Good morning, everyone and welcome to the Carnegie Endowment or international peace. Im ashley tellis, c senior felw at the endowment and its a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you to this Book Discussion of age of iron which is a marvelous analysis of conservative nationalism. I see i will say couple things but the book in a in a t but before i do i want to extend on your behalf in mine a warm welcome to call in himself and our distance, duty, Danielle Pletka and Richard Fontaine. As you probably know, colin is a professor at the start school publicly and government at George Mason University andco is also a nonresident fellow at the American Enterprise institute, neighbor nextdoor, literally. Colin has made his mark thinking deeply about american politics. And this book is trademark direct. It examines the concept of conservative nationalism, a phenomenon that has been brought to public attention conspicuously through the rise of president trump. In terms of both the history of ideas and how these ideas have found manifestation in modern american history, especially in the debates about americas role in the world. So the book is both encompassing and grandiose simultaneously. And despite the gravity of the subject, i can assure you its also a very delightful read. I read the book over the last weekend, and ihe commend it to your attention. So welcome, colin. As a pleasure to have you with us. Im also very grateful that danielle dutka and Richard Fontaine have consented to join us as discussants. We could not asked her better commentators, given both their intellectual interests in conservatism and their own practical contributions to the making and permitting of foreign and domestic policy in the United States. Danny has had a long career on capitol hill where she worked at the Foreign Center of foreign relationse committee. She has written extensively on u. S. Foreign policy especially on the middle east, appears widely on television and until recently was the Senior Vice President for a domestic Foreign Policy studies at aei where she continues to remain a senior fellow in foreign and defense policy studies. Richard fontaine has had an long career in public service. He is now the chief executive office of cnas, the center for new american security, which i say with some jealousy is doing incredibly Creative Work on operational issues relating to u. S. National security. Richard worked for many years as senator john mccains Foreign Policy advisor, and prior to that work at the state department, the National Security council, and also the Senate Foreign relations committee. So very warm welcome to both of you, dani and richard. Its wonderful to have you both here again. Without further ado, let me invite called in to visit the key themes of this book for us. Before yielding the floor today and richard for the comments, we will have a brief conversation thereafter and then i will open the conversation to the floor. And i look forward to your interaction during that time. Thank you, colin. Welcome. Thanks very much for this invitation. It just so happens that this Panel Includes three people, all of whose experience and expertise and use i really respect, so its a real pleasure to be a with dani and richard. In fact, dani, without dani this book probably would not happen. She may regret that but that is the truth, at the American Enterprise institute. So glad to beer. Let me say a few words about the central thesis of the book. Whatat motivated me among other things was the common argument over the last five years that the Trump Administration represents something completely unprecedented in american history, and that this striking rise of populist nationalism on the right on both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons really back to the 1930s. Without downplaying some of the genuine causes for concern, i think thats overstated. I think it misunderstands the nature of american populism, american nationalism, and the administrations Foreign Policy. So the book isnt a political one way or the other. Its not a drawer at the trump polemic. An american creed with Classical Liberal elements, rule of law, limited government, sovereignty and american sense of nationalism so small see conservatives have sought to conserve that tradition and that the same time when it comes to foreignpolicy the founders had some key principles that were a consistent paradigm for generations. If you have a dollar bill in your pocket you see the new order of the ages. I hope popular selfgovernment spreads, that is a distinct the american hope, annulment of us Foreign Policy, doesnt mean you do it by force but as an example. The second element and this is in washington, the idea you maintain a free hand, as jefferson put it, there would be no entangling alliances, no permanent alliances. That was a key element in american Foreign Policy from the beginning and founders saw a contradiction between those two things. That was a dominant political bipartisan tradition well into the Twentieth Century so what shifted was, i argue, Woodrow Wilsons innovation in world war i. Wilson believed he not only needed to tie a new foreignpolicy paradigm we call globalism, domestic progressive reforms in every country including the United States, and you have to be willing to get multilateral commitments worldwide as intended with the league of nations under article 10. That is an alternative to the founders, and and have to accommodate that liberal tradition. We see this over and over again. One, conservative internationalist are skeptical of some of the rules and overkill when it comes to multilateral commitments. And that was the tradition of somebody like senator lodge who faced off against wilson during the treaty a sigh, wanted an alliance with britain and france, and wilson was overly optimistic and unrealistic. There was a second group who were strict noninterventionists. The us had to avoid military commitments, and interventions that it can trade peacefully with other countries but shouldnt have military rule. Outside of the western hemisphere. That is a tradition that goes back to that period as well. Often populists from west of the mississippi. Then there is a third strain in the middle, a hawkish or hardline unilateralism which doesnt get as much attention. It has been underrepresented. A lot of conservatives at the time had a strong willingness to spend on the military, willing to counter concrete adversaries in the soviet union and al qaeda but are enthusiastic about brought liberal international projects. It actually requires a response and that is the Pivotal Group over time. We pivot