Including the second sino japanese war that started in 1937 and the u. S. Embargo of Oil Shipments to japan. This hourlong event took place at National Defense university in washington and was organized by the friends of the National World war ii memorial. I am with the world war ii memorial. With our board. Thank you very much for hosting us today. We are favored with an extraordinarily interesting and wonderful lecturer. Dr. Craig symonds, an old friend of mine, who has devoted his life to College Teaching and writing. To be more specific, a professor in the u. S. Naval academy for 30 years, during which time he , is currentlyooks finishing a book about the history of the United States navy in world war ii. The whole thing. And has also written wonderful books, including a biography of general joe johnston. What brought you to dry land for that, sir. Ateral johnston was present the funeral of his great antagonist general sherman. And my right in saying he caught cold and died himself . A case, that is the kind of fact that attracts historians and antiquarians. We are blessed to have him with us this morning. Perhaps the proudest ribbon on his breast would be from the his service during the turner revolution. 60 and 85ween ages of might know about that. Admiral Stansfield Turner was president of the Naval War College from 1972 to 1975 and he was sent there by his superior basically with a hunting license to make the place stern and rigorous. They are up there in newport, rhode island, playing golf and having a good time. I do not know how many of you met admiral turner, but he took that advice seriously and he hired relatively young military officers and professors and insisted the curriculum be changed so that all entering officers would be required to begin their studies with a reading of the peloponnesian wars, the most important book on political and Literary History ever written. This was a year of great change. One of the stars in the change was the gentleman on my right who survived a great teaching career at the Naval Academy. He has been invited back several times as a visiting professor and has received the academys highest award for excellence in teaching. Join me in welcoming dr. Craig symonds. [applause] thank you, everyone. I am delighted to be here at the National Defense university, in part to honor the legacy of the work by Hayden Williams that led to the establishment of the world war ii memorial. Also in mainly to commemorate december 5 anniversary of the japanese attack on the American Fleet at pearl harbor, 75 years ago tomorrow. The image that we have been looking at on the wall is the uss arizona in its death throes. For many americans, it is a metaphor for what happened that day. December 7 is a date that still echoes in the collective national memory, as roosevelt promised it would. When he prepared the speech he was going to give to congress the next morning, roosevelt dictated it out loud to his secretary, voicing the punctuation as he did so. Yesterday, december 7, 1941, a date which will live in World History. After he finished dictating that, he sent grace off to type it up in a trip ive been spaced manuscript he could work with. And she brought it back and he had a pen and rewrote the first sentence, deciding it lacked the impact he wanted, so he crossed out the words World History and wrote in the word, infamy. Well, i am having no luck whatsoever here. Here we go, in the upper right corner. And so, we have thought of it ever since. Infamy. A surprise attack on a sunday morning on a nation at peace. To most americans, it was a complete shock. Surprise is the most common adjective applied to this event. Like all historical events, it had a long back story and a critical context. In fact World History, the , phrase f. D. R. Originally wrote in his speech, had quite a lot to do with it. The roots of this stretch back a more than a decade. I think we need to back up to at least 1937 when japans military leaders initiated a conflict they labeled rather benignly the china incident which soon became a full scale war of invasion and conquest. It may seem more than a bit absurd that a small Island Country of fewer than 100 million should seek to conquer a continentsized nation of 780 million. Part of it was hubris. In 1937, the japanese were infected by a National Confidence and National Pride that was rooted in the assumption of a racial and cultural superiority. Not only over the chinese, but over everyone else on the planet. They believed that they were exceptional. And not bound by the normal rules that applied to other nations. Inaddition, japans military 1937 was a relatively recent creation, modern, wellequipped, well organized. And chinas military was none of those. At first, the japanese found the war in china easygoing. Their army swept aside the opposition and occupy great swaths of chinese territory. Soon enough, that progress slowed and the japanese found enmeshed in a seemingly bottomless quagmire. In most cases, the chinese armies they fought dissolved from the battlefield and, in retreated to fight another day. In many ways, it was their vietnam. Frustrated by chinese tactics, convinced by their own propaganda that the ungrateful chinese were refusing to accept the nine liberation at the hands of their superiors, the japanese responded with what was then unprecedented fury, unleashing their aircraft and artillery on chinese civilians in chinese cities, conducting wars against civilians and the elusive chinese army. This was a form of