Congressman, again, i will say when we close this place down and go into the classified, well go into every one of those specifics, but i would tell you this, you may have already read the mou which we sent up here yesterday, and well be glad to take you down into the subparagraph six of each one of those to get to your question. But to go beyond my testimony here, i dont want to do that and if its okay, well wait. Let me go back historically then and look at the history of qatar and what theyve done in receiving detainees. As you know, the first transfer to qatar was in 2008, and was that one considered a successful test case . I believe, and i just asked our general counsel if we just had one transfer. Is that right . To qatar . To my knowledge. So weve had one. I dont know all the history of that transfer, although my understanding is it wasnt particularly good generally. So whats changed . Again, i addressed this here this morning. First of all, you have a new em emir. Weve got more presence, assets there. Their relationship with the area and with us is significantly changing. Now, are these absolute guarantees . No. I mean, there are very few absolute guarantees in life, as we all know. But i think a number of things have changed enough, significantly changed, to be able to have confidence in the enforcement that the emir told the president of the United States that he would personally see to that as well as the government. And if you follow down, as you did, through your reading of those mou requirements and then well get into details, we felt confident that that mou covered enough, but the enforcement was good enough. You did acknowledge there was an additional risk there in qatar taking those detainees, especially based on their past performance, so are you comfortable with that risk and does this willingness for the u. S. To accept that risk, does that now set the stage for the u. S. Transferring detainees to other nations who have not met obligations under previous agreements in accepting these detainees from guantanamo . Well, you said the right word, risk, and that is the essence of what were always dealing with here and the analysis that we made, the decision that i made, as well as the National Security council and ultimately the president , again i say we believed that all of this together could substantially mitigate the risk. Let me ask this. There is some concern, too, that of knows considerations given for the qatari government and what they will do to keep up with these detainees, is there an opportunity for these detainees to go to the qatari legal system to have these travel restrikctions lifted so under legal means they could have free rein to travel throughout qatar or elsewhere . Ill ask the general counsel. He signed the mou and i will ask him to handle that in particular, that question, because he negotiated it and signed it. Thank you. I think the question is best answered in the closed session, if you would indulge us in that respect. Let me close by asking this then. What happens to these detainees after a year . As has been said, the restrictions of the mou are for a oneyear period. That includes the restriction on their travel outside of qatar. So after one year so after one year, no restrictions. Except under circumstances that we would discuss in the closed gentlemans time is expired. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you very much, mr. Secretary and mr. Preston. I appreciate very much your service. Mr. Secretary, you said in your testimony that this was a well, first of all, let me just say that i think a lot of people have had very emotional reactions to this and what theyve seen about this with incomplete information, and i certainly think thats understandable, but these are difficult circumstances to judge, and we as elected officials and you as appointed officials have to put aside our emotions and political expediency in order to best use our professional judgment, and obviously what will be said in secret session also pertains to this. But what im concerned about now is the law and the notification of congress. And you said in your testimony, i believe you actually used the word unique circuits. Im a little concerned that this isnt unique. It might be rare, but not all that unique. Do you believe that congress hadnt thought this was a sort of issue that could come up when they passed the law . Should we amend this law if, indeed, these kind of, you know, very rapidly evolving situations occur where you would want to have the authority to do a prisoner transfer . First the secretary and then either one of you. Well, here is the way i would answer your question. First, it was an extraordinary situation, and maybe everyone doesnt agree with that. I absolutely believe it. The president believed it, National SecurityCouncil Leaders believed it. For the reasons weve discussed here the last three hours and actually more. So i think were on pretty solid ground in saying that this was an extraordinary situation. I think it also gets into the constitutional issues that we have discussed here this morning. The responsibilities of the president given to him through article 2 of the constitution, what are his authorities under that article. It doesnt discount what the Congress Passes as laws. By the way, this is not the first challenge to a law by a president , as has been noted here this morning. President bush, george w. Bush, probably signed as many signing statements as anybody. Executive legislative differences exist probably since the beginning of the republic, so i answer your question that way, too, and then if you want to hear from the general counsel. Well, actually let me just stick with it. I think you answered it fine, mr. Secretary. I am concerned though that there was an opportunity to notify the congress. I have heard some reports that 80 or 90 people in our administration knew. I dont know if you can confirm that or not. But sort of the answer that goes back to 2011, 2012, i agree with the chairman on that. That was a different set of circumstances. It was also, by the way, a different congress. I wasnt in that congress. And it does concern me that that many people knew and there wasnt some sort of a notification of congress. Particularly