Bomb, five to six bombs, by january, february of this year. Has iran accomplished that mission . Do they have enough material to do that . I dont think we see that. The sense is no, they do not. The concern was when they had 20 purity and enough kilograms up there to have maybe one but yet we dont have all the information. So we cant say with certainty they dont have that, correct . Were just looking at the declared facilities, the facilities were aware of. There may be undeclared facilities, as the iaeas indicated. And mr. Lauder and ambassador detrani, you were saying that its very difficult to monitor and verify irans compliance with the iranianu. S. Jpa agreement. Do you believe these details should have been worked out prior to any agreement starting and releasing sanctions . If you go into a negotiation, you should have everything on the table. I want to know everything you had before you move forward. I mean, would you agree with that . Sir, i dont have all the modalities of the negotiators and what they were using. I believe they gave them relief on a certain number of sanctions so they could move forward. But if we cant verify now or monitor it, we should have had a way to monitor that stuff, all those parameters before we move forward. I would hope so. How about you, mr. Lauder . I think its very important that before theres further loosening of the sanctions, which have brought iran to the table, that we do get this complete and full accounting of irans intentions and have the data monitoring thats the basis of our monitoring regime. In your opinion does the Current Situation in Irans Nuclear program or whatever theyre doing in our agreement, does it allow iran to get closer to having a bomb if we stay on the current track . Mr. Rademaker. I think the Obama Administration would argue that the current arrangement diminishes the risk of Nuclear Breakout because it limits the number of new centrifuges that iran can deploy. It limits the prevents them from continuing to enrich to the 20 level which they were doing in the past. But on the other hand, theres been some recent analysis done by the bipartisan policy center. Its on their website. Theyre no longer producing 20 enriched material, but their production of lower enriched 3. 5 has gone up by about 25 . And then what ive heard today on this panel the advantages are the progress is substantially less than the Obama Administration advertised. Right. But what ive heard on this panel today is theyve got way more centrifuges than they need to have for Nuclear Power production. And so i think were all in agreement that theyre moving in that direction, theyve been moving in that direction in the last 25 to 30 years. Playing the cat and mouse game. Do you believe that the u. S. Iranian interim agreement was detrimental to the u. S. Security, or israels security or the Regional Security the way it was negotiated, release the sanctions at the time they did . Do you think it was detrimental to do that . Just kind of real quickly because im rung out of time. I think twas detrimental on the sanctions side. I also think it was highly detrimental by basically legitimizing centrifuge enrichment in iran which at the time we said was not permitted. Ambassador detrani, what do you think . [ inaudible ]. Your microphone, please. The reporting from the iaea indicates that iran has down blended and converted to uranium oxide their inventory, part of their inventory of 20 purity enriched uranium. The iaea report speaks about the framework for cooperation. So i think what weve just recently seen from the iaea is that there has been some movement on the part of iran in response to the relief on some of those sanctions. But thats just a very interim type approach to it. Certainly if youre sitting in israel youre looking at something different. Thats different. That brings me up to my last question. Since iran do you feel like theyve abided by the terms of the agreement . Sir, i dont have all the particulars on, that but according to the iaea, the iaea most recent report is a much more positive report that ive seen in the past with the exception of the weaponization and the militarization. Okay. And if they dont abide by, that what should we as a nation do . More sanctions . Preemptive strike . Prepare for the day that they do get a nuclear bomb . Sanctions are biting. Sanctions are big. Sanctions have had impact. Theyre having impact. Im out of time. I appreciate your time. Thank you. We go to mr. Juan vargas of california. I too want to thank you, mr. Chairman, again for having this meeting and also for the ranking member. And to give us so much time. I appreciate it too. Thank you. As many of you know, ive been very critical of the interim deal. I thought it was a mistake. I believe that we first should have gotten the final deal, then we should have negotiated the interim deals. In other words, we first should have made sure that there was no path to getting a Nuclear Weapon. Then we could have negotiated these interim deals because i did think that the sanctions were working. I voted here to ratchet up the sanctions because i think you had to get to that fundamental choice, do you want your Nuclear Program and do you want to militarize it as youre attempting to do or do you want a functioning economy . We will continue to press the sanctions until you didnt have a functioning economy. I think that would have been the right way to go. But now we are here and we are here. And i think it is a very dangerous situation that were in. Because i do think were going to get to july 20th and for sure theyre going to want more time. Thats what we feared at the beginning. I think thats going to be the case. Then what do we do . Then do we say were not going to negotiate and make ourselves look like the bad guys . Then its harder to put the sanctions back on again. So where do we go from here . And i do want to