Moved me in equal measure. Iifather fought in world war on the canal and absolutely magnificent work. Of anthe author authoritative look at the end game of the pacific war, and most recently macarthur. I asked if there was a subtitle, and he said no, the man stands alone, in need of no subtitle. I am currently working on a narrative, a trilogy to the so lets give him encouragement. He was in the historical consultant in the hbo series. Richard will be speaking today macarthur, and drooling postwar japan. I give you Richard Frank. [applause] Richard Frank thank you. Thank you, rob, for that generous introduction. Pleased thatlarly he did not accuse me of the dignified. [applause] [laughter] i was at the Conference Center a couple days ago, at the end of the conference, there were certain remarks and the explained that at centers, the british army trains lieutenants and he told us about how they have various tactical and other problems that they gave him, but the also like to talk about immoral issue into these problems. One recent exercise involved a scenario very much along the lines of the famous drop on the fortified battery on the night before dday, it was heavily fortified and had heavy artillery that could threaten transport. It was for a plan for them to drop in and capture the battery. The scenario goes along to that point and instead of having over 700 troopers, the only have hundred 60, and then they suing this, this year, waiting at the rendezvous point, five french civilians appear what do do with them . The tenets come back and announces that they are deadlocked. Three of them believe that to maintain operation security, shoot the civilians. The other three are appalled. You cannot just take them and shoot them, it is much too noisy. [laughter] so there is a moral thread that kind of leaves through my talk basicand it involves two elements, both at believe are very much connected. Let me start with the first. The enormous literature on the occupation of japan from 19451952 generally treats it as a great triumph, or at least an overall success, if flawed. But that literature is overwhelmingly concentrated on political, economic, and social issues. In my judgment, that literature conspicuously ignores or underplays what is the most critical moment of the occupation, the first year when the occupations paid hung by a fate hung by a thread in the face of two humanitarian crises, one involved epidemic diseases, and the second involved famine. The occupation was led by Douglas Macarthur whose title was Supreme Commander of the allied powers. It provided an economic of scape, which he was known by. His command was known by that to the occupation. The ward had disrupted in degraded japans Public Health. Malnutrition had rendered the entire population more susceptible to diseases. 6. 5 million japanese personnel and civilians were being repatriated to the homeland. They were all potential carriers of deadly infections. The situation created a perfect storm for rampaging lethal epidemics. In fact, 650,000 people would contract Communicable Disease during the first three years of the occupation. Nearly 1000 of them died. As sad as these numbers are, they represent a small measure of the peril facing the japanese. A peril defeated by occupation authorities who worked in extremely close collaboration with japans own medical personnel. The medical element of the occupation was under a colonel, career armyams, a officer and a trained neurosurgeon. Neurosurgeons at the top of the pecking order. He was involved in extensive medical planning during the war, particularly planning for the occupation of japan, and his foresight in terms of stockpiling material there would save many japanese lives in the coming months. He was dynamic, authoritarian, extremely harddriving, tactless and hyper efficient. This may not have made him a first choice for dinner companion, but the man for vanquishing diseases and he was the man for the hour. He arrived as a type this outbreak threaten japan. In short order, there were some 7000 cases and 615 deaths. The epidemic threatened to release typhus in to japan. Sam set control of type is as is typhus as is first priority. He organized a thousand american and Japanese Public Health personnel to confront the disease. And 800 newly created Public Health centers. He personally swung into personal action in osaka and oversaw the dusting of 500,000 people in four days. In total, 50 million japanese, or two thirds of the population were dusted with ddt. Nearly 13 million inoculating during the antityphus effort. For several months, there were no cases of highly lethal cholera. But japanese patriots from china introduced the disease in 1946. Cholera is an extremely deadly disease. Of cholera,utbreak the group of 17,000 japanese being repatriated to korea of resulted in 11,000 deaths. By august 1946, medical authorities identified 1200 cases of cholera in japan, most in port cities. General sam saw to it that 35 Million People, almost half the population of japan, where vaccinated against the disease. There were no more cases of cholera after december 1946. So it was that the medical textbook list of other diseases like smallpox. Sams efforts are seeing dressed are believed to have touched of 96 ofed total japanese population. No other element affected so many japanese. Sams second major front was Public Health. Under his direction, there was a upgrade in the educational licensing and practice for positions, dentist, and veterinarians. He squared up Public Health efforts in multiple dimensions. In many cases, it must be emphasized he expanded upon early efforts by Japanese Health care providers. Indeed, he worked rigorously to work in collaboration with the japanese when japanese historian said that american japanese cooperation during the occupation was at its zenith in dealing in the medical spear. The combined efforts of the japanese and american Public Health efforts in 19461949 dramatically reduce the incidence of the following diseases. Here is some idea of how effective they were. Further, tuberculosis had been prevalent in japan and the death rate was among the highest in the world. 