it comes that way. Thats how you build that deterrence capability and a lot of people dont understand deterrence capability and what it means for deterrence capability and full capability. Which means intense, capability weapons systems. Capability to sustain yourselves, put yourselves strategically, thats a very large and encompassing capability to deter conflict. So what does that actually mean for the army . So if you blow up that slide, what we spend just a couple of things that the army has do to win in a complex world. That is, you see them on the left, one is the army is inherently the foundation for the join force. So we said to win in a complex world is a strategic level aspiration. That means the army has to bring together the strategic Assets Available to us as nation. When you look at early battles you are focussing on the tactical operational level, you are focussing on acquiring enemy targets and engaging them. So it became a targeting exercise. It is math problem. So i focus on acquiring targets and engaging targets. It was about synchronizing firepower. How do you synchronize firepower . When in a complex world, what we are saying is synchronizing firepower in and of itself is inadequate. What we are saying the army has to do now, if you want to win at strategic level, we cant only synchronize and deliver firepower, we have to synchronize and deliver National Power. National power is much larger than firepower. Firepower is part of it. But National Power means can you deliver economic capability. Can you enable diplomatic capability. Can you enable all of the instruments of the United StatesNational Power to be able to focus and win at the strategic level. So now you say, you know what, my staffs have to be different. I have to have different kind of people on the division staff. They cant not only know about artillery but they have to know about diplomatic activity. They have to know about economic activity. They have to know about cultural activity. They have to know about how Coalition Partners operate. If i send a brigade to western africa and deal with ebola, they might have to know how to deal with the World Health Organization. Work with united nations. When you look at this picture, not only is it colored but you can see it has the domain, maritime domain, cyber domain and land domain. Special operating forces. Unhcr. Marine corps, navy, air force. Mountainous terrain. Plains. It is all of the domains intersecting each other. When you look at the battle all about the land domain, then when you talk about air, it was about what does air do to land . Really with that, what we are saying is because and most of the time that i grew up and in the complex i was in, the air and sea were uncontested really. And actually we had to keep it that way. In the army we want to make sure the United States air force has air supremacy at least wherever i am. I like that. We want to make sure the United States navy has absolute naval supremacy wherever they are. Make sure the United States marine corps has absolute supremacy whatever they are responding to crisis. Those are all given. So this is a very joint document and we want all those guys and gals to kind of really do their part as well. Now what is happening now as we move to the future, those domains previously uncontested are becoming more and more contested. Which means we no longer have the other domains being uncontested space and what we are saying those that operate on land, we may have to deliver effect needs other domains. We may have do something from land to secure the for the United States navy. We may have to do something in the space domain for Ballistic Missile defense or for our air force brethren. It is not all about land. This is about what does land do to synchronize and deliver all elements of National Power in all domains. Other point ill bring up there is the ability for us to present multiple dilemmas to the enemy. Because thats what you have do in a strategic level endeavor. You are chess players. If you put somebody in check mate, it means they still may have moves available. But wherever you move, you have something for them. They cant move without you countering their move. You cant just have a single dilemma, you have to have multiple dilemmas. You generally present single dilemmas. And that if you look on the previous slide, i have my main body of tanks and so i have one dilemma for you. If you can somehow mitigate that, then you sort of have freedom of action. What we say at the strategic level, if you want to win at the strategic level, there could be nowhere that our enemy turns that they are not contested. Thats why we have to deliver all elements of National Power. Thats why if all you can do is target somebody, thats all can you do is target somebody, eventually they will stop presenting themselves as target. So you may build the influence over the tactical level but you cant influence and compel their activity without their compliance, the strategic level unless you can stop every move they have and present them with these multiple dilemmas. Can you see down there,ant grate partners. This is part of us being a member of the joint force. And in the end consolidate games. When you operate in a tactical and operational level, you get effects there. But when you want to win at the strategic level, you have time and space and consolidate them to give you sustainable political outcomes. Because that is what war is about. Thats how you win at the strategic level. And the nature that war is by politics of other means and in other words, really quite honestly, the reason the United States goes to war is to gain some type of sustainable political outcome in the favor of our national interest. Well we are saying most of that occurs on land. So what we have do is not only provide a tactical operational effect, we have to consolidate all of those gains and all of those gains of National Power, economic, political, Coalition Partner, into sustainable political gains for the United States or why do it in the first place. You may feel good about yourself, a momentary tactical effect. But if you cant translate into a political outcome that you are focused on in the longterm, what we are saying is you are coming up with short with what we say an army is. The future of the army is to win in complex world and win at the strategic level and all limit of National Power in an unknown, unknowable and constantly changing world. And so i think that at this point we transition to i guess a discussion and in q a . Okay. And so good evening, everyone. As ms. Shoup said, im from the Rand Corporation here in washington and the way we will proceed here is general perkins and i will engage in about a 15minute conversation. And that should leave about 20 minutes for q a from the audience. So with that, sir, thank you for your remarks. And for the keeping the power point to a minimum. Three slides is most of them were pictures. Thats right. Excellent, excellent correct use of power point slides there. In reading through the latest operating concept, i think you accurately sort of get at all of these unknowns were dealing with Going Forward here. Be it the environment, enemy, the coalitions well be working with. Given all of these unknowns, how difficult is it to articulate a clear Strategic VisionGoing Forward . Particularly when you have to incorporate all these other entities that perhaps didnt have to be part of the deliberations in the past . Yes. You know, it is very complex, right . One of the things, and you know, why we actually thought a while about this, the words in a complex world, is that you, from the very beginning, you have to get into this discussion of winning. Which is very difficult. Because define that, draw a picture of it, what does it look like, et cetera. It involves multiple people. If you look