I think breaking down those boundaries between different parts of government is very much something that weve seen and its translated into legislative action as well. Asset freezing recall, legislation that many countries have adopted. So a holding measure. E. U. Has done that. Switzerland has done that. Just after arab spring. A list of these persons, freeze their assets now. It is not a judicial freeze in the context of judicial action. It is an administrative freeze giving the countries time to prepare their judicial action. I think that sort of innovative legislation is happening. The civil forfeiture legislation that i think in america has been around for a very long time but in many other countries is still relatively new. You see that i wouldnt say proliferating but you see countries taking up those sort of legislations, so what we call nonconviction based legislation where you connect the asset to a crime. Typically on the balance of probabilities. Wont go into too many details. But anyway, look at legislative action to make it easier for a country to get stolen assets, the proceeds of corruption. I think those are all very positive, positive developments. Of course, there are still challenges. If we look Asset Recovery initiative, we have the Asset Recovery watch where we try and track international Asset Recovery efforts. And i think at this stage, i think actual returns so far, were at 4. 9 billion. I think were at 27. 7 billion in freed frozen assets. And so lets say were in total at maybe 8 billion. If you look at the whole landscape of corruption, it may be not a whole lot but ambassador zellweger made a very good point. Maybe we put too much burden on the system of Asset Recovery. Maybe were expecting too much to happen in the context of Asset Recovery, which is, after all, a judicial process. You soon overburden it and put all your hopes in we can do it that way. Maybe there are other things that may be looked at as well. One of the challenges that comes up and it relates to the point of civil Asset Recovery that jay made earlier that jay made earlier, its precisely this point of linking an asset in a Financial Center to a particular crime in a corrupt or autocratic state. Certainly if youve had regimes in place for 20, 30 years, how are you going to do that . How are you going say this bank account or this particular house was bought with assets that we can trace back all the way back to a thats extraordinarily thats an extraordinary high level of thats a very high burden you are putting on the country to prove that. So i think where we would like to see some more development is on that question of linking the asset to the crime and maybe more systems of equivalent value confiscation. That is to say i have proved that there was a crime to the tune of xbillion and i will take now an asset owned by the same person even if that asset not even if of that ascetic not prove the criminal origin so some flex is necessary. And to the earlier point of are we putting too much expected station, too much hope on Asset Recovery . Are we expecting too much to come from Asset Recovery . I think there are certain subtleties which in a culture of corruption such as existed in, for instance, tunisia, and theres a very interesting report which the world bank probably should a couple of months ago called all in the family and it talks about the way in which the ben ali family really had a finger in every pie in the country. And so when you talk about a foreign investor into tunisia, he doesnt have to be told in so many ways you have to pay the son of the president or the soninlaw so much money, there is a subtle way of suggesting that wouldnt be a good idea if you took him on your supervisory board. And so there are lots of instances like that where you really have state capture which maybe we shouldnt be looking to the Asset Recovery system to solve those issues because that is thats not a clear intent that you can say thats where the corruption took place. So, you know, those are the sort of issues, or other things like parliaments really rubber stamping legislation for the ruling family so that it was come pleadly legal if a minister simply awarded a contract to the president s firm because under the law he would be allowed to do that because the parliament had given him the discretion to do that. So sorry, yes . I was going to before i forget i was going to raise a point on that which is that theres a paradox in bringing these case which is is that the more dictatorial the country is, the more the difficult the case is to prove precisely for that reason because it may be perfectly legal to have conflicts of interest or even overt expropriation in the sense you think of 16th century france if youre louis xiv, you own all the property. Whats the corruption if you give it to somebody who you know . And so paradoxically some of our biggest successes come in countries where its an issue of corruption and not necessarily kleptocracy. And in true kleptocracies, meaning where a family or a clan or somebody has expropriate it had tools of state for their own benefit it becomes much more difficult to prosecute. Jay, wouldnt that be an instance where the u. N. Convention on corruption would help you . Because it does set the standard that is applicable to all countries because its pretty universal. I think that should give you absolutely. I think every country wants to appear legitimate so just by signing on to it you have to do it. The question becomes can you prove to a judges satisfaction that that is the law of the land . And so absolutely, those are the arguments we make. I just wanted to point out a paradox that exists in our enforcement regime. There is a point about criminality and to what extent you would be able to fall back on more general Civil Service ethics where you can say well, a minister should act in the Public Interest and clearly here that was not the case it becomes much more difficult from a legal point of view