It is hosted by the Woodrow Wilson center in washington dc. Welcome to the panel exchanging intelligence, exchanging data. Todaye three panelists who will give a paper. We start to my left with john fox. This paper will examine the role of the fbi and the formative years of the Transatlantic Partnership and focusing on the first decade of the cold war. That will try to give a Historical Perspective on recent discussions around the. Sa post9 11 activities , a paper that would look at the partnership or conversation within the context of intelligence organizations and organizational degree and look at it within the idea of intelligent studies and what it tells us about cooperation of the nsa and its partners. I and the curator of the International Spy museum here in washington dc. John, and right to fbi historian. His articles have appeared everywhere. He has a lot of pieces on the fbis website. Contributed chapters in several books and you can see him on the news, and he was a key player in creating the f fbis exhibition. John, why not you take it away from here. Has now the exhibit been completely refreshed, and luckily i had nothing to do with it. It has been taken over by other materials, celeste history and more current stuff. And talking on fbi history its role in the early u. S. Intelligence community. They are my ideas and interpretations and do not represent those of the bureau or federal government. Im sure they will be quick to tell you that if you ask. Do is talkd like to thet how the fbi got into Intelligence Community and how it develops, the end of four or two and the cold war. I will be talking about the expansion of fbi liaison operations. With some of the themes and ideas brought up why our two earlier papers, so it is a good continuation there. , at the end of the 1930s, there was not an organized u. S. Intelligence community. Army wereavy, and talking about if war breaks out what will europe do. The british were starting to look across the atlantic to say what kind of help can we get from the United States. We expect them to be neutral, but want an intelligence liaison comes up quickly you see the fbi interacting with british agents aree, and fbi invited over to learn how things are going in britain by 1940. This is before the oss is created in the operation he sets up and when williams is stephenson is setting up in new york. He is supposed to be there 5 and miwith mi . 6. Apparatus was not very effective or strong in the United States. Once by, may, who was captured. It was not something where they learned a lot. The 1920s and 1930s, counterintelligence was not a significant concern. Start noticing espionage operations going on, it starts to get more involved. Detectives and spies were often synonymous, the transition occurred fairly seamlessly. The fbi is sending nonofficial cover agents to central and south america to collect intelligence. Responsibility in the western hemisphere, and it is where the bureau begins to things to set up an intelligence collection operation abroad, and out of that effort, the bureau begins to realize that it needs not only to be sending people with cover identities sending back coded messages and so forth, they actually need official liaison representatives, so by the 1940s, the bureau was formed lasting relations with foreign governments, especially intelligence and Police Services of those countries and through the u. S. Diplomatic establishment there. Mexico, we have an official liaison from 1940 on. London, andawa and those become important. Ottawa was important because the bureau had been exchanging information. It was largely Law Enforcement related, but also internal Security Matters that are. Someone from london came over to get a feel for the u. S. Intelligence agency in 19391940, he learned that a lot of the information they were trying to send over to the United StatesIntelligence Services about german activities there was getting bottlenecked at the state department and it was a problem because it was not getting through to the people who would do something about it, so he found out the canadians had been exchanging the same kind of information for 10 years or so, but calling it criminal information and the state department did not care about criminal matters. Britainht that may be should start to establish some of those relationships, and that is how stephenson develops and comes through. Through the war, the bureau is becoming an important part of the growing u. S. Intelligence operation. It is kept out of parts of it to given limited access altra, but once it is over in england and starts learned about the fact that the british are beginning to break german codes and that there is counterintelligence significant information there, the bureau starts to get involved and they begin to have access at least to the british with that information. Army wanted toe. Ontrol from there in in the early days, we were not butmost security conscious, hoover started to crack down on that and the bureau kept a tight control on the information it was getting and the relationship did continue to develop into the end of the war, so altra is , germany has surrendered and the allied forces have taken over because it has a specific role in u. S. Intelligence that it has to continue. Is just a quick picture of the coverage of our special Intelligence Services, undercover operations, in central and south america. 