Of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, which we know as fisa. Two former Staff Members are with us and will be with us to help provide some Historical Context and understand the significance of the 40yearold video that you were about to that you are about to see. From new york city, Frederick Schwarz who was the committees chief counsel is with us. Here in our studio in washington in washington d. C. Is elliot , maxwell who was counsel to the committee as a his designee in pennsylvania. Thank you for joining us. In this installment of our series of connected work 40 years ago of the Church Committee into the work of u. S. Intelligence agencies, we will focus on the committees investigation into the National Security agency and the Fourth Amendment rights of american citizens and where they come into conflict. To get us started, lets watch a clip from october 29, 1979. Sen. Church this morning, the committee begins public hearings on the National Security agency, or as it is more commonly known, the nsa. Actually, the agency remains unknown to most americans either by its acronym, or it for name. In contrast to the cia, one has to search far and wide to find someone that has even heard of the nsa. 40yearold video of the Church Committees work. That was the chairman of the committee, frank church of idaho and immediately to his right was the 39yearold chief counsel to the committee, Frederick Schwarz who was our guest joining us throughout this series. He is with us in new york. Elliot maxwell here in washington d. C. Today, in the wake of 9 11, the nsa is something of a household word for anyone that follows the news in politics. How wellknown with the agency in 1975 . Mr. Schwarz hardly at all. The joke was the nsa stood for no such agency, and was not meant to be discussed at all and was not generally. It was to have the hearings on the nsa was one of the most hardfought issues within the committee. I think it was a quite close vote and again, not all along not at all along partisan lines about whether we should have a public hearing but we decided to have a public hearing. There was dispute as to whether we should provide the names of names of reveal the the companies that for 30 years had given every single telegram, every day to the nsa. We voted again very closely to do that. Actually, the wonderful staff member who uncovered that, britt snider had recommended that we , not disclose their names and i disagreed with him because i said, look, they violated the rights of their customers and they did it for 30 years, and so they deserve to be mentioned. Another thing of attitudes, i remember speaking to the general counsel of the nsa when we began getting information and indicating we needed to get more information, and he said to me, but the constitution does not apply to the National Security agency. That was an interesting idea, that the constitution did not apply to a whole agency. I think i know what was in the back of his mind. Their work was met to be mostly, meant to be foreign. They were meant to be doing things overseas, largely. My rejoinder to him was, of course, the constitution applies to the nsa when you are doing things that affect americans and affect americans within america. But elliott may remember more details about that it was a controversial issue within the committee where actually you could not predict who was on what side at all and it was quite a close vote about whether we should have the public hearings on the nsa or just issue some report without a public hearing. While you are thinking about that, wasnt it also difficult to get the nsa director to testify . Mr. Maxwell i think that was another issue. The nsa is a peculiar beast. And it was the only reference to the Legal Authority for the nsa was a provision in the espionage act about the disclosure of signal intelligence. This is a large agency with activities around the world, a giant vacuum cleaner for information, and it rested on the Legal Authority of a crime to disclose its product. That was an odd thing. At that time, if you went to a r booksre and looked about the cia or the nsa or about the fbi, you would come up with one or two. That is all. Nobody knew anything about it. Nobody knew what was being done or how it was being done, and it was remarkably effective at what it did. It also was a creature of the defense department, and the leadership was a military officer because the primary support was for defense activities. And military officers respond to the chain of command. And they do what they are told absent some really extraordinary , reason not to. And nsa was being told, and partly in the context of the vietnam war and protests against it, was being told to target people beyond that which they would target normally outside of the country. He i spent six months going up every day to nsa, and the conversations i had at the time, which i think were genuine were that we wanted to know what we are allowed to do. We are not going to fight about the restrictions. We will do what we are told to do. We will honor what we are told to do. We are being told by our chain of command to do these things and there is nothing to say that we cant. And that was extraordinary, and they acted inappropriately, they acted improperly. They violated the rights of americans, but they were doing what they were told, largely, not aggressively going out and saying, i want to do more and more and more in the United States, but saying, if my commander tells me to do that, then i will