back and forth. It depends on the circumstances. In the moment of that debate, all factions agree that wilson was wrong, but they didnt agree with why. In the 20s and 30s. Conservatives agree the us should be detached from military affairs in europe. Pearl harbor settled that debate and the rise of the soviet union led many hardline conservatives to support more robust military role overseas but if you think back to barry goldwater, he was not enthusiastic about liberal internationalism. It is staunchly anticommunist. The soviet union as welcome as it was, and it was wide open. You have ron paul and conservative internationalist and everything in between. Most republicans supported him in that for much of his administration. And during the obama years your back to that period they are asking what now. The big surprise of 2016, 201516 in the republican primary was a candidate could win the republican nomination and the presidency campaigning against that conservative internationalist tradition going back to the 40s. Donald trump led a frontal assault on the conservative internationalist tradition going back decades and he won which was astonishing. He turned things upside down. Group that had been marginalized felt better represented, groups that had been in charge were deeply concerned, but what trump was doing, im not suggesting he personally read these older documents. My suggestion is he instinctively is a kind of american nationalist who draws from older traditions. When trump ran for president , particular american nationalism of his own but he said the same thing for 30 years and his own unusual way, he said over and over that he viewed us allies as free riders. Rather than assets. That is not my view. It is his view. He was quite consistent about that. He said they were taking advantage of the United States economically and militarily, politically. He aimed to somehow fix this through his own negotiating skills. It with a complaint. It wasnt really a plan. There was no sense of a policy alternative but it was a complaint with some popular residence as we saw in the 2016 primary particularly when you tie in frustration over military interventions in iraq and afghanistan not to mention libya, patterns of economic mobilization that seemed to benefit the well off, chinas middleclass, working americans, and National Sovereignty to supernatural organization but bundled together a sense of frustration and turned it into a winning platform. His own particular version of american nationalism we have seen resurgent and that is part of the historical context. Once he had to transition unexpectedly to government because i think his election came as a surprise to a lot of people in this room, then the question is what now . What is the plan . What is the policy . There is digitalized uncertainty from the beginning, severe personnel challenges. In reality the trump foreignpolicy is a mixture of nonintervention, hardline unilateralism and continued us foreignpolicy activism and engagement. It is a mixture, a hybrid. The personnel around him, partly because of his own adaptation over time. He is likable to a fault. He is flexible to a fault. There is a pattern to harry handers foreignpolicy. There is Something Like a trump doctrine. If you will indulge me, i picture at as a 2 x 2 grid. He launches pressure campaigns against allies as well as adversaries. He launches pressure campaigns on Economic Issues and security ones. In other words pressure campaigns against security adversaries, north korea, iran, isis, taliban and. Another president might have done the same thing in a different way but that is part of what you are seeing and in the case of iran and north korea. Then you see pressure campaigns against allies, not entirely new but in a way we havent seen before. Pressure campaigns on the economic front against china, us competitor. That is a trump innovation that was not nearly as much, to really push china on the commercial side and finally pressure campaigns against us allies on trade, that is very trump. I dont think any other candidate would have done that, pressure canada, mexico, japan, south korea, the eu looking for renegotiated trading arrangements. What he does is he goes up and down the ladder of escalation in ways that can be quite sudden and unexpected. He will raise the temperature and lower it. He will make threats and be willing to sell or talk to almost anybody. This tends to unnerve people. It unnerves allies, adversaries, some of his own staff but what i find striking, if you turn down the volume which tends to be very high it is not obvious that he himself knows the end point. Im not sure he himself knows his own Reservation Point on any of these fronts. He keeps his options open. That is different from saying he is hellbent on dismantling what we call rulesbased liberal international order. Im not convinced he has that is a Reference Point one way or the other in fact i doubt he could describe it to you. He is interested in renegotiating existing arrangements consistent with his 2016 campaign promises. It is a portfolio assessment of us commitments overseas, commercial, diplomatic, military, hes reserving the right to walk away from some commitments, renegotiate others, maintain or even bolster some. There are us troops in poland more than there were under obama. The outcome is not predetermined. A significant amount of the us presence is still there and may in some cases be increased. And that seems to be the foreignpolicy. We can talk about assessments of each of those fronts but that is what it looks like to me. A few final thought. How my doing on time . I also talk a little bit about Public Opinion, and i found to my surprise the distribution of opinion hasnt changed that much over the last 5 or 10 years, trump took advantage of one end of the spectrum, the less international, the more protectionist and managed to turn it into a winning argument politically but distribution has not changed that much. The average voter has next feelings about us policy activism but no less support for than 5 or 15 years ago so that is interesting. He hasnt changed voters minds as much as you think. Hes made a difference in capturing certain segments of opinion. For example most republicans had a negative opinion of Vladimir Putin ten years ago, most have a negative opinion of him today. There was mixed feeling about globalization 10 years ago and is mixed feeling about globalization today. Most republicans supported nato 10 years ago, most republicans support nato today. Go down the list that is the reality politically. Having said that i do think there has been a longterm shift