1945, the fbis representatives in europe are starting to follow the army as it progresses, and as germany falls, the role is pows, interview people who want to immigrate to the United States. And provide name checks other Services Based on the fbi records, which are voluminous. So the fbi is providing that , butof Liaison Service also other services. A quick timeline of how our liaison offices are developing. Their purpose is not together to intelligence, but share information, and that becomes a key part of what the fbis legal a program is doing i tell. The fbis agents are beginning. O broaden their connections this is the legat paris. Most operations were small because they were for or liaison purposes, but they provided a significant function. In the cold war, the u. S. Begins to realize quickly that it had been deeply penetrated by soviet and the fear of agents this time round came from the actual fact there were foreign agents, so the fbi is starting to at that information. Elizabeth bentley comes in, and u. S. Intelligence begins to realize it has got a lot of issues, then you throw in the sigint issue because the army decryptagency begins to the fbi is working with the asa, which becomes the nsa, to make use of that information it is getting from soviet wartime cables. When he is arrested by the british, he gives the fbi information to arrest others. It allows us to identify that there was a british mole in the embassy in d. C. That eventually turns out to have been Donald Burgess defects with maclean because the western powers are on to them and are about to close on them, and because kim philby is providing information to the soviets, they get out in time to escape, but the idea is that this Counter Intelligence cooperation is continuing to go on as it did in it is a small part of it because the Transatlantic Community was largely based on , defense arrangements intelligence related matters, things like interpol dont play a role in this. The fbi has a falling out with interpol over a defector and the possible politicization of things. England, andrance, other western european powers play an Important Role in with the bureau does for the next number of years through the cold , since thence then 1990s, the program has only expanded. 19701990, 21 offices. By the end of the 1990s, we were up to 42, and we have more that70 at this point, so kind of relationship has only expanded and included things like Police Training and matters to build coptocop bridges. It was focused on the Law Enforcement side rather than intelligence, but having those interrelationships made it possible for the bureau to do its job. Thank you. [applause] i did not need the thing to go off. That was great. Thank you, john. Is anxt to speaker adjunct assistant professor of modern European University at montclair state university. He has written extensively on the relationship between the United States and European Countries in dealing with intelligence, including a couple. F articles on the cia giving a talk on project hydra cia. Mr. Wegener no pressure. Thank you to the conference organizers and Panel Members here. Project hydra, one of the neat things i find is that you have interesting file folder names. Sound more interesting than what is in there at this point, so im talking about something that is in the past, is relevant tos what is going on in the present. About two years ago, a german newspaper reported the German Intelligence Service had discovered 12,000 search terms provided by the nsa that had caused the service to spy on european diplomats, and this story became part of the postsnowden scandal narrative, but for the purposes of this talk, it is important because it highlights how routine this kind of raw Data Exchange has become. Common explanations for this increased interdependence are along the lines that since the end of the cold war, threats have increasingly come from nonstate actors or globalization has forced intelligence agencies to cooperate more. In the most present version of this narrative forced Intelligence Services to confront the transnational threat and to intensify liaison activities on this level. As historians, we like to look at the past and this is what i wanted to do here, and going back almost 50 years ago in the summer of 1967, america confronted a series of internal and external challenges, the vietnam war escalated, dissent at home, in detroit, buffalo, new york, and other urban centers there were race riots. Operablesphere of crisis, Lyndon Johnson tasks his Intelligence Services to investigate the true causes of this unprecedented level of domestic unrest. It seems highly unlikely that rather than present a true expression of useful dissent, coordinated byre chordae an foreign powers, especially the soviet union. Domesticsion of intelligence collection would be investigated. And to this day, part of our standard lexicon scandals. Among the disclosures brought to light with the cia had led , tracing civil rights and peace activists with a Computer System called hydra, which reports had suggested had stored the names of 300,000 americans. What i would like to do internet to 10 minutes is not relitigate the question of whether or not the u. S. Intelligence community overstepped its mandate but rather to ask to what extent the story of hydra tells us something about the Way Technology change the way Intelligence Services operated in the incipient information age, and this includes the implications of a shift for the liaison operations at an international level. I am presenting here is part of a project we are developing right now at the university. One professor is involved in that, and tomorrow my colleague germanesent from the side of the story, and i and here to tell something about the american