Im pleased to welcome today our panel of expert witnesses all with deep knowledge and experience in the region. Victor who is the Senior Adviser at the center for strategic and international studies, aaron who is professor of politics at princeton university. Kelly help me. Maximum secretary of defense for Security Affairs and ashley tellis, senior im having trouble with my anunciation this morning. For the past 70 years we have worked with our allies to uphold a rules based order based on principals of free peoples and free markets, open seas and open skies. The rule of law and a peaceful resolution of disputes. These ideas have presented peace and prosperity in the asian pacific. Now they threaten not just the nations as the asia pacific but the United States as well. The most immediate is kim jong uns regime. They have thrown its full weight behind the means to deliver Nuclear Weapons. Unfortunately the regime is making real progress. A north Korean Missile capable of striking an American City is no longer a distant hypothetical but an eminent danger. Like forward hearing about u. S. Policy options on the Korean Peninsula. For years the United States has looked at china china is the only country to curb the behey yor. Instead china has chosen the bully south korea for defending itself from the north korean threat. China is doing all of this to stop defensive system. I welcome the Trump Administration on the issue of north korea. As these discussions continue the United States should be clear while we earnestly seek cooperation we do not seek such cooperation at the expense of our vital interest. We must not land not bargain over alliances with japan and south korea. As its behavior towards south korea indicates china has acted less like a responsible take holder and more like a bully. Its Rapid Military modernization, provocations in the east modern sea signals an increasively pattern of behavior. Despite efforts to rebalance u. S. Policy has failed to adapt to the scale and velocity to rules based order. That failure is called into question the credibility of americas security commitments in the region. The new administration has an important opportunity. For example, i believe there is strong merit for an asia specific which is similar to the deperns initiative over the last few years. This would enhance commands credible combat power to realign u. S. Military force in the region, improve operationally infrastructure, Fund Additional exercises, and build capacity with allies and partners. It incorp. Rates all of National Power. I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about what an apsi should fund and how they would articulate a strategy for the asia pa sif tick. I thank all of the witnesses for being here today and look forward to their testimony. Thank you to all of the witnesses for agreeing to testify this morning. It could not come at a more critical time as north korea enganled in tests for its Nuclear Programs. I look forward to hear wlg china will pu pressure to denuclearize and with f not what are alternative is. Is a military strike given the scope and retaliation and nature of the regime . I would like to hear about how we should coordinate options in the region. We have also had concern that they have not articulated. What is the strategy to deal with unlawful clams . How will it balance with Economic Engagement to cover that china is the economic partner of choice and how will it balance cooperation with china especially given issues ranging from north korea . I look forward to hearing testimony on all of these issues and more. Thank you. Before i call any witnesses we have housekeeping. I would like to say whats that . All right. We just lost one. Well wait. Welcome. Thank you chairman mccain and distinguished members of the committee. There used to be a time when north korea and their actions were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator who was harmless and looking for some attention with really bad hair. I dont think people think that way anymore. Between 1994 and 2008 north korea did 16 Ballistic Missile tests and one nuclear test. Since january of 2009 they have done 71 missile tests including four nuclear tests. The leader in north korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other country in the region, not just the United States, but that includes china, south korea. All of this translates to, and a dark strategic cloud, starting to dominate the skyline with regard to east asia. Having said that i think there is a Silver Lining to every dark cloud. There are four that could help to inform asia pacific security initiative. First, the north korean threat between the next government and south korea and washington. New government cannot afford indulgences in a new engagement or sunshine policy. It would be unwise for a new president on may 10th presumably with possibly a sixth nuclear test to declare they are reopening the industrial complex. It would only as the new government would lose steps with the United States and even china. The u. S. Is not a verse to korean engagement. For it to be effective such engagement will be coordinated for negotiations and denuclearization. Second has to do with tri lateral communications. It is presumably before the scheduled trip to the region in the fall. The goal of alliance should be a collective security statement among the three allies. An attack on one constitutes an attack against all. The third Silver Lining relates to china. Beijing is unlikely to let off on economic pressure on south korea over the Defense System i think for at least another one or two financial quarters. This will hurt south korean