We have, for those of you who have been with us for this spring semester, we have had a number of really great presentations and special events. This is one puts particularly me, the special to launch of greg brezinskis worldg the third sinoamerican rivalry during the cold war. Know, isany of you associate professor of history and National Affairs at George Washington university, really one of this countrys leading historical voices and historians of asia. Of nation building in south korea koreanamericans in the making of a democracy. Of course now, winning the third world. Its really shes a friend and part of the Wilson Center family, is even more special. 2010, 2011 at the as the most Senior Fellowship you can get from the Wilson Center. He is a Senior Adviser to two of the programs at the center the history of Public Policy programs of north korea documentation progress project is also a member of the Advisory Board of the center. He his current work, he is on to his next project of course already focuses very much to our delight north korean relations. He is also looking working on a larger book on nation building in asia. Its a very, very special occasion to have you here, greg, to launch your new book. We launched her first one, and it is just fantastic lunch this volume. Here the center again. Ly to you, copies of available for sale outside for your convenience. Afterwards, please join us for in the roomion over right nextdoor here. With that, i will turn it over to greg. Then to questions and answers. That veryou for generous introduction. Its good to be here the woodrow Wilson Center. Im known as the former pfizer james person. I want to thank the washington history seminar and the National History center. I also want to thank eric arneson for being such good colleagues. I want to thank friends and family members come in particular my mother. Is dedicated to the memory i was a visiting fellow here about six years ago. In the end toronto in the we in the historical profession inevitably have about what it is you are writing a book about. I say that im reading on sinoamerican competition in the third world. They say oh, whats going on in africa. When i tell them im actually working on the cold war. When i was in beijing meeting up with one of my former chinese teachers and i told her about all of the interesting documents. She said i think all the ff about the cold war stuff on the last seven years. Thats going to be our book. The idea is, should just be writing i should be writing a prehistory of current sinoamerican competition. When i set out to write this book, i really didnt set out to write a prehistory of what is going on in the current times, the presence, or a prehistory of anything else. It came across this topic, the way many scholars come across their topics, by stumbling i thought were some interesting primary sources. Across, wast i came putting together a course on the cold war in the third world and is course look to u. S. Policy, soviet policy in the third world as i was finding primary source documents to give u. S. Policy inut africa, one of the things i was was how concerned american policymakers were the chinese activities in africa. In fact, they were often more concerned about what the chinese were doing in africa than they were about what the soviets were doing in africa. I thought, this is interesting, maybe i will write an article about some day. I filed it in the back of my mind. Then i came across another even more important set of primary sources. To62007, i was invited china for a number of conferences. When i went for these conferences come i do it all when theyistorians do visit foreign countries. I look in the archives. This may in front of the Foreign Ministry archive beginning in about 2004 the chinese Foreign Ministry started to declassify a growing number of materials about its called cold war Foreign Policy. The declassify them in several patches. The first was from 19491954, then there were subsequent batches that covered 195559, then 196090 xt five. This is me in front of the archive. Now the shorts and search shirt doesnt match with my shorts. When you live out of your suitcase, doing or have a research for a month, this is what you end up with. It was taken, thinking about 7 30 in the morning. Those of you who know me know how much i hate to be anywhere at 7 30 in the morning. At the time the archive only had about nine computers. This is exciting stuff. Of these new materials about chinese cold war Foreign Policy. A great lucy motivator for getting you to the archives, those of you who know him, he and i is together at about 7 30, so we could be there before all the chinese graduate students influence from the provinces. We were there, i thought these documents were interesting. Chinasthem documented relations with asia and africa. They have their limitations, but nonetheless, the documents also clearly constituted a significant advance in our knowledge about chinas cold war era Foreign Policy. I thought that these documents really speak to those documents i found when i was putting together my class on the cold war in the third world in interesting ways. I thought that taken together, they told this story about sinoamerican rivalry, and an expensive rivalry between china and United States, for influence in the third world during the cold war. I felt these documents would let me get into the topic in ways that scholars have not done so previously. So this was really how the topic started to come together. But at the same time, i really struggled to figure out what exactly this book was the same what the theme of this book was going to be. What was at the heart of this competition, what was a really about . I found a very difficult and challenging to write