Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics Public Policy Today 2015050

Technology exploration now is to look at ways to bring electrooptical sensors into this architecture beyond that opir sensor, that Missile Warning sensor that kicks these things off. And were going to do that by capitalizing on the work thats being done in industry today. Both on sensors, as well as on building Unmanned Aerial Vehicles that fly at very high at attitudes. A High Altitude platform is also key to one of the other investments we want to make. So if we go back just a few years here, we made a big bet on airborne layser in the light 90s and early 2000s. And that system that we built, although it was very effective in doing that one particular job we had for it, which is proving that you could shoot down a rocket at the speed of light using light a tremendous accomplishment. Although, it proved impractical from an operational standpoint, you can imagine have a fleet of 737s flying at 33,000 feet with a laser system in them. There is a lot of challenges in that. What we know now from that, the next time we do this work we are going to be looking at getting above the known atmosphere, where the aerosols wont affect the lasers and at at attitudes where the turbulence is significantly lower. So we want to fine a regime thats high above the 33,000 feet. For all of us who fly on 747s on a regular basis here, we know it can get shaky at 33,000 feet almost any time of the year depending on where you are flying. So we want to make that more like 60,000 feet, get to the stratosphere, where it will be a much calmer place for us to work. Were making investments in Laser Technology today that both in our National Laboratories and in our industry that goes beyond those chemical laysers that we looked at early whier to new solid state electric lasers which will be much more efficient, effective as well, i believe. And ones that we can scale up and reduce the size of the laser necessary to get that job done. If we can find a way to make that happen and we believe these technologies will lead us there that well be able to excuse me to get those lasers on an unmanned arrow platform at very high at attitudes and make that case for the entire logistics and infrastructure which goes along with that much much more simpler, and make the technical challenges less daunting than they have been in the past. I mentioned earlier, it might have been during our discussion at lunch, that there are other areas which we want to go back to. And so im sort of going back to my past in this one. We left the rail gun in 1989 because there were challenges with getting a rail gun. And the idea that we would build a new launch infrastructure that would get these 2,000 or 100 ton satellites in orbit with rail guns on them was not achievable. However, the services have been making investments in bringing that technology along primarily for closein engagements, and primarily for longrange fires. And so as they continue to develop that technology we are looking at that as a possible way to get at some of our Missile Defense challenges. Again, having a magazine which is very, very cheap project tiles with the capability of electrically generating the power makes it possible for us to get away from this challenge that we fine in terms of expensive interceptors against other rocket systems. So our goal ultimately is then to fine a way to get more capable sensors into the architecture, to improve the knowledge that we have from birth to death of this launch, and to reduce the number of credible objects by understanding what objects are there. With the ultimate goal of reducing the objects dramatically by destroying the rocket booster in the boost phase. That will revolutionize the capable for Missile Defense and dramatically change the calculus of many of our adversaries. Were working today with industry. Were working with academia, and were working in our National Laboratories to make that vision come true. Were shifting our the overall balance in our investments this year which had been primarily focused on increasing capacity over the last few years for our regional Missile Defense systems and looking now at shifting the balance somewhat, ramping over the next couple of years, to get at the advanced Technology Challenges that were going to need to build that foundation for the Missile Defense architecture i just spoke of. We hope to have that here in the next decade based on those investments. We recognize that just like in the past, it wont be a challenging en will be a challenging endeavor and we may not rush forward with continual success towards that goal, but were excited about having u. S. Partners and making that a true reality over the next ten years. Thank you. [ applause ] good afternoon, everybody. Im arch macy. And now a private consultant. As many of you know i had a background in some of this for a few years. If you dont like ballistic Missile Defense review, you can blame me. Ive heard it before. But go g. I was one of the coauthors. Id like to talk about Missile Defense and thinking about next steps in Missile Defense from a somewhat different, perhaps look at rubics cube. This panel was is about future directions, thats what it was titled. And so the question im thinking about is what are the future elements of Missile Defense that need to be developed, melded with each other, and demonstrated and made known to potential antagonists . Let me develop that for a moment. Weve talked today a lot about intercept activities. Theres been some comment on left of launch. Ill phrase the question this way, what is the right of launch activities and plans, other than that of intercept . My basic premise is that the Missile Defense system that is generated by mda and the services does not and cannot provide the overall defense of the nation against Ballistic Missile threats. We acknowledge for the moment that the a massive attack from china or russia, the only response is in kind. And that has long been our explicit policy and will not change unless there is some breakthrough in physics, which no one expects. But thats the Everything Else. We talked earlier about defending against Ballistic Missiles cannot be an inventory challenge. You are always going to lose, there is there are always going to be more threats than interceptors. At some point, in addition, the laws of physics, the laws of probability and statistics say that even as you are taking on incoming threats, some are going to get through. I mean, no system is 100 . I am answer Aerospace Engineer by trade and experience, you hate to admit that, but you cannot build a perfect system. So there is no way to assure somebody i can get them all even if i have a perfect inventory. Why do we have an bmds . You need to destroy threats. What it does is provide protection against critical assets long enough that the National Command authority, the president and our leadership can take steps to end the threat by other means, get them to stop launching. If they dont launch, its not a threat. As rich pointed out, if we can get them on launch, thats great. At some point there, i would submit that particularly in a short and intermediate range scenarios, you are going to run out of boost phase interceptors or whatever your tech neck may be, and boost phase to me can include directed energy, light, rail gun im agnostic as to the technique. So the question is, what is does this thing need to do . The ballistic Missile Defense system, that capability produced by mda and the services, has to buy time, and it affords time to the leadership to take other actions and to make decisions. And they are going to have to have to happen in pretty short order. It gives the nca the chance to choose other methods. All of the elements of national power, the classic four that you learn in war college, diplomatic, information, military, and economic. And using all of them in whatever way is appropriate to get the threat to cease to occur. The strategic necessity is to protect the homeland, our own forces, friends and allies from Ballistic Missile attack. So the key word there is its about protection. Its not about just flight destruction. So Ballistic Missile Protection Planning must encompass a continuum of capabilities, plans, lines of authority and communications and training to negate or interrupt the Ballistic Missile threat sequence from its threat planning to preparation to targeting to launch to subsequently launches. So i submit that perhaps an idea for future discussion is that what we need is a Ballistic Missile Protection Plan of custom the ballistic Missile Defense system is an element. This to achieve and maintain a comprehensive all of government approach to negate potential or actual Ballistic Missile threats. Today weve been talking a lot about systems. We started off with the sdi concept of ways to protect us from the missiles, to protect us from the war heads. Thats a kinetic approach. To people like me in the department of defense thats where we tend to go to. We grow up that way. Im an arrow space engineer, i think like that. Since the advent of even the sdi concept weve been focused on developing and fielding the capability to perform threat negation by interceptor destruction in flight. But we know that we can keep doing that because well lose the inventory game. Its clear that mda owns the intercept part of Ballistic Missile protection. Who owns the rest . Do they know that they do . Do others know who owns what . Then the question is, what is the rest . What are the methods, the techniques by which you are going to get an antagonist to stop launching . Now, it can range from the absolutely terrifying to perhaps something less. Ill go back to that in a bit. But that range of action needs to be thought about and understood developed to prevent launch in the first place or prevent subsequent launches and melded with each other to provide a developed and understood comprehensive protection. The longest flight time of a Ballistic Missile is icbm range of 40 minutes. Assuming its a one after the other, the best time you have is 40 minutes. It is probable, depending on what you think the inventories of limited number of launches may be, that the ballistic Missile Defense system could provide protection to a certain level for hours to maybe a day or two. Thats how long you have in order to accomplish another effect, to end the launches. So i said what capabilities need to be developed to prevent the launch, to prevent subsequent launches . Something that will have to be considered at some point is who is responsible for the attribution that can be made public to explain what you are doing in an unchallengeable manner . Who knows where it came from . Well, we know where it came from, within the bmds and the overhead sensor systems. We usually tend to be loathe to put too much accuracy into our reports on that. But in the case where you are going to take action now, at some level you are going to have to convince the world, as well as your antagonist that in fact they are the ones doing and it you know where its coming from and you can prove it. So we need a comprehensive basis for bmd protection. It can be intercept alone. The overarching goal, as i said has to be to deter or prevent launch in the first place. And if the launch occurs to inflict sufficient pressure to end further