Good morning. We meet this morning to receive evidence on the noil the u. S. Asia region. Our panel has deep knowledge and experience in the region. Victor cha, erin friberg, who is professor of politics at princeton, university, kelly help me. Former principles tal deputy si of defense. And Ashley Tellis senior fellow in tata. Im having trouble with my enunciation this morning. I apologize. Senior fellow and chair for Strategic Affairs at the Carnegie Endowment for international peace, an old friend of the committee. For the past 70 years weve worked with allies and partners to uphold a rulesbased order based on principles of free peoples in free markets, open seas and skies. The rule of law and the peaceful resolution of disputes. These ideas have produced unprecedented peacened prosperity in the asia pacific. Now a throthe most immediate che is a situation on the crane peninsula. Kim jong uns regime has thrown its full weight behind its quest for Nuclear Weapons. Unfortunately, the regime is making real progress. A north Korean Missile with a Nuclear Payload capable of striking an American City is no longer a distant hypothetical. But an imminent danger, one that poses a real and rising risk of conflict. I look forward to hearing from our Witnesses Today about u. S. Policy options on the crakorean la. For years the u. S. Has looked to china to bring the regime to the negotiating table and achieve progress toward a denuclearized Korean Peninsula. China has repeatedly refused to exercise that influence. Instead, china has chosen to bull bully south korea. In response to the Alliance Decision to deploy the fad Missile System to the crane peninsula, china has waged a campaign of economic retaliation against south korea which has inflicted real damage. China is doing all of this to stop the deployment of a Missile Defense system which is only necessary because china has aided and abetted north korea for decades. I welcome the Trump Administrations outreach to china on the issue of north korea. But as these discussions continue, the United States should be clear that while we ernestly seek chinas cooperation on north korea, we do not seek such cooperation at the expense of our vital interests. We must not and will not bargain over aligns with japan and south korea nor over fundamental principles such as freedom of the seas. As its behavior towards south korea has indicated china has acted less and less like a responsible stakes holder and more like a bully. Its Rapid Military modernization, provocations in the east china sea, and continued militarization activities in the South China Sea signal an increasingly assertive pattern of behavior. Depilot u. S. Efforts to rebalancest asia pacific, theyve failed to adapt to the rulesbased order and that failure has called into question americas commitments in the region. I believe theres strong merit for an asia pacific stability initiative. This initiative would enhance Pacific Command power through targeted funding to realign u. S. Force posture in the region, improve infrastructure, Fund Additional exercises, and build gas with our allies and partners. These are important steps that should be taken as martd of a new comprehensive strategy in the asia pacific. I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about what an apsi, senator reed. Thank you for calling this hearing and thank you to all the witnesses for agreeing to testify this morning. This hearing could not come at a more critical time as the north korean regime has engaged in an aggressive schedule of tests. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. Is a military strike something we should consider given the scope of retaliation from the regime . I would also like to hear whether there are feasible military options on the table and how they should be coordinated. Weve heard concern that the administration has not yet articulated a comprehensive asia pacific strategy. For example, what is the administrations Maritime Strategy to deal with excessive, unlawful maritime claims. And most important, how will it balance cooperation and competition with china . Especially given the importance of chinas inkorm race issues ranging from north korea to terrorism. Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of the witnesses on all the of these witnesses and more. Thank you. Before i call on the witnesses, we have a housekeeping whats that . All right. We just lost one. So well wait. Dr. Cha, welcome. Thank you, chairman mccain. So there used to be a time when north korea and their actions were considered isolated acts by a lonely dictator who was harmless and looking for some attention with really bad hair. I dont think people think that way anymore. Between 1994 and 2008 north korea did 16 Ballistic Missile tests and one nuclear test. Since january of 2009, they have done 71 missile tests, including four nuclear tests. The leader in north korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other country in the roimg, not just the United States but that includes china, strae, russia. Absolutely no interest in faulking. All of this translates to one of the most challenging strategic environments for the United States and its allies and a very dark strategic cloud that is starting to dominate the skyline with regard to east asia. Having said that, i think there are theres a Silver Lining to every dark cloud. And in this case i think there are four that could help to ininform an Asia Pacific Security Initiative as the chairman mentioned. First, the