American data is not discriminate searched by intelligence authorities. Ok. I was up here doing my tap dance. Theres a pleasure to introduce stuart baker. The former general counsel for the National Security agency. He is going to be our first speaker. Lets do it. Stuart i am really delighted to be able to introduce matt olson. He advertised that. We did until the events over last weekend. We ask who can talk about this topic, which is 702. The suggestion of the white house was that we ask matt olson to do this. We are really grateful for you to doing this on short notice. Matt is perfect for this topic. He has a deep experience in the Intelligence Community. He was counsel at the National Security agency. In between there before he came back to the Justice Department where he now runs the security division. He has a long and deep experience. That has that she has been one of the principal advocates are for renewing section 702. Why dont i just start asking you matt, what is the 702 program for this audience . They may not know as much as you or i know. I think they would really like to hear, what is the 702 program, what does it come from and what is its value . Matt i am really pleased to be here. It committed group of folks to talk about this. A committed group of folks to talk about this weird i was. I was shocked to see a full crowd. Im kind of shocked that you all all showed up. Maybe did not realize until you were stuck here. Exactly. Exactly. We do obviously totally occupy with the events of our time. I will say, a great friend and a brilliant leader. We are lucky to have her in that role. I am happy to fill in for her as best as i possibly can. Yeah. Section 702 is a part of the surveillance act. It was added in 2008. Most importantly, it expires in two and a half months. At the in the year coming december 31 at midnight it will cease to exist. It has a sunset built into it. It is without question the single most important Legal Authority that we have from the intelligence collection at this point. It has proven since is a passage to be indispensable and irreplaceable for collecting foreign intelligence. Some of the people who are here may remember coming in days or weeks after 9 11 as a president ial program. Can you give us a feel for ultimate origins. Matt it really did grow out of the program and some ways that followed 9 11. It was a recognition that what we had was by the which was passed in 1978, and its initial form was not up to the task of collecting foreign intelligence at the time focusing on al qaeda. You have a law passed in 1970 passed before the internet, past before the advent of fiberoptic cable and the way to medications are carried and that was technology dependent. We were using the traditional target designed for people in the United States who were using the exact same tool to target people outside the United States. That was necessary because the way it was written, it was designed to keep up with the times. 2005 there was recognition that it was not up to the task. It was not necessary because we were given targets in pakistan in terms of how it was being applied. I know some of you are tracking it. It would convinced congress to amend it with section 702 to allow us to have a mechanism to target overseas it. People who are using u. S. Service providers appeared we have a lot of targets who were using u. S. Infrastructure because our infrastructure is second to none in the world. We do not have a way to legally compel them to produce assist the government. We changed the law to have a programmatic approach, where we go to the corp. Once a year with the procedure that we are using to disarming if someone is a appropriate target. The court looks at the procedures and determines whether or not they are consistent with the amendment. If they are, the Court Authorizes the director the attorney general together to go to the providers in the United States with the director to do United States. At that is 2008 focused on counterterrorism. In the last 15 years, this law has proven to be indispensable across a range of foreign intel. 60 or so of the pdb article has some collection in them. Because youre talking about u. S. Service providers, we are talking about if you want access to gmail for quantum intelligence purposes, this is what the government is likely to use. Everybody is providing electronic services. Every Committee Case and that goes through a u. S. Switch to a u. S. Foreign target is object subject to surveillance under this program. Theres a lot of stuff that is there. Why is a controversial . Matt i think the way to think about section 702 and why it is controversial. We are always trying to balance National Security with the protection of privacy. That was true in 1978. It was certainly true in 2008 when we passed section 702. It is controversial because it is because of what is at stake. It is controversial right now because of the way that section 702 works, which is why we are targeting somebody overseas not a u. S. Person, not infrequently is that person is in can medication with the person in the United States. Their communications would be collective because we are talking about communications with two people at least. We need to have rules in place that protect privacy for the people in the United States. What we are seeing in terms of controversy, particularly how the fbi, one agency who operates within the United States has access to to some of this data how they are able to use it. Much of the concern has been on as a foreign intelligence tool but the fbi. The fbi only actually gets access to about 3 of the take. The 3 that is tied to a predicated fbi investigation. They say, we are investigating this target. Please put him on 702 coverage. That collection goes into a data place. Database that is assessable. Exactly. Im glad you made that point. Its a critical one. It often gets lost in the