We will have votes in a couple hours. We want to make sure we move quickly through this. Before i start, i want to acknowledge that our good friend and Ranking Member of the committee, frank palone is not with us because his father died. We keep his family in our prayers. I did not personally know his father, i know he raised a good son. So we thank him for that. We will continue on from there. Next, joined today also with my colleague who is wearing Denver Broncos orange. Congratulations for a super they must be a good team, because they beat the steelers. Now on with our hearing. Good more than, wer good morning. Were reminded those that seek to do us harm through a variety of harms, including biological attacks. The threats are growing and every changing. We are ill prepared to detect and respond to the threats as rapidly as needed. We have been caught flat footed too many times in the past. We face a deadly enemy we cannot see. Our methods to find it are inadequate. We may know know its there until its too late. This is frightening. The federal governments ambivalence towards biological threats must end. Today the biological threats confronting the u. S. Fall into three categories. One, naturally occurring. Two accidental and three intentional acts which are ofas terrorism. Its easier formation statements and terrorists to obtain b biological weapons than ever before. Given the ease, its difficult for the Intelligence Community to collect, analyze and produce intelligence about biological threats. The threat of a biological attack is not as remote as one would hope. The at the same time, pandemic and other pathogenic diseases are occurring with greater frequency and spreading more quickly throughout the world. As populations put pressure on remote areas and with ease of global travel, we will see more and more Infectious Diseases emerge. Since 2002, the world has seen outbreaks of sars, cholera, influenza, measles, ebola, mers and zika. Everyone has a plan until they are pufnched in the face. We were not prepared for ebola. This is what shakes the publics confidence. Instead of ensuring the u. S. Had strong central leadership, the administrati administrations answer was to serve an ebola czar. A zika outbreak threatens the continental u. S. It could have greater consequences if it brings increases in microcep hmicrocep. The latest budget request continues to leave gaps of more than 1. 8 billion in project bioshields, special reserve fund and pandemic flu Counter Measures. Over the last three years, this subcommittee has examined the impacts of and our preparedness for biological incidents. We have held hearings on our flawed response to the ebola crisis, ethe need for better preparedness, the unsafe practices by the department of defense, the handling of live anthrax. In the coming examine the response. Each topic has a common denominator. The federal government was not prepared. For years we have lunged from crisis to crisis reacting to what just occurred instead of planning for the next outbreak or attack. The subcommittees oversight work has made a difference. But i am concerned that the federal government locks an overall plan. Instead of being reactionary, we must be proactive with a new approach. Last fall, the Blue Ribbon Study Panel published its National Blueprint. The panel examined the current state of the United States related to prevention, deterrence, preparedness and response to name a few. This is not a book that should sit dusty on a shelf but one the people should read. I am pleased that two distinguished Commission Members are here today to speak about the important work of this panel. We thank you. The panels findings that we are dangerously vulnerable to a biological event because we lack leadership and overall strategy are frightening. The panel made 33 recommendations, many which fall within the jurisdiction of the energy and Commerce Committee and impact work that this subcommittee has done and will continue to do. The need for improved leadership echos throughout the report and is a theme we have heard far too often about the federal government. Without leadership, theres no coordination of biodefense research, preparedness and other issues. Without leadership, theres no strategy. The panel also makes a number of specific recommendations. We must improve our biosurveillance and biodetection capabilities. We need to detect pathogens in the air in hours and minutes, not days. Agencies already collecting Surveillance Data should share it, not squirrel it away. We need a platform that allowed for Vaccine Development that can be applied not only to what we know about but also to the ones we have not yet discovered. The energy and Commerce Committee and this subcommittee in particular must take the lead in understanding and improving our biodefense capabilities. I thank our witnesses for being with us today. We look forward to hearing your testimony. Now i recognize i Ranking Member of the subcommittee. Thank you. I want to welcome our witnesses. In particular, former congressman greenwood who sat right there for many years and who sat next to me while we had a lot of the hearings on these issues that you mentioned in your Opening Statement. I know he is just as frustrated as you and i are about the fact that we still continue to lurch from crisis to crisis in this country without any kind of unified or comprehensive response to some of these issues. When i was listening to your Opening Statement, mr. Chairman, i thought to myself, who says bipartisanship