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[laughter] good morning everyone and welcome to the Carnegie Endowment for international peace, im a senior fellow of the endowment and its a great pleasure for me to welcome all of you to this Book Discussion of colin duecks age of iron. Which is a marvelous analysis of conservative nationalism. A couple things about the book in the moment before i do i want to extend on your behalf and mine a warm welcome to cal colin himself as you probably know colin is a professor at the stars School Public iuniversity and and a nonresident fellow at the american and Bryce Institute neighbor next door, literally. Colin has made his mark thinking deeply about medical politics. And this book is trademarked direct, it examines the concept of conservative nationalism, phenomenon that has been brought to public attention conspicuously to the rise of president from. In terms of both the history of ideas and how these ideas have filed manifestation in modern American History. Especially in the debates about the medical role in the world. The book is both encompassing and granular simultaneously. Despite the gravity of the subject i can assure you its also a very delightful read, i read the book of the last weekend and i commend it to your attention. Welcome colin, its a pleasure to have you with us. Im also very grateful that danny billiken and Richard Fontaine have consented to join us to discuss. We could not have asked for better commentators, given both their intellectual interests in conservativism and the practical contributions to the making and implementing of foreign and domestic policy in the United States. Danny has a long career on capitol hill where she worked on the Senate Foreign communications abappears widely on television and until recently was a Senior Vice President for foreign and domestic foreign policies at ai where she continues to remain er senior fellow in foreign and defense policy studies. Richard fontaine too has had a long tucareer, now the chief executive office of the center for new American Security which i say with some jealousy is doing incredibly Creative Work on our racial issues relating to u. S. National security. Richard worked many years as senator john mccains Foreign Policy advisor and prior to that worked at the state department, National Security council and also the center for Foreign Relations committee. Very warm welcome to both of you danny and richard, its wonderful have you both here again. Without further ado, let me invite colin to present the book for us before i yield the floor to danny and richard for their comments. We will have a brief conversation after and then i will open the conversation to the floor. I look forward thto your interaction in that time. Thank you colin, welcome. Thanks ashley, thanks very much for this invitation. It just so happens that this Panel Includes three people all of whom experience and expertise and views i really respect. So its a real pleasure to be here with danny and rich as well in fact, danny, without danny this book probably went to happen, she might regret that but thats the truth at the new york enterprise institute. Glad to be here, let me say a few words about the central thesis of the book, what motivated me, among other things, was the common argument over the last five years that the Trump Administration represents something completely unprecedented in American History and ththat this strikin rise of populist nationalism on ythe right, both sides of the atlantic is a cause for comparisons really back into the 1930s, without downplaying some of the genuine causes for concern i think thats what overstated. I think it misunderstands the nature of american populism American Nationalism and the administrations Foreign Policy. The book isnt a polemic one way or the other if not proor antitrump but its attempt to situate this moment in some broader historical context, which i think is often missing amidst the furies of the day. What i argue is that American Nationalism come there is kind kof an american Foreign Policy nationalism going back to founding which is not undemocratic at all its quite the opposite. Working case at least, there is a civic nationalism which involves an american creed with powerful Classical Liberal elements rule of law, government, popular sovereignty, thats been bound up with an american sense of nationalism from the beginning. In a sense conservatives from the beginning have sought to conserve that tradition. At the same time, what comes to Foreign Policy the founders had a couple of key principles that were really a consistent paradigm for generations, if you have a dollar bill in your pocket you can see the idea of a new order of the ages, the idea of being the United States will stand for something it will hope the popular selfgovernment spreads, thats a distinctly american hope going back to the founding thats been the element of u. S. Foreign policy nationalism, that doesnt mean you can only do it by force but at least as an example, the second element, this is in washington for all address the idea that you maintain a free hand that there is, as jefferson put it later there would be no entangled alliances, no permanent alliances, that was a key element in american Foreign Policy nationalism from the beginning of the founders saw no contradiction between those two things, but was really a dominant one would call bipartisan tradition well into the 20th century. So what really shifted was i argue Woodrow Wilson innovation wilson believe not only that he needed to tie a new Foreign Policy paradigm what we call today liberal internationalism or globalism vignette is tied up to the possibility of domestic progressive reforms in every country including the United States you need to be willing to intervene on the ground militarily in europe to vindicate democracy overseas but you also need to be willingo to make global binding multilateral commitments. Worldwide as he intended with the league of nations. Particularly in article 10, so thats up production if thats an alternative to the founders and wilson understood it as such and so did his republican critics. Which is what gave them pause, from beginning republicans and conservatives in the United States have never quite agreed on how to tackle o or counter or accommodate that liberal internationalist tradition there been internal divisions and debates and we see this over and over again and will probably keep saying it, id say theres three main groups of conservativism over time, one conservative internationalists are skeptical of some of the wilsonian overkill when it comes to multilateral commitments but they basically believe you should have alliances overseas or robust american presence and active role overseas, that for example was the position of somebody like abwho faced off against wilson during the treaty of versailles, lodge actually won in alliance he wanted alienation teaches thought wilson was overly optimistic and unrealistic. Then theres a second group on the other end of the spectrum were strict mom interventionalists, you see this to the present day with libertarians, some pale neoconservatives say actually u. S. Should avoid military commitments altogether, alliances, bases, interventions, trade peacefully with other countries but you have a military role outside of lets say the western hemisphere. Thats a tradition that goes back to that period you have people like robert a often populist from west of the mississippi thats a stream that runs through them there is a third strain kind of in the middle which is talk is your hardline unilateralism which doesnt get as much attention in elite discourse i would say its been underrepresented but a lot of conservatives over time actually have had a fairly strong willingness to spend on military willing to counter concrete adversaries soviet union, al qaeda but there enthusiastic about broader liberal projects. If you cant convince them atheres a enemy that requires response, they tend to shy away from more active role, thats the Pivotal Group over time. What you see is that they pivot back and forth between activism and disengagement. Depending on the circumstances. In the moment of the treaty debate, all three factions agree wilson was wrong but they ondidnt agree exactly why. In the 20s and 30s conservatives for the most part agreed the same actually detached from military affairs in europe. Pearl harbor settled that debate for some time and then of course the rise of the soviet union led many hardline conservatives to support more robust military roles overseas but if you think back to somebody like Barry