Implementation of nonlugar. I turn this panel over to David Hoffman to moderate the biographies of these extraordinary individuals. They are in your program. I will not spend our time going over those, but i want to turn it to David Hoffman for his penetrating questions and authoritarian moderation. [laughter] david thank you all again for joining us for the second panel. You heard in the first panel some discussion about the hopes and also some of the disappointments, but where the rubber meets the road is where this panel is about. Is about implementation. And as all of us know from 25 years of experience, it is one thing to give a good speech on the senate floor, it is another thing to get a missile silo closed in ukraine. And i hope this panel will help us understand how some of those accomplishments were actually carried out. It is my experience in my reporting that there were hundreds, probably thousands of people involved in this implementation. They are not all here. But in my six years in moscow, almost every week i met people that were working on ctr and going to far corners. I remember going to the enormous factory where weapons were being destroyed with senators and being surprised at the incredible effort that was going on way in the far corners of russia to destroy that huge stockpile of chemical weapons. It was not something that you heard much about in washington. It was a giant factory as big as any chemical factory i have seen. The idea of those warheads carrying deadly chemicals being brought by train into that factory with both russians and americans taking them apart, it was quite a sight to see. The big question for everybody on this panel will be how did we get to actually accomplish something with this program . We will start with sig. I think my big question for you sig, you were there very early lab with russian officials at our test sites. You were there almost until recently with the mountain remediation, decades. What is the key to Building Trust in all of this . How did you do it . Sig thank you, david. Good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. It is a great pleasure to be here with such a distinguished audience and the group that really laid out on nunnlugar for us. David, i would say, you asked a similar question before what is the key, how do we build up the personal relationships . I would say it is the personal relationships. To me, the single most important thing was captured in an american song. It is called walk a mile in your shoes. Your shoes, i say, because it was important for us to walk a mile in the russian shoes. Because people ask how did we convince the Russian Nuclear weapons scientist to go through all of these things with us . From Nuclear Weapons safety, to material security to the peoplerelated things, it was important to understand what was it like inside of russia. And david, you mentioned in your opening, that in your book, you said the russians got an inheritance from hell. That is what the nuclear complex was. When we got into the russian facilities in 1992 and we did, we were not just sitting around the conference table, we were doing experiments together. What we found out what the russian scientist wanted to do, was science. They wanted to create new knowledge. They wanted to build new things. Engineers like to build things. Scientists create new knowledge. You have all heard of the make a the megatons to megawatts. Fantastic program. There was much science in that. But we did with the russians was megatons to megagouse. Magnetic fields. We used russian explosives with american diagnostics. We created together the highest Magnetic Field ever created on this earth. In their los alamos. And when we went there, inside los alamos, and we spent weeks working together handinhand, you could barely tell who was doing what. What we found is that, to the russians, the nuclear complex was not an inheritance from hell. To them, it was the means for the revival of a great russia to Nuclear Weapons. I usually try to give the inheritance from hell to an american side. Identify the loose nukes for weapons. As you heard, there were tens of thousands of loose materials. There were over one million kilograms of enriched uranium. Loose people, perhaps, hundreds of thousands in the nuclear complex. And loose exports, the sale of everything that was not nailed down. Thats what we were concerned about. Those loose problems. That is not the way the russians looked at it. The weapons were to ensure the sovereignty of the country. Especially when everything was coming apart. The nuclear material, especially the plutonium. It was fair their children it was for their children. It was going to be burned in reactors to make electricity. Loose people or brain drain . Heavens, no. These were the best and brightest in all of russia. They were going to be the engine of their economic recovery. And loose exports, we did have some problems in the 1990s. We had some concern. But russia became a responsible nuclear exporting state. That is what they viewed as really being important. That is what they were trying to make sure that survived. We learned that by working with them. With the enormous support of the Nunn Lugar Program from here, we were able to do things together with the russian navy, and in the end there were no loose nukes, essentially no loose people. Very few loose materials. After the initial export concern, a responsible exporting state. As i like to say, when i come to washington, there is often the saying that there is plenty of blame to go around. In this case, ladies and gentlemen, there is plenty of praise and credit to go around. You just heard the american government, secretary perry, the people who allowed us to do those things in the department. Charlie curtis was our partner in all of this. Jim turner was there. So many of you. And then of course most of all, it was really the Russian Nuclear