I am with the world war ii memorial, and i want to thank you for joining us today. We are favored with an extraordinarily interesting, and i think you will agree, wonderful lecturer. Craig simons is a friend of mine , and he has devoted his life to College Teaching and writing. To be more specific, a professor at the u. S. Naval academy or 30 years. During which time, it is a book he has published about 38 books. He is currently finishing a book about the history of the United States navy in world war ii. The whole thing. He has also written some wonderful books including a biography on joe johnston. What brought you onto dry land for that one, sir . [laughter] he was present at the funeral of general sherman. In any case, these kinds of facts attract all kind of historians and antiquarians. We are blessed to have dr. Simons with us and, speaking figuratively, the proudest ribbon on his breast would be his service during the turner revolution. If there are people between the mightf 65 and 80, you remember. Stansfield turner was president of the Naval War College from 1972 to 1975, and he was sent there by his superior with the hunting license to make the place stern and rigorous. They are up there in newport, rhode island plane golf playing golf and having a good time. I do not know how many of you met admiral turner, but he took that advice seriously and he went out and hired five or six relatively young military officers and professors. He insisted the curriculum be totally changed. Would be required reading their study by one of the most important book on military history ever written. So, one of the stars for this change was the gentleman on my right. He has survived a great teaching career at the Naval Academy and has been invited back several times and has received the academys highest award for excellency in teaching. Join me in welcoming dr. Craig simons. [applause] simons thank you, everyone. To be here and to honor, in part, the legacy of Hayden Williams that led to the establishment of the world war ii memorial on the national mall. But also, i want to commemorate the anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. The image that we have been looking at the wall behind me is the uss arizona in its death throes. For many americans, it is a reminder of what happened that day. December 7 is a day that still echoes in the collective national memory, as roosevelt promised it would. When he prepared the speech he was going to give to congress the next morning roosevelt dictated it out loud to his secretary, voicing the punctuation as he did so. Yesterday, december 7, 1941, a date which will live in World History. After he finished dictating that, he sent grace off to type it up in a triple spaced manuscript. She brought it back and he had a pen and rewrote the first sentence, deciding it lacked the impact he wanted, crossing out World History and wrote in the word, infamy. Well, having no luck whatsoever, there go. [applause] [laughter] the upper right corner. So, we have thought of this ever since. Infamy. A surprise attack on a sunday morning on a nation at peace. To most americans, it was a complete shock. Surprise is the most common adjective applied to this. Like all historical events, it had a long back story and a critical context. History, thed phrase originally written in his speech, had quite a lot to do with it. The roots of this stretch back a decade. I think we need to back up a little bit too 1937, when the Japanese Military leaders initiated a military conflict that they labeled rather incident. He chinese but it soon became a fullscale war of invasion and conquest. It may seem more than a bit absurd that a small island nation should seek to conquer a continent sized nation. Part of it was hubris. In 1937, the japanese were infected by a National Confidence and a National Pride that was rooted in the assumption of a racial and cultural superiority. Not only over the chinese, but over everyone else on the planet. They believed that they were exceptional. They believed they were not bound by normal rules that applied to other nations. Inaddition, japans military 1937 was a relatively recent creation. It was modern, wellequipped, and most of all well organized. The Chinese Military with none of those. At first, the japanese found the war in china to be easygoing. They swept aside the opposition and occupied swaths of territory. Soon enough, the progress slowed. The japanese found themselves in a seemingly bottomless quagmire. They won great victories. A inmost cases come most cases, the chinese armies they fought dissolved from the battlefield and, in many ways, it was their vietnam. Frustrated by chinese tactics and convinced by their own propaganda that the ungrateful chinese were refusing to accept the nine liberation at the hand of their superiors. The japanese responded with then fury with their chinese civilians and chinese cities, conducting wars against civilians and the elusive chinese army. This was a form of warfare that was unusual then. Notoriously, it included what the western newspapers labeled the rape of nan king. The numbers are roughly estimated, but as many as 300,000 chinese died in that assault. Most of them were civilian and many of them were women and children. Photographs, like this one, became infamous throughout the world and appeared in many newspapers and newsreels. Americanstered the ever further against the japanese. In that same month, japanese planes attacked and sank a navy gunboat. First, the very fact that United States navy and boats were sperating on the inland river of china does not speak highly of the Chinese Government at that time. The japanese