Goldwaters committee actually was not enthusiastic at all about liberal internationalism and such. The reason most conservatives supported this was they were anticommunist. Staunchly anticommunist. Then the class of the soviet union is welcomed as it was but the question of what now for conservatives . In the 90s i think was wide open you had pat buchanan, you had ron paul you also had ivconservative internationalist he had everything in between. George w. Bush settled the debate for some time with war on terror and most are public and supported him in that for much of his administration, ob once bush leaves office during the obama years you back to that period of conservatives are asking what now . The big surprise in my opinion of 2016 2015 2016 in the republican primary was that a candidate could win the republican nomination, and presidency contending against that conservative internationalist tradition going back to the 40s, donald trump really led a frontal assault on the conservative internationalist tradition going back decades and he won which was astonishing. He sort of turn things upside down. Groups that have been marginalized felt they were better represented, groups that had been in charge for deeply concerned. But i think what trump is doing in a way, im not suggesting he personally read these older documents thats not what im saying, my suggestion is he instinctively is a kind of American Nationalist who draws from older traditions the idea that you need to maintain free hand for example when trump ran for president he had a particular American Nationalism of his own if you go back you can see he said the same sort of thing for 30 years and his own unusual way, 30 or 35 years actually he said over and over again that he viewed us allies as free riders, thats his view, primarily as free riders rather than assets. Thats not my view, thats his bucharest even quite consistent about that. He said they were taking advantage of the United States economically and taking advantage of the estates militarily and politically. He aimed to somehow fix this through his own negotiating skills, it was a complaint it wasnt really a plan, there wasnt much sense of whats the policy are tentative but it was a complaint with some popular residents as we saw. Particularly when you tighten the frustration over military interventions in iraq and afghanistan not to mention lydia, frustrations with patterns of economic globalization that seemed to benefit the well off and chinas middle class as opposed to working americans. Frustrations over sections of National Sovereignty to supranational organizations. He bundled together a sense of frustration and niturned it int a winning platform. So its a older version of American National his own particular version that i think weve seen reinsurgents. Thats part of the historical context. Once he had to transition unexpectedly to government because i think his election came as a surprise probably to a lot of people in this room, i can tell you it came as a surprise to me, then the question is what now . Whats the plan . Of course theres been a lot of uncertainty from the getgo. There was severe personal challenges, in reality the trump Foreign Policy is more of a mixture of nonintervention, hardline unilateralism and some boys continued u. S. Foreign policy activism and engagement,e its a mixture commits a hybrid thats partly because of personnel around him thats partly because of his own adaptations over time, he is very flexible, flexible to a fault, hes unpredictable day today. But there does seem to be a pattern in how he handles Foreign Policy and thats one of the arguments i make as hewell, theres Something Like trump talk and if youll indulge me to sound like a political scientist i would picture as a 2 x 2 grid he launches Pressure Campaigns against allies as well as adversaries he launches Pressure Campaigns on Economic Issues as well as security ones so in other words, the Pressure Campaigns against security adversaries and north korea and iran, isis, telegram, thats pretty straightforward, another president might have done the same thing, in a somewhat different way but thats part of what youre seeing, maximum u Pressure Campaign in the case of iran north korea for example. Then you see Pressure Campaigns against u. S. Allies on security to increase defense method. Not entirely new but he is blunt in the way that we havent seen before. You see Pressure Campaigns on the economic front against china, u. S. Competitor, thats a trump innovation i think, that was not nearly as high priority for previous president s to really push china on the commercial side, then finally, Pressure Campaigns against u. S. Allies on trade, thats new. Thats very trump, thats trumpets. I dont think any other candidate wouldve done that, pressure canada, mexico, japan, south korea, looking for renegotiated trading arrangements, those of the Pressure Campaigns. What he does is he goes up and down the ladder of escalation. In ways that can be quite sudden and unexpected, he will raise the temperature, then he will lower it. He will make threats and then be willing to settle or talk to almost anybody. This tends to unnerve people, it unnerves our lives it unnerves adversaries and unnerves probably even some of his own staff but what i found striking if you look at it over time you try to turn down the volume which tends to be very high its not obvious that he himself knows the endpoint, which is interesting, im not dp sure he himself knows his own reservation on every one of these fronts. He keeps his options open, thats different from saying that hes held bent on dismantling what we call rulesbased International Order im not convinced he actually has that as a Reference Point one way or the other. In fact i doubt he could describe it to you. He is interested in renegotiating existing arrangements consistent with his 2016 campaign promises, its a portfolio assessment of u. S. Commitments overseas commercial, diplomatic, military, his reserving the right to either walk away from some commitments, renegotiate others, may team some may even bolster some, the c troops in poland more than under obama. The outcome is not predetermined, significant amount of the u. S. Forward presence is still there and made in some cases even increased, that seems to be the Foreign Policy be happy to talk and discussion about assessments of each of those fronts but thats what it looks like to me, just a few final thoughts, how my adoing on tim . I talk a little bit about Public Opinion the relationship ofs conservative opinion to the Trump Administration i found to my surprise that the distribution of the opinion hasnt actually changed that much over the last five or 10 oyears, in other words, trump took advantage of one end of the spectrum, the less interventionist, the more protectionist, he managed to turn that into a winning argument politically but the distribution actually doesnt change that much, the average voter in the republic and party has mixed feelings about u. S. Foreign policy activism but theres no less support for it then there was five, 10, 50 years ago, thats interesting, he hasnt really changed voters minds is much as you might think of rc he himself has made a big difference and captured a certain segment of opinion. For example, most republicans had a negative opinion of putin 10 years ago most americans have a negative opinion about putin today. Most republicans supported nato 10 years ago, most republicans support nato today. So you get on the list, thats the reality, political, having said that, i think theres been a longterm shift whereby the Republican Party has become more populist culturally conservative, white workingclass voters have become more and more over time as the base of the party, thats going to have an effect on your Foreign Policy including your trade policy theres no getting around it and he is as much a symptom as a cause. He has accelerated that but he also represents longterm shifts. I would not assume that just because he exits the seam that the longterm shifts disappear, we can assume hes just a one off and that is soon as hes f gone everything will snap bac to 2014. Im a little skeptical about that. I guess my conclusion would be that in the future, posttrial, conservative leaders will have the opportunity to make Foreign Policy cases they believe in that they think makes sense and can play a leading role the public is open to it theres still a fair amount of support among conservatives for u. S. Activism in the world but some of these longterm shifts are real they predate trump and probably last him. So theres going to have to be Coalition