weapons scientists. Their patriotism, their professionalism, their dedication and their willingness to suffer. And they had to suffer in the 1990s to make it through. David, instead of my 10 minute presentation i gave you a few minute answer to your question. David let me follow up for one second. I cannot help but ask you, dont you think there was a little bit of denial in those attitudes . You yourself went to the leaders of the two laboratories with your little briefcase of pictures and said, you guys left plutonium in that mountain. Will you help us find it and get rid of it . I mean, it was not as if there was anything loose in this. Egfried the dangers were real in the Russian Nuclear complex. I mean, everything. Economically, things just collapsed. So yes, there were real concerns. Some of them that were quite easy to understand. For example, the fresh fuel for the Russian Nuclear navy. Some were not so easy to understand, such as, what was left behind. Andy weber and his colleagues were over there closing tunnels and doing lots of things that was not appreciated. There were other experiments done. Nuclear materials that were not blown up in a mushroom cloud. Either above or contained underneath. So yes, those things were left behind, but, quite frankly, from a russian perspective the way we finally solved the problem was with the russians, americans and the kazaks together. From a russian perspective, when they did the experiments in the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, who would have thought that test site would ever be in somebody elses hands . It was that connection that i said, did you leave something behind that you are concerned about . Or that we should be concerned about . The answer initially was that we are not going back. They did go back. Yes, that stuff was loose. , andy weberilateral worked on this for many, many years through trilateral cooperation we did manage to litigate the problem. It took 17 years. A lot of recently and stick to it of this stucktuitiveness. I would like to turn to implementation of another problem that was a little more linear and less mysterious. That is the question of the icbms and Nuclear Warheads left outside the Russian Federation at the time of the collapse. This is a source of great concern for the United States for many years, and all of them were brought back to russia. We have with us, two people who helped work on the implementation of this problem. A real arms control and cooperative Threat Reduction problem. I would like to hear more about how they actually accomplished it. I would like to start with gloria. Gloria thanks, david. I truly apologize for the quality of my voice. It is an honor and pleasure to be here with so many colleagues and friends. Some of whom i have not seen for the past 20 years or so. On the historic 25th anniversary of the signing of the nunnlugar legislation. The first thing i would like to say, as one who implemented it, was that legislation was very foresightful and brilliant. It correctly and insightfully assess the problems and the trends that it sought to address. It was well crafted to enable many of us here in the room to find Practical Solutions and problems. Our implementation of the legislation was a very entrepreneurial activity. We knew the problems and the goals of the legislation, but despite our intelligence, we did not know exactly what the situation would be on the ground, and how exactly our goals could be reached. The act provided the authority and flexibility we needed to get the job done. When a request came in, many of them very unique and unforeseen requests from the former soviet countries. For instance, remove weapons grade uranium from kazakhstan. Stand up the foundation so we the civilian R D Foundation employ russian scientists in russia while they install the operation of the ispc. In each case, we found the authority in the law that we needed to get those jobs done. Secondly, nunnlugar was and is an exercise in International Cooperation, but it has also been an example of an intraagency and interagency cooperation in the u. S. Whatever i was able to do, whatever we were able to do at dod depended on the cooperation and mentorship as a negotiator of my friend jim and the state department. The blessing of jim who came to bash the blessing of cam savage who came to our office from the Comptrollers Office in d. O. D. And knew how to work the budget and administrative issues at d. O. D. Also jack, i see you here, who is our assigned Legal Counsel from the d. O. D. Office of general counsel. Who cast a very sharp eye on the proposed agreement, and in the end always found a way to make it happen. There were so many other colleagues from other d. O. D. Offices and agencies within the u. S. Government. It was a great example of transcending the divisions that exist between agencies and even inside agencies. Finally, i would like to tell a story, because it illustrates the extraordinary cooperation we had in the former soviet union. And how it often depended on one courageous individual. In the winter of 1995, dr. Perry led a Bilateral Working Group to moscow. One of those longlost bilateral regular bilateral forums we used to have. We were at a big rectangular table. The russians were there with their various programs and offices represented from the ministry of defense, and the same from d. O. D. And i was there to brief on the nunnlugar program. I literally received a tap on the shoulder from behind. And i looked around, and there was standing a person who i did not yet know was general maslin. He said are you the nunnlugar person . I said, yes, i think so. Are you the person we talked to about nunnlugar assistance . And he wanted to talk to me so , we went off in another part of the room. He told me about his fears about the security of Nuclear Weapons, which were under his control as earlier described when being