about. Was an economic question mark economictries offered aid, but chinas policy towards afroAsian Countries, a lot of its economic programs didnt serve chinas economic interests at all. In fact, chinese economic aid programs often promoted selfsufficiency and autarky. That wasnt a good answer. What would geo strategy and this toosecurity was obviously a consideration at some point. There were also a lot of long activities. This was to prevent each other from gaining influence. They also had their limitations. Their relationship with each other went far beyond national interest. This and i wrote a reach wrote rewrote chapters and throw away chapters. Then i realized some of the stuff i was throwing away was an actual depomed, so i picked it back up again. I went back and forth finally, i had an epiphany about this book, one afternoon, when i was parking in the costco parking lot, where all the wealthy lobbyist are parking their cars. Theyre in the middle, is the professor kaczynski mobile my certain feeling like some sense of inadequacy. I thought, why . With the better cars would they get me to where i wanted to go faster with about what what the butler traffic, probably not. Ite that status influences our countries. Io think donations invented he will say that the idea that status is relevant to Foreign Policy. In fact there has been a significant Political Science than theory literature on this. Completely ignore everything that the political scientist are saying. What i foundd, wanting in their definition of status was that it insisted status meant a position within a formal hierarchy. This didnt fit chinas aspirations. Chinas view of it status in the third world, what it aspired to, was more like this, comrades. Is central it is admired, important. Heres a formal hierarchy china does not command in a formal reference. In fact, china and its rivalry it was a rival of the United States through almost the beginning of the cold war, then 1960slate 1950searly after the sinosoviets what occurred. Then it would become engaged in a protracted rivalry with the soviet union as well. Claims that what different you did itself from its great power rivals in the third world was that it was not seeking formal deference. Was not tryingt to credit formal hierarchy. Abouts book, try to talk that in terms of how chinese and rathern officials than how Political Sciences have seen it. I dropped very loosely on their theory. If you read the book you will see im not the local scientist. I dont have the independent and dependent variables, and untried operationalize status or do anything crazy like that. I argue this two reasons this was important to china. As a lot of stuff about the media this is really remote a lot of in the medias nonsense. This 1. I agree with, that is the legacy of national humiliation. This is been emphasized this idea that china was once important factor. That it had been divided faded invaded and robbed its rightful place and the chineseional fashion leaders, i argue during the cold war so the third world in particular as a region where they could regain their lost status. Forget national humiliation, revitalized china this is elementary schoolchildren today, foisting a banner with slogan. Another reason this was important to china, the center was ohese Foreign Policy is, mao zedong. Link his personal status to the status of the peoples republic of china. Often when china made efforts to gain status in the developing world, these efforts were geared not only arisen chinas prestige took more about this letter and summoned him and enhances likes that the u. S. Improve itsrts to service and third world . Not very much. Americans, i argue, were generally very competent in their own status. They were the wealthiest and most powerful military in the world within world war ii. They do not want to see china a rival, increase its own status. Americans even took an exaggerated view of chinese influence. I argue the fact that they took not exaggerated view does did not make the competition less important. I think it was actually perception american policies, and led to very expensive and toe american commitments trying to block chinese influence in the third world. In the book, i look at several different kinds of competition between United States and china. First i will summarize them briefly. In the book itself if you really want this in detail, you have to buy. Over these forms of competition . One, diplomatic china was a new stage in 1949 it was the first inaugurated of course in 1949. For a new state like china, just achieving basic diplomatic relations with other countries was important. Afterasian so china actually basicto just establish relations with everasian states. United states does everything it can to prevent it from doing so. To ultimateried positive impression of itself that Major International conferences. Included conferences such as the geneva conference, and perhaps most importantly, the bent on Conference Committee afterasian conference in 1955. The sister when life speaking 1955, this conference in where he made a very important performance that really did raise chinas standing along him him a lot of effortAsian Countries that didnt have relations with it before the conference. These conferences, beijing often represented itself as a peaceful effortasian nation that had also suffered from in the pure realism in the past, and it tried to create a leadership role for itself among afroasian as a successful example of postcolonial nationbuilding. State visits these were also a very important part of chinese diplomacy, sending diplomats abroad. China constantly tried to raise its International Profile for sending its representatives most often joanne july to asia, africa, different afroasian dates. This