is dead, because my Opening Statement mirrors yours to the point of talking about some of the very same examples that you discussed. So i wont read the whole Opening Statement, because i do not subscribe to the adage that everything has been said but it hasnt been said by everybody. So i will put it into the record. I just want to highlight a couple of the issues. We have the zika virus going on as you mentioned right now. Were scrambling once again after the fact to deploy the appropriate resources to protect our citizens as this spreads. Last year, it was the Ebola Outbreak. We did finally organize to respond to that. Were still trying to put the systems in place to make sure that ebola doesnt spring up again. This National Blueprint for biodefense made a number of important findings on how to respond to these natural occurring threats. But also how to respond to deliberate attacks. As you mentioned, mr. Chairman, the panel made three dozen recommendations to better posture our government to respond to these emerging biothreats. Now for those of us who were here during the fall of 2001, we remember vividly those little few envelopes of anthrax that arrived on capitol hill. The chaos that it caused within congress. Offices were closed. Buildings were fumigated. Some congressional business was suspended. Thousands of staffers and members of congress lined up to get tested for exposure. Even worse, of course, some of the workers in the Postal Centers died. This was a relatively small attack. Imagine what would happen if we had a large attack in a major metropolitan area or some place else. Thats why we have to be organized to deal with these things. Thats what brings us back to the findings of this panel. You know, there are a number of really important recommendations. And i recommend to every member of this panel and every member of the audience that you read you read the actual blueprint. Because it is sobering. But i think that the top observation thats made in this blueprint is that the nation is under prepared for a bioattack because we still lack centralized biodefense leadership. The Panel Recommends appointment of a Single National leader under which preparedness for and response to biological threats could be consolidated. The Panel Recommends this authority be institutionalized in the office of the Vice President of the United States. And what the panel says is that this will, quote, ensure that biodefense will be addressed by every administration at the highest levels with adequate access to the president. I think this is a very unique recommendation and one that we should explore. And i just want to say one more thing, mr. Chairman. One of the grand traditions of the oversight and investigation subcommittee is to shine light on issues like this and to actually move the dialogue forward. So i was really gratified to hear you saying in your Opening Statement that you dont just intend to have this hearing today and let this go. I think if we really have a series of hearings diving deeply into the recommendations of the committee and take their recommendations that we have some of these hearings, we actually can make a longterm difference in how this nation is prepared. And that may be the very best legacy that not only this Blue Ribbon Panel but this subcommittee can leave. I will put my full statement in the record. I would like to ask unanimous consent to put Ranking Member palones statement in the record. I yield back. I will ask unanimous consent that any other openi ining statements be in the record. Without objection, they will be. I believe you dont have an Opening Statement. We want to make sure we hear everything and every member gets a chance to ask questions. We will move forward. Will introduce the witnesses on the panel for todays hearing. The first witness on todays panel is the honorable donna shalala. Former secretary of health and human services. She has demonstrated strong commitment to Public Service from the peace corps to the department of housing and urban development. Shes a recipient of the medal of freedom and is president and ceo of the clinton foundation. We appreciate your time. Next my friend and colleague from pennsylvania, the honorable jim greenwood, former congressman from pennsylvania. Chairman of the subcommittee from 2001 to 2004. He served since 2005 of president and ceo of biodevelopment committee. He has aided in the development of Biotech Solutions to major challenges in agriculture and health care. Dr. Tara otoole who is a senior president at a nonprofit Strategic Firm that works to facilitate cooperation between Technology Startups with the u. S. Intelligence community. Dr. Otoole, formerly served ace under secretary of science and technology at the department of Homeland Security and assistant secretary for Environmental Health and safety at the department of health. Thank you for being here. Now i will yield to mr. Flores who will introduce our next witness. Thank you. I thank you for holding this hearing today and for the courtesy of allowing me to introduce one of of my classmates and a fellow texas a a aggie and expect on Public Health. At texas a m, he oversees the largest private partnership with the Biomedical Advance Research and development authority, commonly referred to at barta for Vaccine Development and manufacture. Prior to his current role, dr. Parker had the career in public and military service including serving as a Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for chemical and biological defense. In