Screeria nigeria. The tenhour drive, frankly was definitely worth it. According to your program, what were supposed to do today is first offer some insights speak briefly on a portion of the campaign they believed to be particularly illuminating. Two things ill do real quickly, if i can, the first one deals with spring hill. Spring hill was the day before the battle of franklin and what it represented was a lost opportunity to attack some union troops either at spring hill itself or some who were in colombia and would come up to Franklin Pike that night. Essentially what happened is a profound mystery in many ways. Hood planned a flanking movement which was extremely successful. In fact there were federal troops still at columbia who were going to come up the pike that night. They failed to do two things. They could have launched an attack on the yankees who were in spring hill. They did not do that. There was a fight but it was not the larger fight that i think the generals had contemplated. The other thing they could have done potentially was to cut off the pipe so that as troops came up from columbia they would be met by confederate resistance. The thing that always sort of astonished me about this is that its always deemed as a confederate failure, which it was, but theres tremendous assumptions made about what the federals would have done which is essentially they would have inevitably been snared and destroyed. Our irish guy today said that at spring hill they had an opportunity of destroying or mangling a large part of the union army. Thats possibly true. But what i think theyve lost in spring hill in some ways it never gets the attention it is due, is that the yankees in this case appear as simply unwitting accomplices of confederates who were bent on destroying them. These were veteran federal soldiers though. These were battlehardened veterans of the Atlanta Campaign and elsewhere. The idea that they would simply encounter confederate troops and meekly hand over their weapons is to me simply preposterous. There could have been a battle. It could have been at spring hill. It could have been somewhere between columbia and spring hill. But i think the idea that the federals would have been dispatched with ease is simply nonsense. But you can do what i did when i was a kid with my toy soldiers. You can basically do whatever you want with your imagination. If youre a confederate partisan, you can wipe out john skofields army to a plan. If you are a union you can have your union an ses tore fight his way through, then go on to franklin, then nashville. Both sides would have suffered casualties. A night attack if that had taken place was fraught with danger. There could have been a battle november 29th. There could have been a battle fought somewhere else in frank ln lin on november 30th. But the claim this could havale al altered things is simply false. Frankly, there is an elephant in the room here. His name is John Bell Hood. I went to visit hoods boyhood home. Everyone properly associates him with texas but he was actually born in kentucky in bath county. I went over to see his boyhood home. Looking for inspiration. There was none. The house has been sided. There is a nice car port and really he left when he was so young i could not have imagine little toddler John Bell Hood with his beard. You know. In the driveway. So alas. Some of you know theres been a new book published by a fellow named stephen m. Hood. Its called the rise, fall and resurrection of a confederate general. It is a major reappraisal. Essentially he believes historians formed an inaccurate portrayal of hood, that they have ignored positive views of him both during the war and postwar period. He believes that historians have accentuated the negative and written things that are basically false. He believes that historians have copied anecdotes and statements from other historians without going critically to the original source. They take citations out of context that defame hood and ignore larger context which would make him look better. Frankly, there is a long line of historians he asailssailsassails including me. Mr. Hood conveniently tells me that in prewar in 1950s america, 2,500 would have been the equivalent of 68,000 today. Hes right. I should have couched it in terms of something to the effect like, he was viewed as aggressive, and this anecdote even though it is preposterous illustrates it. But there are other people that he takes on more. Theres the tennessee connection. Starts with thomas r. Hay who comes off relatively better than stanley horn thomas connelly. Then wiley sword is his particular target. I really have the impression that sam hood would like to get all of us historians in a big room and just beat the hell out of all of us. I will tell you that sam hood has lots of supporters. I went on amazon right before i came. There were 60some odd comments and 44 gave him either a fivestar or fourstar rating. So i do think that there are people who have felt that john hood has been maligned unfairly, that he deserves better and that if it was a failed campaign which sam hood acknowledges that maybe John Bell Hood has been wronged by historians. All ill say is that what we historians do though. We take Historic Events and figures, we interpret the past and there is conflicting interpretations and if it were not so, to be honest with you history would not be much fun. So im glad to have you here and hope you enjoy the festivities for the rest of the day. Thank you. It is a pleasure to be here as we commemorate the civil war and particularly the middle Tennessee Campaign of 1864. It is good, it is an honor to be on the program with these distinguished gentlemen who have been studying the civil war for many