debate. Nsa is a primary organization responsible for implementing section 702. They do all the targeting decisions. I dont have to go back and explain what i mean by targeting decisions. We are an informed group. As you said, the fbi gets a small subset about that. About 3 of the overall collection. They are focused on that 3 . They are focused on targets that relate to their investigations. Those investigations can be counterterrorism, counterintelligence investigations. Increasingly cyber investigations. They get that subset and they are able to work with that, but only that part they are getting out about 3 . Stewart if i can channel my cyber libertarian guy, the government, without getting a warrant to carry out wiretaps has collected all of these conversations of americans. They want the target but they are in there. And now the fbi says, we are actually interested in the americans. I want to see what he is saying. Its those queries that have particularly been of concern. I will say, the fbi has screwed up. Pretty badly in administering the limits the law imposes on those searches. That has produced the biggest lapse of this renewal cycle. Talk about what happened there. Matt i will talk about the screw ups. I think it is the right word. Take a step back. The way it has worked since the beginning, still works, imagine its a collection against somebody in syria. An isis member in syria. That person is on coverage under section 702, that nonus person that has foreign intelligence outside of the United States in syria. They may be talking to a lot of different people. People in syria, iraq. Then they may also be talking to somebody in the United States. In viewing the collection nsa , may see that that person is now talking, for example, with email with somebody in the United States. You can see that one end of the communication. In order to focus on the person in the United States, that could be a real concern if theres actual planning or recruiting of somebody in the United States. Then the fbi would have to get a traditional fisa. In other words, they cannot continue to focus on the person in the United States without getting traditional fisa, getting to the courts and getting probable cause. That happens all the time. Stewart i would say, we should talk about focusing on the u. S. Persons, but a big chunk of what got the fbi in trouble is doing what i would call low probability, high risk searches. Im going to treat this person as a confidential source, i will bring this person in for a meeting with the top official. I better check to make sure they are not in communication with the foreign person. I will run their name through the system. Thats not consistent with the rules that have been set up for the database. Matt exactly. Here it is important to get in the weeds. Who is the targeting government going after. What we are talking about with the fbi, what you are mentioning is a query. The fbi has that collection based on the targeting position. What can they do without the with that 3 . There are too many cases where the fbi queries the already lawfully collected data that the government got through their targeting, where they queried it without meeting the standard. The standard is, is searching the data with the search term not targeting . Is it reasonably likely to return foreign intelligence . This is going back a few years. The fbi didnt fully appreciate the need to demonstrate that standard. They might have a meeting where theres a u. S. Government official who was going to attend a meeting. We will just check to make sure that everyone attending the meeting is not a risk. Theres no reason to believe in that scenario that there will be for intelligence in the 702 database. That would be a compliance incident. My team at the National Security division, the lawyers at the Justice Department who work in this area, we do compliance checks all year long. Making sure this is being done right. We found a number of compliance problems along those lines. The last couple of years, we have taken remedial steps to address that. Stewart youve gone through at least three stages to bring these procedures in line. I have to to you i think the law , is wrong and the fbi is right. There are a lot of times, people coming into meet the president , i want to know if they are talking to terrorists or not. Even if i have no reason to believe, i would like to check. I would like the fbi to check. But thats not what the law is. Frankly, we ought to be revising that. Matt i think that is what is motivating the fbi. The thing to think about they , have a lot of databases they can check. They can check open cases, public source information. Theres a lot that they can do. But we are very careful about raw, unmitigated fisa. The contents of communication. We cordon that off. That requires special position to check in those circumstances. Stewart that makes sense. 98 of these searches produce no tips. We are checking to see if something terrible is going to happen. 99 of the time theres nothing to worry about. But almost all of those searches turned out to be violations. When you hear about surveillance of americans by the fbi, shocking numbers of searches that are done. Its those kinds of searches , almost all of them. Matt i agree. To reflect back, i testified in the Senate Judiciary committee this past summer on section 702 and the reauthorization. I was there with the Deputy Director of the cia and nsa along with the Deputy Director of the fbi. Open hearings. I was sitting next to the Deputy Director of the nsa. Where i was previously general counsel, as you had been. A threehour hearing where the number of questions to the nsa Deputy Director was zero. Zero questions for the nsa. Nothing sweeter, except if you are the fbi. Absolutely the target of very strong questioning and distrust. The fbi has work to do. I will be the first to say, these are screw ups. This