Many of you in the audience have benefited from her superb tours. She is working on a geography of general gordon meade which i hope will be published by the university of North Carolina press. Ian isherwood to the left of jen, he is the assistant director of the Civil War Institute at Gettysburg College for a few more months. He has accepted a position as a assistant professor in war and memory studies which i assume will be part of the civil War Studies Program right here at Gettysburg College. Its a good thing for our students, not a great thing for c. W. I. He has been a very important part of what we do here. He is fantastic, though, with our students. He is especially, especially gifted when it comes to developing our Students Research interests. In fact, he took one of our students to oxford to deliver a paper and i believe, ian can correct me on this, that he cowrote a paper, a war and memories study, the journal, did i get that wrong . Prof. Isherwood war and society. It will be coming out in a year. Very rare as you can probably imagine where a college professor, especially in history, that they are able to do their own research but not on their own, not in isolation, but their colleague is an undergraduate. So ian has done fantastic work there. He will continue to do that as he moves on. I should also had that ian is an active scholar as well. He has his own book coming out entitled remembering the great war, writing and publishing the experiences of world war i. It will be released in november of 2016 and i suspect that we can get ian to come back. He said he would stop by on occasion. Will you stop by, ian, to sign some books for everyone . Can you work it into your schedule . Prof. Isherwood anything for you, pete. The devotion and loyalty of my staff, it almost brings a tear to my eye. Its really pretty amazing. Christian keller. Christian keller is professor of history in the department of National Security and strategy at the United States war college in carlisle where he teaches courses on the theory of war and strategy, National Security policy and strategy and the war in history. Among his many publications of the civil war, he is author of chancellorsville and the germans, nativism, ethnicities and civil war memory. That is coedited and he is a coauthor of the book, dutch pennsylvania germans at gettysburg. He is working on a project right now between lee and jackson. You are thinking what more could be said about lee and stonewall jackson. Christian has a lot to say about that. He is going to emphasize the religious and spiritual relationship between those two men and that book i hope will be published by the university of North Carolina press as well. I should quickly add that christian was also, back in the day, he was a recipient of one of our high school scholarships. What year was that . Prof. Isherwood it was both 1987 and 1988. You got two . We dont allow that anymore, man. One and thats it. Prof. Isherwood they must have liked me. He is a graduate of washington lee college. He did his graduate p. H. D. At penn state. He started with dr. Gallacher. I said yesterday, West Virginia university, what i was thinking, West Virginia university and university of virginia are so close. Dr. Gallacher moved on to u. V. A. Wait, i taught at w. V. U. I love West Virginia university, its a fine institution. Dr. Gallacher went on to u. V. A. And then you worked with carol and mark neely for your dissertation. So i will turn it over to the panel. Christian will begin by reading a paper and well have some comments and questions for the audience. Take it away. Prof. Isherwood thank you, pete, for that generous introduction. Thank you all for being here after lunch. I know what this can be because when i have to teach an elective at 1 00, my officers are generally not exactly the happiest to be there at 1 00 in the afternoon. They like the morning classes because they can go and the golf course beckons after lunch. This is a tough slot. We will endeavor to ensure that you stay awake. Thats my plan. There are some tough material in this. Im going to try to make it interesting and make wild jess wild gesticulations and things likes that, well do our best. Ok. Enabling the inspiring leader to refight battles in his mind. Contingencyiguity, begins vicariously two cents the resulting decisions in the real world. Sharpen the past would judgment and thinking skills before judgment, not prescribe decisionmaking while it occurred. It allowed future generals to allow history through the thoughts and actions of the great captain. And in so doing, increased creative thinking. Studying the lessons of military history should aim and improving the mind of the future commander or more accurately, to guide him in his selfeducation, not accompany him to the battlefield. History, whether it be from the American Civil War or some other conflict was a means to an end. That end was the intellectual preparation of military leaders and their future performance on the battlefield, both of them. Education and practical application, if you will, the two went hand in hand and in the 50 years following appomattox, the leaders of the u. S. Military came to embrace that duel end state. One major way they did that was to study the campaigns of the civil war, indeed, the postwar American Military looked primarily to the lessons of leadership conveyed by that recent cataclysm, both to educate its officers and to deal realistically with the military challenges confronting them in the years prior to world war i. The occupation of the defeated south, the indian wars, the spanish american war, world wars and