side. Regarding the u. S. Side of the story, the project can proceed from a solid base of of andrature on mhchaos related intelligence programs in the late 1960s. From then comes political size perspective, intelligence oversight, or from a civil rights history perspective. Much of this literature however seeks to distinguish the between legitimate and illegitimate or. Egal and illegal operations , ale i think it is important more critical approach comes from surveillance studies. However what makes this approach problematic for the present purposes is that it emerges from the liberal critique of the surveillance state that is part of our analysis here. Andinstance is a plan punish with a panoptic disciplinarian regime that forms part of the public response to the events we are investigating here. What we would like to do instead is approach our research through the prism of an ivalent process we call and this sounds only slightly in and the original the original german. I think we might have to come up with a better english term here. Ofwhich the requirement shedding light on complex and opaque threats he comes paradigmatic for governmental as as efficiency and security while citizens also seek to pull away the veil of secrecy shrouding intelligence work, and i try to put this into a simple matrix here, so the government collects and and shares intelligence Civil Society actors protests and what to investigate the government. That is on the active level, and on the passive level, the same groups would ask for privacy and push for Privacy Protection while Intelligence Services might ask for enhanced classification and secrecy to keep their work secret, but within this framework, i interconceptualize as hydra as a center of calculation, which means a site that bundles and , mobilizes data from diverse sources. Just very briefly about the Historical Context of this hydra operation. It was in the late 1960s that we really see the postwar consensus that existed in many western societies and also in many eastern societies actually beginning to splinter and giving way to more dissent and the result was a phenomenon that we have termed a crisis of representation, both in a political and semiotic sense, questions of legitimacy of Government Action, intelligence, and security services, so now Civil Society groups are an area of enhanced inquiry. Have theme time, you beginning of Computer Technology to travel outside from campuses and military research sides into major bureaucracies, often causing a revival of early 20th of ary modernist utopias rationally organized society, and hydra fits into a broader pattern of widespread enthusiasm among managers, bureaucrats for the potential of modern Computing Technology to help intractablegly social problems, the same year as hydra, the fbi founded its National Crime information fromr to marshal data federal, state, and local agencies, and during the same summer, the department of justice started a project that would eventually turn into the interdivision information unit, a program to analyze data on civil disturbances. The usef these cases, of modern Information Technology was not merely an operational detail, rather the computers ability to find patterns in vast tounts of data appeared signal a potentially revolutionary application for the Law Enforcement and Intelligence Community from reactive policing to predictive intervention. Self came intoit existence in 1967 as part of mhchaos and was initiated by James Angleton in response to ident johnsons request, run by the cia special operations group, and headed by richard ober. Due to the sensitivity of the mission, this remains closely compartmentalized, and over the next seven years, the group collected information among radical leftwing and simple right activists and foreign groups and fed this information database,ydra david producing reports for the white house and other consumers. Theirere chosen for Counter Intelligence skills rather than for their technical expertise, and hydra was instead maintained by the cias office of Computer Services and ran on a remote query, remote input ibm 36067. That is the model we are talking about. Offices would fill out index cards to create, edit, or delete entries, then pass these cards along to the technical staff who would input it into the computer. In return, they received printouts of reports, and unfortunately i have not yet found so all this data was destroyed in 1974 for Privacy Protection reasons. I have not found a print of hydra data, but this is from the department of justice from the department of information unit that i talked about earlier, so i believe the date it would have been quite similar, so here we have for instance something about black panther leaders meeting, a number, actually it his his wife he is meeting with or traveling with, so this was put into machinereadable form and stored in hydra. The operation never really established the type of outside influence that president johnson and later president nixon had hoped for or feared would be the better word, but it did resent a lot of evidence of International Contacts between these groups. Time,h a view towards the to briefly summarize two areas where i think we can make an original contribution here. Aa of about the disability and threat perception. Basically what happens is that the computer enables people to see and enables Intelligence Services to trace connections that they could not see before, and one hypothesis regarding this aspect is that the new focus on complex transnational actors represented by hydra was a key ing