Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics Public Policy Today 2014080

CSPAN3 Politics Public Policy Today August 1, 2014

What does that tell the public at large . Belligerence. You cant ignore the perverse events like this on perceptions. And you cant ignore perceptions. You cant govern without people. Its not good enough to say the right thing. The question is can you carry. And, you know, in light of the experience and failed experience of diplomacy for the past 30 years, its very difficult for me to see the palestinian framework as is able to carry. And thats the bottom line. Thats the bottom line. That cant be ignored. You know, what im saying to you here, that drives people away from their comfort zones. This is not really i would exclude myself from many. But look, there is tragedy going on. And it will repeat itself, time and again. And there are consequences to failure. You cant keep doing the same thing. And really in the process do nothing more but kick the can down the road and pretend that you can go back to the old framework and do it. You just cant. Im sorry if this pushes some outside their comfort zones. Now, how is a question. How can we do it is the question. Its not that were starting from principle with the luxury of designing things to the liking of everybody. But we need to take into account, you know, these complications. Well, lets go to the how to do it question because it seems to me that youre saying very passionately and articulately this vicious cycle were in cant continue. And violence pays off and were also experiencing unprecedented violence. It sounds like youre prescribing changed representation in the palestinian part because its necessary and its urgent. But without saying specifically what that should be. And the changed framework without saying specifically what should be but just saying that it has to change because its not working. But youre not being specific. Youre not prescribing a new framework. Ill do what i can to be more specific. I dont know if i can be too specific. For the reasons what i have in mind is a set of ideas im putting out for consideration. What or the extent to which well be successful and start a discussion on this is important here. And i think its really up to, you know, various factions, whether domestic or foreign to somehow coalesce on something. What im really talking about here is, if you will, the broad architecture of this but not the specific details in terms of, for example, you know, i talk about timebound commitment on nonviolence. What does that really mean in terms of length of time . The concept is there, but its really up to all concerned to define it. But the idea is the following, the substance, to be more specific, it needs to be adjusted. I started to make the point that adjustment was necessary, but then in what direction . What does it really need . First you have a plo as a matter of course and legality and national legitimacy had entered into an agreement going back in 1993 that has a great deal of significance. That cannot be ignored. And the power to represent was certainly there. It continues to be there today. But then what do you do to make that adjustment . My own suggestion would be to leave the plo alone. I mean, do not really get to the point of saying lets undo this or, you know, open it up without any criteria anywhere that makes International Engagement very difficult if not downright impossible. Just keep it as it is with its right to represent in the way thats referred to in those agreements, but in a way that has come to be known, leave that alone. But in parallel, in parallel, having a unified leadership framework that involves participation by everyone. You know, old fashioned. Whether there are plo or nonplo. Theyre all sitting at a table. And there together collectively are to inform decisionmaking by the executive committee of the plo. What does it really mean . Is this really asking too much . Lets just say that the plo doesnt like that or doesnt want to do that, lets assume. This is just for the sake of argument. I dont think they would. But you know, what is the basis for the plo or for the plo to continue to engage in International Diplomacy when its not sure it will be able to carry. You know, again, we could really choose, you know, the kind of game we would want to play. But were not going to deliver results unless we have good answers to the questions. It is in the interest of the plo and its leadership, tourism. To really have its decisionmaking process in full. In order for it to be able to secure the consensus needed in order to deliver an agreement. You know, this is not going to be just an agreement between two people. This is a formality of it. But is it going to be delivered to a point where it is going to be this moment . Something theyve lost their life for . Its very important to prepare and not to continue to pretend. So no, i dont think should. And i think it should welcome it. What kind of processes are involved . And thats why i say this is really open for discussion. This is as much intended on our own domestic Political Team as it is international. Ideas. Exactly how were going to concentrate ourselves in order as a consequence of dialogue thats taken place to achieve reconciliation. How to authorize it in a way that meaningfully informs the decisionmaking by the plo which continues to serve. Thats one element of this. Another is how to govern domestically. Anyone out there who thinks there is going to be an end to this conflict and palestine emerging. Without gaza, you dont need to really rethink the position. Its not going to happen. Its not going to happen. Look at it from the point of view in israel who are in favor of a twostate solution. Clearly, the element is based on the kind of government and country they would like to have. And so demographics are important in that argument. And time and again, ive seen one after another making the case for a state of palestine. Without gaza, if you take gaza out of that mix, they will its very important. So what do we do domestically . We need to have all of them adequately presented. This is in the interest of everybody. And at some point, two final elements. One that needs to be basis for there is a Critical Mass that is absolutely necessary in order to permit a takeoff here. Especially on security. It would be a case of