warfare all too common today that was unusual then. Included whatt western newspapers labeled the rape of nanking in 1937. The numbers are in some dispute. But perhaps as many as 300,000 chinese died in the japanese assault on nanking. Most of them were civilian and many of them were women and children. Photographs, like this one, became infamous throughout the world. Appeared in american newspapers and moviehouse newsreels and they embittered americans even further toward the japanese. That same month, december 1937, japanese planes attacked and near 1 american gunboat nanking. The fact american boats were operating there says quite a bit about the dysfunction of the japanese government at the time. The japanese suspected the americans were there to gather information. And although they insisted the attack was an accident and apologize, the incident further poisoned japanese and american relations. It was evident to americans that the japanese were the aggressors. Self evident it remains today. And the chinese were victims. Are, wers that we thought someone ought to do something about it. There was no enthusiasm for intervention. But the United States sought to modify japanese behavior by applying economic sanctions. Again, there is nothing new under the sun. In the late 1930s, the United States was in a particularly strong position to apply economic sanctions, especially against japan, because america was then the worlds leading producer and exporter of crude oil. And by a large margin. The discovery and exploitation Texas Oil Fields in east had made the United States the worlds oil king. In 1940, the United States was not only the largest oil producer, it generated six times the amount of the number two oil producer which was venezuela. Middle east production at the time was negligible. So, throughout the 1930s, we pumped oil out of the ground as fast as we could and sold it for overseas for pennies on the barrel. The japanese had no oil and that is still true. What that means is that the United States has its hands on the control valve that supplies d oil to japans industrial economy. If japan did not behave, the United States could close the valve anytime it wanted. Despite that implied threat, japans behavior, at least two american eyes, only got worse. Iner the european war began 1939, the success of the German Forces created opportunities for the japanese in asia. The swift defeat of france and holland and the circumstances of britain meant that the asian colonies of european states had become virtual orphans. Borneo, java, and sumatra were in the Dutch East Indies, as well as the british colonies in red, were all rich in proven oil reserves. French indochina was a source of rubber and tin. And because japan had none of these resources, the temptation to seize them was all but irresistible. To Japanese Army officers in particular, the move into south asia was not only economically appealing. In their it is a curious and kind of contradictory vision. To complete the conquest of china, they needed access to the european colonies. They would have to fight a war with britain and holland and the United States and the Japanese Army leaders saw that as acceptable, if it enabled resolution of the war in china. In for a penny. In for a pound. Roosevelt certainly knew that americas near monopoly on oil was a potential key to influencing japanese behavior, but he was reluctant to play that card. To use the modern euphemism cutting off oil to japan was the Nuclear Option. It would force japan into a corner where her leaders would have no choice but to knuckle american demands or to find oil elsewhere. This obviously being production in the west indies. There is hardly any question about which of the options they would choose. And calculating the response of other nations to whatever leverage, cost is a critical factor. Tougher is not always better. Roosevelt sought to calibrate the pressure he applied on japan rather carefully. He wanted to apply enough pressure to encourage the japanese to change their behavior, but not so much that it attacked their National Pride, forced them into a corner, or triggered a war. Since then, there have been a few conspiracy theorists that have suggested in fact roosevelt wanted a war with japan, and their argument goes with this. Roosevelt was committed to ensuring the survival of england in its survival of germany, and that is true. In the spring of 1940, they focused on lend lease on being the arsenal of democracy. As england staggered under the blitz, he began to fear that supplying the tools of war might not be enough. The only way he could make that happen was to provoke a confrontation. In pursuit of that, he directed the u. S. Navy to become progressively, increasingly aggressive against the german uboats in the north atlantic, even issuing a shoot first directive after there was a torpedo at the uss greer in september. Risking, and according to some even inviting, a german declaration of war. If that was his goal, it would not work because hitler were not take the bait, he was forced to subject to the soviet union before taking on the United States. The japanese would oblige, according to the conspiracy theory. Provoking a war with japan would provide the United States the socalled backdoor to japan. It was in pursuit of this they claim roosevelt deliberately backed japan into a corner. The most extreme version of this theory holds roosevelt knew the japanese were about to attack and withheld that information from the operational commanders