Missile defense over a number of decades starting on capitol hill, House Armed Services committee in the late 80s, early 90s and continuing on through my time including as undersecretary of defense in the Obama Administration. We have a great panel here toda youve youve already met tom karako, senior fellow in the International Security program at cis, director of the Missile Defense system. And tom will talk about in particular his report Missile Defense 2020, next steps for defending the homeland. Dr. Laura grego, thank you for being here today. Laura is a Senior Scientist in the global Security Program for the union of concerned scientis and and also has a recent report entitled, shielded from oversight, the disastrous u. S. Approach to Strategic Missile and and well speak to that and a number of other issues, i think. And our third panelist today, major genre tired fran. Plans and policy for norad and northcom and headed up several commands for army, missile and air defense and one time director of test. So its a great group. I want to thank you, general, especially coming to pinch hit for Keith Englander from the Missile Defense agency who was unable to be here today due to a schedule conflict. I want to say a couple of words to kick off and then well turn to the panelists today. And indeed as was mentioned earlier by senator sullivan, Trump Administration is kicking off a major review of u. S. Ballistic Missile Defense posture and policy. If we harken back to the 2010 Missile Defense review conducted by the last administration, i think its notable that it placed defense of u. S. Homeland as number one priority for Missile Defense. Our allies and partners can contribute to thee der Missile Defense for defense of their own key asset population indeed to support our Forward Deployed forces. No no one else would do the job or should do the job of defending the United States for us. It also made clear the prior review of the Obama Administration that our Missile Defense system is aimed at north korea and iran. And that is not intended to effect strategic stability visa vis russia or china. One of the recommendations in toms report would say shift that focus a little bit and include as a goal the ability to engage Ballistic Missiles in very limited numbers from russia or china. And well want to talk about that issue and any potential implications for stability. But clearly as we think about Missile Defense today, the driving consideration is north koreas continued missile testing, its continued efforts on its Nuclear Program and the reality that while north korea poses an uncertain threat to the United States homeland today, it does pose a threat even today. And that threat is likely to grow in the coming months and missile Missile Defense is not the only part of the u. S. Approach to that problem and to our allies approach, but its got to be a fundamental part. Currently a lot of qualitative improvements under way in the system. I i give great credit to Missile DefenseAgency Director for pushing these along including for modified kill vehicle, for improvements to command and control, bmc cubed and sensors as well. A lot of work underway. One of the questions well want to discuss is whether the pace is appropriate on the qualitative side and whether there are any places that are being missed. And of course well want to discuss as we get into the panel whether we should be looking today to grow the system beyond the current 44 ground base interceptors that are deployed and that we would like ready for operations as necessary. Theyll be among the issues we discuss, theyll be among the issues that the new administrations Missile Defense review will have to discuss. And i think well get a good start today. Well start with tom. All right. Well, good morning. So im tom caraco, i want to thank jim and other panelists for joining and again thank senator sullivan for coming out this morning. As jim mentioned im going to give an overview of the report of Missile Defense 2020. And on the basis of both the ndaea and president ial directive as jim mentioned the administration will be looking at Missile Defense policy, posture and strategy. And also by explicit president ial direction the relative balance between homeland and regional. You know, every month or so north korea lately seems to be doing something new in terms of missile development. And theres other new threats out there as well. And i think that given the circumstances we find ourself in, i would not be surprised to see a relative rebalancing in favor of homeland at least relative to where weve been in recent years. And we kind of hope that this report lays out a menu of options or kind of a roadmap for how one might do that. Before i get started i want to acknowledge a couple folks including my coauthors, ian williams and wes rumbah both put a put a lot of work into this i want to i want to thank the many smart people in and out of government who let us bend their ear about its its been going on our research here for a while. Also those at ft. Greeley who kindly gave us their time. And finally to the csis ideas lab and particularly carolyn who put together i think some great graphics to help communicate some of this stuff. Let me say that, you know, one of the reasons we wanted to put this report together was i think that the conversation about homeland Missile Defense remain unfortunately too polarized and generally underinformed or misinformed. To to some extent thats pretty under its its hard to keep track of all the different kinds of kill vehicles and all the Different Things in development, gbi math has its own rules as well. Its one of our secondary purposes here is to kind of serve as a compilation, maybe a guide