two missing ingredients. Something needs to be agreed. And so far as violence is concerned, i think there really needs to be an understanding of the need for there to be preventable violence. How long . Let that be discussed and agreed. Thats in the interest of everybody. And use the time on the palestinian side. Use the time to rebuild. Use the time to reunify the institutions of the people. Gaza and the west bank have been separated for seven years now. Theres a lot of work that needs to be done to unify institutions. You put all of these things together. Lets say a consensus could be formed on these critical issues. Thats when we should feel powerful enough to go to the israelis and the International Community and say this is what we have. This is what we can and expect to do over the next period. Can we now and this is really the most critical, the adjustment thats intended to deal with the design flaw in the overall framework. Can we now agree on a date certain for ending the occupation . Thats how you really put all of these elements together. Can we agree on a settlement for action . We cant keep on going like this. We need to agree. The default to failure to negotiations cannot be denied occupation. This has to be the certainty of an end to an occupation. Can we agree and then work backward. And then the International Front will begin to proceed with the degree of a sense of coherence that makes sense to the people. And thats we important. For us to expect the process to succeed and deliver. Dr. Fayyad, thank you for that. Some in israel would say and lets come to the present tense, the situation on the ground. Some in israel would say to break the cycle is to defeat. Hamas once and for all to ensure its safety. Thats exactly what Michael Orrin argued in the Washington Post recently. Last week at the aspen security forum, Lieutenant General michael flynn, head of the dia warned if hamas is totally defeated in the current round of fighting, its likely that a more extreme group would rise in its place. Id like to know your vision on this. And i know your job is not to advise the Israeli Government, but what would your advice be to the Israeli Government in this sense . You know, you see the popularity figures of whats going on right now of netanyahu rising. So first this question of what replaces hamas would be more extreme. This tension between say what ambassador orrin said and the head of the dia. And secondly, if you were sitting in a room advising the israel government, what would you say to them . Id say stick with it. This notion that somehow youre going to really continue to engage in this escalation until it leads to the alienation of hamas and other factions of the same kind, apart from the tragic consequences and implications of continued fighting of the kind that has been taking place. This is not really a small matter. I mean, were talking about peoples lives. And loss of life that simply cannot be tolerated. This is completely unbearable. And then what . Everyone has to remember that we are dealing here, at least so far, with unsafe actors. You know. Hamas is in control of gaza for sure, has been since 2007. Understanding the unity arrangement that was brokered recently or agreed to recently. Effectively is there. But still it has not acquired the status of a state operator, a state. And this is really a quandary. Not only insofar as factions of the palestinians are concerned, but other activists of the world. A criteria of winning and losing, you know, are different when you are dealing with state actors. Weve seen this happen time and again in the United States with a country like afghanistan, for example. In terms of firepower, you know, bombing and the rest of it. The situation is like this. We talk about survival of a few. Who after the extensive damage, loss of life and misery and all and say we won. What are we going to do about Something Like this . This is serious. And lives are at stake. With futility. Absolute futility. Thats number one. Agree with hamas and likeminded factions is not as significant as realizing the need for any palestinian leadership to carry in order for that leadership to deliver an agreement. And you simply cannot ignore the ideology. Even if you disagree with it. Thats the kind of work we live in. These are the kinds of standards by which developed and advanced countries you will live by. It isnt a set of standards for the developed advanced world, another set of standards that should apply to others. Its time for all of us to be taken on board. Then i think it should not really be beyond strong leadership, enlightened leadership. To accept that at some point somebody needs to pay for failure. This is not 1990 or 1991. More than 20 years past oslo and more than 15 years past, you know, the end of the time line under oslo. And to somehow pretend that were just starting this and to really take a purist approach to this in a matter that conforms to the highest standards, what someone would like to happen is, i think, extremely unrealistic. Nor i believe would be right and that is really important. Inclusiveness. Inclusiveness. You need to include and you need to govern in a way thats effective enough to ensure that there is sufficient support for that which we stand on. Otherwise we should not be there presenting to the conflict. This is essential to what were looking at. Its a necessity, in other words. But to think, you know, this way is i think is constructive and productive. Unfortunately 1,000 more lives and more suffering, people come back to the same conclusion. Its not hamas, per se. Its that ideology. What do you do . What do you say to people who look at the record over the past 20 years and tell you what have you done for us . What do you tell them . Forget about hamas. Lets just put hamas aside. Unless youre able to be convinced and to make sense when you say, you know, we have an alternative. You need to really provide an answer to that question. Hamas or no hamas. If a solution is what youre interested in, we need to show enough courage to be accepting, of being pushed away from our comfort zones in the direction of finding something sensible. Finally, on the other point that you raised, the region, and i sort of alluded to this in my opening remarks. Really when it will end and how it will end, only god knows. But there are very few people i know who