businesses and tourism even more but should also spark Strategic Thinking in the United States and south korea. Given the Energy Revolution and removal of export the two allies should think about Bilateral Energy partnerships that could reduce dependence on china in the middle east. They can Work Together to map out south korean strategy for engaging south korea. These new engagements should not be a temporary measure but should be a serious measure at creating new markets for u. S. Allies, production chains and investment. And be a distinctly and allies in the region. Thank you very much. Thank you. Before we go to you we do have a quorum now. Nominations so senate all in favor the motion carries. Welcome. Senator mccain, i appreciate the ability to express my views. In the Time Available i would like to make three main points. First, as senator mccain has already indicated i dont think the United States has integrated National Strategy and in particular for dealing with increasingly powerful klichina. We have a Strategy First put in place over two decades ago. It is a set of goals and policies intended to achieve them which are largely discontadi disconnected from one another. Second, china does have strategy for the continental domain. The goal has become increasingly clear in the last few years. It is to create order thats very different from the one we have been trying to build. Third, just because beijing has a strategy we and our allies have many strengths. I think we have reached the point where it is essential we review our strategy and adjust our policies accordingly. The start of a new administration would be the time to attempt such review. Let me try to expand on each of those poinds. The United States set out to expand the scope of the Constitutional Order by integrating the pieces of the former soviet empire and by accelerating china. The United States pursued twopronged strategy on one hand seeking to engage china but diplomatic and others and at the same time working with partners and maintaining our own forces to presaev balance of noour was favorable to the security of our allies. The goals of that policy were to preserve stability, to deter the possibility of aggression while waiting for engagement to work its magic. The hope to ultimately transform china, to encourage leaders to see as lying in preservation of that order and to set in motion processes that would lead to the economic liberalization of that country. As in europe and also asia our ultimate aim was to build a region whole and free, an open liberal region in an open world. Since the turn of the century it has become apparent it hasnt worked. Engagement has not achieved intended results. It is more repressive domestically than at any time since the cultural revolution. It relies heavily and impose costs on other countries including ours. And external behavior has become aggressive most notably. And meanwhile engagement not working balancing has become because of the growth of chinas military capabilities. So second, what accounts for this recent shift . The short answer to that question is beijings increased assertiveness is on arrogance on one hand and also deep insecurity. For roughly the first 15 year ors so chinas rulers followed who advised in 1991 that china should bite its time, build up elements of National Power and advance towards achieving a position of reestablishing china in the region. Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of financial cry says and these changes have accelerated and become constitutionalized with the exception of the party in the state. Basically the financial crisis caused strategists to include that the United States was declining more rapidly than had been expected more quickly than had been hoped. It was time for china to step up to become clearer in defining its core interests and more assertive in pursuing them. At the same time, however, the crisis also deepened the chinese leaderships underlying concerns about their prospects for sustaining Economic Growth and preserving social stability. China is behaving more assertively both because its leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by what they see as a more favorable external situation, and because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and rally Domestic Support by courting controlled confrontations with others who they can present as hostile for forces including japan and the United States. The chinese actions arent limited to pursuing its claims and trying to extend its zone of effective control in the maritime domain. Along its land frontiers, beijing has unveiled a set of one belt one Road Initiative which aims to transform the c e economic geography. Leaders have begun to articulate their idea of new order. New rules written in beijing and mechanisms for political consultation with china at the center and the United States pushed to the periphery. U. S. Alliances would be dissolved or drained of their significance. Maritime democracies would be divided from one another and relatively weak and china, meanwhile, would be surrounded on the continent by friendly and subservient authoritarian regimes. If the United States try today make the safer for democracy, in the 21st century china is trying to make the world safe for authtorianism. Theyre using and trying to coordinate all the strults of policy to achieve these ends. Military domain, building up both conventional antiaccess capabilities and theyre modernizing their Nuclear Forces in order to deter possible u. S. Intervention and raise questions about the continued viability of our security guarantees. And also developing other instruments, little