years. Certainly, as chris said, we all are appreciative of your presence here today. Thank you very much. The events leading to the confederate mashlg intorch into central tennessee began with the conclusion of the Atlanta Campaign. In september 1864, United States military forces led by William Sherman triumphantly entered atlanta which had become a major southern city, railroad center, and symbol of confederate resistance. The victim climaxed a fourmonth long, 100,000man strategic offensive. The Confederate Army pulled out of the city just before being trapped by the federals. The atlanta news electrified the nation. Dramatically and undeniably demonstrating that the United States war effort was at last succeeding. The grand achievement also contributed significantly, possibly decisively, to president lincolns campaign for reelection. The success of which virtually assured the ultimate doom of the confederacy. Desperate to somehow minimize the United States victory, John Bell Hood led the Southern Army northward in late september disrupting the western and Atlantic Railroad between chattanooga and atlanta. We served as shermans supply route. Although sherman initially pursued hood with a portion of his forces, the Union Commander had no intention of relinquishing the military initiative to the enemy who soon moved into north alabama. Sherman had all together another campaign in mind with 60,000 veteran troops, he determined to march across georgia from atlanta to charleston or savannah, living off the land, breaking up roads destroying all manner of war resources, leaving a trail, he remarked that will be recognizable 50 years hence. The impact on southern resources and morale, he believed would be more devastatingeing than the capture of atlanta. If hood continued to move west and north into middle tennessee rather than following sherman then georgia s. Thomas in nashville who was amassing widely separated troops, and also reinforced by thousands of shermans veterans from the Atlanta Campaign, would defend against the rebel offensive. In midnovember, sherman began the march for which he will ever be remembered, while hood and the army of tennessee, instead of pursuinge ingingeing sherman, prepared to cross the Tennessee River and drive northward toward nashville. The resulting campaign in central tennessee highlighted by events at spring Hill Franklin and nashville, and characterized by mystery and misery, anger and turmoil, suffering, slaughter and tragedy soon became and ever after it has remained a subject of endless controversy. The spring hill affair was an intriguing enigmatic episode, and has been the focus of much attention. The bloody, tragic clash at franklin has attracted even more attention. But the twoday battle of nashville has a highly 8q significant feature which neither spring hill nor franklin can claim. I refer to the participation of africanamericans. Several thousand strong, in a combat row for the union army the black regiments had come to be officially known as United States colored troops. Usct. They fought both days of the engagement, and this is a major reason why the battle of nashville deserves to be commemorated. Certainly not the only one but a major one. The experience of serving as a member of the United States colored troops a black soldier in a blue uniform, was not easy, as you well might expect. When the civil war began, president lincoln rejected any idea of abolishing slavery or seeking black military assistance for the war effort. He feared that such action wop ale would alienate the border slave states which had remained loyal to the union, arouse the racial prejudice of northern whites and further harden confederate union, arouse the racial prejudice of northern whites, and further harden confederate resistance. By the late summer of 1862 however the president had come to believe that undermining slavery would significant weaken the confederacy and should become a major priority overriding any negative factors. Thus, after the emancipation proclamation was issued, the union army with lincolns full support launched a drive to recruit africanamerican soldiers. By the wars end, nearly 180,000 blacks would serve in the usct. More than 0807 0 80 of them coming from the confederate states, and most of those former slaves. The great majority of officers for those black troops were white men. This was in order to provide the inexperienced africanamerican soldiers with leadership by combat veterans. It also certainly reflected, in part considerable part a bow to racial prejudice because it was believed that few White Union Soldiers would take orders from a black officer. The black soldiers had to deal with discrimination in several ways. Their pay was 10 per month while a white private received 13 per month. Many Union Generals thought the usct should be used only as laborers or asgarrison troops having no faith in their fighting potential. When black troops did get into combat, they sometimes carried inferior weapons, and if they got sick, they well might receive inferior medical care. If they were captured they often were mistreated or even murdered. At the battle of nashville general george h. Thomas, like many of his peers, harbored doubts about the combat prowess of africanamericans. But with black troops available thomas decided to use them. On both days of the battle the United States colored troops made a diversionary attack against the confederate right flank. The africanamerican infantry were serving in a division commanded by james b. Steedman. It was composed of two black regiments and one white regiment, and numbered approximately 7,500 men. Through no fault of the blacks, as the fortunes of war dealt with them harshly the diversionary attack