Building theres going to be more than one type of conservative and they are going to have to figure out how to live within the same party. Not to mention with independents and democrats. One way or another i guess my conclusion would be that conservative American Nationalism is here to stay, thank you. [applause] can i ask you to say a few words. Sure. Thank you so much ashley for being here, i love the fact that i didnt even need to put on a coat to come over for my office, i appreciated your words of thanks. Colin said he wouldnt have normally done this but he actually was the first cohort of the program we have at aei which we are really proud, which we named after Jean Fitzpatrick he was one of our first gene fitzpatrick scholars. People come from academia to a think tank to try and work on policy related issues and we were away from the pure Academic Work they have been doing and we wanted you because we knew you would be productive and indeed you were and this is a really fine work and i know everybody at aei is super happy about it. Of course sitting next to richard is nice for me too i feel like im in the falcon because richard was my legislative assistant when he was just but a wee thing. A long time ago. He hasnt changed a bit. But onto the substance. This is i think a very sober and very fine treatment of the questions that confront us all. The thing i like best about it is not simply that it delves into the origins of various different types of american conservatism and Foreign Policy National Security but that it does so in where in a way that absence hysteria that characterizes pretty much every conversation about these issues that goes on today in washington its good to have a sober serious conversation that doesnt actually reference twitter in any way. Although i did actually bookmark one part of this because i thought i know who youre talking about here, you heart back to abin the title and then in your file chapter called age of iron and this is gorgeous quote in here from a [laughter] colin writes he was hardly optimistic about this new era in which scoundrels will be honored and shame will vanish stop i thought i know we are talking about. It is true but the reality is that if you set aside all the strawman drum that goes along with todays conversations about whether going to abandon nato or whether United States is going to honor article 5 or whether we are walking away from our global commitments or liberal International Order, the reality is that this is what i see as a really very typical reversion to the need. We can all debate whether in fact now is any different than as almost everybody has at any turn where there has been this reversion to the mean, we had a project at aei some years eco, it was in reaction to what we found a rubber dog rather nervous making rise of libertarian ideas and rand paul at the forefront of what i would actually call isolationism, i dont think of him as a realist i think of him as an isolationist and i think there are plenty of people who represent that viewpoint on the left as well if you watch last nights debate you saw that actually on display a little bit. As far as national ssecurity, but we started this project in one of the things we looked at was polling over the years about American Public interest in Global Engagement and what you see is a very very cyclical engagement, interest drop it if you go back to pretty much every president ial campaign lets just pick we can pick this century we can go back even further to bill clinton, every single one of these campaigns republican and democrat has been about turning inward, its the economy stupid, abwe could go on and on, nationbuilding here at home, nationbuilding here at home was barack obama slogan but it could have easily have been Donald Trumps, and of course in each instance what we find is they run on these slogans everybody was like oh my god its terrible americas turning inward then of course we end up as a middle east specialist attend the focus on my area of the world we end up entangled in some sort of conflict in the middle east, nd donald trump has been no different. No different than that. I think the other point to make that i think colin widely described is that the American Public views on these things are fairly constant. The only thing that really changes is interest and engagement on particular issues. For example, to the American People think its great to be in afghanistan and that long running and obviously not hugely successful war . Very low numbers of support. But during the Obama Administration when obama decided we needed to plop up troops has been going down troops in iraq he went out and gave what was a relatively rare speech compared george w. Bush, relatively rare speech talking about the importance of this and the numbers went right back up again. The American People are game to be led. Ironically thats true in most democracies. They want their leaders to make a persuasive case to them and will make a persuasive case, whether its for engagement, greater engagement, military commitment, economic commitment or make a case for disengagement moving away nationbuilding here at home, avoiding foreign entanglements, whatever clichc they choose for the moment, the public reacts to that as well. I would not call that fickleness on the part of the public i would call it a general normal lack of interest in the daytoday of National Security. I always try to underscore that we here in washington are weird. We pay a lot of attention to this, most people dont. And thats just the reality and by the way, thats not a bad thing. Where i think you really pinpoint something that i would call an open question for the future this populist trend. This really is rooted into my mind much more in the sort of pack tonic shift within society rather than in the sudden appeal of the Donald Trumps of this world. So we have Political Parties that have remained relatively static over the years, especially the United States with a parliamentary system you dont get to simply shut up and decide that im losing their form going to create a new Political Party doesnt happen here, you have these relatively static Political Parties although they redefine themselves slightly over the years and you have a public that actually has changed and feels rightly as so many do around the world that the parties no longer represent their interests. This is where you see the upstart coming from this is where you see the step modesty notice like donald trump but ovall over europe as well you s them in asia and elsewhere. That shouldnt be a surprise but the underpinnings of that, walks of faith, loss of faith in Political Parties, the loss of faith in the establishment is less National Security phenomena and more a social and economic phenomenon. I commend to you the work of another aei scholar Charles Murray wrote a book a couple years ago called coming apart, really a wonderful work. In it he details the fact that 50 years ago there was enormous cost clash relationships in the atUnited States, people were no isolated in their doubles and therefore there was a lot of cross colonization, the poor communities rich, the rich can marry the poor, the university educated would marry the nonuniversity educated, and that doesnt happen anymore, as a result we become much more fragmented. I think that has fed into this populist phenomenon in the sense of particularly of one group of people who are Donald Trumps constituents, what color less educated man. Who feel like society has left them behind. What those people think about these sorts of things is hugely important and could be a transformative driver, could be, but might not be. Very hard for us to know one way or the other. This is something for all of us to think about was told to turn. Off my phone and of course i did, typical, at least its not my mother. He usually is my mother. All of these come together and raise questions that just arent about on about article 5, theyre not about the commitment of the moment. Theyre not about whether poland is paying two percent or greece is paying two percent, these are broader ideas that are flexible but that shift over time and may in the long term have an impact if we can with those of us who care about this are not vigilant. With that let me turn things over to richard. Thank you thank you ashley for bringing us together, cohen, congratulations on the book and danny i dont think you need glasses yet but if you do ill put them up on my way out. I thought id give a few thoughts on some of the things that struck me in the book and there may be a few areas of difference with some of the conclusions. The first is i think cohen and danny as they laid out are fabsolutely right in the cyclical nature of u. S. Foreign policy in terms of emaximizing and you can see this we get into the korean war and all these things and then eisenhower retrenches jfk and lbj are maximum is 10 nixon have to pull back commitments to vietnam and other foplaces a pursue detente and everything you see the court lexi and maximo american exertion around the world and then retrenchment of the biggest driver of this is the end of review and wars americans suddenly become realists or realpolitik aficionados. Idealism gets thrown out the window. 