blue men, maritime militia, Island Construction to advance towards their goals, create facts without provoking confrontation. Economically, theyve been using the growing gravitational pull of their economy to draw others towards them. Theyre becoming increasingly open in using economic threats and punishments to try to shape the behavior of others in the region, including u. S. Allies, such as korea and the philippines. China has been engaging in Political Warfare. Attempts to shape the perceptions of both leaders and elites and publics by conveying the message that chinas growing wealth and power present an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors while raising questions about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of the United States. And i think its important to note, also, that china is waging Political Warfare against us. Holding out the prospects of cooperation on trade and on north korea, which i think is now going to be, again, a part of that process. Even as they work to undermine and weaken our position in the long run. Finally, and very briefly, how should the United States respond. As i stated at the outset i think the time has come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy towards china and the asia pacific and the entire eurasian domain more broadly. A serious effort along these lines would look at the various instruments of power, the various aspects of our policy which i think are largely fragmented and dealt with separately and consider the ways in which they might be better integrated. It would also waive the possible costs and risks of alternative strategies. A useful model would be the solarium project, a review of possible approaches for dealing with the soviet union that was undertaken in 1953 during the early months of the eisenhower administration. To my knowledge, there has been no such exercise regarding our policies towards asia and china. Were effectively running on the fumes of the strategy that was put into place a quarter century ago. Congress cant do such an assessment itself, but it might wish to concern mandating such review as it did in requiring a general statement of National Security strategy in 1986 and the quadennial review in 1997. Im afraid my clock isnt working, so im sure ive already gone over time. I cant claim to have conducted such an exercise myself, but id like to close with a few thoughts about issues it might address and some of the conclusions towards it which might lean. First and most basic is what is it that were trying to achieve . If an asia whole and free is out of reach, at least for now, and if a region reshaped according to beijings vision would be threatening to our interests and our values, as i think it would be, how should we define our strategic goals . Part of the answer here i think is likely to be that well need to rededicate ourselves to defending those parts of the asian system that remain open and liberal, including our allies, the rules in which they abide and the comments that connects them. Its sometimes said in order to accommodate chinas rising power and avoid conflict well need to compromise. Thats certainly true. But theres some issues where it will not be possible to split the difference. We need to be clear about what those are. In the economic domain, if we dont want others to be draw increasingly into a chinese coprosperity sphere we need to provide them kw the greatest opportunity to remain engaged in mutually beneficial trade and investment with us and with one another. Whatever its economic merits, tpp had Strategic Benefits in this regard and its not clear what, if anything, will take its place. In regard to military strategy, a great deal of energy has been devoted recently to figuring out to respond to these chinese initiatives in the socalled gray zone. As important as this problem is its subordinate to the larger question in how we and our allies can counter chinas evolving strategy. Were in an odd position of having raised this issue in a very visible way back in 2011, with the creation of the air sea office. Then seeming to back away from it. Theres a limit of what we can and should say in public. Were at a point where we need to be able to explain to our allies and ourselves how would we fight and win a war in asia, should that ever become necessary. Finally, theres this delicate issue of Political Warfare, what is, as senator reed mentioned, whats our counter to the narrative the chinese are pushing across much of asia as were portrayed as unable to solve our domestic problems, as inward turning, and potentially dangerous, while china presents itself as the wave of the future. Economically dynamic, efficient, unthreatening, nonjudgmental, loaded with cash, and eager to do business. In this regard, it seems to me it would be a serious mistake strategic as well as moral to drop the subjects of human rights and universal values from our discussions with and about china. Our commitment to these values and our demonstrated willingness to defend them are among our greatest assets. And being seen to abandon them in the face of chinas growing wealth and power will embolden beijing and other authoritarian regime regimes. Thank you very much. Chairman mccain, Ranking Member, reed, other distinguished members thank you for convening this important and timely hearing today. I want to commend the committee for its steadfast bipartisan leadership on all matters of peace and security in the asia pacific. Its extremely important as well as your steadfast commitment to our men and women in uniform and the civilians that serve alongside them. So thank you. Also thank you to my fellow