whereby the Republican Party has become more populist, culturally conservative, workingclass voters have become the base of the party. That is bound to have an effect on foreignpolicy including trade policy. There is no getting around it. He is as much a symptomatic cause. He has accelerated that but also represents longterm shift. I would not assume just because he has seen these longterm shift disappear you cant assume he is a one off and as soon as he is gone everything will snap back to 2014. Im skeptical about that. My conclusion would be that in the future, conservative leaders will have the opportunity to make foreignpolicy cases they believe in, they can play a leading role, the public is open to it, theres a fair amount of support among conservatives about us activism in the world but some of these shifts are real, they created trump and will probably outlast him so there will have to be collision building, more than one type of conservative and they have to figure out how to live within the same party, not to mention other independents and democrats. One way or another conservative american nationalism is here to stay. Thank you. [applause] can i ask you to stay here . Thank you so much for being here. I love the fact that i didnt even need to put on a coat to come over from my office and i appreciated it. Very kindly, colin dueck said he wouldnt do this but i knew he would have but he was the first cohort of the program of which we are really proud which we named after james kirkpatrick, one of the first teams kirkpatrick scholars, the first of academia to a think tank to work on policy related issues and move away from your academic and he wanted you because we knew you would be productive and indeed you were and everybody is happy about it. Sitting next to richard i feel like i am the full crumb because he was a legislative assistant when he was a we thing. That was a long time ago. You havent changed a bit. There is that. Onto the subset. This is a very sober treatment of the questions that confront us all and the thing i like best about it is not that it delves into the origins of different types of american conservatism and foreignpolicy and National Security but does so in a way that the absolute hysteria characterizes every conversation about these issues, going to have a sober serious conversation that doesnt reference twitter in any way although one little part of this, i know what we are talking about here. So then in your final chapter colin dueck rights he is highly optimistic about this new era, scoundrels will be honored and shame will vanish. And it is true, but the reality is if you set aside what goes along with with we are going to abandon nato or the United States will honor article 5 or we are walking away from our global commitments the reality, what i see as a typical reversion to the means. We can all debate whether now is different as almost everybody has at every turn where there has been this reversion. We had a project some years ago in reaction to what we found a rather nervous making rise of libertarian ideas, with rand paul at the forefront of what i would call isolationism. I dont think of him as a realist but as isolationists and plenty of people represent that viewpoint on the left as well if you watched last nights debate, you saw that on display a little bit. We started this project. One of the things we looked at was polling over the years about American Public interest in Global Engagement and what you see is a very cyclical engagement, interest drop. If you go back to pretty much every president of campaign, lets just take this century or go back further to bill clinton every single one of these campaigns, republican and democrat, has been about turning inward. Its the economy, stupid. We can go on and on, nationbuilding here at home was Barack Obamas slogan but it could easily have been donald trump. In each instance would be signed as they run on the slogans and then we end up, as a middle east specialist i took is on my area and we end up with a complex in the middle east and donald trump has been no different, no different than that. The other point is the American Publics views on this are fairly constant. The only thing that really changes his interest and engagement on particular issues. To the American People think it is great to be in afghanistan, and that longrunning about hugely successful war . Very low numbers of support but during the Obama Administration when obama decided we needed to toss of troops, he went out and gave a relatively rare speech compared to george w. Bush talking about the importance of this and numbers went back up again. The American People are game to be led. That is true in most democracies. They want their leaders to make a persuasive case to the mans when they make a persuasive case whether it is for engagement, greater engagement, military commitment, economic commitment, disengagement, moving away, nationbuilding here at home, avoiding foreign entanglements, the public reacts to that as well. I would not call that fickleness on the part of the public. I would more call that a general normal lack of interest in the daytoday of National Security. I always try to underscore that in washington we are weird. We pay a lot of attention to this. Most people dont. That is the reality and that is not a bad thing. Where i think you pinpoint something that is, i would call it an open question for the future, populist trend. This is rooted to my mind much more in sort of tectonic shifts within society rather than the sudden appeal of the Donald Trumps of this world. We have Political Parties that have remained relatively static over the years especially in the United States. Without a parliamentary system we dont get to decide im losing and therefore will create a new public a party. That doesnt happen here. You have relatively static Political Parties although they have redefined themselves over the years and the public that actually has changed and feels as so many do around the world that the party no longer represent their interests and this is where you see the upstarts coming from not just in the United States in someone like donald trump but all over europe, you see them in asia and elsewhere and that shouldnt be a surprise but the underpinnings of that the loss of face in Political Parties, the loss of faith in the establishment is less a National Security phenomenon and more a social and economic phenomenon and i commend the work of another scholar Charles Murray who called coming apart a really wonderful work. He details the fact that 50 years ago there were across class relationships in the United