50 ofunted for 12 to all the deaths in japan in the mid the concentrated efforts 1930s. During the occupation reduce the death rate by 40 between 19461949. Overall, sams effort in reforming and strengthening the Health System proved dramatic. This is the metric of that success. Between 19331940, before Armed Conflict with the u. S. , the annual death rate was 18. 7 per thousand persons. The rates01951, that plummeted to 8. 1. A reduction literally of one half. The preeminent japanese scholar would write that his efforts saved 3 million lives. Amazingly, this was the lesser of the mass saving endeavors during the occupation. An 18yearold american soldier, ato, arrived in japan has the occupation began. He was shocked to witness japanese fathers come up to the fences around american facilities and try to pass over their children to put them in the hands of americans so that they might eat and live. He saw japanese sifting through garbage left from americans. Our own their hard weinberg was president and witnessed similar scenes and gis finding ways to give foods to starving japanese. Devastated lived in tokyo where the family meals included grass. She had been warned that americans are great or killer, so the first time she saw americans, she ran. They cant care, but they proved kind. They could tell she was hungry. They offered her a strange food and to assure her it was not poison, they ate some of it themselves. She then took it and it was spam. She reports, she still loves spam [laughter] which places her in a very low percentile of the world population. [laughter] one later wellknown japanese scholar recalled that at his university, they planted Sweet Potatoes on the lawns and later dug them up to cook and eat. On saturdays, they searched for grasshoppers to eat. Four decades after the war, he and a large number of other japanese recoil at the site of his wheat potato. The stories put a human face on wars like hunger, but to be precise, the japanese nation not only based hunger but it was confronting famine. Famine has been defined as quote the shortage of food or purchasing power that leads to death from starving or hunger induced diseases. The connection between starvation and disease is very close and intimate. They had no indication that it really was a generalized problem and few indications of food problems. The most comprehensive assessment had confirmed that japans food supply was nowhere near collapse. The premise that the japanese taste of food crisis framed the occupation policies. As did the promise that japanese andcreated their own plight it was the job of the japanese to remedy it. Directions issued to macarthur provided that the japanese functioning in the occupation would have told up responsibility for japans economy, including feeding the population. The directives additionally commanded macarthur that there would be no gratuitous and that was the exact word gratuitous distribution of American Food to the japanese. Macarthur and sams became aware of this. First and ago delete and then efficiently. By october 1945, Staff Officers were warning that japans food supply and Distribution System might totally break down in the latter half of 1946. This would endanger the home mission of the occupation. Macarthur took three immediate measures. First, he ordered the transfer of all storage and equipment , including food that had been held by the Imperial Army and navy to the japanese civilian authorities. The problem was not a great scandal. 70 of the said already been looted by the japanese before the occupation began. Second, he ordered the u. S. Would feed its own Occupation Forces. This is very significant because japans policy throughout areas that it occupied was that the local areas had to supply food to the occupying armies. This had disastrous effects on many places, particularly in vietnam where 1. 5 million vietnamese starved to death in 1945. Undoubtedly, the decision to make sure that we fed our own troops saved thousands of japanese lives in the coming months. Third, he cast aside the prohibition of the using u. S. Food stamps to feed japanese by ordering 3. 5 million tons of food to japanese that have been stored for the invasion. They shipped macarthurs options. First, the urgent crisis involved urban, not the rural population. Most verbal self suppliers fared well. A few urbanites had previously scorned them. The second problem was the lack of food and lack of data on the food situation. And the fact that massive amounts of food was being hoarded in rural areas. This made it impossible to arrive at a precise figure at how much food was actually available in japan, especially during the first critical year of the occupation. Macarthur turned to the japanese government for basic backs. Rice was a major foodstuff. It was harvested in september and october and november commenced what the japanese call the rice year. In 1945, the rice harvest was devastated by cold weather, typhoons, floods, and a lack of fertilizer. The fertilizer had been converted to arm production. The japanese government reported the rice harvest was only 6. 