Good afternoon. Very nice to see a really large level of the audience. Its for a really fantastic panel. Also wanted to welcome our cspan audience who will be watching this excellent panel which i want to address. First introduce the panelist. To my immediately right is eloy fad can. To his right is michael duran, also senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. To his right i want to welcome someone who has not been on our panel before. Leo, i think hes a colleague of mine at talent magazine and i think hell have an interesting perspective along with michael as well. Leal i should say its not admitted in the identifications but leals family is from jerusalem for many many years for forever. So i think that hell be able to mention to give an interesting historical perspective, and very interesting personal perspective as well on june 1967, which is thats what the panel is about today, six days of fire israel and the june 1967 war, 50 years on. Again, welcome. Ha little if youd begin. Thank you very much. And thank you for coming. We are here to talk about the longterm consequences of the sixday war and rightly so. We thought it well to speak of the it ourself and the situation on the eve of its outbreak. That is fallen to me. Among other reasons im old enough to remember it from direct experience. And it was an experience so dramatic and moving that it is very hard to forget. I had refreshed reminders of it last week during the visit to israel, most of all on juvenile d jerusalem day, the annual celebration of the city. In 1967, a few reminders of its history to that date. At that time israel was a 19yearold sperm, an experiment within jewish state hood. That experiment was formally launched by the u. N. In november of 1947. In other words, israels establishment was authorized in the mode of International Multi laterallism that we now tend to regard as something i think has forgotten being israel. It remained an experience for several reason. The arabs has neighbors were opposed to its existence and even though who had originally opposed israels establishment, including the u. S. Came to merits the doubt of those support. Why . It was a reason stated on the eve of sixday war by youth meyers the american ambassador. Quote whos value to the u. S. Is primarily emotional. Balanced with a pull range of the vital centra steek political, commercial and economic interest represented by arab states. This feud was powerful in 1948. It had anticipated to the arab states on israels border, egypt, syria, jordan and lebanon and others besides would attack and cease to murder iz real state and its cradle. The arabs did attack. Israel managed to avoid the war in 1948, by israels survival did not mean peace. For the next ten years the arab states continued to reject any status with the israel and attacked it wherefore possible. But theyre ultimate ending freelily announced was to destroy israel completely, to finish as they put it, the business of 48, to remove the same of 48. Until 67 that aim remained unfull filled and was not attempted. It was thought to unite a grand coalition of arab armys such has having put together in 1948. Only then could israels enemies launch a terror attack and achieve the ultimate goals. Until 67 these conditions were not achieved and could not be. The most important reason was that the army of egypt, the largest arab army could not be deapplied to israels boarders. It could not be because of the outcome of war in 1956, a war in which israel was alive with britain and france against egypt. The i know of that war provided for the partial de Peace Keeping force that acted or was suppose to act as a buffer. It also provided for the right of navigation through the straits ofty ron for israeli shipping. All of that changed in may of 1967 and abruptly. A crises arupted that lasted three long weeks and culminated in the sixday war. Egypt reintroduced its army into the sign nigh. It demanded and received the withdrawal of the u. N. Force. Its forces moved closer to theist really border. Egypt formed a line with syria. Subsequently yo subsequently jordan joined this alliance, placing its army under egyptian command. This was a painful blow to israel, jordan then ruled what is today called the west bank. The location of west bang means some places in central israel, israeli was only nine miles. The attack from this border could destroy israel and its coastal cities. The attack came. The circle of israel was complete as it has been in 98. Many countries rushed to join the especially iraq which sent its forces into jordan. Nasa took a fatal step by closing the to israel. Nasa knew and announced that this was amount of decoration of war and welcomed the onset of that war, confidence that he would win it. Its home was fortunately stated by the president of the iraq, quote, our goal is clear, to wipe israel off the face of the map, we shall, god willing meet in tell a vif. Such revision was repeated over and over by nasa and arab leaders and i could remember vividly, to people in the United States to hear. In israel, the government deliberated about what to do. Anyone who thinks that it took a decision to go eventually to war lightly, should just consult the record. It could have no doubts that it faced the prospect of a war of ex termination. One point in the three weeks the chief of staff said its now a question of to be or not to be. But apart from making military preparations it took no definitive decision. Some in the government hoped that had a peaceful resolution might be found. But in that event, israel might have to accept the new quo. Egypts army on its border and could not its arab enemies and could still and probably would still attack sometime later at a time of their choosing. In all events an acceptable peaceful resolution depended upon outside parties and thus israel under took a major diplomatic major which lasted those three weeks. The long way to three weeks grew increasingly painful. It was painful for many of those who sympathized with israel as well. People were oblige to wonder if they were about to witness a new holocaust. Confidence in the government faltered. Eventually to restore confidence, unity