Consensus reached after multiple days and meetings among officials. We reviewed Department Policies and concluded Assistant Director pre steps exercise of description in opening the investigation was in compliance with those policies. We also reviewed, as we detail in the report, the emails, Text Messages and other documents of those involved in that decision, particularly mr. Pre steps. We didnt find documentary or Testimonial Evidence that indicated political bias or improper motivation influencing his decision to open the investigation. While the information in the fbis possession at the time was limited, in light of the Throw Threshold established by department and fbi predication policy which, by the way, is not a legal requirement but a prudential one in the fbi and Department Policies, we found that Crossfire Hurricane was opened for an authorized
investigative purpose and with sufficient factual predication. This decision to open Crossfire Hurricane which involved the activities of individuals associated with a National Major campaign for Party President. Was a discretionary judgment left to the fbi. As we point out in our report, there was no requirement that Department Officials be consulted or even notified of that decision prior to the fbi making that decision. Consistent with this policy, the fbi advised supervisors in the Departments National Security Division of the investigation days after it had been opened. As we detail in our report, high Level Department notice and approval is required in other circumstances where investigative activity could substantially impact certain Civil Liberties. That notice allows senior Department Officials to consider the potential constitutional and prudential implications in
advance of those activities. We concluded that similar notice should be required in circumstances such as those present here. Shortly after the fbi opened the Crossfire Hurricane investigation and condu, the fb conducted several monitored recorded meetings between fbi confidential Human Sources referred to as chss and individuals affiliated with the Trump Campaign including a highlevel Campaign Official who is not the subject of the investigation. We found that the chs operations received the necessary approvals under fbi policy, that an fbi Assistant Director, mr. Pre step knew about and approved of each operation even in circumstances where what was only required was first level supervisory agent approval and that the operations were permitted under department
and fbi policy because their use was not for the sole purpose of monitoring activities protected by the First Amendment or the lawful exercise of other rights secured by the constitution or laws of the United States. We did not find documentary or Testimonial Evidence that political bios or improper motivation influenced the fbis decision to conduct those chs operations. Additionally, we found no evidence that the fbi attempted to place chss within or report on the Trump Campaign or recruit members of the Trump Campaign as chss. However, we were concerned that under Applicable Department and fbi policy, it would have been sufficient for a firstlevel fbi supervisor to authorize the sensitive domestic chs operations undertake inin Crossfire Hurricane and theres no Applicable Department or fbi policy requiring the fbi to notify Department Officials of a
decision to task a confidential human source to con sensely monitor, in other words record, conversations with members of a political campaign. Just in terms of that, its worth noting that had in the midyear investigation which was the clinton email investigation or in this investigation, the fbi could have at the supervisory advisory level authorize an undercover authorized a confidential human source to have a con sensely monitored conversation with either of the president ial candidates with no notice to the Department Of Justice or any lawyer in the Department Of Justice. In Crossfire Hurricane where each of the operations had the potential to gather sensitive Campaign Information protected by the First Amendment, we found no evidence that the fbi consulted with Department Officials before conducting those operations and no policy, as i just noted, requiring them to do so. We concluded Current Department and fbi policies are not sufficient to ensure appropriate oversight and accountability when such operations potentially implicate sensitive, constitutionally protected activity and that requiring Department Consultation at a minimum would be appropriate. We make a recommendation to that effect. One investigative tool which the department and the fbi policy does expressly require express advance approval by a Senior Department official is the seeking of a court order under fisa. When the Crossfire Hurricane Team first proposed seeking a fisa order targeting carter page in mid august 2016, fbi attorneys assisting the investigation considered it a, quote, close call, closed quote and the fisa order was not requested at the time. However, in September 2016, immediately after the Crossfire Hurricane Team received
reporting from christopher steal considering pages Election Acts for russian 06 fishls, the department was ready to move forward to obtain Feis Zoo Author to surveil page. The Steele Reporting pushed fisa over the line in terms of establishing probable cause and we concluded that it played a central and essential role in a decision to seek a fisa order. Fbi leadership supported relying on steeles reporting to seek a fisa order after being advised of concerns expressed by a Department Attorney that steele may have been hired by someone associated with a Rival Candidate or campaign. Surveillance authority under fisa can significantly assist the governments efforts to combat terrorism, clandestine intelligence activity and other threats to the national
security. At the same time, the use of this Authority Unavoidbly raises civil liberty concerns. Fisa can be used to surveil u. S. Persons and in some cases the surveillance will foreseeably collect information about the individuals constitutionally protected activities such as carter pages legitimate activities on behalf of a president ial campaign. Moreover, proceedings before the foreign Intelligence Surveillance court, which is responsible for ruling on applications for fisa orders are exparte, meaning that unlike most court proceedings, the government is the only party prrcht for the proceedings and fisa orders have not been subjected to scrutiny through subsequent proceedings like Search Warrants and wiretap applications, potentially through the criminal process. In light of these concerns, the fisa statute and department and
fbi policies and procedures have established important safeguards to protect the Fisa Application Process from irregularities and abuse. Among the most important are the requirements in fbi policy that every fisa application must contain a, quote, full and accurate, closed quote, presentation of the facts and that agents must ensure that all factual statements and fisa applications are, quote, scrupulously accurate, closed quote. These are the standards for all fisa applications regardless of the investigations sensitivity, regardless it is incumbent upon the fbi to meet them in every application. Nevertheless, we found that investigators failed to meet their basic obligations of ensuring that the vice is a applications were scrupulously accurate. We identified significant inaccuracies and omissions in each of the four applications,