6 cost sets in a people say with that constraint the definition of our National Interest and that goes on for a while then starts to expand again. I think the chop administration is effusive that only partially appeased. Colin framed the sort of react to the intellectual reaction to conservatives thinking about Foreign Policy to begin reaction to wilson and will sony is him i think you could make an argument also that an Inflection Point was there in 1888 and the assumption of overseas territories and that significantly change the way that everyone including conservatives at the time thought about american responsibility in the world american activity in the world but i actually think the more salient turning point in his 1945 if you look, heres where i think the Trump Administration is a piece of this cyclical thing much more than donald trump abmore of an outlier in the rest of his administration with whom they just dont agree many times with a lot of his things. What i mean by that is if you look post1945 three broad assumptions built into u. S. Foreign policy work or principles, one is that to maintain the peace we would have strong alliances underwritten by the deployment of american troops the troops that one over another . We have seen the alternative the alternative is they come home with us in the back at the end of the war. So were not to do that again. The other another was that you maintain prosperity and increase that we would support open International Economic system underwritten by free trade. Then the third was to support the forces of freedom and safeguarded at home when possible we would have a biased in favor of democratic systems as opposed to autocracies and then the debate among conservatism and within the parties within the ideological streams a lot was about how you do this, okay what you do at the front of the autocrat, when you promote democracy or what is it too costly . What are the tradeoffs . How big of an army . Station where . What trade deals with whom who does it help and who does it hurt . But there was a lot of among the president s and post1945 questioning about the fundamental assumption and in part because that was the reaction to the first half of the 20th century what we saw postworld war ii Human History the rise of autocrats who thought they could take over the world or at least large parts of it and look at the state of depression, nobody wanted to repeat that donald trump comes in and i really think his instincts are in the reverse on those three things, as colin pointed out not exactly model of consistency on these things we could find all these exceptions. But rather than seeing the florida deployment of american troops as not having to return to the first half of the 20th century you see this is really bad deal for the United States because allies are getting rich under u. S. Protection of not paying their fair share International Economic agreements and free trade if you listening to anything for 30 years opposition of trade agreements and bleed trade deficits have really harmed the little guy. Then he generally seemed not terribly interested in the promotion of democracy and human rights, there are some exceptions like venezuela and other things but just not a top priority. Some of these are trends, obama you can see a similar trend in this direction. Obama was wanted to dial back on American Military commitments overseas he was all over the place in terms of democracy and human rights clearly was not a chestnut of his Foreign Policy but i do think trump in that sense is a very stark difference in what american Foreign Policy had foassumed to be the fundamental principles whether the publican democrat conservative or liberal its complicated because the administration is very hard to think of people in the administration who had his dire view of allies of the president does. As in different as the presidency does of democracy and human rights. The kind of nets out to be something more in terms of the administration more in this broad cyclical up and down. I think part of this is new because we just have never there is the nationalist part which weve seen before and presently havent really seen the populace. This populism the starting point that the good common sense of the American People when appropriately applied can resolve really entrenched problems that the country faces and theres a corrupt elite that has been distorting things for its own purposes and things like that, we havent seen that is articulated and of course its by no means only on the republican side. You look at front runner of the democratic side very strong echoes of big institutions are run by elites and their out to get you and only by applying the common sense of the real making people however defined caseload of the challenges we face in the country that get back to them which is even more philosophical but how do we identify americas interest to protect and pursue. Republicans as recently as think mitt romney, john mccain, george w. Bush probably would have been comfortable generally with the idea that america is this idea, its this place that people from around the world can come and buy into this notion of functional rights and freedoms and things like that i think for the hardline nationalist view is its not an idea, its a particular set of people that live in a particular geography which is the United States and that geography has to be protected so that raises issues that could harm the physical security of the Economic Security of the American People living in their traditional homeland much higher than thinking about the rights of others to live in peace or democracy or even americans living overseas. He saw this was President Trump obviously much more concerned about north korean missiles that could hit the United States and north korean missiles kill americans living on the korean peninsula. That makes totally logical and straightforward but thats a difference in at least the way publicly articulated american president s have thought about these things including on the right side. I guess i would say two final things, one, on the polling of popular opinion i think its important to distinguish between issues that resonate and issues people vote on, it would be an interesting thing to see if all the people who voted for donald trump how many of them did so on the basis of they were really irked by insufficient support by japan for american forces. Certainly in the democratic side now or trump rallies and things like that the commitment to end the forever wars, it resonates just like getting ab a lot of these things resonate but its not clear at all to me that these are definitive in any way shape or form that it president could take a very different position on this including ending the socalled forever wars there is not marches in the streets this is not vietnam or even 2003. But there are other issues people will vote on i think the president cant walk away from on immigration and trade and some of these other things, i think you can get people to express an opinion but i actually think the president whether republican or democrat will have much more room for maneuver, sometimes maybe then they even think, i just dont think theyre bound to their base or things that resonate with these issues that are not drivers of the vote. Then finally, the book concludes with the interesting reflection of what will be and should be the future of conservative Foreign Policy and i participated in some of these groups where republicans who are not in the administration get together and talk about the future and sometimes it feels like white russians meeting in helsinki in 1920 saying, we got to plan the bolsheviks wont be there forever to fall any day now. And that was 1991 and all the white russians were long gone. So who the hell knows whats coming next and a lot of this will turn on who wins the election Going Forward but this is a contribution to the debate. Thank you colin for writing it, thank you ashley for inviting us to talk about. Thank