States. People were not isolated in their bubble, there was a lot of cross polymerization, the rich could marry the poor, the university educated could marry nonuniversity educated and that doesnt happen anymore. We have become more atomized, more fragmented. That his fed into this populist phenomena and particularly of one group of people who are Donald Trumps constituents, whitecollar, less educated men who feel like society has left them behind. What those people think about these things is hugely important and could be a transformative driver. Could be but night not be. I do know one way or the other. This is something for all of us to think about. I was told to turn off my phone but i didnt. At least it is not my mother. It usually is. All of these come together and raise questions that just arent about, to put it crudely, article 5. They are not about commitments of the moment, they are not about whether poland is paying 2 , these are broader ideas that are flexible, shift over time and may in the long term have an impact, and lets turn things over. Congratulations, lets come up on my way. I thought i would give a few thoughts, with some of the conclusions. As colin dueck and Danielle Pletka laid out about us Foreign Policy terms, truman building eisenhower retrench is, jfk and lbj, and other places. You can see this waxing and waning, maximum american exertion and the thing that is the biggest driver is at the end of a long war americans become realists and the idealism, the exhaustion sets in, the constraints and national interests. Only partially as a piece of that. The intellectual reaction among conservatives with Foreign Policy, you can make an argument the infection point was there in 1998, and everyone including conservatives with responsibility than american activities, the more salient, the Trump Administration is a piece of this cyclical thing more than donald trump. They are more of an outlier. They just dont agree many times, if you look post 1945. To maintain the peace we have strong alliances, and world war ii never came home and the alternatives at the end of the war. The other was you maintain prosperity with an open Economic System under and by free trade and the third was support the forces of freedom safeguarded at home, when possible we would have a bias in favor of a democratic system as opposed to autocracy. The debate among conservatives and republicans and within the parties, within the ideological stream, focuses a lot about this. When is it too costly . How big an army and where . What trade deals . There wasnt a lot post 1945 question of the fundamental assumptions, in part because that was a reaction to the first half of the Twentieth Century, the rise of autocrats trying to take over the world or parts of it, the most devastating depression in history, nobody wanted to repeat that history. Donald trump comes in, i think his instincts are the reverse on those things. As colin dueck pointed out hes not a model of consistency so you can find all these exceptions but rather than seeing the deployment of american troops, not having to return to the first half of the Twentieth Century means this is a bad deal. And not paying fair share. And free trade, the opposition of trade agreement and trade deficits harm the little guy. Generally seems not interested in the promotion of democracy and human rights. With conceptions like venezuela and other things but it is not a top priority. You see a similar trend in this direction. Obama wanted to dialback American Military commitment overseas and was all over the place in terms of democracy and human rights. Trump in that sense is a very stark difference in what american foreignpolicy assumed to be the fundamental principles with a republican, democrat, conservative but it is complicated because the administration, hard to think of people in the administration who had a dire view of our allies, closed the view of what economics should look like, a different view about democracy and human rights so it nets out to be something more in terms of the administration in a broad, cyclical up and down and part of this is new because there is the nationalist part which we have seen before. We didnt elect William Jennings bryan or pat buchanan or bernie sanders. This populism, starting point that the good common sense of the American People when appropriately applied, and entrenched problems with this that the country faces and there is a corrupt elite that is distorting things for its own purposes and things like that, we havent seen that articulated and it is by no means on the republican side. The front runner on the democratic side, there are strong echoes of big institutions run by elites and they are out to get you in only by supplying the common sense of the real American People however defined can overcome the challenges. That gets into something more philosophical. How do we identify this, to protect and pursue . Republicans as recently as mitt romney, john mccain, george w. Bush, this idea and around the world by into this notion of fundamental rights and freedoms and the hardline nationalists view, its not an idea. It is a particular set of people in a particular geography which is the United States, and issues that harm the security of the American People, much higher than keeping about peace and democracy, americans living overseas saw this, donald trump was more concerned about north korean missiles that could hit the United States or kill americans on the korean peninsula. That is logical and straightforward but that is different in the way publicly articulated american president s i should say two final things. On the polling and popular opinion it is important to distinguish between issues that resonates. It would be an interesting thing, all the people who voted for donald trump how many of them did so on the basis that they were really irked by the support by japan for American Forces deployed, certainly on the democratic side. Getting tough with allies, a lot of things resonate. A president couldnt take a very different, ending the socalled forever wars, this is not vietnam or even 2003, and the president cant do that. And and they have more room to maneuver. And they are not drivers. It concludes with the interesting reflection that would be and should be the future of reform policy. I anticipated some of these groups where republicans, they get together and talk about the future and white russians meeting in helsinki in 1920. We have a plan, the bolsheviks wont be there forever, they will fall any day now. So who knows what is coming next . A lot of this will turn on the election going forward. This is the contribution