Nations humanitarian awakening from oxford in 2013 and is working on a manuscript with the title of catastrophic diplomacy a history of the United States responses to Global National disasters. Thank you for agreeing to chair. Gen. Neller thank you for julia thank you for introducing me. I will introduce everyone in order. Our contributors was unable to make it, but i will read her comments in the order she appears the program, that is next. Our first speaker is a senior lecturer of American History at light chester. He is author of 2 books. The four freedoms on the eve before 14 published in 2014. The limits of internationalism, the American Association for the United Nations and u. S. Foreign policy 1941 to 1948 in 2009. He is the coeditor of the u. S. Public and american foreignpolicy that came out in 2010. His articles have appeared on diplomatic history, global society, the global of american studies, the global of transatlantic studies. He coedited with andrew priest next year with the University Press of kentucky. Andrew . Andrew thank you, everyone for coming out. What we wanted to do was to go broad in discussion this morning. What i wantednly to do. World war ii is often represented as a watershed in u. S. Foreign relations history. A time when the nation finally and fully engaged with global affairs. His position as a superpower and integrated itself into International Organizations. Numerous books and articles use the war and 1941 in 1945 in particular as a start and end turning point. However, based on my research and a lot of material that i have been reading over the last year or two, i want to urge as to be wary of treating the war as a watershed, a definitive break, a turning point. I want to focus on the need to be aware of continuity from the years, ands, the war the postwar years. Do not get me wrong. I do not want to minimize the significance of the war and the International System that develop. World war ii changed many things. I want to highlight the ways the war acted as a catalyst. The continuity between preand postwar continuity. Recentlyas written, from pearl harbor to post nuclear surrender, it was fuzzier around the edges than the usually imagine. Hammer this home, we were knocking around ideas for the roundtable, was firstly specific books that i have reviewed over several years. And also, a broader look at literature. Im trying to keep an eye on world war ii literature for the schaeffer guide, which is a challenge. One book that i reviewed started in 1945. It got me thinking about the use of 1945 as a starting point. The lack of wartime contentless striking. It started abruptly. Historical work start in 1945 because they adopt a cold war framework. Also perhaps all books and articles have to start somewhere. 1945 is so common that it made me think of the number of books on my shelf that start their. While many are excellent, i find myself questioning the idea that 1945 is always the ideal place to start. An idea was reiterated in online roundtable review yesterday for the latest book thinking small. The mainly post1945 story on Community Development was praise for starting in the 1930s rather than the media it. Ostworld war ii period the result of this, reviewer argued that the book helps us to understand the intellectual and conceptual roots of development thinking and practices. The idea of continuity through the war years was highlighted i another book that i reviewed. The empire of ideas. It emphasized roots and continuity of things that are often seen as postwar ideas in the years before the war. 1930s. With empire of ideas, the development of Public Diplomacy considerations. The prewar origin said wartime wartime tribulations come the activity was not simply an outgrowth of the cold war. World war ii was not the origin of the cold war, as it was argued 15 years ago. History does not begin in 1945. Work on Public Diplomacy relates to what ive done on the development of Public Affairs and machinery at home. What little work there had been on Public Affairs and works was a oneoff wartime activity. In fact, the idea was there in the 1930s. The war years accelerated ideas about how the government should work with the American Public to promote and create American Public policy. The ideas were carried into the postwar years, albeit with mixed results. This is a longer story. The origins of ideas, wartime acceleration, and cold war complications. Mythis point, i wondered if ofse of a fuzzier conception world war ii was a result in an increase in cultural approaches. Ideas rathers of than traditional considerations of diplomacy and military activity. All that might be true to an extent there are real problems with taking 1945 as the definitive turning point. Ive struggled with this while teaching. In particular, with my first year at u. S. History where ive struggled with the origins of the cold war. Where do you start . This is a big problem for me. You cant cover everything. I cant afford to have a lecture on the war. The 1930s, so at the moment i started in 1939. Unconditional surrender, before even getting to the 1944, but among 1945. The idea of starting in 1945 for me doesnt work. Even if it does, it runs the risk of relegating the origins of the war to the cold war again. It doesnt account for the growing tensions in the particular areas of disagreement. Appliese, the framework to the years immediately after 1945 as well as right before coming even in military and diplomatic terms, u. S. Public u. S. Occupations continue three years after 1945. The fuzzy framework applies just as much, if not more, to the american entry into world war ii as it does to the ending. The pearl harbor