back at previous conflicts, world war ii, world war i, they each had a different view. And if you look at lincoln, his vision of winning in the civil war changed multiple times during fighting the civil war. But he always had a longterm strategic look of an outcome that was sustainable for a long time. And so, what were saying is that that is critical because what it does, first of all, it forces the very tough discussions. There is no exact answer and it is probably going to change because your coalition will change. Maybe some of the outcomes that are within the realm of the possible change. People may switch sides. People have a change of heart. But if you always stay at that level, what it does is it provides a basis of understanding of what youre try doing in the longterm. And therefore, when you have discussions about a short term problem, a lot of times, if you dont have that longterm view, and is it sustainable. A lot of times, we are very clear and we talk about sustainable gains. Sustainable outcomes. That people have a view and they say, i dont think that is really sustainable, is it . It makes you grade your own homework. And you say, i probably have to do things differently. When i was Division Commander in iraq, we were the last division up north. And at that time, and there were a lot of issues and things like that and i would go around to Brigade Commanders and what are you doing and well sir we are doing this and there is this security mechanism and my unit is in the middle of it all. And whenever there is an argument, they come see me and i figure it out. Yeah, but thats not sustainable. Because youre not going to be here forever. So how are you working yourself out of picture. Youre the last commander here. So what i need you to do from now on when i come up here is you need brief me on how you are making yourself irrelevant. Thats generally not the way we look at things. The Army Officers are type a people. So we generally, in the army, have a solution of which we are the center, if im irrelevant, why am i there . Maybe youre there to build a sustainable process that as you stay out they can continue on. Thats why winning at strategic level is imperative to keep it at the forefront otherwise you will sub optimize what you are doing for a temporary tactical operational gain. Thank you for that. Okay. Thank you for that. Just to follow on the concept of win, as you are going through deliberation and draft of this document, was there ever any sort of push back on do we want to use this word . And sometimes i know the long involved process and a lot of people get a vote, but when i think of win, i think there is an insinuation that there is some level of closure. That i think certainly a recent experience in the world have been not been able to produce. So i would be curious know as you are going through the drafts, was there any sort of push back or people who felt that maybe we should be careful about how we use this word. To this day. So i probably have received more i would say a lively discussion. On whether or not we ought to put that word there. And there is a there are a number of reasons for it, quite honestly. And that we chose to put it there. I would like to say first of all, it was a product of you know, six to eight years of intensive research, focus groups, looking extensively at history and all that. The truth of the matter is, you know, we have a shorter time line than maybe hist and so we have to define the problem because i tell my staff, define the problem before we come and answer. So they came to me with a very sort of, what i call army ease overwritten description of the problem which is like two pages long. And it kind of tries to get, you know, at the very nuance world and you know, not capability and lets look for something generally favorable and all of the mentions that it went on and on and on to define the problem. I said, okay, look, heres the deal. I always tell my folks, never lose clarity in the search for accuracy. Im sure theres a very accurate description of the world we are going into. It is not very clear. So always especially when you are talking at a large level, a document like this, you need clarity. Clarity versus pages and pages of excessive accuracy that really dont provide clarity. So we went through a couple turns and we go from two pages to a page and half and okay, heres the deal. There are Large Organizations and forcing functions. Everyone tells me early in battle, thats the standard. It can be as good as that. Lets look at the problem statement. Youve got six syllables, really, thats all the guidance a four star general can tell me, just six syllables. So win in a complex world, i think thats six syllables. That is forced to bring clarity to what it is we are try doing. Can you go on and on and on and on about accurate nuances but what were saying is the first question we want you to discuss, im not telling you what the answer so win is, im just telling you, you need to focus on that and you need to come to an understanding collectively. We are talking about understanding visualize describe then direct, lead and assess. There is more to it than the four power point slide. What we are saying is if you dont have a common understanding of visualization of what some form of win means or what it doesnt mean, the problem is, you automatically will revert to tactics. And what happens is if you dont have some vision of what win is, and youre not looking at strategic level of things, you start substituting tactics for strategy. Tactics is not strategy. Ways are the tactics. But what happen says a lot of times, we confuse it and instead of having end which is the vision of win then ways to get there, then means that you work with to get there, we focus all our ways on getting more means versus our ways to achieve an end. And then we get a lot of means but it never gets us to an end because we have the math wrong. We have means you apply via ways to get to the end. You need a strategy, an system of random tactics. So it is a forcing function. Staying on the complex theory, the various entities involved now days, when compiling a document like this, how do you incorporate feedback from not just other services but also, in the boat on slide. And it has become players in some of these theaters that we find ourselves in. Do you incorporate their feedback and their input as you go through a process like this. This is very important. We want this to be sort of not just a tradeoff when we document but an Army Document and then really a National Document with regards to what the army does. So we did a number of things. The first thing that i did personally and my team did before we wrote our document is we read the Navy Air Force and marine corpss operating concept. So we could read what they are saying about themselves and how they view themselves and how they view the future. And in many ways, the foundational element and how can we enable what they do. Than we look inside the army and bring it all of the Division Commanders, all of the corps commanders, most of the one stars and out to groups of captains and we would have these sessions and we have gone through multiple versions and first of all, does this make sense . Can you understand it . Can you see it translating to capabilities . Because thats the next thing that this does. So the Division Commanders, these not people without opinions, you know. And so thats why they are Division Court commanders. They provide good insight us to. They have all of the four stars. That i went down to quantico. And i briefed the chief of staff of the air force on this and about a month ago, army staff, briefing chief of Naval Operations and navy staff on it and extensively out to think tanks and put it on the blogisphere and this is not only an invented document to make sure we are not oversimplify