Groups have in common is far more than what separates, and so when we go through the war, when we have these different elements, they are all responding in a kind of, you know, human way to these things and they are together in it, they are together in the war, and together in a lot of it. I mean, it sounds terribly pollyanna, really, but i do believe that for most people on earth, what we share in terms of the Human Experience is much more important than what separates us. Od and fellowes when we odierno and fellowes when we continue, funding for charlie rose was provided by the following. Rose additional funding provided by these funders. And by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and captioning sponsored by Rose Communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. Everybody is that we agreed to take about 800 billion worth of cuts, approximately 300 more that what secretary gates suggested, 487 that we agreed to and those are based on downsizing a little bit, getting more efficient, providing a force that is more effective. Rose ray odierno is here, he is a fourstar general and the 38th chief of staff of the United States army. He is best known for successfully implementing 2007 surge and for his units capture of Saddam Hussein exactly ten years ago, i am pleased to welcome general odierno to this table. Thank you, it is great to be here. Rose take me back to that moment and what that meant. Well, at the time, it was important. We had been really looking for him for about six months, you know, we had started in about june of 2003 and we had figured out early on that we were going about it wrong in the beginning. We were worried, we had the cards and you had the faces on the cards and we thought they were somehow related but we realized they werent, what it was about is understanding who is trustful in the circle wise, it had a lot to do with family and people he grew up with and so, you know, working very closely with our special Operations Forces we started to put the puzzle together. We probably did 30, 40 raids thinking we were close, but finally, you know, on december 13th we got him and, you know, we thought we had a pretty good lead but i remember waiting and getting the call that in fact we had, the code number one we had captured number one and at the time it was very important, because, you know, we went in and toppled his regime, you know, with him still out there there was always a question of what would that mean . So i think it was very important for us to capture and make sure he would never be able to come back and terrorize the iraqi people. What did we learn from him once he was captured . I am not sure how much we learned. I think we learned a little bit about the inner workings of the government. We learned about how, in fact, he fooled all his people that worked for him. You know,. Rose that is the interesting point, isnt it . It is. He was not trying to fool the United States. Right. Rose but his own people so they would be in fear. Yes. Rose and the iranians. What was interesting is my comment, all the generals i talked to are part of the regime, they were absolutely and they still are to this day they would still argue we had nuclear weapons, we had chemical weapons, they were there, they have been moved and hidden somewhere. They all still believe that. Rose thats what they thought. And still believe it today and we just didnt find them and so it is very interesting, so people always ask how when your own people and the people closest to you, who are your generals think you have it, then you understand maybe why we certainly believed he had them as well. And so it is very interesting. As i look back on that i say to myself, why didnt he just let the inspectors come in but for him that was weakness, that showed weakness and he had to be he had to continue to show that he was in charge of that regime, that he was a leader in that region and by admitting he didnt have these weapons, i think he felt it would show that he had a significant amount of weakness. Do you believe he thought that we would never attack . I absolutely believe that. I think he thought he was to be able to handle it and that we would not come in there. Rose so it would not be what it was. There would not be regime change. We would put a little pressure on and maybe negotiate a little more. You know, of course there are lots of varying opinions on that but he miscalculated and i think as i look to now in the future i start to worry about is miscalculations by other leaders based on their interpretation of our actions. Rose talk about that because that really is crucial, isnt it . It is. So, you know, as we i talk about preventing conflict and so for me, one of the things we go is we provide that ability to prevent conflict and what it is is about deterrence, and so it is about having and ensuring people think you have the capability, air and naval, land, to conduct operations that would maybe make them think about what they are doing and we have to make sure we dont lose that ability to deter. And make sure it is still something that the president has as an option, it certainly shouldnt be the first option and i think no president would say it is, but i think it is certainly one you want to sustain, i think thats what we are trying to do is sustain that capability. Rose and you also, i assume, were the reaction, what happens on day two . Yes. Thats right. I mean, so, you know, the lesson that we have learned, the lesson, my lesson from iraq and really the last ten or 12 years in afghanistan as well is that we knew what to do to top it will regime. Rose right. We didnt know what to do after we top it would regime because we didnt have an understanding of what i call the societal devastation that has occurred inside of iraq for 20 years before we got there. We didnt understand the depth of issues between the shia population and sunni and shia and kurdish so we relied on others that provided us that information which really was not true because they were expatriots who hadnt been in the country for a long time, long time as well so we underestimated and didnt understand so if we had known that i think we might have been gone about doing