comment, mr. Rademaker. I couldnt agree with you more wholeheartedly. If its a fiveyear deal, if its a tenyear deal, if its even a tenyear deal its not a deal. I mean, that is a bad deal. This is a situation where you have to make sure you can force them to comply all the way out. Because otherwise, they will just simply play cat and mouse and outlast us ten years, and then theyll get on with their Nuclear Program. So where do we go from here . Meaning were approaching this point. I dont think were going to be the monitoring and verifications, congressman. Theres no question about it. And weve talked about unfettered access, anytime, anyplace, access to all the facilities. Concern about covert facilities, concerned about weaponization. These are things that need to be drilled down and pursued with great vigor indefinitely. Right. But i believe were going to get to the sixmonth assume for a second we get to the sixmonth and they want more time. I think thats what do we do . At that point what do we do . Mr. Rademaker, you look like i think its pretty clear that if we reach the sixmonth point without having reached agreement on the comprehensive solution that there will be a sixmonth extension. In fact, the jpa at one point says it will take up to a year to negotiate this. So even in drafting the jpa they were anticipating potentially a sixmonth extension. I did want to pick up on one thing you said. You said you think the right thing to have done here would be to negotiate the final agreement and then come back and fill in the details. You know, it pains me to say this but i think in fact that is what they did. I mean, the jpa does specify the final agreement. The final agreement is that i read it earlier. The final agreement is that upon the expiration of the comprehensive solution the iranian Nuclear Program will be treated in the same manner as that of any nonNuclear Weapons state to the npt. So the end state, the final state is no sanctions, no restrictions on their ability to do whatever they want in the nuclear area. Ordinary safeguards if i could interrupt for a second. I thought the issue of having any type of enrichment program. Any type of way for them to be able to reach their ability to create the Nuclear Weapon, the heavy water facility. Thats there. I know what youre saying, and im actually not disagreeing with you. But i think that in the final agreement what i would say is if youre going to allow any kind of Nuclear Power program that had to be one that was so tight there was no way you that had to have the fuel coming from somewhere else, montrealed closely, that youd have to have unfettered access to their country and where they could potentially be hiding things. Thats the deal i mean. Because i agree with you. Thats why i think personally. And again, ive been critical of the people i think associated with this deal were very goodhearted and attempted to negotiate with a western type of nation and found out that thats not who theyre negotiating with. I think it was very naive. Mr. Lauder, could i have you comment on that . I think the extent to which negotiations continue, the opportunity that needs to be seized, and i agree with ambassador detrani in this respect, is to use that time to push even harder to expand the monitoring provisions that iran will need to undertake. Iran is different. They have violated International Norms over an extended period of time. They have not been in compliance with international agreement. It is reasonable then to expect that iran should need to undertake additional need additional monitoring provisions to build confidence in the international community, that they are changing their path. Thank you. My time is expired. I want to say i think that iran is like north korea. I believe if they get a Nuclear Weapon theyll also threaten to bomb los angeles or else and i unfortunately think that they might have the nerve to do it. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Vargas. We go now to mr. George holding of north carolina. Thank you, mr. Chairman. I think we can all agree that if the Obama Administration is able to craft a final agreement with iran that it would be a huge Foreign Policy win, at least in the eyes of the administration, a Foreign Policy win, a political win, truly in an environment of an administration that is some what bereft of Foreign Policy wins or accolades. You know, my concern is that if they achieve what they consider a win that theyll lack the political will to risk tarnishing that win by calling out a violation that we find subsequently. So my question, im going to just run down the line and have each of you all respond to this, is what internal controls are there there . Red team, so to speak, that would ensure that the politics of trying to salvage this Foreign Policy win dont trump good sense in the white house as far as calling out a violation. Mr. Rademaker, take 30 seconds, and lets go down, and by the time everyones done that ill be out of time. I honestly dont know what sort of checks there might be within the administration. Every president can structure decisionmaking on Foreign Policy in his administration in the way he sees fit. Id like to think that there are people at the Defense Department that are vigilant, that there are people in the Intelligence Community drawing attention to problems. But i dont know. I think the ultimate red team is the United States congress. And this committee perhaps that might have been helpful as the president was considering exchanging bergdahl for five taliban terrorists. Well, the good news here i think for the congress is i think one of the things the iranians are demanding is an end to all u. S. Sanctions. In fact, theyre promised that in the jpa. And i dont think the president has the authority unilaterally to get rid of all of the sanctions. He has some waivers. He has some ability not to enforce certain laws. But i think at