included of course, joe and lies famous 1964 visit to africa, regarded as it bold and important, also successful trip at the time. Do questiond states United States did everything. Ossible to undermine it pressure neutral countries not to establish relations with the peoples republic of china inchina participated conferences such as geneva and bandon, the united dates generally try to do everything that occurred to minimize the importance of these conferences command to limit chinas role. In fact, theres this famous story about the 1954 geneva conference, wenzhou online approaches secretary of state john foster dulles, and tries to shake his hand rituals apparently disassembled and walks briskly past him. The search was some debate among historians but whether this event actually occurred. Even if it didnt occur, as it is to see why take on such powerful emotional and symbolic resonance. Competition to read about this book, cultural. Argue competition i by three nature, it involves presenting a stage, aimage of your negative image of your rivals to the greatest degree possible. The on a lot of different things, talking about cultural competition, propaganda found particular thing i cultural competition between United States and china, was that they both emphasized each others treatment of their own ethnic minorities. Both china and United States had come in very different ways, but, and fires that forcefully incorporated different kinds of ethnic minorities. Propaganda ine asian and african countries often use the civil rights struggle in the United States which was of course, gaining momentum a great deal during the 1950s and 1960s, the chinese topagandists would use this demonstrate, look, this is how the United States treats its own minorities. How could the United States be trusted by other afroasian peoples question mark one of the things that china often did, and disenfranchised africanamerican radicals, such as to bbb do boys w. E. B. This picture is of him with a highranking come in is Chinese Party official. He visited china when he was about 90 imagine that he was taken around to african embassies in china. About howly spoke well treated he was in china, how awful things were for africanamericans back in the United States. So, do boy to boy also, he even wrote a poem, something like, i praise china. So china really established numberith a limited of africanamerican radicals. It did try to use them for propaganda value in competition with the United States among african and Asian Countries. Had the u. S. Respond to this . It often responded by emphasizing chinas treatment of minorities, especially muslims and type it. Theings suppression of 1959 uprising intended to bat was a gift that kept on giving for american propagandists. An usa i ask films like comparable to that and arranged for them to be shown in theaters throughout parts of asia and africa. This is actually a somewhat effective strategy. A lot of the regions that the United States and china were computing and in south asia, Southeast Asia, africa, where either heavily muslim, or heavily buddhist. Important counter dimension. Who treats its ethnic minorities this, and they started was going on, there was a lot of back and forth on this on radios and newspapers and other media, that the United States used and china used to propagandize in the third world. This is another kind of competition that i talk about in the book. I call it insurgency and counterinsurgency. I think one of the most important ways that china sought expand its influence in the thirdworld was through promoting insurgencies. I talk a house how they use different strategies for promoting its influence in asia and africa different times. Sometimes it focused more on the lummis he tried to present an image of itself as a peaceful afroasian country, sometimes it presented a more revolutionary image of itself, especially after the sinosophia slipped split, when the chinese want to emphasize they were the more radical, the ones that truly supported revolutionaries, and that moscow didnt. The maoing also hoped zedongs ratings would serve as an inspiration to anticolonial revolutionaries throughout the world, thus making china a more important part of a new postcolonial international order. Whats new in this book people have written before about chinas Foreign Policy in vietnam come in blouse laos, and chinas relationship with ho chi minh, and theres good literature on that. A cover that, with some new documents that i found in the chinese Foreign Ministry archive, but i also focus on chinas support for revolutionaries in africa, especially the congo, zanzibar, some of the more interesting material that i found. That was actually records of chinesetions between officials and congolese insurgents, who visited china or requested aid from the chinese government. Heres were this argument i was mentioning before, but how the United States took been exaggerated view of chinese influence in the third world. Heres one of the places where this becomes particularly important. Robert mcnamara coming years later in his memoir, in retrospect, he talks about how at the time, they took this exaggerated view of chinese influence, and they didnt realize that the vietnamese were actually nationalist revolutionaries with their own agenda. Hat was absolutely correct he apologized for of course but it doesnt necessarily justify u. S. Policy at the time. This perception in the United States that malice maoist doctrine was gaining influence in Southeast Asia, even aroughout the world, played very important role, not only in americas decision to escalate the war in vietnam, but also in a number of other ventures, such as u. S. Support for intervention in the congo, and elsewhere. Competitionm of that