Panelists in the most difficult position of any panel in any event which is standing between resistance and the bar. But there is extraordinary substance on this panel, and the intent is to turn us forwardlooking. I would like to turn over to ambassador john ordway, our partner in kazakhstan. John, it is an honor and a pleasure to have you here as our moderator. Amb. Ordway thank you very much. We are facing the future with an urgent set of problems and to prove they are urgent we are going to have a little time to deal with them. Let me just say i really liked from the beginning what bill perry said about the challenge of this separation of the variables and what we are going to do with this panel is separate those variables and address them separately. I would like to recall what the general said that he is optimistic, and the time to renew the work we have been talking about is not somewhere over the hills. There is it is not over the hills, but i expect there is still a lot of terrain to traverse to get there. That is what the members of the panel should talk about. Et me start with ahmet uzumcu we have seen progress to get sarin gas and other chemical weapons out of syria during the civil war. But there is still a lot going on besides all this great success. What are the lessons from your experience . And what are the Biggest Challenges ahead to getting to the goal of the organization which is a total prohibition of chemical weapons . Mr. Uzumcu thank you. I consider it a great honor to participate in this 25th anniversary celebration of the most Important Program for reducing the threat of weapons of mass destruction. Let me first acknowledge the outstanding contributions of senators nunn and lugar. I wish to make a few remarks about the progress of illuminating the chemicals Weapons Program and the global ban on chemical weapons. There are three aspects of the work of our organization in syria. First advice the second concerns the continuing use of toxic chemical weapons, and the third is about teaching and understanding. Objective the elimination of the nuclear Weapons Program, there can be no doubt that in the midst of a widespread civil war, the Syrian Chemical Weapons posed a serious threat to the general population. It could have led to a wider regional attack. There have been reports of these of chemical weapons in 2013 in syria. An investigation by the United States confirmed the use of the gas in a suburb of damascus that killed 1400 people. Such attacks led to a looming International Crisis in the wake of calls for military action. The framework document was the foremost intervention for infusing the tension defusing the tension and eliminating the syrian chemical Weapons Program. This was concluded in a few days, and we all knew that this would not have happened if we do not have the nunnlugar experience in the past. The key elements of the Framework Agreement provided for special procedures for the of theious elimination syrian Weapons Program. This wasnt the first time that the organization was going to get involved in an active war zone on an ambitious target base. We prepare the plan and submitted it to the executive council. This Implementation Plan for the uns joint mission involves an operation and verification at each step. It needed to be carried out with the Syrian Civil War shifting constantly. The target was tons of Chemical Warfare materials that needed to be packed at multiple locations before being loaded onto the cargo vessels from norway and denmark. Several production facilities were destroyed, and those which were above the groundwork raised were razede ground to the ground using explosives and those under the ground were flattened. The experience of those who were associates of the Reduction Program was essential in assisting us. We worked very closely with u. S. Officials for the plan of removal. The fact is that insured success of this difficult undertaking are the following. First, cooperation between the United States and russia. Carrying forward the framework remainnt, the countries engaged with each other in the face of the work in syria. Recently, i had regular meetings until recently, i had regular meetings with the ambassadors of russia and the United States in the hague. Second is coordination with contributing state parties. The United States was particularly important considering the Financial Support it provided in the process of removal of chemical weapons from syria. The Logistic Support provided by the United Nations has also been crucial. The removal and destruction of serious chemical weapons did not conclude our work in the country. In the face of credible allegations that chlorine gas had been used as a chemical weapon, i established an investigation in april of 2014. The investigation came under attack from an unknown source. Fortunately, all the team members remained unharmed. Since then, there have been a significant number of other incidents that have substantiated the use of clean as a chemical weapon. It was also confirmed in instance of the use of sulframite. In response to the finding, the secretary council established the joint investigative mechanism which mandates to identify the perpetrators of chemical weapons in syria. The findings are deeply disturbing thus far as they confirm the use of chemical weapons in syria, identify and identifies the units the Syrian Armed Forces and isis as responsible. They have adopted this with great concern and condemn it all condemn in all possible terms the use of chemical weapons in syria. A