you, i love books with a simple theme that actually make things clear in ways that when you read them you think, gee, i knew that all along i just didnt have the conceptual apparatus to short capture the intuition. This is really one of those books where as you read it you end up agreeing with a lot and you end up thinking, gee, i knew that but abi want to come back to some of the mechanics you unpack in the book because i know we come back to trump in some way or form in the open discussion. You make the argument that the self structure of the conservative movement as it were consistently three groups embed isolationists, they been unilateral lists nationalists, and they been internationalists, and that for much of americas postwar engagement was the coalition between the nationalist internationalists allowed us to maintain Foreign Policy that the activist and expansive. And as this coalition has fragmented giving way to a new alternative isolationists plus nationalist, thats what explains in some ways the ab of donald trump. Its the broad structure in fwhich the analysis and the boo has base and i think that seems tells us something that goes beyond headlines so i have two questions, the nationalist internationals coalition produces the world order that we have seen post1945 and yet today thats now the inheritance we have to deal with. United states no longer the old republic set apart from the rest of the International Political the management of that order is everyday breadandbutter business of the United States. In this environment, what is the future of the isolationist nationalist coalition that brings trump to power . We dont have the luxury now of setting apart we had that luxury before in 1945 condemned to manage the world whether we like it or not whether we want it or not because our interests are inextricably tied to this world weve created. And yet its a world which is a product of the nationalist internationalists coalition not the product of the isolationist nationalist coalition. Even if you have an isolationist nationalist coalition revisited by trump, theres a world out there thats very different from the expectations and from the presence of the truck coalition. How does one manage this . What do you see as the future for this coalition that brings trump into office . Quick setting there is more than one possibility, one possibilities is not managed or not managed really well, it might be that domestic political coalitions were up against Foreign Policy legacies inherited legacies and we that are just extremely disruptive. I think a lot of people feel thats what were seeing right now. So thats one possibility, however, i did like the point that came up both from danny and richard which is the sheer role of president ial leadership and persuasion. I think president s have a lot of leeway and i say this in the book repeatedly i show how past republican president s have cobbled together coalitions often very skillfully. Eisenhower had to deal with ab not by actually confronting frontally but kind of coopting them and recognizing some of the valid concerns. You can imagine a few considered conservative republican president who skillfully bridges these gaps and understands that no average voter is not voting on what say the exact amount of money that south korea or japan pays the United States you have leeway on those things, however, what i think you are seeing is a real shift thats good have to demand respect on immigration, maybe to some extent trade, as it turns out there little bluecollar republicans that really feel multilateral freetrade agreements have hurt them and their families and communities over time, thats politically thats a fact, its got to be recognized. Whether or not columnist like it or not, think you will see some new athat will look exactly like bushs neck and look exactly like regular macbook exact electronic and a lot will depend on the specific leadership of the president , its possible that these things can be managed in the way described i actually think a lot of it depends on president ial leadership. And what is the rule of distributional effects on the survival of these coalitions . If, for example, we moved into a phase where there was a better distribution the economy, better distribution of International Trade relations in terms of incomes for medical, and different groupings with the convictions change . How much of this is really a response to some losses of globalization that have manifested in the last 30 years . So the question im getting at is when you talk of three igroupings, are these convictions primordial or are these convictions in some sense of function of circumstances . If the circumstances change to people move from one group to the other . I think its more door number two, the reality was you had the civil union, it was understood threat, events matter. Circumstances matter. I think trump recognize politically turn out to have uncanny political sensitivity in 2015 at that moment to the 01 fact that what we did realize of the campaigns was the potential appeal of a protectionist platform, however, oddly enough his supporters feel coming up to november that he has represented them well and i think many do that hes renegotiated trade agreements that he has leeway politically to see if he chooses, lets not completely walk away from afghanistan, lets not completely whats not to disband nato in my second term, he can do that, he has the ability to do that, does not mean mass demonstrations depending on his exact decisions over syria one way or the other, thats not because of the abpersonalities because it parted him support president s of their party. The same with obama. Actually think if you are more of what say conservative internationalists tennessee that is possible, even under donald trump so events make a big difference, if for example there are some shocking military events, some crisis civil war breaks out we might see a second trump term look radically different than the first, in my this is not unusual historically. He did have a Foreign Policy that changes quite a bit if war occurs whether the president likes it or not and some regional leader. Any thoughts on this . I think part of the problem we have and thats becoming more and more common as we look inward is that we deny agency to everybody else. The truth is, there are two huge factors we havent talked about that have had a very very meaningful influence on these fluctuations of the last century, the first is financial crisis we talked about the depression but the financial crisis of 2008 incredibly impactful, really had a huge huge effect on what i describe as the tectonic shift in american politics and really without it would probably have not propelled someone like President Trump to the presidency. The second part is of course that part of the cyclical nature is that when we disengage use the vernacular, ship happens overseas. What happens when we take our eye off the bull, understanding the global order the United States has underwritten since the end basically since itthe e of world war ii but to a certain extent prior to that that when we cease to do so bad things happen for both those things suck us back in, if war breaks out, 9 11, i still wonder one of my favorite conversations with a girlfriend where i was marveling at how much i couldnt stand the second term of the Bush Administration but different than the conventional view but still emma she said, no because in the second term george bush is the president that he would abandon head 9 11 not happened. Thats exactly right. Thats the reality is that there was that version and that mixed drinks and event that drew us back and of course if we stop for a second, dont gaze at her belly buttons in these and quite the enthusiastic way that we have been over the last couple years we are looking at a world in which there are very very serious threats to not just the global order that we have sustained and it hasnt made even the people who feel like they worked but also there are also other factors out there that we dont talk about as much but that enhave huge potential for disruption and we dont talk about nonproliferation anymore but the percolation of weapons of mass destruction, very very serious things and anyone of those can cause that intrinsic event that con outalked about. I would add is that if you look historically and i think it still to fear changes the ideological preference, people will subsume their ideological preferences if they are afraid enough of a threat. That is the key driver. In 1945 he still had robert taft and all these guys who not only were at least quasiisolationist