is a real problem. We cant have the fbi in a position where theres a lack of trust of the fbi. That is why, when we found these problems two years ago, attorney general, fbi director, with our lawyers, worked to implement changes in the way the fbi does these searches of the data. A very simple one. This meeting huge difference, and when i say this, this will sound obvious to this group. The way the fbi was doing it two years ago and previously was that they would do the query of all their databases automatically by default, including raw section 702. If they wanted to check their open cases, it would automatically run that query against raw fisa. A simple flip of the switch to change that default setting from you have to opt in instead of , automatically being searched, that has reduced the number of u. S. Person queries by 93 . It is really a matter of, ill go to search the data, usual checks. I will run the names. That name will check all the databases, and they didnt meet the standard for searching the raw fisa. Just checking and changing the standards, recording your reasons for searching it. Weve seen a dramatic reduction in the number of u. S. Person queries. Now the compliance rate is in excess of 98 . Stewart there are a lot of people on the hill and Civil Society who would like to help you with solving this problem. There are solutions that are a good deal more aggressive. Why dont we just take the fbi out of this . Let the cia, others do the check, not have the bureau accessing this data. Weve also had recommendations from the privacy and Civil Liberties oversight board, three of the five said, the fbi ought to go to the fisa court before they search for an american with information in that database. One of them said there would be probable cause. Two others said, you should take the existing standard, it is likely to produce intelligence , and have the judge secondguess that determination. Your thoughts on these other recommendations . Matt on the first one, i will talk about that first. The idea that you should just section 702 should be available to the cia and nsa and not the fbi i think is deeply flawed. Actually really dangerous. Stewart probably dangerous for everybody in this room. Nobody wants to be looking at u. S. Person data from the cia or nsa if they can avoid it. Matt those of us who work in those agencies, the concerns about u. S. Data, anything that touches u. S. Person data. When you are in a foreign Intelligence Data like nsa, cia. Beyond that, to me its basically forgetting one of the fundamental lessons of 9 11. You cannot have a wall between a Foreign Intelligence Agency and the one agency, the fbi, that has authority to act inside the United States. Really, one of the critical things weve learned and spent 20 years addressing after 9 11 is the need for the fbi and cia and nsa to work closely together when it comes to National Security. The transformation of the fbi over the last 20 years has been focused on that exists, but still existing in a way that protects Civil Liberties and privacy. Having worked at the nsa and fbi, you cannot have a system where one organization has responsibility inside of the United States with the authority to arrest. The cia and nsa do not have the authority to arrest people in the United States. The fbi does to disrupt a threat. The fbi is the organization with the mission to understand these threats that may emanate from overseas, whether that is a paris threat, cyber threat, espionage threat. To take steps inside the United States to stop it. That could be knocking on the door of an American Company and saying, we are seeing efforts to compromise your network. Here is what you need to do to stop that. That is the fbis job. We cannot stop them from doing their job. We would be stopping there job if we were to take them out of the ability to have access to 702 collections, so i think it is a deeply flawed suggestion to remove the fbi. Stewart they have different recommendations. Want to cut the fbi out. They did want them to get a warrant at least when they were at the point of knowing there was something in the database that they wanted to see. I just did a podcast, for those of you who listen to my podcast, it will be distributed later today or tomorrow. We interviewed two of the five members of the board, talking about their recommendations. If youd havent heard enough on 72, you can listen to that. That recommendation was sort of split. Two dissenters. Two people said, apply the current statutory standards. But have the judge makes the call. One said, it has to be probable cause. How do you feel about those recommendations . Is that workable . Matt i will talk about that report in a moment. This proposal that the fbi or Intelligence Community should go to a fisa court to get permission to look at information that they lawfully collected. Thats what we are talking about. Intelligence collection that is clearly lawful, that is sitting in the Intelligence Community holdings. Before they query it or look at it, they need to go and ask for additional permissions from a judge. Whether that is to show probable cause or meet some other standard. I think this is a really bad idea. For a number of reasons. One, its not legally required. Every court that has looked at this question of, does the constitution require an additional approval by a judge before looking at lawfully collected information to get a warrant . Every court has said no, no court has said you need to go and get additional approval to look at lawfully collected information. It is a policy choice that we would be making, not a legally required one. This policy choice would really hamstring, especially the fbi. In part it is because of the sheer numbers. There are thousands of these checks. They are done in the early stages of an investigation. The fbi opening an investigation on a potential spy network. Collections from