to that debates. Books with a simple theme that make things clear in ways that when you read them you think i knew that all along and didnt have the conception of that information. As you read it you end up thinking i knew that but i want to come back to some of the mechanics you impact in the book because we come back to trump in some way, and open discussion. You make the argument the substructure, as it were, they have been isolationists, unilateral lists and internationalists, and that for much of americas postwar engagement, the coalition between the nationalists, to maintain foreignpolicy that was activist and expansive. As the coalition has fragmented, for isolationist, nationalist, that explains in some ways the advent. That is the broad structure actually tells us something that goes beyond the headlines. I have two questions. Nationalist internationalist coalition reduces the world order that we have seen post 1950. And yet today that is what we have to deal with. The United States is now longer the old republic set apart from the rest of the international fellows. The management of that order is every day bread and butter. In this environment, what is the future of the isolationist nationalist coalition that brought trump about . We dont have the luxury of sitting apart . We had that luxury before 1943. You are condemned to manage a world whether you like it or not or whether we want it or not because our interests are inextricably tied to this world and it is a product of nationalist internationalist coalition, not the product of the isolation but even if you have an isolationist nationalist coalition there is a world out there different from the expectations and preferences of the trump coalition. How does one manage this . What do you see as the future of these coalitions that brought trump to office . There is more than one possibility, one possibility, it is not managed very well and that is entirely possible. The domestic political additions run up against foreignpolicy legacies, inherited legacies, in ways that are extremely disruptive. I think a lot of people feel that is interesting right now. That is one possibility. However i did like the point that the sheer role of president ial leadership, there is a lot of leeway. I show how past preferring president s had these, i had to deal with the powerful midwestern nationalist wing and handle it very effectively not by confronting but by coopting and recognizing a concerns. You can imagine how they skillfully understood the average voter is not talking about this same amount of money japan pays but you have leeway. What you are seeing is a real shift that demands some perspectives on immigration, to some extent trade. A lot of bluecollar republicans really feel multilateral freetrade agreements have hurt them and their communities over time. That is a fact that has got to be recognize whether or not economists like it. You will see some new courses that wont look exactly like bush or reagan or trump and a lot will depend on the specific leadership. It is possible these things can be managed the way you describe. I actually think a lot of it depends on president ial leadership. I noticed the zone of distribution affects the survivor of the coalition. If they for example moved into a phase where there was better distribution of the economy or International Trade in terms of income in different groupings, with the convictions change . How much of this is a response to globalization that manifested in the last 30 years . The question i am getting at is focusing on groupings, these convictions are these convictions of a function of circumstances . These circumstances, can people move from one group to the other . The noninterventionist train never disappeared during the cold war but wasnt politically very relevant. In reality it was an understood threat. Events matter. Circumstances matter. Trump turned out to have uncanny political in 2015 at that moment to the fact the potential appeal of a protectionist platform. Oddly enough if his supporters feel coming up to november that he has represented them well and many do, then he has leeway politically to say if he chooses, lets not completely walk away from afghanistan, lets not disband nato in my second term. He has the ability to do that. There will be mass demonstrations depending on syria. It is not because of a cult of personality but because of the support of president s a party. I think if you are more concerned internationalist tendency that is possible even under donald trump. Events make a difference. If theres shocking military event, some crisis, we might see a second trump term radically different from the first. It is not unusual historically. You could have a foreignpolicy the changes quite a bit. If war occurs whether the president likes it or not. Thoughts on this . Part of the problem we have that is becoming more and more common, we deny agency to everybody else. The truth is there are two huge factors we havent talked about that had a meaningful influence on the fluctuations of the century, the first is financial crisis, we talked about the depression but the financial crisis of 2008, incredibly impactful. Really had a huge, huge effect on what i described as a tectonic shift in american politics. Would not have propelled someone like donald trump to the presidency. That is part one. The second part, part of the cyclical nature is when we disengage to use the vernacular happens overseas. What happens when we take our i off the ball . A global order the United States has underwritten since the end of world war ii, to a certain extent prior to that, when we cease to do so things happen and those bad things suck us back in because they are the events that colin dueck describes. It for breakout, 9 11, one of my favorite conversations i was marveling how much i couldnt stand the second term of the bush administration, better than the conventional. She said no, because in the second term george bush is the president he would have been had 9 11 not happened and i didnt like him and that is exactly right. That is the reality. There is that a version to the means, the event drew us back in and if we stop for a second, dont days at our bellybuttons we are looking at a world in which there are very serious threats to not just what we have sustained that made us all pretty rich. But also other factors we dont talk about as much that have huge potential, not just nonproliferation but the proliferation of weapons of mass distraction, very serious thing and any one of those can be what colin dueck talked about. If you look historically, it is still true, fear people will