Transcripts For CSPAN3 World War II And The D-Day Invasion 2

Transcripts For CSPAN3 World War II And The D-Day Invasion 20140608

War progressed, often his function was to coordinate an effort with the allies, british or canadian, and that was one of the things he did at dday. Ford asked if stevens would not mind working with the british to help shore up their filmmaking effort, and i believe the ships that stevens arrived on the ship that stevens arrived on was a british ship. He was kind. His greatest blunder was this. He thought he could break up our partnership, but we are bonded together by fighting for one great cause in one great team, a team in which you were an indispensable and working member. That spirit of free people working, fighting, and living together in one great cause has served us well on the western front. We will pray that that spirit of comradeship will persist forever among the free people of the united nations. The world war ii dday invasion of normandy took place 70 years ago on june 6, 1944. Coming up in one hour at 1230 historianuthor and symonds looks at his book. Then in one hour, our discussion with him from earlier today, including responses to your calls, tweets, and facebook posts. Thank you. I appreciate the introduction. It is very kind. I learned just before we came into the auditorium tonight that there is a hidden storm expected heavy storm expected outside and it reminded me of the dilemma the Dwight Eisenhower faced on the fourth of june about the timing of the dday invasion. There was a very narrow window when the tide and circumstances were such that he thought the allied force had a good chance of getting ashore, but the weather needed to be just so and alas, the forecast for the fifth of june, when the landing was originally scheduled, was not good. So he decided to postpone that, which is why we now observe the sixth of june, 1944, as dday. It was put in mind of that. What a brave group you are to come out in this storm despite the forecast to talk about dday. Some of you, i suspect most of you, have probably seen both the longest day and Steven Spielbergs film, saving private ryan, which has very moving scenes of the landing at normandy beach. Saving private the landing at omaha beach. It is one of the most moving scenes in all of Motion Picture history. Like most great historic events, it has a big back story. That is what i want to address with you tonight. To find the beginning of it, it goes back to the beginning of the second world war. Certainly goes back to may of 1940 when the german war machine sliced through belgium and france and drove the british to the beaches of dunkirk, from which they were forced to evacuate, because that was when the british, and soon enough the americans as well, again thinking about the circumstances necessary and the conditions under which it would become possible to go back into europe. Because before that could happen , if indeed it could happen at all, the allies first had to recruit the enormous armies, trained the men, build the tanks, thehe artillery pieces. And above all, they would need to build be ships that would carry 2 million americans across the ocean and across the channel with all of their supplies and their mood tally out and their materiel and their hardware. And then they would have to cross with the predations of the german u boats, and still keep those men supplied. Bullets,with bombs and but also cocacola and hershey bars, newspapers, cigarettes. And then warships, very specialized ships that could take that force, bring it across the channel, and landed on a post beach. And then they would need more ships, thousands warships to fight another war in the pacific ocean, halfway around the world, against the japanese. The voracious demand for shipping in particular was the single greatest impediment, the single most important bottleneck in allied planning and execution of the dday landing. Ships, planning for any of that was an exercise in futility. In short, the story of dday is not that her terrific 20minute scene we see at the beginning of thatng private ryan, moment on unimaginable heroism and sacrifice on the landing beaches. It was also the years of planning, building, training, as well as the landing, and that is a story i want to talk about tonight. It falls into three parts rather naturally. The first element is a strategic one. That is the decision to do it. It,particularly when to do which, as you will see, became quite a conversation, followed with the logistical problem of planes and tanks, assembling the materiel, and finally there is the operations story of getting it done. Collectively, all of that, all of that prestory, all of that back story to Operation Overlord was called operation neptune. Let me start the story with the strategic planning. Just how did the angloamerican allies decide to do this, how do they make the decision . There is an awful lot of talk about the special relationship british and the the americans. And despite the ties of a common heritage, a common language, more or less, a common foe certainly, the allied partnership was nonetheless marked by disagreements, intense, sometimes even bitter arguments between the partners. With this image. They say a picture is worth 1000 words. This one may be worth at least 2000. I certainly plan to spend at least 2000 talking about it. You all know the is two guys in front. There is fdr on the left, flashing his famous smile. From the beginning of the war roosevelt had supported britain in its unequal contest with nazi germany, and he did so not just with words, but supplies and equipment, stretching the law and arguably the constitution to the breaking point to ensure the british could hold out against the nazis. And he did that a great Political Risk for american isolationists including popular spokesmen like charles lindbergh. Clerics. Most republicans. And even roosevelts own ambassador to the court of st. James, joseph kennedy, the father of the future president , all opposed him. One of the reasons they did this was they believed such support violated the spirit, if not the letter, of american neutrality. In