a Foreign Intelligence Service there are , 25 phone numbers that were found in the possession of a known officer. Those 25 phone numbers have u. S. Area codes. Are they targets of this intelligence officer, are they victims, are they working. We dont know at that stage. The first thing you want to do is run those numbers. U. S. Person identifiers through the 702 data. Learn more. To do that at the speed at which we need to do that, whether thats an espionage case or cyber case, those hours matter. For the fbi to put their pens down or stop working on their investigation to write an application, to go to court, i work on these applications for fisa. We have to show probable cause. It will take weeks, months, often hundreds of pages long. The judges take weeks to look at them. This is not an agile way to approach National Security. It would be unworkable from the sheer numbers and time required. As my example showed, theres not going to be probable cause. You will not meet that standard in the early part of the investigation. You have the potential compromise of a network. We may want to look at technical identifiers like ip addresses, run them through the system, section 702. The idea that we would be able to show probable cause or stop while theres an ongoing compromise, cyber attack against a company, and then going to a judge to ask for permission, something that is not legally required. I am not sure how the judge would decide. Yes, we think there is foreign intelligence information in that data. You all have experience in this room doing. There is no reason that a judge have particular expertise in that area. The Intelligence Community is unified in its opposition to this idea. Stewart the other agencies know because we have heard it from Civil Society groups, commissioners of the board members, they think this is a solution not just for the fbi but for all the agencies. If you are going to handle u. S. Persons data, because there is a good reason for gathering it, they want to layer on judicial review of what you do before you get to do it. This could be a major change. Matt exactly. Important points. Right now this is focused on the fbi and section 702. But there is no limiting principle. The goal is to require every Intelligence Agency including nsa, cia, to go to a judge before running queries of lawfully collected information. Stewart they had a lot of good things to say about the program. They are the source of the statistics about how often this ends up in the pdb. They said it is essential, ought to be renewed. On balance, what is your view of the report . Did they do a decent job . Matt im glad you did a podcast with two of the members. The report, to me, is a missed opportunity. You have a fivemember board. They split three to two. It is two separate reports. They agreed on one thing, importantly, that the program is extremely valuable. It produces uniquely valuable foreign intelligence. All five members agreed on that. Beyond that, they didnt agree on anything else. I think its a missed opportunity. Prior reports on section 702 were very authoritative and very influential. I think the two reports effectively cancel each other out in a way. I think it wont have much influence. Its an unfortunate missed opportunity. On this issue of warrants, going to a court for preapproval, the twoperson report said that the majority clearly dismissed examples of where those queries were. The government provided examples of intelligence operations that would not have been able to be carried out if that standard had been in place. There was intelligence missed, if the majoritys recommendation was adopted. For my part, i was in the room when we provided those examples. We gave classified and unclassified examples of where these queries will go, including one example where the fbi did queries of section of 702 and was able to disrupt an ongoing kidnapping and assassination plot in the United States. An ongoing assassination plot. So, to me, a missed opportunity. These were examples that we told to the board as a whole. For the majority to come back and say, you should get a warrant or get preapproval from the court, i think it is the wrong suggestion. It would really hamstring us. Stewart i want to change gears. We cant have this meeting without recognizing the truly horrific, barbaric videos that weve all seen coming out of the hamas attack in israel. And to wonder what that means for the United States. Pretty focused on domestic National Security. Not entirely but largely. Which is probably why you have the time. I did want to ask, what do you think this means for Homeland Security and National Security inside the United States . Matt i appreciate you raising that. To echo the words of the president and secretary of state, we stand in solidarity with israel and israeli people at this time. We at the department of justice , fbi are working very closely with federal Agency Partners as well as partners around the world and the israelis to do everything we can to support them. Much of our focus is with the department of justice and the fbi. U. S. Citizens who have been killed, those who are missing. We are working night and day right now on those challenges. The one thing i would say in response is, bring it back to 702 for a moment. In the past, reauthorizing section 702 is keeping me up at night. I have had a couple of sleepless nights in light of what is happening in israel and gaza. But theres no doubt in my mind that section 702 is part of helping us understand the picture. Whether thats potential threats emanating from overseas into the United States, what hamas is doing. Of course, we are always worried about iran as a threat. Theres no doubt in my mind that section 702 is part of that. I would say, i cant imagine what it would be like if congress didnt reauthorize section 702. If we were going through a crisis like this without our single most