to make the case. Its dual criminality. It has to be a crime in your country and the other country. Thats why its so difficult. But just a few more points of what i think challenges are. We talked earlier about preventative system and the extent to which, yes, its very good if we can be successful in our Asset Recovery efforts but thats expost facto. Would be so much better if we could focus our efforts on making sure that money never ended up in the Financial System in the first place. So that is where Due Diligence obligations by banks are very important and i think maybe something is i hope something is changing in the culture of banks. There were some very interesting reports by the swiss regulator and by the english regulator still at the time the efsay, now ifca, on the extent to which branks in those countries had or not implemented Due Diligence obligations for socalled politically exposed persons. And certain the english report is very hard hitting and actually very unbureaucratic. Its very clear that quite a number of banks would deliberately miscategorize certain clients as low risk whereas they had enough information to suggest that the opposite was the case. So i think on that preventative side we still have some work to do. I think also focusing on the enablers, the lawyers, the accountants the Service Providers who tend to set up these constructs of shell corporati corporations. If you talk to many Financial Centers and particularly to the investigators in those countries theyll they often say the same thing and its actually quite a small defined group of the same lawyers and the same accountants, the same trusting companies that we see in many cases. But its very hard to get them on the hook for the crime and very often well i dont know very often but often youre after the big fish, youre after that corrupt official in country x and it may be just a waste of your resources to go after those enablers. And in the big, big picture there is such a small category of those maybe its worth focusing more on that. I think those challenges still remain. I dont want to end on a negative note by any way. I think we have come a long way i think if youve worked on something as obscure as Beneficial Ownership for a long time and two years ago you hear David Cameron talk about Beneficial Ownership at the g8 summit, thats extraordinary. Thats something for a few nerds in ministry suddenly become this is big issue absolutely extraordinary. As is the fact that there are so many people here today. This debate is clearly generating some interest so i think those are hopeful. I want to come back at some point to this notion of thinking about changes in how we address these challenges of different modes of corruption and kleptocracy because certainly what youve begun to see are blending of legitimate, illegitimate commercial activities, especially family run state owned enterprises and such. It then gets very hard to quantify and track and ultimately engage a stolen Asset Recovery effort. How you think about as what you were saying modalities of the legal paradigm and the tools we use and what they should look like is very interesting. I want to come back to your point about prevention because i think weve talked about this often. Stolen asset is an issue of not just corruption in Law Enforcement but of development and economic reform. Very important in terms of where developing countries are going. So i want to come back to that. But just to give the audience a sense of what these kind of cases look like, i was wondering if, especially given your historical view, your role in switzerland, can you give us a sense of the kinds of cases that are still under way now and that you see as still prominent in the swiss financial and legal context . Just give us an example so the audience gets a sense of whats happening in the real world of stolen Asset Recovery. And, jay, im going to come to you with the same question. Well, lets start with the marcus case. As i mentioned, the marcus case started in 86 when president marcos was toppled. The case has still not really been finalized. We sent back 680 million in 2002, but the philippines then had to enact a law that would allow the victims of the Human Rights Violations of the presidency of mr. Marcus to be to have a right to have access to these funds. And the political problem the filipinos faced was they had to recognize that the presidency under president marcos, there were very systematic Human Rights Violations. And that took a long time and that statute could only be enacted this february. So we will have in a months time a conference in manila to mark the end of the marcos affairs. And remember, that took 28 years. Jean claude duvalier, baby doc, who recently died, was also topped in 86, the same year, and the case is still not finished. Why isnt it finished . I think that is also a phenomenon of increasing concern. Often times these dictators they really wreck their countries which means once they lose power their countries are no longer in the position to really prosecute and to be a partner in that. Take haiti, zaire, congo, other examples. The problem that we have is that the very person that is responsible for the demise, so to speak, of the institution of this country would then also be its first beneficiary and that is what happened to us in the congo, in the mobutu case because the congolese institutions were weakened to a point where we could no longer cooperate with them. So we had to release the funds. Because, as you said, we have to go through judicial procedures. We can not rely on kangaroo courts. So our judges said, look, we can not just confiscate the funds and as long as we dont have evidence coming from congo because the evidence had to come from congo, there was nothing we could do. And in the end, it was the mobutu family that was the main beneficiary and that led switzerland to enact a new statute that is actually for these cases would allow us to confiscate