addition, most of them were convinced britain would not be able to hold out in any case, and that meant that when hitler won the war against the british, all of the supplies we were sending across the atlantic would end up in his pocket anyway. Fdr bet that britain and he wasout, determined to do all that he could to make sure that it did. Ofconvinced a majority americans, mostly through those famous fireside chats on the radio that britains survival was essential to americas own security. And he got his way on most of these issues, including crucially lindleys, the program that allowed britain to survive, though barely, through those dark days of 1940 and 1941. Throughding crucially lendlease. E and Winston Churchill, without puckish smile on his face. His determination and guess what aziism, asalled n though the root of the word was not shut. What he really wanted was active american participation in the war. Consequently throughout the time of american neutrality and even after the United States joined the war, churchill was a supplicant in their relationship, and roosevelt was the one being glued one being wooed. This photo was taken in august of 1941. This is four months before pearl harbor. The two men are on board a british battleship, the hms prince of wales, which parenthetically would be sunk four months later by japanese aircraft. To arrange the meeting between himself and churchill, roosevelt had sneaked away from washington, keeping his intentions hidden and completely secret even, incredibly enough, from the secret service. If you could imagine such a thing happening today. At this time, when the photo was taken, roosevelt still hoped the United States might be able to limit its involvement in the war to what he called being the arsenal of democracy. In fact he wanted the u. S. To provide the materiel of war so britain and her commonwealth australia, newa, zealand could not only holdout, but eventually with american support when. With american support win. Became more realistic after hitlers fallujah and in fatalght completely decision to invade the soviet union in summer 1941. That made churchill at least think it was possible, just barely possible, that with american money time a russian american money, russian blood, and british grit, it might the decided without the United States having to get into the war. The strategic landscape changed dramatically after pearl harbor. Churchill was thrilled to have the United States finally as a full ally, that he feared that given the character of the publice attack, American Opinion would force Franklin Roosevelt to direct the energy of the United States to the pacific, rather than against germany. He neednt have worried. At least not about that. In the months, before pearl harbor, from the time this photograph was taken and the japanese attack, the United States had settled on a plan thategic land hitlers germany was by far the more serious threat in the world and it would have to be defeated before the United States turned to deal with japan. It was an american admiral, harold stark, who was also in this photo there he is near the right hand of the image there, the fellow with all of the stripes on his sleeve. Star, with the unusual Naval Academy nickname. It was he who drafted the policy which becameirst, the center of not only american, but angloamerican war planning. Churchill was relieved to hear it. On the other hand, churchill also learned that the americans took the view that since germany was to be the first targets of angloamerican ferocity, the best possible thing to do was to attack it immediately. Now. Well, maybe tomorrow, but it wants. But at once. This is a characteristic american attitude. We are not, as a rule, patient people. When we decide what we want, we decide we must have it at once. The british view was, yes, that is all well and good, but after all we must be practical about these things. Their preference was to postpone any reintegration of the consonants if firet until the nazi was on the brink of collapse. This difference in view between american expectations and british hesitancy, if i can use that word, became a running dispute that lasted for most of two full years. The principal advocate of an immediate, well, approximate cupied invasion of nazioc europe was the chief of staff george c. Marshall. He is also in that photograph. He is the guy over churchills i guess that is his right soldier, between the two heads of state. Talking to actually, it looks like he is listening to the american chief of naval whoations, ernest j. King, is standing directly behind fdr. You also has a lot of stripes on his sleeve. King was skeptical of the Germany First strategy. Not officially. He would not openly contradict the president or his policy. But king was also determined to ensure the japanese did not get a chance to consolidate their conquest in the western specific pearl harbor,er because that would make the subsequent and eventual reconquest of those islands more costly and more difficult. Result, marshall had to convince not only churchill and the british that an early invasion of europe was a good idea. He had to make sure that king and the navy were on the same page as he was. Note the fellow just to marshall for a left. That is to the right. Between marshall and star in this photograph. He is looking somewhat suspiciously at marshall and king, it seems to me. I love the expression on his face. It is like he is trying to listen in on their conversation. And well he might. That is british general sir john and churchill had brought them along on this trip and on subsequent trips to the United States. Stayed behindll and washington to serve as a kind of liaison between the englishspeaking allies. Was anrshall, dill underappreciated player in the contrivance of allied grand strategy and in fact the running of the war generally, because he was able to smooth over many of those rough patches between the allies. He was willing to talk back to his own superiors in london when it was necessary, and gracefully represent the british view in washington. Alas, did not live to see the fruit of his labors. He died in 