important Legal Authority for intelligence collection. Right now, so much of what we are able to provide the policymakers as an Intelligence Community, the nature of whats happening in israel and gaza and across the region. Stewart i, too, want to pick up on an area where your office is central to the u. S. Projection of power. It is relevant to both the russiaukraine war and our increasingly pointed decoupling of technology with china. Thats export controls and sanctions. Maybe too often, but it is how we exercise the leverage and Economic Dominance that that has provided. And its basically telling russia that they are not going to have a whole bunch of stuff and china that theres a lot of Cutting Edge Technology that they know they intend to turn to military purposes that we are also going to deny them, but the way we deny it is by telling the private sector not to sell it. And as you probably know, theres been a lot of stories that say its getting through anyway. Im not sure thats completely a surprise. At the end of the day, it all comes down to the people who are selling the product knowing that they will be prosecuted if they are caught violating those and thats your job. So, i guess i would ask you, how well do you think we are doing and enforcing those export controls . Do you think theres a point where we may have overdone it . Matt just to step back a bit, i think this is a really important set of questions. It is the responsibility of the Justice Department to enforce our sanctions, laws, and expert export control laws. As you point out, these are increasingly becoming an important part of our National Security toolkit. Certainly not the only part. But its an important part. For example, after the russian invasion of ukraine, we set up our task force to go after russian assets and russian oligarchs who were supporting the kremlin. Stewart did you sleep on any yachts . Matt we did seize some significant assets including yachts. The goal is to increase pressure on putin and the kremlin by going after his inner circle. On the export side, taking significant steps this year to not just on russia, but focus on china and other countries that would seek to obtain access to our most sensitive and valuable technologies. Technologies like artificial intelligence, computing, semiconductor technologies. That really has the potential in the hands of our adversaries to change the balance of power. We set up a strikeforce. This is what we do. Disruptive technology to bring together the department of commerce, justice, together federal prosecutors, fbi agents around the country and 14 locations to focus on sensitive technologies that are being sought by our adversaries and that we want to prevent from falling into their hands. We do that with a carrot and stick approach. The carrot is, we go to companies, tell them they need compliance programs, they need to manage the risks around the idea that these technologies could get into the wrong hands through intermediaries, they go through shipment points in other parts of the world. What weve seen with russia is an effort, through intelligence agencies, to set up these Procurement Networks that seek to invade our export control laws. Strong compliance programs working with the government. The stick the enforcement side , is where we find violations and prosecute cases. We have prosecuted a number of cases. A few involving russia in the past few months, two involving china, trade secrets. We are increasing our efforts along the lines you described. Really to prevent these sensitive technologies from falling into the wrong hands. Stewart its not your job to evaluate this, but it seems to me when you look at how russia , is doing, they are hurting, but if people are willing to pay enough and move these goods through enough hands, there is deniability. Stuff that is needed by the russians is going to get there. Maybe it will be inflated by 30 or 40 . But we should be realistic. We are not going to totally cut off most of these sales. Matt calculating the impact. Its not a panacea. It is an important part of the overall effort. Russia now is the focus because of the battlefield in ukraine. We are seeing u. S. Made Technology End up on the battlefield. Thats unacceptable. More longterm, maybe china. Artificial intelligence technology. That could be through export control violations. The other thing is within the department of justice, interagency, addressing risks that stems from Foreign Investment in u. S. Companies. That is another aspect of our work. It is designed to address the risks of technology, pertinent information going to china. Stewart i do want to get some questions from the audience. One last question and then we will ask jim to come up and give the questions he have got. You talked about china. When you came in, you got rid of what had been the China Initiative. That raised questions about, are we going to continue to have an effective and aggressive counterintelligence program, given what china is trying to do in the United States . Can you give us a sense of what you put in place for the China Initiative . Matt sure. What was then called the China Initiative. The goal is not to go backwards but to go forward, and to advance our understanding of the threats from china. As i sit at the time, we are going to relentlessly focus on that threat, which is beyond any threat we face in any other country over the long term. The reality is we are facing threats from a variety of nationstate actors. When i made that announcement, it was in the midst of just before russia invading ukraine. Today, we are very focused on the threat from iran. The reality is, we face threats from a number of different countries, including north korea in that group. We needed to have an approach that was broader than just focus ed on china. We are relentlessly focused on that threat. As i said, judge us by our record. We brought