the end of the day there are certain things that only the congress is going to be able to do. So for them to be able to fulfill their commitments to the iranians in this negotiation theyre going to need this committee and this congress to pass legislation. And that will afford you an opportunity to pass judgment on the entire arrangement. And for that reason, i would think it would behoove the administration to consult closely with you now to make sure that you are prepared to accept indeed. I dont know if thats happening. But ultimately, they need to persuade you that theyve struck a good deal and if there are details youre unhappy about its better to know that now rather than promise things to the iranians that theyre not going to be able to deliver. Mr. Lauder . I agree that perhaps the most effective red team for this will be the u. S. Congress. You will have the opportunity, im presuming to say this, as an outsider, but this is not a treaty. But you will have the functional equivalent of a resolution of ratification when you deal with the sanctions question. And that is an opportunity to express the congresss views about the types of capabilities that need to be for monitoring that need to be nurtured in the u. S. Government, that need to be funded in u. S. Government. And you can ask for a periodic compliance report. It could be the extent to which iran is complying with the agreement and what types of anomalies are being detected, what is being done to resolve that. They ask for both a periodic unclassified and a classified report. Thats certainly been a feature of other agreements in the past. I didnt used to like them when i was in the executive branch because they were a lot of work and it led to it led to a lot of internal debate, but i think its something to make sure that the iranians understand that their compliance is going to be very important to the United States across all the branches. Thank you, mr. Heinonen . Thank you. I agree with mr. Lauder and the best is actually the public opinion, that you make the deal open and open compliance reports. And this deal is important. This is important not only to the security of the United States of america but the Regional Security, and this sets a benchmark, for example, for how were going to deal in the future with north korea. This has a lot of ramifications and they dont end here. I believe ground truth will be the monitors in the field, the iaea and other countries. I believe its those foreign governments that also have access and unique insights into whats going on there. I think a strong case can be made that they can speak to compliance issues and if iran is gone on to their own way and cheating and so forth i dont think anyone will be able to conceal that aspect to it. Thank you. Thank you, mr. Holding. We thank all our witnesses for their testimony today, and i think youve given us a lot to consider as the administration continues to negotiate. I am particularly troubled that, as mr. Rademaker put it, this agreement puts iran on the path from nuclear pariah to nuclear partner. And i dont think any member of the committee is comfortable with that given the supreme leaders comments in may in particular about expectations that we might try to limit their Ballistic Missile program. As i quoted earlier, he said, this is a stupid idiotic expectation. But i didnt give you the rest of his quote, which to me is very revealing. He said, the revolutionary guards should definitely carry out their program and not be satisfied with the present level. They should massproduce Ballistic Missiles. He said, this is the main duty of all military officials. Now, hes not referring to a Space Program here. And when you combine that with a call for the head of Irans Atomic Energy Organization to add 30,000 centrifuges last month to irans existing 19,000, ignoring what the iranian officials and what their leader is saying on this subject as they move forward with their program is very concerning to me. And i especially wanted to thank mr. Angle and the other members of this committee and our witnesses for the chance today to take a good hard look at the ongoing negotiations. Thank you all very much. And we stand adjourned. Cspans new book sundays at eight includes huffingtobe post senior military correspondent david wood. Theres something that drives them to this ideal of service and the its like so many people i know who served in war, is that the intensity of the experience, the intensity of the relationships they had with their combat buddies are so strong and so pure and true that they look back on those times with longing. And so id always asked them, you know, do you wish this had never happened, and theyre like, id do it again in a heartbeat. I think theres Something Else that goes on there too, and it is that going through a near death experience somehow seems to give them so much strength and courage and optimism that i think thats one reason why they would do it again. Read more of our conversation with david wood and other featured interviews from our book notes and q a programs in cspans sundays at eight, from Public Affairs book, now available as a fathers day gift at your Favorite Book seller. The center for strategic and International Studies held a discussion monday on chinarussia relations. With former australian Prime Minister kevin rudd and former u. S. Ambassador to china stapleton roy. They discussed both of those nations increasing tensions with the u. S. Even as relations between china and russia continue to warm. This is 90 minutes. Good afternoon, everyone. My name is chris johnson. Im the freeman chair in china studies here. Its great to see so many friends to join us for what i think is going to be an absolutely fantastic panel. I couldnt be more proud of the panel we managed to put together. Obviously, an issue of tremendous concern, lots of thinking about whats going on in the