seven in the first application and a total of 17 by the final renewal application. For example, the Crossfire Hurricane Team obtained information from steeles primary sub source. In january 2017 that raised significant questions about the reliability of the Steele Reporting. This was particularly noteworthy because the fisa applications relied entirely on information from the Primary Subsources reporting to support the allegation that page was coordinating with the russian government on 2016 u. S. President ial election activities. However, the fbi did not share this information with Department Lawyers, and it was, therefore, omitted from the last two renewal applications. All of the applications admitted information that the fbi obtained in august 2017 sorry august 2016 from another u. S. Government agency
detailing its prior relationship with carter page including that carter page had been approved as an operational contact for that other agency from 2008 to 2013, that page had provided information to the other agency concerning his prior contacts with certain russian Intelligence Officers and that an employee of that other agency assessed that carter page had been candid with them. The fbi never followed up on that information. As a result of these seven significant inaccuracies and omissions, relevant information was not shared with and consequently considered by Department Lawyers and the fisa court. The fisa applications made it appear as though the evidence supporting probable cause was stronger than was actually the case. We also found basic fundamental and serious errors during the completion of the fbis factual
accuracy reviews known as the Woods Procedures, designed to ensure that fisa applications contain a full and accurate presentation of the facts. Department lawyers and the court should have been given complete and Accurate Information so they could have meaningfully evaluated probable cause before authorizing the surveillance of a u. S. Person associated with a president ial campaign. That did not occur. And as a result, the surveillance of carter page continued even as the fbi gathered information that weakened the assessment of probable cause and made the fisa applications less accurate. We concluded that investigators did not give appropriate consideration or attention to facts that cut against probable cause, and that as the investigation progressed and more information tended to undermine or weaken the assertions in the fisa applications, investigators did not reassess the information
supporting probable cause. Further, the agents and supervisory agents did not follow or even appear to know certain basic requirements in the Woods Procedures. Although we did not find documentary or Testimonial Evidence of intentional misconduct, we also did not receive satisfactory explanations for any of the errors or omissions we identified. We found and as we outline here, are deeply concerned that so many basic and fundamental errors were made by three separate hand picked investigative teams on one of the most sensitive fbi investigations after the matter had been briefed to the highest levels within the fbi, even though the information sought through the use of Fisa Authority related so closely to an ongoing president ial campaign, and even though those involved with the investigation knew that their actions would likely be subjected to close
scrutiny. The circumstances reflect a failure as we outline in the report, not just by those who prepared the applications, but also by the managers and supervisors in the Crossfire HurricaneChain Of Command including fbi senior officials who were briefed as the investigation progressed. We believe that in the fbis most sensitive and high priority matters, and especially when seeking Court Permission to use an intrusive tool such as a fisa order, its incumbent upon the entire Chain Of Command at the organization including senior officials to take the necessary steps to ensure that they are sufficiently familiar with the facts and circumstances supporting and potentially undermining a fisa application in order to provide effective oversight consistent with their level of supervisory responsibility. Such oversight requires greater familiarity with the facts than we saw in this review where time
and again during our oig interviews fbi managers, supervisors and senior officials displayed a lack of understanding or awareness of Important Information concerning many of the problems that we identified. That is why, as youll see in the report, our final recommendation was to refer the entire Chain Of Command that we outline here to the fbi and department for consideration of how to assess and address their performance failures. Additionally, in light of the significant concerns we identified, the oig announced this week we were initiating an audit that will further examine the fbis compliance with the Woods Procedures in fisa applications that target u. S. Persons, not only in Counterintelligence Investigations but also more importantly in counterterrorism investigations. The oig report made a number of other recommendations to the department and the fbi. We believe that implementation of those recommendations including those that seek individual accountability for the failures identified in our report will improve the fbis ability to more carefully and effectively utilize its important National Security authorities like fisa while also striving to safeguard the Civil Liberties and privacy of impacted u. S. Persons. The oig will continue to conduct rigorous oversight of these matters in the months and years ahead including the recommendations that we made in this weeks report. That concludes my statement. Id be pleased to answer any questions the committee may have. Thank you very much for your team and thank you for your service to the country. The fbi former fbi director james comey said this week that your report vindicates him. Is that a Fair Assessment of your report . You know, i think the activities we found here Dont Vindicate anybody who touched
this. Lets run a clip here. This is what comey said in 2018. It would be nice to have sound. Do we have sound . Never mind. Ill read it. Director comey, the reporter is asking him, can i ask you a question on fisa abuse. Its a major issue for the republicans. Do you have the total confidence in the dossier when you used it to secure a Surveillance Warrant and also in the subsequent renewals . This was asked in december of 2018, about a year ago. Comey, i have total confidence that the fisa process was followed, that the entire case was handled in a thoughtful, responsible way by doj and the fbi. I think the nation i think the notion that fisa was abused here is nonsense. Would it be fair to say that you
take issue with that statement . Certainly our findings were that there were significant problems when comey speaks about fisa, you shouldnt listen . You should listen to mr. Horowitz. Hes not vindicated and to be concerned about the Fisa Warrant Process is not nonsense. Christopher steele, is it fair to say he had a political bias against donald trump . Given who he was paid for, there was a bias that needed to be disclosed to the court. Does it seem that he personally had a bias, not just because hes on the payroll of the Democratic Party . We found in the course of this and heard that he was desperate to prevent mr. Trumps election. Again, this is the guy that provides the dossier that gets the warrant over the top against carter page. Hes paid for by the Democratic Party and he personally believes its bad for donald trump to
win. Hes marketing the dossier which is a bunch of garbage to anybody and everybody. To me thats important. Is that im