if not more but part of their ideological impulse for this is because they didnt want to maintain national socalled National Security state this broad Standing Army a huge federal bureaucracy that collected taxes from everybody because they were small government suffered dominant conservative. There were a few holdouts but mostly as the cold war picked up strength those concerns were relegated to secondtier because the big tear was communism so you may prefer a small government you might prefer not to have Standing Army you might prefer not to have government in your face but theres something bigger to worry about. Then same thing was true after 9 11 in part because of we saw terrorism connected to somebody the amount of democracy in our country was going to have some bearing on how radicalized people were in military intervention was necessary to kill terrorists in different places and destabilize countries in different areas and things like that, suddenly the small government conservatism in 1990s were really trying to chip away at what they thought was a vestige of the National Security state that had kind of grown up over the cold war and no longer necessary suddenly back in business whether theres a war could be china as the big major perceived existential but i hate existential abbut existential challenge of the challenges some of the core things that we enjoy here in the United States so the question is, future president may have all of the preferences that go along with the hardline unilateralist word isolationist because theyre small Government Conservative they think we should be in the final work all these other things but if the fear is great if it could be reduced to a very small people and they were expansive view of american Foreign Policy will obtain. Will open the discussion to the floor in a minute but i a one question however the three groups you identified as significant significant or conservatism stay in politics . How did these groups map on the questions of citizenship . And the view of citizenship as a matter of political belonging and commitment to the constitution . Versus citizenship which is a and connected to identities . Is there any obvious mapping of notions of citizenship in these groups . Yes and there has been in Political Science to try to answer that. It goes back to Richards Point about is the u. S. An idea or a place . I think you tend you more likely to find hardline nationalists unilateralist tend to have a view of the United States as a place, its a place with particular people and not only that, maybe more than that of a particular religious and ethnic background. Huntington talked about the civic definition of American Nationalism versus ethnic definition he argued that there is an anglo protestant core as historical fact in the 17th century. So thats one way to think of it. Thats compatible with being pretty muscular if you think al qaeda is something abbut you know is likely to have a Foreign Policy approach at large. I think this is a relationship in that point. The only thing i would add to that is looked at lots of the drivers of populism right now and then nationalism that gets linked to the populism and of course theres economic ab there is the fed up and nonrepresentation that elites have never sorted spoken to the needs of those things like that. Theres also a cultural or aspect ait twisted around world war i and then all the legislation was passed in order to close the spigot of people who were able to come in and then opened up again in the 60s and now we are seeing it pressed again. In elite circles that kind of diversity in cosmopolitan i think is embraced even on the right and left and seen as a great virtue of the country and a cultural renewing phenomenon, its felt differently in other parts of the country particularly if you tack on some economic difficulties you see residents here with the president s, can we been doing a lot of stuff for a lot of people that are americans for long time its time for us to get hours, its time for us to put america first. Depending on how you define that now in america first, i think that can be a driver of some of this. You are right and i think its very hard to know because there are ebbs and flows in attitudes towards immigration but there are also demographic realities. One of my favorite interviews from back around the time of when there was a controversy about whether the european allies were going to do more to support us in the wake of 9 11 and we were all arguing about what it wasnt dictating was on some sunday show and asked, why it was that the europeans would it do more. Be he said, because they cant. Factor, its important fe chinese. As you start to spend more on social policies and social welfare nets and disinvest in defense as we have been doing for quite some time. If you have a population of the general of the young people is to sustain and pay for and work so that old people have benefits. They dont want to join the military and their parents dont want them sent off to do this. This is something that actually one thing that our friend and colleague predicts there are mo elderly people and not enough children to sustain them. If we are not a nation of immigrants which we have been, that is pat of where the energy or our growth comes from, our innovation and our success and if we stop, and we rely upon americans, well have the same problems. Im going to open the discussion if you want to make an intervention, just identify yourselves and ask as pointed a comment or question, please. Im retired u. S. Government official. Thats a very stimulating and reassuring discussion, so thank you to all of you. So, trade sovereignty, you know, is not only not going to go away anytime soon but most probably is going to intensify, not only in the u. S. But throughout the world. So, the question is, dont we need now as person and about u. S. National security and gnat National Interests dope we need now to start think about how the intensification of trade sovereignty in all quarters begins to affect the overall environment, how that affects the behavior and calculations of allies, adversary, rivals, whatever you like. Sure. This to me was one of the most striking and unexpected changes in the last five year. In he book i lay of recommendations. One thing im most critical of the administration is trade policy. Actually give them credit on china. The president deserves credit, that was underappreciated, the economic side, not just the military. But u. S. Trade dispute with allies doesnt make sense on on the merits. Tragedily or economically. We should be cooperating with our allies to coordinate in relation to china. So, trump as so often is this case, some kernel of truth. The wto needs reform. I dont see a wellcoordinated effort to do that. What i see is picking fights with allies and then resolving those fights and saying, we got a deal, and we may see the same think with the eu. Throughouts out auto tariffs them germans are very worried, so i agree that there is a trend toward trade sovereignty, toward protectionism, a sort of shift historic shift were seeing and it seems to have some domestic Political Support in Different Countries and that also seems to be one of the single biggest areas where Congressional Republicans really have a problem with the administration. That dont always put their foot down but that is a sore spot for a lot of congressal republicans because they hear about. I glory a farm state, you havell kitses constituents this is going to hurt you. So you coordinate with allies against china. I mean, two things i think. One, i actually dont see this is a an historic a shift as i think youre describing because i think theres always been a really vast gulf between elites and by that i mean members of congress who are voting on these matters and the public. The difference is that the elites were far more willing in the past two ignore their constituents. Having sat through god knows how many msn debates on china and house it shifted depend on the president and the constituency. That was a purr sign pure sign of how big a gulf between the leaders and the people, and there was always a lot of hesitation about this because people think differently about it. Theyre not leaders. The mentality of the elected leaders was we were elected to lead, not be in front of a mob. Now as confusion has dope ended what people really want, nobody really understands what this is all about. People are kind of confused how donald trump got elected and who voted for him and what those people want those people thats washington for you. I think thats why theyre paying more attention