government was formed and hero of 56 was appointed minister. It had its own name, the waiting. In the end, the diplomatics efforts were a total and complete failure. Israel and 3 Million People totally and utterly alone. Several of the arab states had the soviet union as an ally. Frances Charles De Gaulle reputed an old alliance with israel as well as the 1957 guarantees. Britain was sympathetic but offered no help and effectively left its own guarantees in abeyance. America too was sympathetic. All of israels were was warmer than that expressed in the judgment i cited earlier than that of u. S. Ambassador. But he was informed by the same logic augmented by cold war concerns, the possibility of a direct confrontation with the soviet union. After much consultation the most president johnson was willing to offer was re repeated message was, and this is a direct quote, israel will not be alone unless it decides to go it alone. But israel regarded such a stance in the absense of real american support as unatenable. In the end on june 5th, israel did go at it alone. And prevailed all alone in a remarkable military campaign. It was a spectacular victory by every measure and many descriptions of t let me offer one written by the wellknown historian of world war i barbra tuckman who visited israel before and shortly after the war. Quote, a people considered for centuries nonfighters carried out in june against long odds the most nearly perfect military operation in modern history. Surrounded on three sides amount of armament fighting alone and equipped by major power and having lost the advantage of surprise, they accomplished the rarest of military feats. Obtain many of exact objectives. And with absence of blunder. Not quite with the absence of blunder, but thats a longer story. We will now move to the discussion of a longterm consequences of this victory, but i would like to close with one observation of its immediate consequences of israel at that time and following on. No doubt israel would have preferred to a less lonely path of security. But having to go it alone, it proved to itself two important things. And maybe to others that it was not a mere client state nor was it unviable. It had a chance if regrettably necessarily a fighting chance to be what it declares in its National Anthem to be a free people in its land. Beyond survival there is a special virtue in that. And in the last 50 years israel has made the most of that. Thank you. [ applause ] mike, if you would like to follow up. Thanks. I will say a few words about the egyptian role in all of this and then have a couple of reflections on the longterm meaning of the war. There is a kind of enduring mystery about the outbreak of the war because everyone agrees that this is nassars war and when i say everyone, to prove that, there is a historian, that has never had a sympathetic word to say about israel and in his history of the arab israeli conflict, even he kaernt cant assign responsibility to nassar. He didnt take the off ramp and he kept escalating. And the mystery in all of this is why did he do it. Because at the time, the best units of his army were bogged down in a war in yemen. So he was totally unprepared for this conflict. And couldnt have won it. And yet he escalated and escalated to the point where at a certain after he is remilitarized the signi, he said israel has no choice. But we put israel in a position that it has no choice but to attack. So you have to say he is totally irrational or playing a game that we dont understand very well. I will give you a couple of thoughts about what i think the game he was playing. This may be one of the questions that people may never be able to answer or maybe they will be able to answer defintively, but it is a mystery that continued to intrigue me. And i think perhaps because of a lit of selfinterests, i just wrote a book about 1956. And the key is 1956. I was going to mention that. I do have a tendency to see everything at 1956. In 56, nassar lost the war against israel but won politically. Britain, france, and israel teamed up against egypt. Defeated the Egyptian Army but the super powers got involved and the United States in particular forced the israelis out with minimal concessions. The concessions being the ones that nassar overturned in 67. Emergency force in signi. And that is the world in which that was nassars greatest moment. The unstoppable Political Force in the arab world was 1956. America handed him this incredible political victory. I think in 67 he thought he could replay 56. Escalate things at such a point that even if there was a conflict with israel, a conflict that he might not win on the ground, still come out the political winner. So his major miscalculation, he made two, one of them was the military miscalculation. The israelis destroyed his air force in record time and they did it alone. In 56, they had the french to help them in the air. And in 67, they didnt it. They did it alone. So though obliterated his forces so quickly, there wasnt time for the super powers to step in and hand him a victory, snatch defeat from the israelis from the jaws of military victory. The second miscalculation he made was about the americans. Since he had encountered the americans back from when he took power in in 1952, the americans had been completely allergic to association with zionism. They were afraid to be seen on being the side of the is israelis in the war and eager to distance themselves from israel. And that is what generated eisenhowers decision to role them out of the signai. Mr. Smith. I had a discussion with harold saunders, former Foreign Service officer. And he was among those, and saunders was among those who was very interested in maintaining good relation with nassar and believed that the u. S. Association with israel was pointing the relationship with nassar. And he told me that nassar gave a speech in 1966 in which he said in which it was full of fire and brimstone and defines of the americans. And if the americans dont like it, they can go drink the red sea. They can take a flying leap and saunders said that from that moment, for some reason, i dont know why, i never went to research the exact moment on the