on december 15 resulted in heavy casualties. The situation was even worse on december 16 when Corps Commander thomas j. Wood decided instead of a demonstration, to launch an assault in hope of carrying the formidable rebel right flank. It was a blunder a hastily conceived affair that cost the union troops dearly, both white and black. In fact the attack exacted approximately onethird of the total Union Casualties for the two days fighting at nashville. And suffering the greatest loss of any regiment was the 13th usct, a regiment raised in nashville, which lost approximately 40 of its men. Once more as so often in the civil war, gloryhungry commanders in frontal assaults against strong defensive positions proved a lethal combination. There were numerous accolades for the fighting prowess of the black troops, and some of them from southerners. Confederate Brigadier General james t. Holsclaw whose firing brigade devastated the 13th usct was deeply impressed by their furious and desperate assault. He reported how the blacks gallantly that was his term gallantly assaulted. Again and again they charged, he said right into the abity. But, they came only to die. Holtzclaw continued ask the i have seen most of the battlefields of the west, but never saw dead men thicker than in front of my two right regiments. The magnificent effort of the black troops seemed to deserve a better fate, but the battle of nashville did prove that africanamericans would fight, would fight offensively and aggressively, even when assaulting a heavily defended and naturally strong5 enemy position. Thank you, jim and chris. I guess i am the Counter Point to stephen sam hoods book on the resurrection of John Bell Hood. And i will say in preface here that my aim certainly is not to get John Bell Hood, but in a tragedy such as the battle of franklin represents responsibility should not be overlooked even in a modern sense in terms of our generation. Just please bear with me. In examining the many specific points of controversy about the events at spring hill and franklin, as ordered by general John Bell Hood on november 29th and 30th, 1864 perhaps the most critical are the reasons for the key decisions that he made. In an attempt to explain some of hoods actions that affected major aspects of the crucial events, often we have heard of his alleged use of an opium derivative taken for pain but which during the civil war era was regarded more of an aspirinlike medicine than a mindaltering drug. Theoretically, from a modern perspective, if hood was on an opium substance, he would not be reasoning with a normal lucidness. Thus his decisions would not necessarily be wise or proper. Yet that drug in my opinion, really should be a nonissue with John Bell Hood and the spring hill and franklin series of events. Why . Because there are much better explanations for the key events at spring hill and franklin as orchestrated by general John Bell Hood. First, at spring hill the Confederate Army had the majority of the opposing union army trapped in the vicinity of columbia, tennessee, during the Late Afternoon of november 29th, but let them march past the deployed grey ranks that evening and night without a major fight. This has been debated and analyzed extensibilityvely with various explanations and blame apportioned to certain confederate commanders. The truly critical aspect which had generally been overlooked by some modern generation historians was that John Bell Hood abdicated his command responsibility by turning over control of active operations on the afternoon of november 29th, 1864 to Major GeneralFrank Cheatham. The rationale and reason for this is not often explained. Hood went to oak lawn, the Thompson House which he established as his headquarters, about 4 00 p. M. The Thompson House was more than a mile distant from the front line operations at spring hill. Thus, hood was absent from the critical area of observation and Decision Making by his own doing. Why he, in essence gave up command at the very critical moment in the spring hill series of events likely relates to his physical fatigue at that point. Hood had been in the saddle since 3 00 a. M. That morning, and with a missing leg and a formerly severely injured arm, he would logically have experienced fatigue and weariness. As general steven d. Lee later wrote, John Bell Hood was so physically incapacitated while acting in the role of an infield commander that he never should have been selected as the armys commander. Hoods lack of endurance and vulnerability to fatigue makes far more sense in explaining why he wasnt on the front lines at spring hill to make critical decisions when needed. A succession of generals and curriers had to make their way back and forth from the hood headquarters at the Thompson House to convey data and get instructions. This was the real boondoggle for the confederates at spring hill. And while hood could give authority to Frank Cheatham for these operations he could not delegate the responsibility. Hood was thus directly to blame for what happened despite the confusion, mistakes and omissions of others particularly Frank Cheatham who was very much a culprit. A dire result of skofields army escaping hoods trap by marching past the confederates at spring hill that night resulted in the obvious cause for the second major decision controversy. Why hood determined to make a masked assault on the entrenched union army at franklin on november 30th. It seems that the real reason was hoods anger and distress with the events of the previous evening. Skofields troops having escaped from the spring hill trap without difficulty. This matter is crucial to the entire story. Hood was described by an observer as as angry as a rattlesnake, striking out at anyon