1944 before the invasion. But he is one of very few nonamericans to be buried at Arlington National cemetery with full honors. Not pictured in this photograph are the russians. Bearinghis time were the full brunt of the war against the armies of germany and were positively frantic for the angloamericans to open a second front in france to take some of the pressure off them. Stalin suspected, and not without justification, the churchills opposition to an early second front in europe was because churchill was willing to fight the germans to the very last russian. [laughter] might have said to thefight the nazis very last communist. Before i leave this slide, there are two more characters i want to point out. They are on the left. They are talking to one another, having their own private conversation. The fellow with his hands behind his back is harry hopkins. Hopkins would prove to be as important in Holding Together the englishspeaking allies as dill, and maybe even more so. Hopkins was roosevelts most trusted personal advisor, second only to eleanor herself. Hopkins was a sick leave rake of a man. He was a cancer survivor. Most of the stomach had been cut out of him. He was unable to process food drop relay. Easily exhausted. None of that kept him from regularly. Hour weeks roosevelt, who was inhibited in his mobility of course, sent him to any place in the world where conversations needed to take place in an effort to hold together the often fragile anti axis coalition. The workload probably killed him. Although he at least live to see in end of the war, dying january 1940 six at the age of 55. That handsome fella whispering averillns ear is harriman, who fdr had sent to court. Notchill may or may have been aware that the 50yearold, married harriman was having a torrid affair with churchills. 1yearold daughterinlaw decades later, after everyone else in this photograph was long averill and pamela would marry and decades after that, Pamela Harriman will become John Kennedys choice as the United States ambassador to france. That is our cast of characters. Negotiations between the americans and the british not so much about whether to invade zioccupied europe. That was never in question. A little bit about where, but mostly about wind. The where was selfevident. It had to be northern france. There was some backandforth about the pontifical lay versus normandy. The main landing had to be in france. That was evident. It was closest to britain, which would have to be the staging area for the invasion. It was the only place from which land based air could cover the invasion beaches. The wind, that was more problematic. I have noted, the americans were eager to do it as soon as possible. The british, not so much. It was marshall who represented the most serious plan for an invasion scheme. He called on the angloamericans to land in france in may 1943. At the time he did so, the. Ritish offered support somewhat muted perhaps, but support nonetheless, after all this proposed date at that time was still 16 months away. Be plenty of time later to raise objections and concerns are for right now, we just did not want to annoy the americans. Wasmore immediate issue what are we going to do in the meantime . Surely the americans did not intend for the allied forces to sit around for 16 months toiling their thumbs well they build up the wherewithal for a fullscale invasion. Roosevelt knew the americans would not tolerate that. They wanted action. They wanted it immediately. American soldiers had to get in the actions on where al and somewhere else and soon. Of course there was always the pacific, and admiral king was always ready to suggest, well, i have some ideas about how we could use some of that materiel, but roosevelt oppose that. Thelar as it might be with voters, still angry with the pearl harbor attack, it would germanycompromised the first strategy, which roosevelt stop to. No, there had to be some way to use those troops and ships they did have in the european theater prior to may 1942. Unsurprisingly, churchill had a plan ready to hand. He argued that the allies should seize french north africa. Marshall thought this was a terrible idea. There were no germans and french which belong to vichy france, and was technically neutral in the war. At least as important from marshall for a point of view, an invasion of north africa would supplies,d forces, reinforcements, manpower away from what he was convinced was the vital theater. Marshall feared once the allies committed to a campaign in the mediterranean theater, it would force a gravitational that would draw more men and supplies until the 1943 invasion of france became impossible. And he was right. Landings in north africa led inexorably to a campaign into tunisia, which led to an invasion of sicily, which led to an invasion of italy. , itlong before that happens became obvious that exactly as marshall had foreseen, the momentum of event said draw the into the mediterranean, which may in fact have been exactly what Winston Churchill had in mind. So, marshall had been right. Churchill was right, too. For the extended campaign in north africa and mistreated more clearly than any british argument could have done that the angloamerican allies were simply not ready for the kind of effort that wouldve been necessary to invade northern france in 1943. It almost certainly would have been a disaster. Beenandings in morocco had haphazard. The campaign into tunisia marked with blunders and reversals. None of them worse than a humiliating american effete in february 1943. Demonstrated how unready the americans were to take on the wehrmacht. Besides, there was still the whole shipping problem. Now in addressing that we move from the strategic argument to be logistical problem. Before pearl harbor, the United States had embarked on a truly historic Shipbuilding Program. In 1941, before pearl harbor, the United States produced just over one million tons of shipping. Was, inve as that february 1942, roosevelt told the u. S. Maritime convention they expected him to build 8 million tons of shipping that year and 10 million more the next year. These

© 2025 Vimarsana