attack is even more definitive a start to the war than any concluding act. There are a number of issues that i would argue cannot be resolved with the firm line on december 7, 1941. Thinking of books, the one sitting on my table as i was working through these comments was one of the key historical text that we use, america in the world. It is subtitled the the oric of the pearl harbor attack came out of nowhere and changed everything. There is no justification for the choice of 1941 in the latest edition, the only justification for the choice in 1945 was since the start of the Second World War was a period that has preoccupied historians almost to the exclusion of other eras. The problem is you get into a cycle. Post1941 means everyone focuses on post1941 material. I would argue americas slow Movement Toward war in the years prior to 1941 makes it difficult. Or a number of pearl harbor you can understand the wartime political relationships, the international allies, the u. S. , domestic influence unless you start earlier than 1941. Most notably, the Atlantic Charter and the fact the United States has a joint decoration of work. You cannot understand angloamerican wartime planning unless you start earlier than pearl harbor given what actually occurs. You cannot understand the Economic Significance of wartime preparedness unless you start earlier than pearl harbor. As they highlight things like Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, and many aspects of the cultural significance, the war years, unless you start below before the United States is actually at war. This, i put my hand up and jemima research. I am guilty of this, myself. My first book starts at pearl harbor and my second one in there. The first one does not end until 1948, i should add. Recognizing this as i was writing my second book, i felt i needed an epilogue that highlighted things very clearly what happened. Before i started writing about after pearl harbor. After 1941. What happens, they do not kind of appear for the great debate on the uber world war ii and finish into nothing. It is interesting that one reviewer in passport has already commented that i had that he wished i had expanded this section further. Many of the international is looking at the eve afford were two ended up in government rules. Organizationsivic many state and civic organizations. Wherever they ended up they sold away the United States acted against nazi germany in 1941 and 1940 as offering a template of how to deal with the soviet union after the war ended. Terms offfer in broader internationalism, arguments can be made about the need for the American World war that had been seen as part of the cold war rhetoric, but actually, you can chased the origins prior to 1941. It is something that the other speakers could come back to. Given that, i will again conclude my comments by urging historians to think about the ways that the war had left a thing break with the past, the year that accelerated preexisting trends, facilitating ideas as much as it did their creation. Saw evolution as much as revolution in Foreign Policy activity. Thank you. [applause] julia thank you, very much. As i mentioned in my wasoductory remarks, joyce unable to make it, but i will read her paper for her. She is an associate professor of history at metal berry college. Her interests are at the intersection of Foreign Affairs and National Politics. She is the author of asia first china and the eight making of american conservatism. That came out last year. Her work has appeared in the journal of american east asian relation. She is working on 2 projects, one on the modernization theory and its relationship to the peoples republic of china, and on diplomacy of u. S. Immigration policy after 1945. Here we go. That wanted me to tell you she wishes she was able to join us in person, but she was happy to be able to participate in this way. Joyce, as many have noted world war ii is typically earmarked as a watershed event that impacted american life. Some areas of National Development are much more strongly associated with the war and its aftermath. Others have yet to receive the degree of attention. This is true when it comes to National Politics. An established name in history are goofy is how modern liberalism dominated after 1945. An established team in how modern liberalism dominated after 1945. Bipartisan liberalism enjoyed successes as democrats and moderate republicans shoot to the core tenets of statecraft. Ethos ofoloring the the cold war through a grand strategy of containment which. Emained consistent for decades as world war ii prompted americas global power, it sparked different lands of nationalism. The conflict exercises influence on conservatism, particularly the rights approached of foreign relations. Toprompted conservatives rethink how they could craft an original nationalist agenda. Their political survival depended on it. Wasdefense of isolationism obsolete after pearl harbor. War demanded an ongoing commitment to active interventionism. As a conservative radio host said, world war ii made a complete change. He was certainly correct when it came to ideology. By adopting overseas conventions, conservatives cast aside strict antistatism and called for a federal defense state. It did not have a complete break. Rightwing internationalism was a demand for American Economy and for affairs. Unilateralism. Another was constitutional of ritualism, to keep a tight leash on the growth of executive power. That world war ii had amplified fdrs power and were wary of liberal president s wielding power because of the cold war. A regional perspective offers the clearest views on how world war