transported, serviced, maintained, stored, etc. He talked about some very specific concerns. It was the time of the chechnya chechnyian uprisings. He was concerned that there could be a hijacking on the tracks, a stoppage of a weapon s train and theft of weapons. He was concerned that there were demobilized officers who did not have housing, living on Strategic Rocket forces bases because they had nowhere to go. And that corruption or greed could lead to communication between them and their stillemployed, still in service colleagues, that could lead to the theft and perhaps blackmarket sales of a nuclear weapon. He was concerned about the reliability of their people, their personnel working on the commanding control of Nuclear Weapons, transport and storage. So he asked for talks with us and possible assistance that we might provide. I sent a long classified cable back to washington from moscow. We had some meetings in the d. O. D. And talked about how we could be helpful. Some of you may remember those meetings, that went over our experience with reliability of personnel with safety of nuclear nearns with incidents and accidents with Nuclear Weapons. We composed a team, then we went back to moscow in march. We had several days of meetings with the general and this team. A group of colonels and lowerlevel generals talking in a most extraordinary way about the problems they faced. It included disclosure of their mishaps and nearmishaps. In included discussions about the very specific personnel reliability problems they had. Included fears about chechnyans and what could happen to their Nuclear Weapons. We asked questions, it also included concerns about an antiquated way of keeping track of the whereabouts of the Nuclear Weapons. Sort of predigital era. While in transit and in storage. Our team, when asked a question, as these meetings usually went, can you be more specific, tell us more. The generals and colonels, the maslin maslin general was there sometimes at the table, sometimes elsewhere in m. O. D. They would look to him and say, can we talk about this . In each case he went like this, go ahead. Cmon, go ahead. We had that thing discussion back at d. O. D. About how much we could share and disclose. At the end of this discussion and in the months and years following, we provided assistance with detecting threats to weapons trains, help with tracking weapons by more digital means, also some sharing of experience on personal reliability, including testing and other methods. But the end of our march 1995 meeting in moscow, where we first discussed this, the general invited his team and ours to one of the seats of the patriarch of the Russian Orthodox church to have lunch and to tour the monastery and meet someone from the patriarchs office. At the end of this rather extraordinary day, which is at the end of an extraordinary week, i asked general maslin why did you bring us here . He said, and i quote, because god is watching us and watching what we do. Whether it is god or simply the ethical imperative to cooperate with the common good, this type of attitude is something we could obviously use a lot more of today. [applause] david i guess god is watching over some of this, but it requires human endeavor. I think you as a negotiator and as a diplomat have put a lot of time and effort into making some of this happen. Tell us how it worked. Thank you. Thank you very much. The diplomatic world is always divided into two pieces. What is procedure and the other one is procedure, the other is substance. You have heard a lot about the substance, i want to talk about the procedure. Between the nunnlugar legislation and the actual destruction of missiles and silos, there was another area that had to do with creating the Legal Framework. Defining what it was or what we were planning to do with our counterparts in russia, ukraine, kazakhstan. Belarus. How to allocate the funds as we started specific projects. That was a task of an Interagency Group. It was initially headed by general bill burns, father of carnegie president bill burns. I hoped one of the other could be here but let me speak a little bit about bill burns senior. He had been head of the Arms Control Agency after a distinguished military career. He had been asked if he would pick up the nunnlugar negotiations to negotiate the Legal Framework i just mentioned. He accepted. He had other things he preferred to do but he thought this was a noble cause, which indeed it was. He became the first head of the interagency delegation that traveled to various capitals to negotiate the Legal Framework. He, after the change of presidencies, decided he should step down. He was doing all of this pro bono, by the way. He wanted to spend more time at home with his family. So i was visited at that point i was at the Lewis Institute of peace on a sabbatical from Carnegie Mellon university where i had gone after leaving to department of state. Jim and bob einhorn came to see me at the institute and asked me would i take bill burnss place . I did nothing wrong about it. I didnt think long about it, i thought it was important to do so i accepted. , i was told that i had to understand that this was in interagency effort, it was not the state department in charge. All of the money came from the pentagon. And therefore, the agreements had to be signed by the pentagon representative, who was gloria duffy. So i got to sit up front and help with the negotiations. Gloria signed the agreements. In the process, i want to mention two attorneys that helped me and gloria very much, you have already mentioned one of them. Jack beard and roy gardner. Two very able lawyers from the Defense Department. I think it is fair to say that jack beard probably created this Legal Framework. It consisted of we call an umbrella agreement that describe what the scope of what the operations were going to be with the four countries we were negotiating with. There were a