to this. Its not theres been a narrowing of the gulf. I really believe that. The second point i think is really important, that we never, ever talk about, is age. Im sorry. Im not a spry as i once was. Why is it that we believe that organizations that were created in the wake of world war ii are somehow spry. They dont require reform. Whether its nato or the United Nations or the wto or the world bank oimf. These organizations have not evolved and meet the challenges of a digital economy. Climate change, intellectual property. They havent evolved. And thats a huge problem and yet nobody talks about these reform issues. I guess the only thing i could add is, i think the youre right, the trade stuff the skepticism of trade is not going away, one, because the skepticism of trade and because trade agreements become a proxy for discomfort what globalization has brought. Dont get to vote on container shipping or intergrated Financial Markets or Broadband Access that allows services tober exported and ported across border. You dont get to vote on automation. Its a severe challenge because theres sort of two remedies to this. Theres the ignore everybody who is hurt, harmed by whatever economicphone is at issue here. Which idea to be the remedy. The eye ones is were going retrain people in manufacturing and theyll get higher paid service jobs or work as programmers in seattle or of what, which is conceptually attractive to those as far as i can tell think tank jobs are not yet tradeable goods now automated we by Artificial Intelligence or smug like that. So when you have people making these decisions who are 99 secure that the effects of these economic phenomenon will be in their economic selfinterest because it lowers prices and other things. It is hard to say, well, what realist the solution . Are we really going to have a system that effectively takes the man or woman who has been working in manufacturing in North Carolina for 30 years and now is going to either find the same sense of purpose and everything by working at a strip mall, even if they get paid 50cents more an hour, or ideally becomes a programmer in seattle or silicon valley. Which raises the larger question outcomes have a collision between the logics of the market and the logics of the state. You november now towards production across national boundaries, and there are consequences to that shift, and those transformations are autonomous of state choices in many ways and yet we have to manage the consequences without easy solutions. And you can make everything worse we with just say the answer is to protect all these industries. That also is the wrong answer, right . So you can recognize worked great in the 1920s. Exactly. You can recognize the challenge and have empathy with those who are affected and then come out making matters even worse if you adopt on the back of that the wrong economic policies. One quick follow one which politically trump showed you can have a narrowly Winning Coalition at the Electoral College level with a protectionist platform and you outflank the democrats and that might hey bev a issue wish with the White Working Class voter in pennsylvania and michigan. Politicians copy a success. When i see the democratic debate the one voss free trader didnt have a great night, michael bloom boring. Seems leak the Democratic Party is not going to take the lead in standing up for free trade. You may get a convergence. Yes, sir. My name is formerly was radio liberty. And you mentioned that the conservative nationalism is here to stay. Do you see the same trend, the same shift, in europe . The first part of my question. Secondly, are your views on definitions of nationalism compatible or not compatible with the views put forward in his book virtue of nationalism . He book is a very important back. I actually like much of it. We have a absolutely different view on some things. For example he oftens a staunch steeves of National Sovereignty. He suggests theres a benign element to nationalism historically, thats a person political tradition we havent found anything better than the nation state to allow for experiments with constitutional selfgovernment. Hes right. By the way, nations dont come together for the most part out of abstract social contract theories. They come together out of coercive situations, external challenges. Actually think he has point. Where im different is i think i dont know if you can have a global their riff of nationalism. The United States has its owners and the american version is a civic version, best understood which is bound up with classal liberal ideas. Certainly not true worldwide and thats one that affects our Foreign Policy as well. For example, its very american to think that a u. S. President has thing reto go to the u. N. And give a speech, as donald trump did, initially criticizing the north korea wreckil for human right abuses. I i dont know if youre a framework i dont know why the u. S. President would have aright to do that. Why is it americas business about the internal affairs of north korea. If i read the become, i dont see where the basis for u. S. President to be able to do that. So thats the difference. But i think hes in a way a brilliant political theorist. On the eu, yes, its their stay and not about Foreign Policy. Say immigration is issue number one. Theres a book i remember to you called light it should. Its a light shift. Its a very calm eric kaufman is the author and suggests the single biggest cause of the rise of populism temperaturely in europe is the issue of mass migration and this is causing a feeling that traditional ethnic majorities will no longer be majorities and theres no getting around it. Thats encouraging the rise of new populist parties on the right. Songs the mast migratory movements are not about to expend continue to be migration from africa across the mediterranean in the coming century. So if thats true, and i think it is, thats going force european governments to decide what to do about it. Given you already have a large persian of foreignborn population in a lot of european countries. So those parties not goingway, the underlying factors are there. Those parties tend to be much more sceptical of the eu. Dont want an exit but they tend to be more skeptical. They assert natch sovereignty and theyre a little left of center on domestic welfare issues. Not necessarily right wing, but on immigration, that is a clear thats the top issue i would say, and then Foreign Policy is interesting because some of them are very pro putin, some of them arent. Obviously if youre polish youre not pro putin so you can have polish nationalist who is culturally consecutive and has no use for putins russia whatsoever. So its their stay, the africaneurope want version and the american version. Whats the idea of nation state . Whats in the nation state. Of course well have accommodations and make adjustments on the margin. What the vibe of a nation state as a pruitt cal operative political operative. A small question. I think there is such a thing. One reason i defend the word nationalism. Some people want to say patriotism. Dont like the word nationism. I thats an american inaguration and an american nation state as a matter of fact, just like other nation states. There is a state and theres a nation. Now, we like the fact that in america it tends to be bottom up, not authoritarian. Its democratic. Wed like to keep it that we about but there is historically an american nation statement talk but the u. S. Civil war. Probably heard the line that before the u. S. Civil war these United States, multiple. One thing the war revealed under lincoln was it was a single United States and the insisted on it. Ed bodied that determination. Going to be an american nation state with the able to defend its territory and integrity by force ifing ifing in necessary t its an idea and also a place. Its a place. So theres a forceful element to it. So i dont think that we should assume there have for decades a tendency so say the nation state is fading, disappearing because of economic interfere pen tense, transnational gotchens. Really . You think so . I would say the nation state has come back with a vengeance in many parts of third and and some dont have control over the territory, subsaharan africa. I would not count the nation states out and if youre american you shouldnt. You should see the United States as a distinct nation that has responsibilities to its citizens and i take it thats part of what were seeing, is a hopefully restored since there is such a thing as a nation, a nation, called the United States. We have obligations to each other. Thank you. Anybody else