launches and do so . A timely manner. We need to determine what constitutes effective deterrence to dissuede an antagonist from launching based on two principles the antagonist must be led to understand. First the attack will not succeed in its objective and that the penalty for the attempt will be too high to be borne. This is understood new concept. Its the basic statement of any deterrent strategy. The challenge for our discussion is what are the steps, the factors, the plans and capabilities necessary to accomplish these two principles in defending against Ballistic Missiles . The first principle is addressed in prime by the ballistic Missile Defense system, the intercept destruction capability. The second has to be addressed by a variety of means, depending on the situation. Bmd planning, i believe will have to account for different categories of attack. I put them into four sectors or judgment. Extensional, a violent statement, a rogue, or an accident. An extensiontial attack, which against the United States would at this time be provided only by china or russia. We have a declaretory policy on how we will respond. We have been clear on that for many, many years. That is not a function of bmd protection, per se. A violent statement by an antagonistic state. A number of missiles, a limited attack. A rogue attack of a limited number of missiles are two different conditions. The roguish you being who do you pressure . If its a violent state, if its an act of state x, then you can pressure state x, you can figure out how to do that, one would hope. If its a rogue attack and i would pick isis as a classic how and where do you pressure . If isis gets its hands on mrbms and uses them europe, whats the point of attack and what do we do about that . In some cases the answer may be no and that will affect your response. And then you have the accidental one. And then how is that communicated . If an accidental launch occurs how does the owner of the missile after launch tell im very sorry, but i wasnt me and it wont happen again. He maine may be right, or he may be faking it. If anyone remembers the terrifying seven days in may thats a very hard decision. And then how do these questions differ between Homeland Defense and regional . Are you going to, when a launch comes at you, a limited attack, are you going to take a massive, violent kinetic attack on that nation . It may be appropriate. It may not be. Because then you run into issues of escalatory response. So we need to consider and preplan our responses to these other types of attack. As i said and i think i bring it up again there is a limited time line here. When this happens, we cant then summon the First National Security Council meeting about it. And going back to what i mentioned about all of the government, whole of government part, is that the Defense Department tends to be very, very good at planning. They do branches and sequels, they do con plans and o plans and all that kinds of thing. The government as a whole does not. But you are going to have an interleaved way of political pressure, economic pressure, diplomatic pressure, steps you are going to take and they have got to be Work Together to be maximally effective. I said, one of the differences between Ballistic Missiles and other kinetic threats, particularly for the homeland is the time span from first action to war head arrival is shorter than other threats. Cruise missiles, bombers, sea and land forces all are viewable in hours to days before arrival. You can take steps to crank things up. But once the first launch has occurred, inbound is less than 40 minutes. So we have to have a method of response that starts to apply effective pressure in hours to a very few number of days. The capabilities and actions across the spectrum of necessary responses and responders must be prepared, equipped, and train before the threat situation develops to the point of requiring action. Putting to the all the elements, the dime elements. The plan will need to consider, particularly in the area of regionol defense, interaction with allies and partners. How it may add to our defense or limb our ability. Nato for instance has a detailed bmd plan for the intercept let me of Missile Defense protection of nato territory in europe. What are other elements that the Nato Alliance can bring to bear against an antagonist . They are a military alliance after all. They are not the e. U. What sort of connections with the e. U. , the economic deciders of europe need to be engendered in order to come up with an Effective Response . In the interleaving of these capabilities, do they fall under the nato command structure or some other entity . The e. U. , council of governments, unclear. Earlier we were talking about exchanging information, franks mentioned that. How do you coordinate this with other allies and partners . Some of this can be very sensitive. Again, some of it needs to be planned and thought of ahead of time. Do we need to extend the concept of the phased adaptive approach to the whole of Ballistic Missile protection and not just intercept capability . So having asked all those questions and posited a challenge, i have a recommendation. I warned elaine about this before she had to leave. She smiled. I recommend that we extent the bmdr, the ballistic Missile Defense review not as a revisit but as an extension to encompass the whole of government approach, to allocate responsibilities and tasks, and define the deturn points that need to be made and demonstrated to all who might consider threatening our homeland, forces, allies, and partners. In other words, to provide a Ballistic Missile Protection Plan. There have been and are still ong