that position,itarymilitary readiness. Dr. Parker served as a principal Deputy Assistant secretary in the office of the assistant secretary for preparedness and response at hhs and in a similar role at the department of Homeland Security. Mr. Chairman, thank you for allowing me the time to introduce dr. Parker. His leadership positions are critical to the topic before this committee. Thank you, dr. Parker, for being with us today. I yield back. And if theres no more statements, we will proceed. This committee is holding an investigative hearing. When doing so, has had the practice of taking testimony under oath. Do any of our witnesses have any ok objection to giving testimony under oath . The chair advises you that under the rules of the house and committee, you are entitled to be advised by counsel. Do you desire to be advised by counsel . All the witnesses say no. If you would rise and raise your right hand. I will swear you in. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth . Thank you. All the witnesses said i do. You are now under oath subject to t to the penalties of the code. We will entertain you with a fiveminute Opening Statement. You are recognized for five minutes. Turn the microphone and turn it close. Good afternoon mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. I submitted testimony for the record. Thank you for inviting us here to present our views and recommendations of the bipartisan Blue Ribbon Study Panel. Im pleased to be joining jim greenwood. We are here on behalf of our cochairs, Joe Lieberman and tom ridge and other members of our panel, tom daschle and former Homeland Security adviser ken weinstein. Its also good to see dr. Jerry parker who was one of our exofficials as well as dr. Tara otoole who advises all of us on this important subject. We are deeply concerned about the biological threat, whether intentionally induced, naturally occurring or accidentally released. I want to emphasize those three issues. Because this is not a report just on intentionally induced biological threat. It also covers the naturally occurring ones or the accidentally released. I want to take a moment to address the threat now, but let me recommend that you get a classified briefing at your earliest opportunity. Make no mistake, we have been told that our enemies are seriously considering the use of biological weapons. During the invasion of afghanistan, the United States uncovered evidence that al qaeda was trying to develop biological weapons. More recently, isil has gained control of enough land physical infrastructure, scientific expertise and professional military personnel to potentially create and deploy biological weapons. And they have expressed their intent to use them. Additionally, the verification protocols associated with the biological weapons and toxics are weak and do not do what the world needs them to do, differentiate between legitimate and malicious activities. We are concerned about the threat of naturally occurring diseases with pandemic potential. Its often very difficult for our scientists to guess the correct combination of viruses that will even make up the strain of influenza that will circulate the following year. Nevertheless, diseases do not have to kill millions to produce impact. There are a number of diseases that have is a fektaffected new florida and puerto rico and the u. S. Virgin islands over the last two years. Zika virus is on the move as well. In some cases, resulting in microcephali who contact it from the mother. The first case has occurred in the United States. In dallas. Which was the first city with an ebola case. This transmission did not occur from mosquitos. It was sexually transmitted. Imagine the devastating societal consequences if we cannot stop the spread of this disease. Accidental releases contribute to biological risk. Im sure that you are aware of the recent Laboratory Biosecurity and biosafety mishaps at a number of our high level laboratories. The organisms in which these laboratories work are too serious, too infectious and too deadly for us tos react indign t indignantly. Our Attention Span tends to increase and decrease as different events occur and their impacts fa s fade over time. Since i was secretary of health and human services, i have seen three administrations increase and decrease their emphasis on biological threats, usually in response to and after recovering from incidents such as the anthrax events, sars, mers and ebola. Now were all gearing up again for the zika virus. We need a leader at the highest level to take responsibility and develop a strategy and a unified budget and lead the whole of the government along with nongovernmental partners to improve our National Biodefense and to do so attentively and consistently. We recommend that that person be the Vice President of the United States. One of the few who can get the Government Agencies and the nongovernmental partners to work together. We are not necessarily talking about new programs or funding. Instead, we believe we can build on existing programs and infrastructure. Let me give you a few examples. We ought to be able to take an environmental biodetection system that was originally designed for the battlefield, for example, evaluated and if it seems useful then modify it to fulfill our needs domestically. We should see how we could build on our preexisting pervasive and familiar system of Community Pharmacies to get pharmaceuticals to localities in the midst of a biological incident and maybe create smaller caches in a