the funds in switzerland without any cooperation from the country concerned and that is exactly what we did and when i come back to the duvalier case, its called the lex duvalier because we enacted it with a view to that case not to lose it. We lost one case, we dont like to lose so we enacted that law and we won the case in the Swiss Supreme Court last september, september, 2013. And we are now in the process of sending back the money to haiti. And perhaps we will touch on this issue, because i would also be interested in how you are going to deal with it. But thats always a challenge because we you know, by being active on Asset Recovery and the restitution of funds, there is also some kind of an expectation in our countries that were not just writing a check, putting it to the mail office and sending the money back to just see how it evaporates again. So we have to find ways how we can ensure that it will be spent in an accountable manner. So these are just two cases and then you have all the ongoing cases in the wake of the arab spring. Ill come back to you and i want to ask you the question of what are some of the modalities of the return of assets to get it to not just throwing money back into a corrupt environment to be misused again. Well come to that. But jay, can you talk to some of the cases that you and the u. S. Are dealing with and maybe give some examples . We have many investigations going on all over the globe. I think its public so i can speak about things like ukraine where theres an active effort to do it. Unfortunately, i cant speak to specifics about pending investigations because i wouldnt want the money to go fleeing somewhere else. Can you give us what i do want to do is talk a little bit about what weve been able to do since bringing our resources together and, you know, weve had a wide variety of cases that have become public over the past few years. Weve had cases against the former president of taiwan, chen, former president dictator of south korea. Abacha, which i know is longer in the tooth, but we and i think thats an example of how quickly things can go. We instituted a forfeiture action against funds that were located abroad. So this was jurisdiction we had over money not located in the United States but located in various jurisdictions including the uk elsewhere. But we were able to obtain a final order of forfeit your with respect to over 400 million of those proceeds. Theres still 120 million which is being litigated which will have to go through the judicial process. Were able to do that quickly. And were now in the process of enforcing those judgments in foreign courts so that we can actually get our hands on the money and then consider how to repatriate it and finally opian case shows is that in some ways we have to be pragmatic and practical deal with these cases. What were going to do is litigate these cases for 20 years until the end of the time. Without without a sense of the ultimate purpose which is to return assets to the benefits of people affected. And in that case, we took what i think would be considered a fairly aggressive posture against a sitting official who became a sitting official but somebody who was very well connected. And litigated it and had various twists and turns in the litigation which is all public and people can read about it. But then had to make a practical jurisdiction over a set of assets in the United States which we were confident we could win on but which could take another three to four years by the time the litigation and civil discovery came into place and asset which is in all frankness we probably had little chance of getting our hands on, an airplane which was transferred into the state of weak or the yall guinea so it posed problems as to whether any government would assist us in seizing that asset fb though we had legal arguments as to why it wasnt a valid transfer. And in our assessment the settlement we were able to enter into was acquire the entire value of assets that we had realistic possibility of getting our hands on in a realistic time frame. So rather than waiting for another few years to actually try to bring this case to closure and try to i think those are quite frankly the kind of judgments well have to make to f we want to devote our resources. We could do legislative changes but those are slow those are more slow in coming. I think some of the issues that were raised in terms of can we tweak laws to eliminate tracing requirements, et cetera, take time to consider because you have to consider whether it fits within our traditions, within other things so those changes can happen. But theyre longer. So in the meantime i think we have to be im a prosecutor and a litigator and i try to be on the grounds. I think we need to figure out how we get within the tools that we have the money into our possession legitimately and then try to work on repatriating it. Just quickly. For folks who arent familiar with the case, what actually was forfeit forfeited. We were able to forfeit the mansion which im not even sure it was an enormous mansion in n malibu. We were able to forfeit the value of the property located in Equatorial Guinea with respect to the Michael Jackson paraphernalia. Paraphernalia he purchased with corrupt funds. Including life sized statues. Including life sighs status. S i should add there are cases pend in other countries, france most notably, if you happen to travel to paris theres a mansion thats an entire city block in a nice part of paris and there are still on going ca cases and nothing we did affects or immunizes anybody. Doesnt affect other jurisdiction. So its an effective tool or effective way forward in terms of how we balance Due Process Rights and the necessity of judicial process on the one hand with trying to do the best we can within our system of laws to acquire things of value and then go to the next step. Let me ask you one question before we get to the question of recovery and models for recovery. H