breakdown of consensus on such a vital issues as these of chemical weapons is not good. Adding to the context of our work in syria, is the question syrians Weapons Program. A team of experts called the Declaration Assessment Team has been involved with syria in their efforts to clarify several outstanding issues. The purpose was to arrive at a declaration that will be regarded as complete and accurate. I have continued to underscore this matter to bring it to a closure. I have also urged the syrian republic to declare all parts of of the Syrian Scientific Research center in damascus as relevant to the chemical weapons. In accordance with the decision, they will be required to conduct additional inspections. These will cover the facilities. Futureords now about the of the office. Next year, the organization will complete 20 years of operation. There is much that has been accomplished to make this a congressman worthy of celebration. The experience has assisted us in developing its inspection regime. Despite the risks and challenges, our work extends out as one of the most important assignments that the organization has successfully undertaken and continues to fulfill. The operation in libya is another example of the positive role that Member States play. Our membership is nearly universal with 192 states partners, and we hope that the countries that have not yet joined the commission will reconsider their positions. Cooperation is critical in an era where terrorism has been a huge concern. There has been a steady improvement in this area to programs offered. The United States supports many such projects including in the process of enhancing security and safety act chemical plants. Here again, the fingerprints of the organization are unmistakable. The challenges faced by the International Community unders or the need to remain strong and effective. We need to focus more on the preventative aspects of security. This is possible only with the support of Member States. As my brief remarks highlight, the United States remains crucial to our efforts and it is my goal to make our world free from the scourge of chemical weapons. Thank you. [applause] amb. Ordway thank you very much. So, turning from a weapon that use at initial, major the beginning of the 20th , we will turn into a weapon that got its use at the beginning of the 20th century and that is Nuclear Weapons. You spent your life working on Nuclear Proliferation and keeping Nuclear Weapons secure. We seem to be at a turning point here. We have a new u. S. Administration coming to town and is sending some signals that are a little different from the ones we have been used to. And we have both u. S. And russia embarking on various stages of the Nuclear Modernization programs. As secretary parry said, is it possible to modernize in a constrained way . Is it possible to keep the framework at we have had and still manage to do modernization . Or maybe you have some other topic you would like to get in the Nuclear Weapon field . Im not goingn to compete with my friends and in defense programs, but i would clarify that we are not allowed to modernize our stockpile. We extend the life of our weapons through engineering but we do not have a Modernization Program as russia does. Im on this panel realizing as we set down that i am the only current sitting u. S. Government official on the panel so with the tv cameras rolling i will speak my mind as i usually do. This event is difficult to control, because a lot of us have not seen each other in a long time, and it is really a kind of reunion. These are people who not only have worked in the former soviet union, but we have to bump into each other in iraq and in libya or syria, because the nature of this work is not constrained to any one locality or geography. What we learned through this program although it was born of a particular point in time, around the collapse of the soviet union, and these programs were particularly wellsuited for that time. It does not mean that those programs are only suited for that time and circumstances. We have learned that over the years. I spent last week in vienna at the i. E. E. A. Nuclear conference on security along with 2000 of my closest international friends. It was the single largest conference of its type the i. A. E. A. Has ever held. Note none of their other conferences even come close. That to me says a lot about what all of us started 25 years ago. That focus on the importance of Controlling Nuclear material, of physical detection of material controls, and counting and all of the disciplines human broad building programs, security culture, radiological security. We spent a week, and many of you were there. We spent a week steeped in discussion. Over 50 ministers participated , and many of them were engaged in an interactive exercise. To talk about how we deal in a practical sense with these issues. That is enormous. We started with two countries, the United States and russia and the other former republics, but it has now graduated into a global issue which we may have seen somewhere back in the past. But we could not have conceived of where this would have gone. From there, i want to go to a couple of observations. So, the United States and russia what do we still do well together . That is important. We still do some things well together. One of the most important things we still do well together is repatriate high risk material. The u. S. And russia have been doing this for many, many years. We just finished successful removal from poland, and poland is now