suspected the americans were there to gather information. They insisted the attack was an accident and apologized, offering to pay indemnities, but it further poisoned japanese and american relations. Further self evident to americans that the japanese were the aggressors. Self evident it remains today. The chinese were victims. As we are, we thought that somebody ought to do something about it. There was no enthusiasm for intervention by jack United States troops in asia. But, the United States looked to modify japanese behavior by applying economic sanctions. Again, there is nothing new under the sun. They applied economic sanctions , because america was then the worlds leading producer and exporter of crude oil. And by a large margin. Fieldscovery of the oil in texas had made the United States the worlds oil king. In 1941, the United States was oilonly the Worlds Largest producer, but it generated six times the amount of oil as the number two producer, venezuela. So, throughout the 1930s, we pumped oil out of the ground as fast as we could and sold it for pennies on the barrel. Japan, by contrast, had no oil at all. That is still true. What that means is that the United States had its hands on the control valve that supplies oil to the japanese industrial economy. If japan did not behave, the United States could close the valve anytime they wanted. Despite that implied threat, the japanese behavior only seemed to get worse. When the european war began in september 1939, the success of German Forces there created opportunities for the japanese in asia. This would defeat of france and holland and the circumstances of britain meant that the asian colonies of those european states have become virtual orphans. Borneo, java, and sumatra were all rich and proven oil roven oil reserves. French indochina was a source of rubber and tin. Japan had none of these, and there was a temptation to get them was irresistible. For army officers, the move into south asia was economically appealing, and it offered a way out of the chinese quagmire. It is a curious and kind of contradictory vision. To complete the conquest of china, they needed access to the european colonies of south asia. To achieve those resources, they would almost certainly have to britain,ar with both holland, and quite possibly the United States as well. The Japanese Army leaders saw cost if itacceptable enabled resolution of the war in china. In for a penny. In for a pound. Roosevelt certainly knew that america is your monopoly on oil was a potential key to influencing japanese behavior. But he was reluctant to play that card. ,o use a modern euphemism cutting oil to japan was the Nuclear Option. It would force japan into a corner that would force it leaders to knuckle under american demands or find oil elsewhere. The elsewhere being the dutch east indies. Given the deepseated National Pride of the japanese government and its citizens, there was hardly any question between which of those options they would choose. In calculating response of other nations to whatever leverage you want to apply, culture as well as cost is a critical factor. Tougher is not always better. Calibrate theto pressure he applied onto japan rather carefully. He wanted to apply a pressure to encourage the japanese to change their behavior, but not so much that it attacked their National Pride, forced them into a corner, and trigger a war. Since then, there have been a few conspiracy theorists to suggest that roosevelt wanted a war with japan. The argument goes like this roosevelt was committed to ensuring the survival of england in its war with germany. That is true. On lend lease ending the arsenal of democracy. As england staggered under the blitz, he began to fear that supplying the tools of war might not be enough. The active american participation might be necessary. Since he knew that the American Public did not want any part of getting into another foreign war, the only way he could make that happen was to provoke a confrontation. In pursuit of that, so the theory goes, he directed the u. S. Navy to become aggressively increasingly aggressive against german uboats in the north atlantic. Firstsuing a shoot directive. Risking, and according to some, even inviting a german declaration of war. If that was his goal, it did not work, because hillard did not take the bait. Didas determined hitler not take the bait. He was determined on subduing the soviet union before he went after the United States. Perhaps then the japanese would suffice . By provoking a war with japan, it would provide the United States with a socalled backdoor to the war. The most extreme version of this theory holds that roosevelt knew that the japanese were about to attack, and he withheld that information from the commanders so that the attack would come as a bolt from the blue which would ensure a furious response from the American Public and congress. There is no substance to this theory. Becauserecisely roosevelt was determined to focus on the defeat of germany that he wanted to keep japan at arms length. He wanted to slow its expansion southward, if he could, but he was determined to avoid an open confrontation. After germany was beaten. Wanted to avoid confrontation with the United States until after stalin was beaten. It is significant that when roosevelt went before congress , deliver his infamy speech he did not ask for a declaration of war against germany. Only japan. Who declared war on the United States two days later. And japanese lords,the in for a penny and japanese warlords, in for a penny. In for a pound. Approved an embargo on highoctane Aviation Fuel could be categorized as military in