subsume their ideological preferences if they are afraid of the external threat, that is the key driver. All these guys who not only work was i isolationist or more, thats have a National Security state, a standing army, a huge federal bureaucracy. There are a few hold outs but mostly when a takeout strength, those were relegated to a secondtier thing, the big tear was communism, you may free for not to have government in your face but theres something bigger to worry about. You see what is connected to that, and how radicalized people were to kill terrorists to stabilize countries in different areas. The small Government Conservatives in the 1990s were trying to chip away at what they thought was a vestige of the National Security state that grew up over the cold war. Whether there is a war, it could be china as the major perceived i hate the word exit stencil challenge for the things, the future president may have the preferences, and small Government Conservatives, if the fear is great enough it is redressed to a small group of people and more expansive view of american policy. I have one question, how do the three groups you identified as significant conservatism. That maps citizenship, as a matter of political be longing and commitment to constitution, the citizenship is both nativist and connected to certain identities. Is there any obvious mapping of the emotions of citizenship. There has been resurgence, is it a place . You have hardline nationalists, they see it as a place with particular people and not only that but a particular background. A civic definition, he argued there is an anglo protestant core so that is one way to think of it. That is compatible, if you think al qaeda is the problem you are not as likely to have a foreignpolicy approach written large. There is a relationship written that way. The only thing i would add to that is people have looked at lots of the drivers of populism and nationalism, growing inequality, the fed up nonrepresentation spoken to the needs of things like that but there is also a cultural aspect because the percentage of foreignborn americans is different than it was for over 100 years, impressive around world war i and all the legislations past, the closing the spigot of people who were able to come in and it up again in the 60s and we are seeing it again. In elite circles that kind of diversity is embraced even on the right and the left and seen as a virtue of the country and a culturally renewing phenomena in. It felt different in other parts of the country particularly with these economic difficulties. You see a resonance with we have been doing a lot of stuff with a lot of people that arent americans for a long time, time to get hours now. Depending on how you define that, america first, that can be a driver of some of this. You are right and it is hard to know because there are absent flows in attitudes towards immigration but there are demographic realities. One of my favorite interviews from back around the time there was a controversy whether our european allies were going to do more to support us in the wake of 9 11 and we were arguing about what it was in thick cheney was on a sunday show and asking why it was americans didnt do more. Because they cant. Can is an important factor not just for us but for the chinese. As you start to spend more on social policy or social welfare, as you disinvest in defense as we have been doing for some time then you end up in a situation where you cant do things with a population with more old people than young people in the job of young people is to sustain and pay for and work so the old people have benefits, they dont want to join the military and their parents dont want them sent off. This is one of the things our friend and colleague predict about china, a population where there are more elderly people and not enough employers to sustain them. If we have a nation that is not a nation of immigrants which we historically have been, that is where the energy of our growth comes from, our innovation and success. If we stop we will isolate and have the same problem. I will open the discussion. The Us Government official. The reassuring discussions, trade sovereignty, they have to intensify not only in the us. The question, with us national interests, with trade sovereignty in all quarters begins to affect the overall environment, the behavior and calculations, whatever you like. Sure. This to me was one of the most unexpected changes of the last nine years. This is one of the things i am most critical of, the trade policy. I give credit to china and i think that issue needs to be addressed in the president deserve some credit. The economic side. On us trade disputes with allies it doesnt make sense on the merits, strategically or economically. We should be cooperating with our allies. Trump as is often the case, some kernel of truth. There could be reform that needs to be addressed. I dont see a well coordinated effort to do that. I see picking fights with allies in resolving those fights and saying we got a deal and similar to the eu with stresses on auto tariffs. The germans are very worried. I agree there is a trend toward trade sovereignty, toward protectionism, a historic shift we are seeing that seems to have some domestic Political Support and that also seems to be one of the single biggest areas where a lot of Congressional Republicans have a problem with the Administration Even though they dont always that is the sore spot. They hear about it. You have constituents complaining this is hurting you so there has got to be and ideally an approach where you coordinate with allies against china. Two things. One, i dont see this as historic a shift as you are describing because there has always been a gulf between elites and members of congress who are voting on these matters in the public. The difference is, far more willing to ignore their constituents. Having sat through god knows how many msn debates on china and remembering how it shifted depending on who the president was and who the constituency was. That was a pure sign of how big a golf there was between leaders and the people. There was always a lot of hesitation. The mentality of the elected leaders, we were elected to lead, not to be in front of a mob. But it has deepened what people really want and we understand what this is all about people are still confused how donald trump got elected and i think that is why they pay more attention, i believe that. It is age. Im not a spry as i once was. Why is it we believe organizations that were created in the wake of world war ii are somehow spry and dont require reform . Nato or the United