north korean threat provides opportunity for closer coordination of policy between the next government in south korea which will be elected may 9th, and washington. New south koreian government cannot afford indulgences in the sunshine policy. It would be unwise, for example, for a new south koreian president to declare that he or she is reopening the kay song industrial complex. This would only serve to further margin marginalize the South Koreans. The u. S. Is not averse. However, for it to be effective, such engagement must be utszed 9 strategically and coordinated with an overall u. S. Strategy for negotiations and denukization. The second Silver Lining has to do with trilateral corporation. The United States should welcome a meeting with the u. S. President and south korea and japan presumably before President Trumps scheduled visit to the region in the fall. The goal of Alliance Coordination should be a collective statement among the three allies, the United States, jaech and korea and an attack on one constitutes an attack against automatic. The third Silver Lining relates to china. Beijing is unlikely to let off on the economic pressure on south korea over the Defense System for i think at least another one or two financial quarters. This will hurt south korean businesses and tourism even more, but it should also spark serious Strategic Thinking in the United States and south korea about reducing the roks economic dependence on china. The two allies should think seriously about new bilateral partnerships that could reduce south korean dependence on china and the middle east. Washington and seoul can Work Together to work out a strategy for engaging india as well as asean countries. This should be a serious efforts in creating new markets for u. S. Products and investment. The chinese have proven with their coercion over the thad issue that the South Koreans welfare cannot be left in other hands. In particular, as part of a new engagement strategy with asean, the United States with support will show stronger will to control the South China Sea. This would be a distinctly positive platform for the United States and its allies in the region. Thank you very much. Thank you, dr. Friberg, before you we go to you, we have a quorum now. 550 nominations. Is there a motion in favor to support these military nominatio nominations . Second. Motion carries. Senator mccain, senator reid, thank you very much. Members of the committee, appreciate very much the opportunity to express my views on these important subjects. In the Time Available id like to try to make three main points. First, as snoerlt mccain, i think, has already indicated, i dont think the United States currently has a coherent integrated strategy for the asiapacific region. What we have instead are 2 remnants of a Strategy First put in place over two decades ago. Some aspirational goals and a set of policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now in varying states of disrepair and which are in any event largely disconnectsed from one another. Second, china does have such a strategy, not only for the asiapacific. The goal of beijing strategy has become increasingly clear in the last few years is to create a yuration order thats different from the one weve been trying to create since the doled war. China has many weaknesses and liabilities. We and our allies have many strengths. I do think weve reached the point where its essential that we reexam our goals, review our strategy and adjust our policies accordingly. The start of a new administration would be the time to attempt such a review. It becomes more difficult as time goes on. Let me try to expand on each point. When the cold war ended, the United States set out to expand the Geographic Scope of the western liberal and institutional order and by accelerating the integration of china, a process that had begun a few years before. As regards china, the United States pursued a twopronged strategic on the one hand seeking to engage china on all domains, and at the same time, working with our allies and partners in maintaining our own forces in the region to preserve a balance of power that was favorable to our interests and to the security of our allies. The goals of that policy were to preserve stability, to deter the possibility of aggression. The u. S. Hoped in effect to tame and ultimately to transform china to encourage its and leading eventually to the economic and political liberalization of that country. As in europe, so also in asia, our ultimate aim was to build a region whole and free, an open liberal region in an open and liberal world. Since the turn of the century its become increasingly apparent that this approach hasnt worked. Engagement has not achieved its intended results. China is far stronger and richer, but its more repressive domestically since anytime in the cultural revolution. It imposes costs on other countries including ours and its behavior has become assertive and aggressive in the maritime domain. And balancing has become more di for us and our allies because of the growth of chinas military capabilities. So second, what accounts for this recent shift in chinese behavior . The short answer to that question is that beijings increased assertiveness is mix bid a mix of optimism and arrogance on one hand and also deep insecurity. For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of the cold war chinas rulers followed dung choip ping that said that china should hide its capabilities and bide its time and advance cautionly towards eventually achieving a position reestablishing china as the power in the region. Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of financial crisis and these changes have been accelerated and become institutionalized since twirtd with the election of xi jinping. Strategists have concluded that the United States was declining more rapidly than had been expected and that china was therefore able to rise more quickly than had been hoped. It was time for china to step up, to become clearer in defining its core interests and more assertive in pursuing them. At the same time, however, the crisis also deepened the chinese leaderships underlying concerns about their prospects for sustaining Economic Growth and preserving social stability. So china is behaving more assertively because its leaders want to seize opportunities presented to them and because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and to rally Domestic Support by courting controlled confrontations with others whom they can present as hostile foreign forces, including japan and the United States. Chinas actions arent limited to pursuing its claims and trying to extend sits zone of effective control in the maritime domain. Beijing has unvabld a hugely ambitious set of plans which aims transform the economic and geography of shall of ur asia. Chinas leaders have become to articulate their vision of a system of networks, regional free trade areas, new rules written in beijing and mechanisms for political consultation with the United States pushed to the prefer rry. Democracies would be divided from one another and relatively weak and china would be surro d surrounded on the continent by friendly regimes. If in the 20th century theyre using and trying to coordinate the instruments of policies to achieve these ends. Military domain, building up conventional capabilities and modernizing Nuclear Forces in order to deter possible u. S. Intervention and to raise questions about the viability of our security guarantees and developing other instruments, little blue men, Island Construction to advance towards their goals, create facts without provoking confrontation. Economically theyve been using the growing gravitational pull toward their economy and ive become open in using economic threats and punishments to try to shape the behaves of others in the region, including u. S. Allies including korea and the philippines. China has been engaging in Political Warfare, attempts to shape the perceptions of leaders and elites and publics by c conveying the message that chinas growth well and power present an opportunity rather than a threat to its neighbors while raising questions about the leadership capacity of the United States. Its important to note that china is wagging Political Warfare against us, holding out the corporation on trade and north korea which is going to be a part of that process even as they work to undermine and weaken our position in the long run. Finally and briefly, how should the United States respond. As i stated i think the time has come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy towards china and the asiapacific. A serious effort along these lines would look at the various instruments of power and the aspects of our policy which are fragmented and dealt with separately and consider the ways in which they might be better integrated. In a useful model here would be the socalled so larum project, a review of approaches for dealing with the soviet union that was undertaken in 1953 during the early months of the eisenhower administration. To my knowledge in the last 25 years there has been no such exercise regarding our policies towards asia and china. We are running on the fumes of the strategy was put in place a quarter of a century ago. Congress cant do an assessment itself, but it might consider mandating a review as it did in requiring a general statement of National Security in 1986. Im afraid my clock isnt working so im sure that ive gone over time. I cant claim to have conducted such an exercise myself, but id like to close with a few thoughts about some of the issues that it might address and perhaps some of the conclusions towards which it might lean. First and most basic is what is it that were trying to achieve. If an asia whole and free is out of reach, at least for now, and if a region reshaped according to beijings vision would be threatening to our interests and values, how should we define our strategic goals. Part of the answer here i think is likely to be well need to rededicate ourselves to defending those parts of the asian system that remain open and liberal, including our allies, the rules with which they abide and the comments that connects them. Its sometimes said in order to accommodate chinas rising power and avoid conflict we will need to compromise and thats true, but theres some issues where it will not be possible to split the difference and we need to be clear about what those are. In the economic domain, if we dont want others drawn into a chinese co prosperity sphere, we need to provide them with the greatest possible opportunity to remain engaged in beneficial trade investment with us and one another. Tpp had Strategic Benefits in this regard and its not clear at this point what, if anything, will take its place. With regard to military strategy, a great deal of energy has been devoted to figuring out how to respond to these chinese initiatives in the socalled gray zone. As important as this problem is, i