nature. He insisted that the sale of crude oil should continue at the same level as in past years. As one historian put it nicely, roosevelt wanted to bring japan to its senses and not to its knees. Other members of the cabinet date. They got their opportunity to months before pearl harbor. Roosevelt sneak out of town for a clandestine appointment. A kind of cloak and dagger staging that he loved. He stole away from washington on a supposed fishing trip, and then he secretly boarded the augusta which carried him to the south bay of newfoundland. On august 5, he met with Winston Churchill for a four day meeting. This was during a Church Service aboard the hms prince of wales. What hasng produced become known as the atlantic charter. Fdr made no Firm Commitment to churchill or anyone else about american involvement. Churchill was greatly disappointed in that. The fact that the two men had met at all was significant. While fdr was a way at this meeting, the assistant secretary akerson, one of the hawks i mentioned earlier, refused japans application for the credit to buy the oil. In fact, cutting off oil exports. Since 80 of the pants oil came from the United States, that decision provoked an immediate crisis in the japanese government. When roosevelt returned from his meeting with churchill and learned what had happened, he felt he could not reverse the decision without looking it esolute. Irr and so, the embargo stood. The embargo force the japanese to choose quickly between backing down to the americans or backing for forging ahead of thee conquest salvation of asia. For tojo, it was inconceivable that they would count how they would bow down to the americans as far as the sale for oil. The only other option for the japanese was to obtain the oil from those orphaned colonies of rich malaysia and the dutch east indies. Japanesender of the Imperial Navy was this fellow, admiral yamamoto. I see this cut off the top of his head here. I apologize, admiral. He had a supposed war with United States at the start. He had served two terms coming two terms,e and he had seen the oil fields in texas. He knew his country had no chance against such a industrial behemoth. Once the decision to go to war had been made, he insisted that the only way japan could survive was to cripple the American Battle fleet at pro harbor in the first few days at pearl harbor in the first few days of the war. He argued that would buy japan a sixmonth breathing space, and perhaps it could hold out long enough for the americans to weary of the war and agree to it negotiated settlement. To a negotiated settlement. Almost no one in japan in january in japan almost no one in japan genuinely expected to win the war with the United States as in defeating its military and dictating peace. They did however expect that by holding out long enough, they would wear down the americans and erode their resolve to continue a war of 5, 10, or 15 years. The japanese ambassador to the United States, nomura, seen here on the left with the secretary of state, knew none of this. He remained in washington to seek a settlement, unaware the decision for war had already been made in tokyo. Hull however did know, or at least she suspected. For some time, the United States government had been able to break the japanese diplomatic code, information from which was called magic in washington. In this november, hull obtained a copy of a dispatch to nomura telling him that if he did not Reach Agreement by november 29, it would be too late. According to that, things would automatically happen. The cable was not enough to convince American Military leaders to send out an alert. Emerald harold stark on november 27 minced no words. This dispatch is to be considered a war warning. The target of japans imminent aggressive moves, start wrote, might be the philippines, thailand, malaya, borneo, or maybe all of us. The army chief of staff also sent a warning to Army Commanders in the pacific. A shooting war, marshall wrote, could start at any moment. By the time those messages arrived in oahu, the Japanese Carrier strike force was already at sea. It was commanded by this man. This is admiral kyuchi nogumo. A warrior by instinct, nogumo fretted constantly over the smallest detail. Occasionally he would call Junior Officers into his presence and solicit their reassurance things are going ok, right . You could even sense is insecurity i think in this photograph. In spite of that, it was nogumo who was tasked with the job of taking a 30 ship task force across the Pacific Ocean to strike the American Battle fleet in pearl harbor. American commanders from the white house, pentagon on down doubted the feasibility of any such strike, not only the likelihood that even the possibility of such a strike. It was not even unlikely that tiny japan would choose to go to war with the mighty United States. It was in their view logistically impossible for a major strike force to cross 3000 miles of open ocean, refueling en route, and going. No one could do that. Yamamotos view, it was too risky not to do that. To him, it was the only way japan had a chance of surviving. Nogumos fleet got underway on the 26th of november, the day before the war warning reached oahu. And president roosevelt signed a declaration in washington declaring the last thursday in november to be called thanksgiving. The americans were very much aware that war with japan could break out as marshall put it at any moment. As evidence of that, let me share with you the front page of the kilo hawaii tribune on november 30. Let me show you, nearly everyone knew the war was in fact imminent, but it is also clear that no one, certainly no o