4 5 million metric tons, about 60 of the norm. It was by far the worst harvest since 1910. Food imports had completely ceased. These have provided at least 15 of the food supply. The japanese minister of finance in october 1945, publicly announced that 10 million japanese would die from the operation without food relief. They insisted the japanese government maximize production. The basic problem of food rtage was much aggravated excuse me by additional impediments like transportation disruption, the hoarding and diversion to the black market. In september, macarthur announced only 200,000 u. S. Soldiers would be needed for the occupation. An announcement popular with the american spec on, but this meant that staff had to rely on the japanese government for most of the work and food election and distribution. Some scholarship maintained that staff had no Economic Policy worthy of the name before 1947. The more recent scholarship emphasizes that they had a food policy from the start, they had an Economic Policy from the start, and it was the food policy. Macarthur and his staff recognized that feeding the japanese people was vital to achieving the goals of democratization and militarization set by washington. The two cannot be separated. No voice was louder than macarthurs in existing that the United States had an obligation to feed the japanese. At first, macarthur made the request loudly as something to prevent unrest and disease. When this produced a tepid response, he went to plan b, scare the hell out of them. He sent a cable describing the rice harvest as the worst in 30 years. He warned the ration of 1000 calories per day could not be met for may. To sustain the food situation, without food he asserted it would be disaster, poverty, hunger, and disease. He said it would spark uprisings of a major character. Macarthur demanded that washington either provide him food or soldiers. He passed on the request that these are questioned the showing to the president or that if the food is not provided, there may be no future question as to the chain of responsibility. Macarthur was the only american officer willing to send a message like that back to washington. Washington did not immediately respond, but they did send a food Investigation Mission to examine whether the situation was as dire as macarthur was reporting. They quickly wrote back that the situation was not quite as serious as macarthur painted it, it was serious indeed. This was followed by the appearance of former president Herbert Hoover was with a u. N. Mission. He affirmed the food situation was extremely dire. He had printed to his report a comment that without food imports, the japanese would be in conditions like the concentration camps. Maintaining order, much less economic recovery, would be impossible. These two definitions helped pave the way for food imports. Although harrison and hoover moved washington to except that the food situation in japan was indeed very critical, the remaining factors that curbed washingtons willingness to ship food. These included a Worldwide Food shortage, japans status as a former enemy nation, and the needs of allied nations and liberated areas are good. In addition, some of the allies were particularly concerned that the americans were favoring the japanese over some of the other liberated areas and their own peoples. It must be stressed that the actual official ration was not nearly enough to sustain life. Famously, a japanese judge who was profoundly disturbed by the fact that the majority of persons brought before them on Economic Crimes because of a search for food, he instructed his lack to be the only the official ration. He died. He was not the only case of that there was. They were required to go off the on the official ration by home production, the black market, charitable organizations, emergency distribution, and imports. The government confronted a crisis with respect to collection to the harvest and confronted a crisis with respect to collecting the rice harvest. Typically, the government held between 85 to 95 of the rice quoted in february. In 1946, they had only collected 60 . Farmers were suspicious of the government. Additionally, the social dislocation appointing of before the next fall harvest all 14 led to undermining the quota system. There was the black market, which was offering far higher prices than the official rates. In the first months of 1946, the rationing system was on the verge of collapse. To equalize food distribution, they started transition deficit areas of surplus from surplus areas to deficit areas. And to gain some cooperation with officials. There was an important appeal by the emperor himself that imports would not be distributed until the deficit transfer program had been completed. These actions improve the collection situation, but in may 1946, tokyo residents receive a ration of 775 calories in their daily distribution. Food demonstrations erupted nationwide. By may 19, over a quarter of a Million People demonstrated in a give us rice rally in front of the palace. Were near theey point of mass starvation. The evidence seems very clear that an American Food shipments proved crucial to heading off what couldve been mass famine. On this there seems to be no real dispute. When we get to the exact figures, the evidence is very murky. Ive been through quite a number of secondary and primary sources. I find it impossible to totally reconcile all of the figures. Heres is basically what we know and do not know. It was previously mentioned macarthur had accumulated about 3. 5 million tons of American Food, stuck that had been stockpiled for the american campaigns. Some of this went to korea, who was also in a serious situation. Some of it was held as a reserve against the catastrophic supply failure in japan. There is some evidence that most of this food that had been brought in for the stockpiles had been distributed by the time this summer was breached. We do not know where this tonnage was attributed. Betweenow for sure that may and october 1946, during the most critical months of the food crisis, some 594,000 of metric rice equivalents were imported in the form of canned goods. This may not seem like much, but bear in mind that the crisis involved about half the population, the urban thrillers, roughly 36 Million People, and the height of the crisis fell in the rice year, so if you assume that have of the rice harvest went to the urban population, and the periods we were looking that means half of the normal period, the regular rice the solution domain shouldve october been around 1. 6 million metric kind. Mentor tends. The imported u. S. Food alone with cap added 37 to the total a