do that. Much of the work of the Church Committee, people who are watching will hear echoes in the recent debates in the postterrorism investigations, and we have another clip that will also resonate. This is of general alan testifying before the committee about the development of watch so watch lists. So lets watch it. 1967 to 1973, requirements for watch lists were developed in four basic areas. International Drug Trafficking, president ial protection, acts of terrorism, and possible for support and influence on civil disturbances. In the there was president ial 1960s, concern voiced over the massive flow of drugs into our country from outside the United States. Early in president nixons administration, he instructed the cia to pursue with vigor intelligence efforts to identify foreign sources of drugs and foreign organizations and methods used to introduce illicit drugs into the United States. Elliot maxwell, it is a must so we can have the same testimony today. Mr. Maxwell absolutely. I think that is one of the great lessons from the work of the committee, that one has to be constantly vigilant when power can be exercised in secret. , but whens now, then the next crisis comes, the same questions will be asked and the same forces will be pushing for more and more and more, and it is an object lesson that we have to be vigilant. Before we show a longer portion of this, anything to comment about the context for what we are about to see . Mr. Schwarz i think you always have to have in mind that some of, many of the missions of these organizations are important, vital to the country, legitimate. And in a way, one of the tragedies of where the agencies go beyond the bounds of what they should go, is if they can undermine their ability and the reputation to do the things we want them to do. And with that thought, lets watch from 1975, portions of the Church Committee hearing on the nsa and Fourth Amendment rights. This one was recorded by nbc cameras at the time. Sen. Church the hearing will please come to order. This morning, the committee begins public hearings on the National Security agency, or as it is more commonly known, the nsa. Actually, the agency remains unknown to most americans, either by its acronym, or its full name. In contrast to the cia, one has to search far and wide to find someone who has even heard of the nsa. This is peculiar because the National Security agency is an immense installation in its task of collecting intelligence by intercepting Foreign Communications. The nsa employees thousands of people and operates on an , enormous budget. It is expensive computer facilities comprise some of the most complex and sophisticated electronic machinery in the world. Just as the nsa is one of the largest and least known of the intelligence agencies, it is also the most reticent. Sweuites in messages it world messages around the , but gives Little Information about itself. Even the legal basis for the activities of nsa is different from that of other intelligence agencies. No statute establishes the National Security agency or defines the permissible scope of its responsibilities. Rather, executive directives make up the soul charter of the agency. Furthermore, these directives failed to define precisely what constitutes the technical and intelligence information of which the nsa is authorized to collect. Since its establishment in 1952, as a part of the defense department, representatives of the National Security agency have never appeared before the senate in a public hearing. Today, we will bring the agency from behind closed doors. We have prepared ourselves exhaustively. We have a particular obligation msa and light nsa in light of its tremendous potential or abuse. It has the capacity to monitor the private conversations of american citizens without the use of a bug or a tap. The interception of International Communication signals test the job of the nsa, and thanks to modern Technological Developments it does its job very well. The danger lies in its ability to turn its Awesome Technology against domestic communications. Indeed, as are hearings of the houston plan demonstrated, a Previous Administration and a former nsa director favored using this potential against certain u. S. Citizens for Domestic Intelligence purposes, while the houston plan was never fully put into effect, our investigation has revealed that the nsa had in fact been intentionally monitoring the overseas communication of certain u. S. Citizens before the houston plan was proposed and continued to do so. Continue to do so after it was revoked. This incident illustrates how the nsa could be turned inward and used against our own people. It has been a difficult task of this committee to find a way through the tangled web of classification and claims of National Security, however valid they may be. To inform the American Public of deficiencies in their intelligence services. It is not of course, a task without risks, but it is the one that we have set out for ourselves. The discussions which will be , held this morning our efforts this morning our efforts to identify publicly certain activities undertaken by the National Security agency, which are of questionable propriety and dubious legality. General alan, director of the nsa will provide for us today the background of these activities. And he will be questioned on their origins and objectives by the committee members. Like the cia and the irs, the nsa too had a watchlist containing the names of u. S. Citizens. This list will be of