would have expected things to be the way they are today. But they are. I mean, in terms of extremism, violence. This is unprecedented, and i think defies expectations of many in terms of whats going on. The degree of extremism, you see this, extremely grotesque and certainly alien to any kind of decency if you really think about it this way. What do you really need to do to somehow understand this and prevent this becoming an ideology. If its managed by and led by few, you know, unless something is done, im afraid this is really going to be most dangerous. The key to the solution lies in good, honest, responsive government. One that responds to the needs of people. Good governance is really key antidote to this. Its not a luxury. Something thats absolutely essential. Let me ask a quick question and quick answer, then i want to turn to steve hadley to start the audience with the first question. I want to pick up on what you just said. Tom friedman in april 2013 when you resigned wrote that it was an arab spring before there was an arab spring. He described you as a new generation of decent arab or what was needed was a new generation of decent arab leaders, whose primary focus would be the development, their own people, not the enrichment of tribe, sector, party. And part of the difficulty and failure of the arab spring was noncorrupt, that there was not enough support and the arabs, u. S. , israelis for noncorrupt institutionfocused leadership. Do you agree, has the arab spring failed and are these the reasons why the arab spring has failed . Id like to still believe its a nature of a work in progress, although its hard to use those words to describe the state of play when youre looking at the extent of violence and extremism that has taken place and continues to take place. Nevertheless, you know, from time to time, i think its really important to try to take a step or two away from what you see, to put it in perspective. I think its useful to look at the experience of other nations and other revolutions, going back not that far back in history, recently, and see if things like this happened before elsewhere before we would come to the conclusion that, you know, things are impossible in the region. That somehow, you know, arabs are or belong to a species that cannot handle both democracy and stability at the same time. Somehow you need to choose, you know, either democracy or stability. Thats the wrong conclusion. Were like everyone else. We can handle democracy and we need stability. Democracy sustains stability. You cant achieve stability on the strength of force, but you cannot sustain it with a strength of force of governance. Thats what we are missing. Thats whats really important to keep in mind. Looking at history of this, the arab spring is the nature of a revolution. People standing up for their citizens right, for being respected, listened to, taken seriously, if you will. Not thinking that the most important task in life the largest of the leadership and that sort of thing. Arab spring, its essence was about this. Its essence was about this. And i think in that sense, it was overdue. You know, it took a long time. Deep sense of injustice, you know, thinking that there was too much double standards in the way the world was managed, the region itself was managed. The way the global west was relating to the region. The arabs were siding with regimes that were not doing the right thing for their own people. Only they would present the case for them was the case against the alternative, with the alternative first being communism and then muslim brotherhood. This is what you get. You get a region thats unhappy, and so therefore in that sense, it was overdue. But it happened. Its in the nature of the revolution. What else are you going to really tell me that experienced a revolution that delivered stability immediately afterwards. It did not happen even in this country. I found the french revolution, it took three of those. It didnt happen in the chinese refuse solution, the russian revolution. And so yes, the extent of the violence is important. Theres no question about that. But to think that somehow the arab spring, if it is really about a revolution, i think it is fundamentally, to expect, you know, to deliver, serenity, stability, tranquility in the aftermath of a major upheaval like this is expecting too much. Two things. Number one. We need to place it in that kind of perspective to get a better handle on it. But i think its really time for everyone to begin to think that this is a region like all other regions. These are people like all other people. People are people. And stand and have to be laid out for systems of governance that respect their own citizens. This is so basic, but its basically obvious, but somehow you often and then they think they need to find a solution immediately. Youre not going to get there unless they respect them. Thats it in a nutshell. Fascinating answer. Thank you so much, doctor. Steve hadley. I have to make a disclosure that i had the opportunity to have lunch with salam fayyad, and id like to invite you to share a little bit of that conversation, and i realize there are some sensitive pieces to it. The reason i say that is because i think theres a lot of despair in the United States that the Current Situation in gaza can lead anywhere positive. And i think its useful if you could share some thoughts about that both to give some hope but also to stimulate some thinking. And im thinking specifically some comments you made about the kind of ceasefire that might allow both what the israelis want, which is the demilitarization of hamas and what might allow hamas to get what it wants, which is the opening of the borders for flows of goods and services. You talked a little bit about that. What kind of arrangement might permit that. The role that the p. A. Might play in that. And also, the issue of reconstruction of gaza and how that might be structured in such a way that actually could begin not just a reconstruction process but a reform process that could begin to do what you talked about, getting these institutions in a line between gaza and the west bank. I admit these are sensitive questions. I think what you said was very interesting and would be useful, and i would just simply invite you to share that portions that y

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