considered heu free. There are others we will continue to work on. This has been a marvelous partnership. We have worked all over the world in this regard, and there is no indication from either side that we want to discontinue that work. So that is one. Implementation of the joint conference in plan of action with iran. Again, nonproliferation, material control and monitoring, partnerships throughout russia has been a very exceptional partner in the implementation. I can remember leaving the state department in 2002 to go off to the National War College when ironic iran was one of the top nonproliferation concerns and coming back it was still the top nonproliferation concern. Going to the academy when iran was the top nonproliferation concern and coming back, it was still the top knopfler relation nonproliferation concern. Somehow, we were able to make that change, because we were able to Work Together respectively. We just heard about the serious the Syrian Chemical Weapons removal. There are some places where we together effectively. Maybe those places are more outside russia than inside russia these days. And that is perfectly fine. Is there a roadmap that we can use . I claim no pride of authorship, although i may have had something to do with its editing here and there, but, in 2009, the National Academy published a report called Global Security engagement, a new model for cooperative threat reduction. I see jim reed nodding his head. You had to do that report, because Congress Told you to. But sometimes good things come out of that. Focused on the reviving a relationship and putting it on a different footing. Putting it on a partnership , peerbased footing. There, never able to get but if we are going to do it again that is where we should start. I still have a copy in my office and refer to it often even with male staff about what Partnership Means and what it can look like. Sometimes the partnership with russia from our agency, from my ministry, is difficult, because we dont have a ministry anymore to work with. We work very effectively with Atomic Energy through all of these programs, and our counterpart is now a state corporation where, in some senses, we cooperate, but in other senses, like commercial nuclear power, we are competitors. And so, it is a mismatch in a way, but it is what we have. So, how do we make of that relationship work effectively . And i would go back to one last point before i close there is a quality to science to science relationships that transcends a lot of the political and other disruptions that we are now experiencing. Historically, there is that connection between the United States and the soviet union and russia. I am a Firm Believer that reviving and allowing some of that relationship to rekindle can be a pathway back to some sort of larger relationship. I am not sure exactly where we start. I know that we would like to begin to implement an agreement that we negotiated a couple years ago on research and Development Cooperation between the department of energy and rosada. It is a new model of cooperation that talks about each side supporting its participation in any project. It is the peer to peer we are all seeking. Im still hoping we can get back to that point. If the new administration finds ways to push that door open, i think that would be a significant step forward. Thank you. Amb. Ordway thank you very much. [applause] amb. Ordway thank you for providing us with some rubber that can meet the road and list up some of those hills. Next onambassador my list is ambassador kairat umarov. An old friend and colleague who is been dealing with these issues for a long time. You were involved with the movement to close the test sites and he was president of the Nuclear Committee summit this year. This may look like the last Nuclear Security thank you, ambassador. First of all i would like to congratulate the nunnlugar program with 25th anniversary. I know that you felt because on december 16 we will be celebrating our own independence and the 25th anniversary of the establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations. Its kind of a landmark milestone in our relations with the United States and it is a Great Program which did a lot just in 25 years. Imagine so many things have been done. Now when we are talking about it, i think most of us here are kind of being proud of what we have achieved. A 25 count threshold is how we can think about what we had done and where we are going. I think the National Security archives are doing a great job looking at the papers, looking at the archives and returning to the kind of roots of how this whole thing developed. To my mind its a good thing to do because it reminds us how we cooperated in the past and today i think we are at the point when we have really to look back to understand how we are going to go in the future. Because whatever is said today and i was patiently listening to , all of the good ideas which were expressed today i think all , of them are good to implement and find how the trust could be built and that could be the foundation for further improvement for the work on this program. Let me just say a few words how we see the further cooperation on this particular program. The governor of kazakhstan has been working with nti for some time on two projects, and one of them is a low enriched uranium fuel ban which were going to put in operation next year. You know, i think that is a very good project which helps to ease concerns among the Member States of iaea that we will have a physical reserve