so that the attack would come as a bolt on the blue that would ensure a furious response from the American People and of course congress. There is no substance to this theory. It was precisely because roosevelt was determined to focus on the defeated germany that he wanted to keep japan at arms length. He wanted to slow its expansion southward if he could, but he was determined to avoid an open confrontation until after germany was beaten, just as hitler was determined to avoid confrontation with the United States until stalin was defeated. Roosevelt moreover, roosevelt had no assurance whatsoever that a japanese attack on the United States would convince congress to enter the european war. It is significant that when he went before congress on december 8 to deliver his infamy speech, he did not ask for a declaration of war against germany. Only japan. It was hitler who asked for the declaration of war against the United States. There were hawks in roosevelt cabinet who had sought to rack up the pressure on japan especially by cutting off oil exports, but roosevelt wouldnt do it. Instead he approved an embargo of highoctane Aviation Fuel which could hardly be categorized as military in nature while insisting that the sale of crude oil should continue at the same level as in past years, as the historian Jonathan Utley has put in a nice phrase, roosevelt wanted to bring it to its senses, not to its knees. Others in the cabinet however did, and they got their opportunity in the second week of august 1941 just two months before pearl harbor. Roosevelt sneaked out of town in the kind of cloak and dagger stating that he almost boyishly loved, he stole away from washington on the supposed fishing trip. Off marthas vineyard, he boarded admiral kings flagship the cruiser augusta which carried him to Placentia Bay on the coast of newfoundland where he and Winston Churchill met for a fourday conference. Here they are. Their military advisers and commanders are right behind them. This is during a Church Service aboard the hms prince of wales. The meeting produced what has become known as the atlantic charter, but fb fdr made no Firm Commitment about american involvement. Churchill was greatly disappointed, but the fact that the two men had not met at all was significant. While fdr was away at this meeting, the assistant secretary of state, dean acheson, one of the hawks i mentioned earlier, and who also headed the foreign funds control committee, refused japans application for the credit to buy the oil. In effect, cutting off oil exports. Since 80 of japans oil came from the United States, that provoked immediate crisis within the japanese government. When roosevelt returned from his meeting with churchill, he felt he could not reverse addisons decision without looking in resolute, and so the decision stood, and it was decisive. The japanese had 18 months of oil in reserve, and they had to choose quickly between backing down to the americans or forging ahead with the conquest of south asia. For tojo and the other Army Generals in tokyo who were now fully in control of the japanese government, it was inconceivable that they would kowtow to the americans merely for the privilege of buying their oil. Imagine if saudi arabia or iran or other countries insisted that we remove all of our troops from the middle east as a precondition for buying any oil. The only other option for the japanese was to obtain the oil from those orphaned European Companies of British Malaya and the Dutch East Indies. The commander of the Japanese Imperial navy was this fellow admiral yamamoto. He had opposed the war with the United States from the start. He had spent to two tours in the United States and had seen the spindle top oil fields and the production plant in detroit. He knew his country had virtually no chance against such an industrial behemoth. Once the decision had been made, he insisted the only way japan could survive that was to cripple the American Battle fleet at pearl harbor in the first few days of the war. That, he argued, would by japan a sixmonth breathing space to secure a south asian resource base, and perhaps it could hold out long enough for the americans to weary of the war and agree to a negotiated settlement. Almost no one in japan genuinely expected to win the war with the United States as in defeating its military and dictating peace. They did however expect that by holding out long enough, they would wear down the americans and erode their resolve to continue a war of 5, 10, or 15 years. The japanese ambassador to the United States, nomura, seen here on the left with the secretary of state, knew none of this. He wanted to seek a settlement, unaware the decision for war had already been made in tokyo. Hull however did know, or at least she suspected. For some time, the United States government had been able to break the japanese diplomatic code, information from which was called magic in washington. In this november, hull obtained a copy of a dispatch to nomura telling him that if he did not Reach Agreement by november 29, it would be too late. According to that, things would automatically happen. The interception of that cable was enough to convince American Military leaders to send out an alert. Emerald harold stark on november 27 minced no words. This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. The target of japans imminent aggressive moves, start wrote, might be the philippines, thailand, malaya, borneo, or maybe all of us. The army chief of staff also sent a warning to