Nations or the wto or the world bank, all of these organizations have become sporadic. And have not evolved to meet the challenges of digital economy. Property climate change, whatever it is. That is a huge problem and nobody talks about these reform issues. I think that you are right the skepticism of trade isnt going to go away one because skepticism trade and trade agreements become a proxy for discomfort with what globalization has brought so you dont get to you dont get to vote on containerized shipping or integrated International Financial markets or Broadband Access of the last service to be exported or import cost orders. Trade agreements are up for a vote and youon dont get to vote on automation. Its a severe challenge because they are sort of two remedies to this. Theres the ignore everybody who is harmed by would have economic phenomenon is at issue here which is the remedy. And then the other one which is we will retrain the people who are in manufacturing and they will get higher paid service jobs or work as programmers in seattle or whatever. Which of course is attractive especially to those commissars i dont think tank jobs are not yet tradable goods nor can they automated away by artificial intelligence. When you all of the people making these decisions who are nice 95 secure that the ethics of these economic phenomena will ultimately be in the economic self interest to lower prices and those things, it is hard to say what really is the solution . Are we really going to have a system that effectively takes a man or the woman has been working in manufacturing in North Carolina for 30 years and now is going to either find the same sensese of purpose in everything by working in a strip mall even if they get paid . 50 fors an hour, or ideally becoms a program in seattle or silicon valley. Its very hard to see how that actually works. Which i think raises the larger question which is you have the logix of the market and the logix of the state. You move now towards production across National Boundaries that consequences to that shift. Those translations are autonomous state choices and get back to manage those consequences with out either solutions. And you can make everything worse by avg say the answer is to protect all i of these industries, that also is the wrong answer. You can recognize the 1920s. You can recognize the challenge. You can have empathy with those who are affected and then, making matters even worse if you adopt on the back about the wrong economic policies. One quick followup, which is politically trump showed you can have narrowly Winning Coalition at the Electoral College level with the protections platform where you outflank the democrats and that may have been the issue with some of the workingclass voters in pennsylvania and michigan. Politicians copy success. When i see a debate like last night democratic debate, the one obvious free trader Michael Bloomberg didnt have a great night. It seems like thevi Democratic Party is not going to take the lead in standing up for free trade. Put it that way. You may get a convergent. You mentioned the conservative nationalism is here to stay. Do you see the same trend shift in europe . Second, are your views on the definition and nationalism cant have double or not are your views compatible are not compatible with the views put forward in the book, virtue of nationalism . . Its a very important book. I liked much of it. For example, the office of staunch defense of National Sovereignty he suggested there is an element that is a western political tradition that says we havent sent anything better than the nationstate to allow experiments in selfgovernment. I think that hes right about that. Nations dont come together for the most part of abstract social contract theories. It is bound up with the Classical Liberal ideas that were not true worldwide. To think that eight u. S. President has the right to go to the un and give a speech initially. I dont know why they would have the right to do that. Why is it americas business of the internal affairs. Its here to stay and its not about Foreign Policy. I would say immigration is a sheer number one. Theres a book i would recommend to yoit to you if you are interd that might sound like an imposing title. And he goes through the cases suggested into the single biggest cause of the rise of populism securely in europe is the issue of mass migration and the feeling of traditional majorities that are no longer going to be the majority encouraging the rise of new parties of the right and since those arent about to add and there is the migration across the coming centuries, so if that is true given that you already have a large percentage so those parties are not going away. They tend to be more skeptical with certain National Sovereignty. Some of them are very pro putin so if you can have a cultural conservative. Would it be true to say it is yes to stay what is the future of the nationstate . What is the nationstate . Of course we have the competitions make adjustments on the margin but because the viability of the nationstate . I think there is such a thi thing. In the nationstate as a matter of fact but nevertheless there is a state and the nation. We like the fact it tends to be bottomup and we like to keep it that way but it is historically the american nationstate. One of the things the war revealed under the leadership is the single United States but he insisted on and embodied the determination with the ability to defend its territory and integrity so it is an idea but also a place. Thereve been a tendency to say that the nationstate is fading and disappearing because of economic independence, governance. I would say the nationstate has come back with a vengeance and we know there are areas that dont have effective control of the territory like subsaharan africa. But i would not count the nationstate out as a matter of fact if you are american i dont think you should. I think you should see the United States as a nation that has responsibilities to its citizens and that is part of what we are seeing is hopefully the restored since of the nation called the United States we have obligations to each other. At one point i think you should have asked the question of how gore described how Global Trends are running up against the existence of states or however you describe it, and danny rightfully pointed out we have multilateral institution. If we look at europe in migration its not at europe as an entity hasnt tried to find the response to migration or the realistic response. The fact that even europe hasnt been able to do that i think its back to your original observation