a number of cases in the context of export control cases that i mentioned, stopping prosecuting individuals, Software Engineers that took technology to china, going after the recent indictment of two u. S. Navy servicemembers who were providing classified intelligence to the prc, to the review of Foreign Investment by Chinese State owned enterprises in u. S. Companies. Also what we call chinese transnational repression. Setting up quads police stations in the United States in order to repress dissidents in the United States. It is a serious threat. It come from a number of vectors and we are very focused on it. We are also focused on addressing that acrosstheboard the board. Its a compex environment. Thats why we made that decision. Based on our record, we have stayed focused on the china threat. Stewart jim, do you want to take over and get some audience questions. Jim ok. The first one is, how has the evolution of technology influenced the success from fisa . Has fisa been able to keep up with the speed and breadth of communication . Matt great question. When i was out of government i , taught a Law School Class where that was the theme. How technology and the law and our policies keeps up with technology. Something we write about all the time. The reality is, our laws are always lagging behind technology. Of course, that is a truism. Fisa 702 is an example of congress coming together in a bipartisan fashion. Both in 2008 and in prior times. Understanding that it was a necessary thing for fisa to keep up with technological changes. Not just the internet but overall, Service Providers will provide services to their users in a way that they can interact with the government, overseen by the fisa courts. 702 is an elegant solution to that technological problem were where a law passed in 1978 hadnt been amended to stay up with the times. Across the board, we are looking at ways that our strikeforce on Disruptive Technologies is another example of where we are focused on changing technologies using existing laws like our export control laws to prevent those technologies from going to the wrong folks. Jim this next question is an interesting one. Im not sure how much you will be able to address it given the protection of sources and methods but it is very relevant given whats going on this week. How has 702 helped in uncovering hamas funding in the United States . Matt of course, i cannot get into the details on exactly what we are doing and how for reasons that this audience is position ed to understand. I will say as a general matter, 702 is exactly the law we need in order to understand threats that emanate overseas that come into our country, whether that is hamas fundraising, recruiting, other terrorist groups recruiting. For the fbi to be able to query that data quickly and in an urgent fashion, given the state of affairs today with the hamas attack, it is an essential part of our National Security. Jim one final question. I think the reference is to the office of the dni. What about using Liberty Crossing to share information . Matt that speaks to me. I was a director of counterterrorism for three years and my office was at Liberty Crossing. Along with director clapper and maybe some of you in this room. Liberty crossing is a physical place but also an idea. One of the great reforms post 9 11. The fbi is colocated there. Nctc is an entity. It brings together fbi, cia, dhs all in one place to focus on the counterterrorism mission. Its a clearinghouse for all sorts of intelligence. Whether thats counterterrorism, counterintelligence information. In fact, its the place where section 702 is present and available to a wide variety of Intelligence Officers so that they can make effective use of it. That is happening in real time and its happening fast. Its getting out to the people who need to use it. Whether that is state and local officials, whether its foreign partners. In particular to the fbi. Stewart this has been terrific. We really appreciate it. Im a little worried. You had practically every good job in the Intelligence Community. There might not be any left for the rest of us. What do you think your future holds . Are you going to go back to the private sector . You have done well there, too. What are your plans . Matt no plans. Im at the department of justice now. This is where i started my career, in the Civil Rights Division 30 years ago working on civil rights cases. Working as a federal prosecutor. I didnt have any plan to be a National Security lawyer pre9 11. A lot of folks in this room, 9 11 change their trajectory of my career. I couldnt be happier to be where i am right now at the Justice Department. Stewart you have to run for the next office. You have run out of others. People in this room will be glad to consider your campaign if that happens. Please join me and thanking him. Matt thank you. Thank you. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] we have a number of distinguished guests in the room today. [applause] the u. S. House is back in session today at 6 00 eastern before a possible phone on speaker at noon tomorrow. This evening at six 30 eastern come houseepublicans are expected to hold another conference meetingn an effort to bolster support for jim jordan of oo to be the next speaker. Heecame the nominee on friday but remains far short of the 217 votes needed to take the gavel. Follow live coverage on the House Speaker election right here on cspan. Watched cspan series in partnership with the library of congress, books that shaped america will feature the common law by Oliver Wendell holmes junior, written in 1881, the double ticket before he would become a Supreme Court justice. The book is from a series of lectures he gave on criminal and civil law and other legal issues. Controversial at the time come he wrote the life of the law has not been logic. 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