things a bit differently. Rose and fair enough, and why didnt we know that . Is. Well, i mean if you think about it we had very limited access, so we didnt have, you know, people on the ground, understand we had it had been a while, and i think, you know, what we do is we rose i thought, even though we had a relationship before with kuwait and helped them in terms of the iron wrap yes, but what we underestimated was sanctions did have an impact. Rose right. That changed, i think, the regime began to change after we kicked them out of kuwait. I think that somewhat had more of a Significant Impact than we thought on the regime. But we just didnt understand the unless you are there, i think it is very difficult to understand how much suppression went on inside of that government. And it didnt matter if you were a sunni, shy a, a shia, it was ever oppressed and the violence, there was testimony to that, yes. Rose when you look at that war and for all of us who like history you look back and there seems to be a rising level of violence there. Yes. Yes. I mean, so my view of this is, first, i think when we left, we had the violence was at a very low level, we had set up for success a country that if they were willing to move forward politically, that it would move forward successfully, politically and economically, it had in fact moved forward economically, the revenue is up, oil is up but what happens is you continue to have this distinct mistrust between the three major groups, the sunni, the shia and the kurds and in fact even among shia you have some mistrust so, and so what has happened is these political differences overtime, you have this growing animosity, this growing mistrust and others exploit this and then you start to have violence so you see al qaeda trying to exploit it on the sunni side. Rose my next question is, is al qaeda coming back and how strong are they becoming . There is probably some iraqi nationalists doing it and some al qaeda doing it. Rose or al qaeda affiliates . Yes, al qaeda affiliates and sometimes you have them joining together. Rose right. Because they might have a common goal to over throw this government. And then you have internal shia strife a little bit, you have iranian influence because of their concerns, and what they do to support so you see all of these things come together and the kurds, obviously have their own, you know, fall on how it should turn out and there always has been some mistrust between kurds and the government itself and so i think we just have watched this play out. Rose havent we watched within the areas that the kurds control, or significant economic development. Yes. Rose and they are doing reasonably well. Never doing very, very well ba. Up in northern iraq, every time you go back there, it is incredible the difference that you see. Continuing to grow, a lot of investment by turkey in those areas, and relatively secure, there was a bombing there recently the first one in many, many years, so they have been able to maintain relative security as well. Rose you know, you face the anybodying of of having the troops remain or not. Right. Rose they may all be out by 2014. Can you have them all out by 2014 . We can. I hope we dont have to. In afghanistan we are making some very good progress. I was over there in august and i will go back in january. How do you define progress . What has happened is the the Afghan Military has taken complete control of security and they voluntary done it through this last fighting season as we call it and stood up very well. And they have performed very well. And so we think now they have the capability to provide the security for the nation. So the next step as strong a force as the al taliban is . They have proven it, they have the will, which is important but i still think we have to help them to build institutions that allow them to sustain this over a long period of time. Including the police . The police, yes, and they have improved as well. They have established some local police that have been effective. But it is about how they sustain it over a long period of time and that takes Institutional Development and continued Leader Development and i think the post 2014 force that would be doing those kind of things, Leader Development, Institutional Development, it allows them to sustain it. Rose are you talking 10,000 people . It would be something along those lines. And the president would make that decision and he hasnt make made it yet. Rose what would a difference be, were there troops in iraq if they negotiated an agreement. It would make a difference, having a u. S. Presence there, would, if nothing else, we became an agent that would continue to allow people to reconcile with each other, if we were there and i think we have more confidence and a bit more trust between the entities if we were there to help with that but unfortunately, it didnt happen. And in my mind it is a shame. Rose . I havent given up on iraq, i will say, i still think there is hope. Rose hope for what . Well, i think with, you know, the economy growing, if we can get the right political leaders to sit down and talk, you know, overtime, i think we can move forward, but, you know, as we watch the middle east, there is growing concern, the problem is bigger than syria, it is bigger than iraq, it is bigger than lebanon. Rose it is what . Because of this sunni, shia divide we are seeing. Rose and playing out in every place. And many places. Rose including syria. A. So for us that is somethingw. So we want that you know, we certainly nobody wants to see that happen and we think there is so much potential in that region but it is something we are going to have to watch as we go forward. Rose . Lets go back to iraq for one second. Yes. Rose because here is a quote, and you will appreciate this. Sure. This is fred indicating again who said about you and general competent address in 2008 after you returned from iraq, great commanders often come in pairs, eisenhower and patton, grant and sherman, napoleon and dubois, general competent address and odierno can be added to the list, that the subordinate in every Successful Campaign pair played a key role in designing and implementing the Campaign Plan