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In 2006, the General Assembly amended G.S. § 20-197(a) to take the determination of aggravating factors out of the hands of the trial judge and place that determination in the hands of the jury. Thereafter, in State v. Geisslererain, 233 N.C. App. 186, 756 S.E.2d 92 (2014), we held that the trial court committed reversible
While executing an arrest warrant for a gang member, police ordered everyone out of the house at which they had seen the gang member, and defendant was among those who exited the house. During a weapons frisk of defendant, an officer saw what appeared to be packages of heroin in defendant’s jacket pocket. During a
Once the trial court ruled that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie challenge under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the Batson inquiry should have concluded. Accordingly, we do not consider the state’s post facto reply to the trial court’s request for race-neutral explanations for the state’s peremptory challenges of Black
The trial court did not clearly err in determining that the state did not improperly use its peremptory strikes against Black jurors. The white jurors who gave similar answers and who were not struck were more pro-death penalty and appeared less likely to improperly sympathize with the defendant and/or to give more credibility to the
Where the jury found that defendant acted with all three types of malice set out in G.S. § 14-17(b) (actual malice, “condition of mind” malice, and “depraved-heart” malice), the finding of depraved-heart malice was not necessary to convict defendant of second-degree murder. Consequently, the trial court properly sentenced defendant at the higher B2 felony level