for the perplexed on all the kind of complexity, bring stuff together in one place. But i think the problem with how this is frequently discussed runs a little bit deeper. Included with a lot of historical baggage that unfortunately tends to confuse the debate. And i think with respect to homeland Missile Defense in particular, the discussions too frequently divided between on the one hand cheerleaders who i dont think take sufficient account of the difficulties of some of the things. And on the other side kind of a folks snickering or deriding. I think that both a better understanding of the past and the Current Program of record might help mollify some of that. So the report really tries to do three things. First as i say to bring together a bunch of information in one place, kind of a reference guide of where things have been. Secondly, at a menu of options for what might be considered and look at the benefits of a lot of those. And and third, make some of our own findings and recommendations. And so not to bury the lead, ill just say i think the Current Program, both gmd and related systems need a range of reliability, capability and capacity improvements relative to where we are today. And as well i think some policy and budgetary adjustments would be in order in the forthcoming md so theres so theres been a lot of back and forth policy wise and programmatic wise programmatic wise over the last 20 years or so. In the report we try to highlight and emphasize the on the one hand the strategic continuity but also the programmatic continuity. On the strategic side, i think go back and read president clintons speech in 2000, the one where he said he was not going to decide to deploy national Missile Defense. And then look at the speech that president george w. Bush gave in 2001 announcing the withdrawal from the abm treaty. And i think actually theres a lot of continuity there in terms of not necessarily the exact assessment of the technological readiness, but in terms of the strategic rationale. The idea being very simply that were not unwilling to accept complete vulnerability to certain kinds of threats. Were unwilling to really accept and risk deter rans failure with respect to certain kinds of actors like north korea. And on the programmatic side, i think appreciating the lineage and evolution of todays program is also important. Looking at really the roots of gmd and nmd, for instance. I also think one cant really appreciate some of the reliability issues of the ekbs and silos today. If you dont appreciate that in many respects they are still the advanced prototype design put together in the 1990s under abm treaty restrictions. And that furthermore that the 2002 decision to build a limited defense capability in two years left little choice but to embrace a kill vehicle still under development and furthermore to adapt a lot of legacy cold war systems that had not been designed for this in short order and put them to use. So ever since then were still i think kind of waiting a true design turn on the kill vehicle. But instead of being kind of life extending the program in different ways. Ill say i think the conversation as a result of some of these things suffers from a kind of unfortunate and maybe even weird dynamic. An old dichotomy tends to get the embraced. The dichotomy that regional Missile Defense is good and effective, but homeland Missile Defense is bad. And the perception extends beyond the particular systems to the mission itself. Regional Missile Defense is effective so goes the argument that you can take it as an article of faith that homeland Missile Defense is impossible. Ill say on the other side that the cheerleaders who do not sufficiently i think acknowledge some of the issues out there, dont do the issue justice so what so what we try to do is to kind of be fair and can dit in both that that means we get criticized from both sides. So ill just say there are a lot of shortcomings, but i think that the path forward you heard about this morning and jim mentioned just now about the rkv really is a good one. And especially it begins to that dichotomy i mentioned is important because the path forwards going to leverage a lot of that past testing, a lot of that past development that had been taking place on the regional systems and applying it forward. So so thats commonalities between atmosphere kill vehicle on one side and atmosphere kill vehicle on the other side. Let me start to walk through jim jim mentioned bmdr highlighting Homeland Defense as top priority of defense efforts. This is just a general view. That is going to be taking place with an sm as well as an ekv. But this is the historical emphasis between homeland and regional really going back to 199 so so its fluctuated a lot. There was a big surge especially for the Capital Investments for the deployment back in the 2002 to 04 time period, but this isnt just gmd, but its kind of the overall emphasis. Green being homeland and blue being regional. And for those of you taking pictures, well have all of these online for you so you can download them to your pleasure. And i also want to put this in a little bit historical this this is i think senator sullivan mentioned it, this is our relative modesty in terms of the number of interceptors were talking about. If you look on the far right thats 2017. That will be in the ground by the end of this year, but compare that for instance to the clinton administration, three phases of clinton administration, 100 to 250. Before that kind of the gpals, whose job whose job it was to go after a limited threat of 10 to 100 rvs. And before that kind of sdi phase one, safeguard and sentinel and that sort of thing. But in terms of the overall context, i think you