ii catalyzed american conservatism. Exploring the changes by world war ii on the pacific rim. California as a major angle. The states second goldrush resuscitated the economy and drew thousands of residents for the defense industry. It did not and in 1945. The southern half of the state defense spending. Rather than process ideal liberalism, much of the electorate would make places like Orange County the cradle of the new right. Voters resented what they saw as federal entered errands in daily life. Even an aggressive stance on communist threat at home and abroad. If we consider conservatism in tandem the fourth after the war in asia, the rightwing ideology becomes more clear. In socalled loss of china 1949 offered in new strife for American Interest in the pacific. In the early 1950s it reinvigorated orientalism that of thechina as a ward United States, a reflection of democracy itself. The korean war and its ambiguous of the unitedoutcome showed that contat is him was not working that ism was not working. Conservative internationalism was the answer. Very cold water provides a goldwaters barry provides a microcosm. He trained at the airfield and flu supplies over the burma hump. He raised the campaign criticizing how democrats handle the korean war. A supporter of the regime in taiwan, he saw the exile as a proof in a flaw in Foreign Policy and insisted the latter protect the island sovereignty. His success as a conservative leader was an ability to sympathize with rightwing ideology for it audience that range from activists to institutionally leads. Asia was a central part of the foreignpolicy platform. He recalled wartime experiences as proof of what the allied chinese were capable of if given adequate american support. Such an argument was a natural fit from the sun belt, but it resonated with conservatives across the country. World war ii symbiosis of the homefront and war front foreshadowed conservatism approach to the cold war and east asian affairs. The brand of cold war internationalism blur the lines between the domestic and global. Most often identified as newrthyism it encompassed ideas such as expansion of the military, military spending, and insistence on a moral obligation to the global community. It balanced new with old. Conservatives declared what was best for the u. S. Was best for the world, and the nation should act accordingly. Unilateralism mattered at all levels of Foreign Policy. Certain practices born out of world war ii should not be carried into the new era. The United Nations was federalism out of control. Foreign aid was welfare writ large of a global seo. One of the fundamental teams is that of change versus continuity. Major developments to the right, yet the developments were simultaneous continuity and change. It advocated overseas intervention framed in terms of diplomatic isolationism and national selfinterest. America first for the new global era. The permanent internationalism borne out of work was not the marker of progressive politics. The state of National Politics suggest the conceptualization of American Power is present today. [applause] so, that brings us to the next presenter, Christopher Mcknight nichols. Professor ofciate history at Oregon State University where he is the director of the osus citizenship and crisis the initiative. In 2016 he will be 820162018 Andrew Carnegie fellow. He is also the author of promise in apparel, america at the dawn of the global age published in 2011. He is writing another book entitled republican revival coming with oxford University Press on conservative Foreign Policy and the last gasp of isolationism in the cold war. He is working on sweeping history as american isolationism. Coediting a book project on rethinking american strategy, forthcoming with oxford University Press. Christopher thank you for organizing this. I wish joyce were here that we could talk more. Start broad and narrow in on a couple of examples. Rum textbooks to monographs to the classroom, from textbooks to monographs to the classroom it is presented as a historical break for the modern u. S. Theyre married of course to seeing the war years for the. S. And world as epochal the war changed a lot about International Relations, politics, culture, and more. In terms of american political thought, particularly conservative visions of a croissant isolated american orientation to the world, i would argue it is woefully inadequate here the turning point case that we are familiar with. Not long after world war ii concluded, scholars of u. S. Foreign relations and political and economic history began drawing lines distinguishing between the postwar era, postworld war ii, those of us who are scholars about postworld war i think about that is being more particularly significant they distinguish the postworld war ii era and everything prior. The war was massively transformative, as a historian has observed. The war demolished the old order. Competing models for the future produced political turmoil coming even as they generated a new International System. We know the devastation was almost world shattering. 60 Million People were killed. American politics was often most often manifested, 36 million were europeans with tens of millions left as refugees wandering what one contemporary account called a blasted landscape of barren citizens and fields. The numbers do not do justice to the human suffering of the war. The nations that played dominant geopolitical roles like Great Britain were exhausted. The soviet union was expanded postwar reach ravaged by the war. 50 of the population was killed. The cities, industrial plants, and fields were raised. China and japan suffered casua