and that history does not always justly appreciate such contributions. In your words, why did the surge work . All of us understand that the awakening was taking place, and therefore you put in additional american troops. But it has got to be much more complicated that than that. I would argue the opposite, awakening realized when we put more troops in. Rose it wasnt the example but they were very but they were very small, i mean, so what had happened is we had gone through a time of almost civil war between the sunni and shia about, but when the americans came in with greater numbers we were able to go over greater distances, cover more areas, and the people felt much more comfortable than, coming forward because they were tired of the violence, al qaeda had worn out its welcome on the sunni side, they didnt want interference from iran, and so when we decided to put more people on the ground, it gave them more confidence, and that is when they really started to come forward and so in my mind, that is they were ready to do it, we then provided them the security to do it. There are also a couple of other things. It was about getting out among the population, it was about us understanding that we had to be out there with the iraqis and with the iraqi army and police to make them feel comfortable, that they felt secure, once they felt secure they would come forward and tell us who the individuals that werent trying to provide peace and security in the region, so it was getting them out among the people, about regang their trust, and with the more Additional Forces that we had, it enabled us to do that. And it enabled us then to conduct more broader operations and more specific targeted operations on only those individuals that were leading and conducting the violence inside of iraq so it enabled us to do that together with our special Operations Forces so all of that came together. , you know, for me the big realization in all of this was we were always focused inside of baghdad, i had a conversation with a couple of the iraqi leaders when i initially got over there for the third the second time and they told me, you know, really the key is always the outside of baghdad, the ring around baghdad, that is really what controls what goes on inside of baghdad and then we uncovered a map in one of our raids from al qaeda and the al qaeda plan was to control the outskirts of baghdad, so i then realized, okay thats what we have to focus on, we have to control the access to baghdad and so we put a lot of effort into putting some people more in baghdad but also taking control north, south, east, west of baghdad and putting a ring around it where it made it very difficult for people to come in and out. And so it was a combination of all of those things and thats what we needed the additional people which allowed us to provide better security, but in reality, the success was on the backs of the young commanders, the captains, the lieutenant colonels, colonels and the soldiers who executed this and did it with the ability to adapt and the flexibility they showed, inc. Knew at this they showed in executing this was important. So what i learned as a leader is i have to give them left and right limits and let them operation operate within those limits and what they were able to achieve is quite significant and we see the same thing going on in afghanistan as well. Rose again, so when you killed, what was the name of the al qaeda leader . I want to say waz her i are. Yes, yes. Killed by forces under the command of general mcchrystal, i think. Yes. Rose is that correct . Did that break the back of al qaeda . What that was. It didnt break the back of al qaeda but it was a signal that. Rose we can find him and kill you. We can find you, no matter who you are, if you are a leader in al qaeda we can find and kill you and that was a strong message, there were people that came up behind him and continued to lead so al qaeda went on for that happened in 2006 so they continued on for, very strongly for another year and a half or so but it extent a strong message and also it enabled us to understand that we had the capabilities to do this, and working together, the special operations and conventional forces we continued to improve our abilities. We understood what it took to Work Together, we understood how we passed information, we understood this strong link between these two kinds of forces would make us even more successful and we built on that you know, it was interesting, as general mcchrystal and i in 2003, we were both younger at the time and in different jobs but we came together with some leaders of the special Operations Command in the summer of 2003 and started talking about this cooperation, and thats what led us rose between between the Fourth Infantry Division and special forces which ultimately led too the capture of Saddam Hussein and led to the capture of some other key members of the regime. And so that began it and we started to carry that on and then general mcchrystal continued to refine and prove the tactics he was using, when we refined and approved how conventional forces would be operable with him and as that went on we got better and better and we see it playing out in afghanistan as well. Rose much has been written by tom ricks and others about that you went to iraq as one person, as one army officer. Yes. Rose and you came out of iraq as a different kind of army officer. Yes. Rose in your own words. Yes, i would just say, i think it is mischaracterized a little bit. Rose a little bit . But we all change. I mean we all learn. The key of being a key leader is you have to continue to constantly learn. Rose what did you learn . I learned a couple of things. I learned first that in order to be successful in this environment and in the future environments you have got to take a multipronged approach. The thing i learned most is you have to ask the question why . Why is something a happening . Because it is not that it happened or what happened, it is why it happened. If you understand why something happened, then you can pick the tool that is the best tool to solve that problem. And in some cases we were picking the wrong tool to solve a problem. And you have g