really see that modesty. Sorry, i keep looking for the keyboard down here. And the other context here, another important context here is the legislative environment. And this past Year Congress went back and updated the 1999 national Missile Defense act, which by the way was 17 years old. A a few anachronisms were in first first of all we dont talk about national Missile Defense anymore in so many words. This is talking in the future tense about, you know, we ought to deploy well, weve done that. And and so i think congress correctly has gone in and rightly updated this. I think unfortunately theres been a lot of hyperventilating about the update that to my way of thinking proves that the schools do not teach sentence diagramming anymore. All the focus has been on the adjectives, like the word but but no one has i think sufficiently appreciated it is a complete sentence. And that the subjects and objects of defense in that sentence have changed. It is no longer about really national Missile Defense territory but also as you can read allies and forces. And, you know, the word limited may not apply in the same way we used to think about it in 1999 or in sort of the gpals kind of you take you take a look at these adjectives and you compare them to the 2010 bmdr and theres actually a lot of continuity. The overall budget top line, this goes back to 1985. Sdio, bimdo and mda, you do see that surge with mda with respect to the deployment in the 2004 but but just within the past ten years as we heard about this morning and i hope you can see this, this is specifically the homeland elements that weve broken out. This is a kind of a falling tree graph. Those those are the phi deps as well as actual spending. And as we heard this morning a 24 decline over the past for the for the top line. But then some deeper cuts for and here were going to go deeper now into gmd. And these are the various components of gmd. Really thats this goes with the trend, pretty clear. I can show you about 50 graphs theyre theyre in the book. And they all kind of look like now, now, let me missing my keyboard again. Let me walk through we have a chapter on interceptor development, another chapter on sensors and that sort of thing, were going to blow through a little bit of this. Let me put up here the long view of interceptors, the lineage really of where we are today. One limitation of the gbi fleet today is its a lot of different kinds of interceptors going on. Its also the case and you can take a look at here at some of the ce 1s, ce2s relative frankly to other deployed systems today. Unfortunately the ce2s dont have the ondemand communications to the ground, for instance. The ekvs of today. Theres also unfortunately a shortcoming of the threestage b the intention the intention to go out and get a twostage booster was never mda mda is looking for a selectable way to get at that flexibility. But what that basically means is youre not able to buy more time and fire later, youre going to have to fire sooner because all three stages have to burn out before the kill vehicle can be released. And and especially if youre operating from alaska, thats going to limit you. Let me also move now to the mdas three phases. This is kind of the current roadmap for going forward, enhanced, robust and advanced is kind of their categories, but what it really is what we are this year getting the 44 gbis in the ground of the ce2s and the cd block 1s. The centerpiece really is the rkv, well talk more about. Although rkv is not dramatic departure, it is that kind of design turn that in some ways should have happened a decade ago but never did. The good news is that theyre not starting from scratch and theyre going back and leveraging a lot of the parallel work thats been going into other programs. But the idea is to make the ekv far simpler, cheaper, more modular and have fewer points of failur these these are the kinds of reliability issues that have come up again and again. And getting to that rkv will also reduce kind of the diversity in the fleet. Ill show in a chart in just a minute shows just how many different types are in todays gbi fleet. The rkv in particular will draw the seeker, kind of the telescope and a lot of discrimination algorithms have been floating out there and draw upon all that. Its not going to be starting from scratch. And further out in the future to the advanced section is the mlkv, which we heard about again this morning. That again is, you know, quite a bit far behind relative to where the plan was. Multiple kill vehicles atop a single booster to compensate for some of the discrimination challenges and really img prove your effective magazine capacity. Unfortunately unfortunately the timeline for the mlkv currently is kind of 20, 2021 plus and really far out to the right in terms of that. This chart right here is actually kind of the centerpiece of whats going on and what the agency currently plans. We call this the skittles chart. You can taste the rainbow and see a lot of different muscle movements of whats happening the green the green at the bottom is the ce1. Thats thats kind of the oldest skill vehicle that got put in place in 200 the the red is the ce2. The blue is kind of the ce2 plus. And then the orange and Pay Attention to the orange, thats the rkv. Thats supposed to come online kind of in the 2020 timeframe, testing in 2018, potentially deployed 2020. Now, this as i said is kind of the best snapshot of whats going on and whats intended to be going on. We would point out a couple we think shortfalls of what mda currently plans. One of them is what is likely to be under current plans a big gap between the things that are going to be put in place this year, the 44 by 17. After that were goin