given that obviously the qatari officials knew. How are we to avoid the perception that this administration trusts qatari officials more than it trusts leaders in congress . Well, you may see it that way as a congressman, and i wouldnt question your perspective, but i would just say this. The qataris had to be a part of it because they were a part of it. They were doing the deal. We signed the memorandum of understanding with them. There would have been no Prisoner Exchange without the qataris. So not everybody, by the way, in the qatari government was aware of this. Again, presston was there. I dont think its a matter of we trust the qataris but we dont trust our own congress. I have already addressed this, too, in my opening statement. Could we have done it better, smarter . Yes. Yeah. I think my concern and im not sure if this would rest in your office or not, my concern is, okay, i understand the circumstances under which the department was not able to obey the letter of the law. My concern is whether the Department Even tried to obey the spirit of the law. Certainly not informing myself, rank and file member, but at least the leadership of the relevant committees that this was happening. Well, again, ill say and i know members of this committee dont agree with this, but in explanation as to why we did what we did, and again ill say one sentence, we were very, very concerned about the risk. We had a fleeting opportunity here. We were told there was a risk. The more people who knew about it, the more risk. I get that. I get why did you trust some in the white house and not here. I get all that, but your question, overall question about who knew and who didnt, i dont know about the 80 or 90 number. I can tell you from my responsibility in dod, very, very few people knew about this at dod. Gentlemans time has expired. Mr. Hunter. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, good to see you. I guess youve said there were better ways to do this, there were more precise ways to do it. I guess my first question would be, is that because do d was not in charge of this the entire time . Congressman hunter, im sorry, i just read a note. I would ask you to add 20 seconds back on. Take it out of my time. Im sorry. Was dod in on this the whole time . You have said before this could have been done better and im guessing that means if you were doing this from the beginning, this Prisoner Exchange, it would have been done better. Well, i appreciate the comment, but, yes, it was dod involved in this from the beginning . Yes, we were. Let me interject there then. We talked in february and i said because the state department had this option on the table and they had preapproval from the executive to go ahead with this Prisoner Exchange, this was months ago, you appointed mr. Lumps lumpkin as the osd representative to the bergdahl case. Yes. Which makes me think you werent heavily vested in this from the very beginning but that you did get vested in it a few months ago. No, thats not true. Youre right, lets pick up february. Youre right, we had the conversation. You know you had written me about this. I did appoint lumpkin who was the guy who oversaw the whole operation, as you know from dod, mike lumpkin. Congressman, this was so fast moving, everything you said is right. There was a break, and i have got the chronology right here i dont need that from you. What im asking is, did you have other options you looked at for approval or at least consider, nonkinetic options. You mean dod . You, yes. No. This was the one this was the only option you considered . The only nonkinetic option you considered . We consider everything and we are, but where we were in the time frame youre talking about in the scope of the reality here, this was the one option that we were all working toward that looked like the best. Thats what lumpkin thats why i appointed him to get into it. Youre exactly right let me ask again, did you have other nonkinetic options that you looked at for approval . Or at least consideration . Not anything that was serious. We look at all kinds of things all the time let me ask then, so you didnt pass any other courses of action besides this one for the president s consideration from the department of defense . If youre talking about this specific deal with qatar im talking about getting bergdahl back, just getting bergdahl back. No, this was the one on the table that was the most realistic, viable, and, no, we didnt present that im aware of anybody in dod present any other let me ask this thing. Why would the president approve or you approve only one course of action after seeing now selfadmittedly no other courses of action . I have never heard that where you only say this is the one thing that weve chosen to do and were not going to consider any other courses of action besides this one, and that means that the president didnt even have any other options, nonkin nettedic options from the department of defense that you recommended to him because you just said you recommended no other options but this one. Well, congressman, we werent holding all the cards here. You know, if the taliban wasnt ready to engage forget about the taliban. Im not asking that but they you have different courses of action. If i want to enter this room, i can come in through that door, that door, or the door over there. What youre saying is you didnt look at any other doors accept that one. You didnt consider any other options besides this Prisoner Exchange, and you only recommended to the president this one pathway . To get bergdahl back. Congressman, this was the only pathway that was emerging that was available. There was no other pathway unless youre aware of something i am aware actually, and these are not from special briefings so i can probably mention a few of them. You at dod, your department, working concurrent options with pakistan to get bergdahls release. You had other options that we know that at least people in your department had looked at. We wont go into those nonkinetic options, but it just astounds me for something this large you wouldnt recommend to the president any other course of action but this one and that the president of the United States would not have looked at other courses of action besides this one before he made the decision to approve this. Well, two issues here. One is do we always look at other courses of action . Yes, we do. Second issue, recommending to the president. This was the most viable, best pathway we could find, we knew that was active. The taliban were coming back. The qataris were telling us they were coming back, so we pursued that as the most immediate, viable, and possible option we had to get him back. In closing, i would think there were Better Options and i think that the president should have been better briefed by folks in your department that knew what those options were, and i hope that the dod and mr. Lumpkin takes a stronger role in trying to get the rest of the americans back that were forgotten via this exchange in afghanistan. I yield back. Mrs. Duckworth. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, its good to see you again and just want to say how great it is to see a member of the nco corps, the backbone of our military at the head of the dod. I served in iraq with a vietnam veteran e7 who went back over at 59 years old. Didnt make it home and he probably is smiling and cussing at me right now and telling me i better treat you right. Look, i think your background and the background of all of us who have worn a uniform and as you said been in combat informs how we feel about the release of Sergeant Bergdahl as well as how we feel about someone who abandons their post and exposes their buddies to attack by the enemy. However, its never been the practice of the United States to leave one of our own behind on the battlefield regardless of the circumstances of their disappearance. We do everything we can to bring them home. You dont leave them to be dealt with by the enemy. Its not who we are as a country. Its not who we are as a military. Now, that doesnt mean that there are not questions that need to be answered about the circumstances around his departure from his post, and i would hope that the military will take appropriate action to review the circumstances again and i have full faith in the leadership of the United States army and the uniform code of military justice to conduct a thorough investigation and to carry out any justice that the result of a subsequent investigation may warrant. That said, i wanted to ask you two specific questions. First, are there any plans by the dod or the department of the army to go back and review the circumstances of his disappearance and then if it is found that he did abandon his post, so he did desert, there will be an investigation, perhaps prosecution . Congresswoman, yes, and thank you for your service and to the other members of this committee who i didnt by name acknowledge, but i referenced as you noticed in my testimony, thank you for your service. Yes. As i noted in my testimony and a couple of the answers ive given this morning, secretary of the army, chief of staff of the army both indicated, did last week, that they intended a full comprehensive review of all the circumstances involved in the disappearance of Sergeant Bergdahl. The results of those reviews will determine if any action would be required based on conduct and based on the review. They feel strongly and i do, but im not going to get involved in trying to influence that. Thats the United States army decision, as you know how this works. They are open to get the facts, and wherever the facts lead then, theyll get them and they will respond appropriately. Thank you. Thank you. You have to ask me. Would the gentle lady yield, please . Yes, i would like to yield the balance of my time to the gentleman from illinois. Thank you. Mr. Secretary, you have a tremendous perspective as miss duckworth has alluded to with your background as a combat infantryman. Now, im sure that you weighed every pro and con in these decision in this decisionmaking process, and your decision was made in the best interests of this nation based on the facts you had as a whole, im sure. And its really unfortunate that the toughest decision that many of your critics have been making on this is as to whether or not they should run for reelection. Now, have you received a single or heard a single sound suggestion from any of these monday morning quarterbacks as to a better course of action that you might have taken in this decision . The coverage has been rather bare on that account. We have a lot of experts in this town especially, but as i said, and i appreciate your service, sir, im well aware of it, in this town its pretty easy or anywhere else to give analysis usually uninformed and criticize every decision. Thats okay. Thats the role everybody has. The country is built that way. Everybodys opinion matters and counts. Everybody has one. But in the end, as i said in my testimony, some of us are dealing with the responsibilities of having to make the tough choices. You make them up here in your votes, and i make them. And thats the way it is, and that will always be that way. So i just deal with it and i do the best i can and i do what i think is right for my country, and i dont have any problem sleeping. Thank you, mr. Secretary. I yield back. The gentle ladys time is expired. They have called the votes about six minutes left, but about 394 havent voted yet. So i want to thank the secretary. Weve gone over what we thought we would it would take, but its a very important issue, and this is the largest committee in congress, and everybody wanted to have their questions answered. The secretary has agreed, we will take one more question, then we will break for votes. I would encourage all who have not had an opportunity to ask a question that want to return. The secretary said he will stay for that, and then we will reschedule at a later time the closed session part. Dr. Fleming. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Secretary hagel, weve talked about this 30day notice. Yesterday the chairman told us that he received notification after Sergeant Bergdahl had actually been transferred. Im sure his Senate Counterpart received that notice at the same time. It was really a notice after the fact, and i listened carefully through all the questions, all the legalese, the technical, the spin, everything. Its clear to me that really what happened here, and this go