ii. All of them owed some degree of their character to the civil war. Pushing towards the middle of the 20th century, the insights of 18611865 were relegated more and more to the Educational Mission of the military academy and war college than to operational doctrine and practitioners in the field. But even so, the legacies of the war for the union were still studied and persevered in a very real and practical manner through battlefield staff rides where officers gleaned nuggets of value about the nature of war by studying the decisionmaking of meade, mcclellan, jackson, grant, and sherman on the actual ground where those decisions were made. In the last 40 years, the American Civil War has been taught as part of the official clutch la of nearly all of the nations military institutions at every level of professional military education, what we call p. M. E. , of course, the military has an acronym for everything, i will do it, too. Perhaps not the corps of cadets and officers education, but certainly as a component and staff rides remain critical to all five armed services. I would add that they remain critical to the education of Civil War Institute attendees as well. This panel will engage in a conversation about a conversation in legacies in the u. S. Military. We will focus from 1865 through the advent of world war i but also intend to discuss the lingering value of understanding the art of war for generations of American Military leaders who came later. I will highlight some of the themes discussed by the few scholars who have actually studied this aspect of the civil war, offer some commentary about how the war influenced the actual fighting of the indian wars of the 1860s through the 1880s and to end with observations about the educational use of Civil War History from the army from the 1880s onward. At that point, ill turn it over to my colleagues who will each offer their views and will engage in a discussion about this interesting and in my opinion very important topic. We invite your participation after that and look forward to your insights. This topic has frankly been understudied, so for the graduate students out there and anybody looking for an overarching subject to right about regarding the civil war, you have got some openings. Carol rear dons book, soldiers and scholars, which was published in 1990 still stands as the primary publication building on the earlier works of jay luvaas, timothy nenninger and others. None focus exclusively on the Lessons Learned from the American Civil War and luvaas concentrated on the war for the european armies which he argued were rather sparse. The terms Lessons Learned has been viewed by the military as reflecting low operation takeaways that have shortterm value in the field rather than war winning strategic level concepts that offer longer term value for the joint force. Other authors, andrew burdle, williamson murray, brian lynn and Gregory Downs have written or edited studies that touch upon the subject as it pertained to topics of their books, but other than a few supplementary articles, thats about the gamut of scholarship on this topic. This general lack of scholarship should be surprising to us considering the vast public and professional interest in the civil war, but i think much of it has to do with something i remind my students at the war college about in practically every lesson, that would be time and timing. You can see my proficiency with powerpoint is as high as others. Ill leave it at that. As i tell them time when things happen within the broader scope of national and International Events and timing, the specific chronological sequence of events within a finite period of time, each strategy regardless of the war in question and the particular context, the time of the American Civil War, i would argue, occurring as it did near the middle of the 19th century and near the beginning of the industrial, financial and managerial revolutions meaning that its enduring strategic legacy and tactical Lessons Learned would have real shelf life of utility to the armed forces. It was most potent in the 50 years after the war but before the entry of the United States into world war i which we know changed just about everything regarding the character of modern war. After the First World War, technological advances such as the advent of military aircraft, political and social changes such as the influence of progressivism and simply the very proximity of another big war, all of this, the timing of world war i, if you will, relegated the civil war increasingly to the realm of education in the United States, both military and civilian. Couple that with the timing of the peace dividend following the First World War that swept the thought of all things military from the minds of Many Americans along with much funding for the army and the navy which was then followed by the Great Depression and the onset of world war ii and you can see how the civil war faded in prominence in the minds of americas military leadership. Other events intervened. That does not mean, however, that the leaders forgot about the war. Instead, the war for the union was sub assumed in priority to more recent wars and contemporary pressing issues. In this manner, how the United States military viewed the value of studying the civil war is no different than how it has consistently viewed its past wars. The further back in time they are, the less valuable in a practical sense they become. This leads me to some observations about things relevant to our topic that previous scholars have highlighted. The first is the tension between the institutional educational