which is that we do have this inadequacy of the nationstate to address the global problems that we have but then that does ultimately come back to the observation which is we really do need to start addressing the question at the multilateral level and thats where the inadequacy of nationalism really implodes because it is going to be very difficult to convince genuine nationalists of the virtue. Not in terms of ethnicity but in terms of the constitutional commitment so in that sense if it became irrelevant in the political personality. Then the United States can survive and prosper as a nationstate. Its when you start settling for the nationhood that you begin to see the competition within countries becoming difficult so there is a multilateral dimension to it, but i think many of these issues have to be involved within certain countries themselves. We took about two Different Things in the ways. One is migration, why does europe have a problem with immigrant because European Countries dont like to say with the exception perhaps a little bit of england into a small extent than id like to say here is what our country stands for because that sounds like i am right and you cant have that. So you dont get the sense of civic nationalism deny that sense of ethnic nationalism. We have not had that but increasingly i would say there is an element of conservatives dare i call them that Tucker Carlson conservative who think of us as endless protestants and that is what makes america and therefore all of you immigrants no matter what they believe in the American Dream or not in the constitution are never going to be part of it and with the playing of the National Emblem they are not wholly american if they are referred to without some hyphenated attachment so we have these factors that are all exacerbating these problems and because of them we actually come together and agree how to prioritize any multilateral. I want to ask about the change of the shift in demographics especially towards the millennial santa generation in the completely connected world that affect the losses of nationalism going forward, and even now that more millennial shaping Public Opinion towards the front. Anecdotally ive been teaching for 30 years so we see the shifts that are interesting and hundreds of students on the ground. It seems to be they are more skeptical than some older generations and what theyve grown up with none of it has been a positive experience. This isnt even the 9 11 generation anymore. I have her graduates with no memory of 9 11 so if it was an experience for you it might be a shocking need to do something. But the lived experiences the war iof thewar is dragging on ie greater middle east. And of course they have memory of the conclusion of the cold war which provides a big formative moment. By the way that is a cross party line. They change because of event and develop different views but i do think that its striking the millennial santa tend to be more skeptical. Its not the same thing as isolation. But i often have the students say to me is why do we intervene after all. Some element of cultural technological interdependence which would cause the outcome. Maybe i am just a natural pessimist, but i noticed that over time so that would be my short take on how millennial search engin changing the u. S. N on policy. That notion is more widely shared including millennial study them back when i was in college in the late 90s when it was all about the multinational corporations and multilateral organizations and the eclipse of the nationstate as sort of the Building Block of International Affairs and networks of the nongovernmental organizations and activists in d things like that. And certainly if you look at Something Like this is, took the nationstate using other nationstates to put an end to the caliphate and even look at the Global Financial crisis and then they had to use fiscal policy to help the financial crisis. It went up rather than down and in this moment it is being eclipsed in economics more than anything else. So theres this kind of reductive reality that for all of the desire for multilateral frameworks and realities of the corporations that could move opinion and technology to connect people around the world, it still is a nationstate that is the primary actor in International Affairs and would agree that its not in terms of the multilateral frameworks. At a particular moment so that it gets a perceived bitter outcome in a different level. This is an issue that can unite it with a different faction right and centerright but i noticed you get a heated debate over the military intervention in syria, retrospective but when it comes to china even some of the more noninterventionist voices are down with the notion that youve got to do something and that can be a unifying argument. One of the things that struck me in this story about was toldd in the book was that you have trump that is the product of an isolationist which pushes us in a different direction from both groups on that note i want to thank all of you for coming to the endowment this morning. I want to extend ag special thanks of course to call in for giving us the opportunity to host him. To dani and to richard for spending time with us. Ing look forward to see you back here at some point in the future. We do have the book on sale outsidee the realm. If you have an interest you can enticing to sign a copy for you but we have a few copies out there, and you are welcome to pick up a copy. Thank you very much. See you soon. Byebye. [applause] weeknights this week were featuring booktv program showcasing whats available every weekend on cspan2. Tonight books on appalachia her here. Watch booktv this week and every weekend on cspan2 here. If you miss any of our live coverage of the governments response to the coronavirus outbreak watch it anytime at cspan. Org coronavirus. From daily briefings by the president and the White House Task force, to updates from governors of the hardest hit states. Its all there. Use the charts and maps to track the virus global spread and confirmed cases in the u. S. , county by county. Our coronavirus webpage is your fast and easy way to watch cspans unfiltered coverage of this pandemic. Thank you janice and thanks everyone for being here. I know the weather has been difficult. Sorry about that. Weve got parking challenges but appreciate you all being here. Tonight were featuring exclinton was a New York Times bestselling author Janice Kaplan and a fascinating book the genius of women from overlooked to changing the world. Janice will be in conversation with kelley griesmer, ceo of the womens fund of cenal