speech and why it had such an effect. But saunders told me from that moment on, the americans at the highest level were done with nassar. He said none of us could possibly put forward a proposal to window nasser because he had so undermined his own position in washington. And that was against the background of this war in yemen. The war in yemen was a super power proxy fight. The americans, the saudi and the yemeni royalist were on one side, the soviets, egyptians and insurgents were on the other side. And we saw that in those terms. When nasser provoked this war, the americans were not sympathetic at all. And right when the war ends, the u. S. Comes up with un he is solution 242. And that is a simple commonsensical idea. When it was you know, get israel out of the signi. In the Nixon Administration where nixon, and Henry Kissinger saw israeli power as an asset for the United States and the cold war where we can use it to put pressure on the allies of the soviet you knunion and if t want to be relieved of pressure, they have to come to us. Now, we werent quite there in 67, but once you get to the land for peace idea. Incredibly important turning point. Just a couple of other thoughts about the turning skpoipoint ann i will pass it over. One, as you hear me talking and saying soviet union, United States, it was another world. It was the height of the cold war and the middle east was a proxy arena in the cold war and that war is gone. There is Something Else that happened in 67, the biggest winner in 1967 was not the israelis. The biggest winner was the saudis and it is interesting if you think about where we are today. Because after 67, the famous cartoon which produced the famous three nos of cartoons, no recognition, no negotiations, and no peace with israel. The real work was that the egyptians made a with the saudis. They cut a deal with the saudis where they agreed to end their propaganda against saudis. And marks the turning point until the moment the egyptians were, egypt was the center of the arab world. And 67 marks the moment when the saudis come into the world. That is the moment where we think of the saudis being the leading power. The other big change that takes place, and then i will pass it to leo. One is this is effectively the end of nasserism and leader of the arab world and the leading power of the israelis. We do have the 76 because will goal of 73 was to get out of the conflict. To deal a big enough blow to israel that it would wake up the super powers and help the egyptians get out off the conflict. It wasnt to use the conflict for other purposes, it was to get out of the conflict. I dont want to you have the war of attrition, and both of them were serious conflicts. But from an egyptian point of view you can see something shifts dramatically in 67. And the last point is as the egyptians move out, start thinking about how to get out of this conflict, they Start Playing up the point that this conflict at its essence is a conflict between the israelis and the palestinians and it is a question of national determine nation for the palestinian people. And israel is an outpost for imperialism and so forth. And the arabs redefine it as palestinian nationalism versus israel. Which brings the plo to the foreand that brings us with the Peace Process which focuses on the palestinian issue. Thanks, mike. I never thought about the resolution 242 as being the premise. The United States would eventually look at israel as a cold war asset. And so that is really interesting. If you could thank you. Round of applause. [ applause ] thanks. So you know, as lee mentioned, my family has been for a while. They arrived in the fifties the seven fifties which means jerusalem syndrome has run anybody the family for generations. But what i am going to sound today is going to sound profoundly crazy. The first thing that i would like to say and it is perhaps a tad uncharitable in an event dedicated to the colossal historical meaning of 1967, is that 1967 actually mattered not a bit. And here is why i say that. I say that because i went to school in Telaviv University which was established over the ruins of villages that were destroyed and abandoned in 1948. And so if you are looking for some sort of Vantage Point at which to start telling a meaningful story about contemporary israel, about the middle east and israels place for t 67 seems a bit arbitrary, and for that matter, 48 as well. 1897, when the first major group of jews descended from the first ship to repopulate in a massive way. The much too Promised Land with its previous to inhabitants. I think that in a way, what 67 did is provide this major almost distraction. He had a beautiful phrase that i am going to bungle, but it had to do with multilateral. A deeply comforting prism for which to look at this conflict. We are now looking at it and seeing something that is solvable. Here is a problem. And we can make this work because this is a problem with negotiations between two sides that are profoundly willing to negotiate some kind of solution. I think both people have a very different perspective and in a sense have always had that perspective. I think the israelis may be looking at neighbors and say remember the jebbusites and the hittites, they were much mighty empires. And i think that is a much more to use a favorite term organic way of understanding the reality that most people had, and in a way, 67 had a major 50 year detour in which everybody is like, this resolution and negotiation, and process and how do we solve it and i think we are slowly climbing away from that. Interestingly enough, that is not the really crazy thing that i have to say. The really crazy thing that i would like to say is sort of contradictory of course to the first thing it will prove that you are crazy. Thats right. In one very important and nontrivial way, 67 mattered a tremendous dealing because it revealed and i use this term in all of its almost theological automa automany 146 years after, try asking italians how many of them identify as garrabaldists. And they will look at you and say what are you talking about. At the same time jews strongly define themselves as zionist and if you understand zionism as a <