use of the civil war as a means of officer education which found its golden years in the 1890s through approximately 1910 and the practical utilitarian use of Lessons Learned from the and experiences of civil war combat, military occupation and pacification. The growing number of military educators in uniform in the second half of 19th century, most ensconced in posts at leavenworth and the Army War College came to embrace the former legacy while the rough and ready tacticallyminded officers on the western frontier viewed the latter as essential in fulfilling their duties. These practical lessons were most applicable in the wars against native americans on the great plains and in the southwest in the 1870s and in the 1880s. Most of them derived not from the experiences of combat with an conventional i dont know federal rat forces, but with southern irregular fighters and hostile civilians in occupied sections of the south. That, i think, is an interesting point for us to consider. The most immediate applicable takeaways from the civil war were in the realm of irregular warfare and not in the conventional sphere. Yet with the exception of the reinstating some of these counterirregular tactics and the endearing policy legacy of francis liebers code during the insurrection of the early 1900s, the practical legacy of the civil war all about disappeared by 1914. The educational legacy, however, enshrined in what Carol Reardon called map maneuvers, war games and the advent of the popular staff rides endured long past the surrender of crazy horse, cochise and geronimo. It persisted and gained strength all the way to 1915, when the pancho villa difficulty in mexico followed quickly by world war i. After the interruption of the two world wars and the Great Depression during which the study of the civil war was still conducted in military education, albeit at a reduced level, it resurged, especially the staff ride, in the 1970s and 1980s and still with us today. The second theme involves tensions within the two primary methods through which the military utilized the lessons of the civil war in the second half of the 19th century. Im going to show you the slide here of what map maneuvers look like. They put a map out on the table and sometimes they had stone or wooden marketing and they moved them around on the map trying to replicate actual maneuvers of larger units of men in historical battles. The second theme involves tensions within the two primary methods through which the military utilized the lessons of the civil war in the second half of the 19th century. For instance, the hard war measures of the likes of generals george crook and nelson miles during the indian wars learned during their days fighting john s. Mosby in virginia or bushwhackers in western virginia were effective in many ways in defeating the sioux and cheyenne in the 1870s and the apaches in the 1880s especially coupled with more lenient pacification measures afterward. Surprise morning attacks, burning out Food Supplies and hunter Strike Forces that pursued the indian warriors day and night were all tactics they learned in the civil war and applied to their native opponents in the west. Yet, the American Public of the postwar period was not the northern public of the civil war era. In cries of hypocrisy and outrage emanated from the big city newspapers who said the policies of harshness and conciliation born of the die createdof the dichotomy during the war by liebers famous code and still roughly followed in the west at that time allowed for far too much discretion on the part of the commander in the field and resulted too often in massacres of native americans. The shock to the White American system delivered by little bighorn notwithstanding, many eastern elites including more than a few Army Officers stationed in washington and in eastern posts howled against the hard war measures of the army employed against the indians while the bulk of the Army Leadership including william t. Sherman and philip sheridan, both of whom had their fill of confederate irregulars in the civil war attempted to walk the fine line between frontier necessity as their subordinates in the west called it and Public Opinion and policy in the east. It was a tension that never really resolved and included a number of unfortunate experiments including the Indian School at Carlisle Barracks which was a large sense an attempt by the army for the misguided calls for americanization of native american children. Other use of Civil War History in the classrooms of fort leavenworth, kansas, and the Army War College, then in washington, tensions also existed. As early as 1881 when general sherman established a school of application for cavalry and infantry at fort leavenworth, military conservatives, many of them born and bred in the late antebellum and civil war periods that enshrined military heroics leading from the front and tough service in the field rose to the challenge of what they called a map making bacillus and an epidemic of wisdom that was turning their officer corps into a leagues of bookworms. Ironically, they found ready allies among the early progressives of the civilian world who in the mold of Teddy Roosevelt believed in selfmade men. Innate characteristics that either existed in soldiers or didnt. Those characteristics could be groomed only by experience and hard service with but a modicum of formal schooling. Yet these old School Officers increasingly found themselves in a losing battle with the rising stars of the army and indeed of the navy as well in their officer corps who came to believe in the theory of what we call safe leader