particular interest for us this morning, so we will take up another important subject as well. The dominant concern of this committee is the intrusion of the federal government rights of u. S. Citizens that have been violated the cia, fbi and irs. In previous hearings, the nsa has not escaped the temptation to have its operations expanded into provinces protected by the law. While the committee has found the work of the nsa on a whole to be of high caliber and properly restrained, and has tremendous respect for the professional caliber of the people that work there, the topics we explore today illustrate excessive and suggest areas where legislative action is desirable. That is why we are here. This complex and sophisticated electronic capability is the most fragile weapon in our arsenal. And unfortunately, i cannot elaborate on that because that would not be proper. Public inquiry on nsa i believe serves no legitimate legislative purpose, but exposing the vital element of our intelligence capability and unnecessary , risks, risks of knowledge and the chairmans own statement. In the chairmans own statement. It does authorize nsa inquiry and this has been done very thoroughly in closed sessions. Beginning in 1967, requested requesting agencies provided names of agencies, some of whom were u. S. Citizens to the National Security agency in an effort to obtain information which was available in Foreign Communications as a byproduct of our normal intelligence missions. The purpose of the lists varied but all suggest a Common Threat , in which the National Security agency was requested to review Information Available through our usual intercept services. The initial purpose was to help determine the existence of foreign influence on specified activities, specified activities of interest to agencies of the u. S. Government. With emphasis than on president ial protection and on civil disturbances are occurring civilbances disturbances occurring throughout the nation. Later, because of other developments, such as Widespread National concern over such criminal activity of Drug Trafficking and acts of terrorism both domestic and international, the emphasis came to include these areas. During the early 1960s, requesting agencies had asked the National Security agency to look for reflections in international medications of certain u. S. Citizens traveling to cuba. 1967 to 1973, requirements for watch lists were developed in four basic areas international Drug Trafficking, president ial protections, acts of terrorism and possible foreign support or influence on civil disturbances. In the there was president ial 1960s, concern voiced over the massive flow of drugs into our country from outside of the United States. Early in president nixons administration, he instructed the nsa to identify foreign sources of drugs and foreign organizations and methods used to introduce illicit drugs in the United States. In 1970, the bureau of narcotics and dangerous drugs, asked the National Security agency to provide communication intelligence relevant to these foreign aspects. They provided watchlist with some u. S. Names. International Drug Trafficking requirements were formally document in the one instance in august, 1971. Which foreign suggest or intercepted for specific watchlist purposes was the collection of some telephone calls passed over international medications facilities between International Communications facilities between the United States and south america. The collection was conducted with specific request of the bureau to produce intelligence information on the methods and locations of foreign Drug Trafficking. In addition to our own intercept, the cia was asked by nsa to assist in the collection. The nsa provided the cia names of individuals from the watchlist and this collection lasted for six months. The cia stopped because of concern of the activity exceeding cia statutory restrictions. With respect to holy domestic communications, is there any statute that prohibits your interception thereof or is it merely a matter of your internal executive branch . My understanding is the National SecurityCouncil Directive defines our activity with foreign medications and with Foreign Communications and that we have adopted a , definition consistent with the Communications Act of 1934 and therefore i think that is. Do you believe you are consistent with the statute, that there is no statute that prohibits your interception of domestic communication . I believe that is correct. Nothing further. The interception began in 1969 and as we described him as and as we described, as somewhat formalized in the process in which these messages were handled. That had begun in 1967. In the initial communications, is it true that one of the equally important aspects was not to disclose the nsa was doing this . That appears in the documentation. Yes. What was the reason for not disclosing to the other intelligence agencies, because this information only went to other intelligence agencies, what was the reason for not disclosing to the other agencies who were the consumers, that nsa was not doing this . It is hard for me to answer because im not exactly sure as to what the feeling was of the people at the time. My understanding is the concern was that the people of nsa felt it was terribly important that the activity be solely related to foreign intelligence and that , by delivering these kinds of messages to an agency which also had a Law Enforcement function, there was a danger that the material would be