out there . At one point i think you sort of asked the question of how0 described how global trend are running up against the existence of states, et cetera, the inadequacy of states and dannie, pointed out we have Multilateral Institutions, interstate institutions which are clearly sderotic but if we look at europe and migration. Its not that europe as an entity hasnt tried to find a response to migration, a rational responsibility. But they dont have the institutional africanamerican work to do that even though they have a Multilateral Institution that puts most others to shape as a multilat recall institution. The fact that even europe has not been able to do that, i think sort of gets back to your original observation which is we have this inadequacy of the state, the nation state to address the global problem wed have, and then that does sort of ultimately come back to dannies observation which is however very lotic it may be we need to start addressing the question at multilateral level and thats where the inadequacy of nationalism really is glaring, because its going to be very difficult to convince genuine nationalists selfdescribed of the virtue of multilateral, multinational initiatives and indeed seeding of some sovereignty. My view was the original american regime in a sense was the exact solution to the problem because it defined nationhood not in terms of ethnicity or blood or soil but in terms of a constitutional commitment. In that sense it became irrelevant in favor of a new mended political personality, and if that becomes the definition of nation, then the United States can survive and prosper as a nation state, because there is no particular definition of nation in this case. Everyone who becomes american becomes part of this american nation. Right . Its when you start i think settling for alternative conceptions nationhood you begin to see these the competition within countries becoming difficult and then so there is a multilateral dimension to it but i think many of these issues have to be resolved within certain within countries themselves and that will impact on their definition and their conceptions of its in hoo. Its a catch22, though. It really is. You are talking about two Different Things in a lot of ways. Why does europe have a problem with migration . Why does europe have apron. He with immigrants. He when makes tom european country the countries dont loo to say, with perhaps a little bit ofening explain small extent of france, theyd like to say heres what our country stands for. That sounds to much like you cant have that. So as a result you have these people who come and dont get a sense of civic nationalism, theyre denied that sense of ethnic nationalism and theyre forever outside. That causes europe problems. We have not that that but i would say theres an element of conservative, dare i call them at the Tucker Karlson conservative who think of us as white anglosaxon protestants and that makes america and all of you immigrants, no matter whether you believe in the American Dream or not, or our constitution, really are never going to be part of it. Thats exacerbated by the left and people two feel like they should kneel during the playing of the National Anthem or theyre not wholly m. If theyre referred to as americans without some hyphenate attachment. So we have these factors that are all exacerbating these problems, and because of them we cant actually come together and all agree how to prioritize any multilateral fixes to any of them because we cant actually decide where those people belong or if they belong and how to manage it. Its a real trap that were in. Yes, sir. I wanted to ask you how do you think the change of the shift in demographics are especially towards more millenials and more generation z coming into the mix, who are green up in a completely connected world, affect the thought process of nationalism Going Forward and even now, that more millenials shaping Public Opinion towards that front. So i can just comment. One is the Public Opinion research and an neck doltly. Ive been an net doltly. Ive been teaching for yours and their a shift, hundred of student the evidence seems to be millenials are more skeptical of military intervention because what theyve grown up with, none has been a very positive experience, looking at these this isnt even the 9 11 generation anymore. I now have undergrads who have no memory of 9 11. So if 9 11 was a formative experience youve might say this is shocking, we need to do something. Thats not their experience. Their lived experience is wars dragging on in the greater middle east. And of course they have no memory of the successful conclusion of the cold war, which for my generation was big formative moment. So, that matters, and that is across party lines. So you find some republicans actually who share that view. So i think that is not to say that views cant change because events, people age and develop different views as well. But i do think it is striking that it mel lenals tend to be more skeptical of military intervention. Not the same thing as isolationist. I have students say why do we need to intervene, after all, it will work out anyway. So they belief theres a peaceful solution, some element of cultural technological enterr deinterdependence which cull cause a positive outcome. Im skin take cal but maybe im a natural pessimist but im noticed that change over time. So that would be me short take on how millenials are changing u. S. Opinion on Foreign Policy. My general sense, not maybe specifically respect to nationalism as nationalism but as the notion of the nation state as the primary actor in International Affairs. My sense is that notion is more widely shared, including among millenials, today, than it was back when i was in college in the late 90s when it was about multinational colonels and super empowered individuals and multilateral organizations and the eclipse of the nation state as the Building Block of International Affairs and networks of nongovernmental organizations, and activists and things like that. And certainly if you look at Something Like i dont know isis, took a nation state leading other nation states to put an to end the eye says caliphate and you look at the Global Financial crisis. Central banks that had to turn on the monetary spigot and then governments had to use fiscal policy in order to help pull out of the financial crisis there was really very little you could do caught the governments from all of our economies went significantly up rather than down, right at the nation when the nation state is supposedly being eclipsed in all ways, so there is this kind of reducktivist reality that for all of the desire for multilateral frameworks and reality of big corporations with crowes that can move opinion and technology that can connect people around the world, it really still is a nation state that is the primary actor in International Affairs, and so to the deits not terms multilateral frameworks its an because the very nation stayeds have made a conscious decision to cede their decisionmake are so has to get some perceived better outcome at a better level. One quick, the issue of the rise of china, i think, is an issue that can unite a lot of different factions, right and center right. Noticed you get heated debate over new military interventions, particularly syria, retrospective critique. When it comes to china, even the more noninterventionists voices are down with the notion that you have to do something. That could be i think can be a unifying argument. One thing that struck me as paradox yuckal in the story you paradoxical, you have trump whose the product of an isolationist, nationalist, returning to great power concentration which is a very different direction from what the political roots of his own ascendancy are. On that note, i want to thank all of you for coming to the endowment this morning. I want to extent a special thinks to colin for give us the opportunity to host him. To dannie and to richard for spending time with us. Look forward to seeing you back here at some point in the future. We do have our colins book on sale outside the room. If you have an interest, you can even entice him to sign a copy but we have few copies out there and youre welcome to pick up a copy. Thank you very much. See you soon. Byebye. [applause] as the crosser continues to impact the country heres a look at what the Publishing Industry is doing address the ongoing pandemic. Several book Stores Including city lyings in san San Francisco literatety in ann arbor, michigan, have asked for donations through the website go found me. They raised to tate 450,000 and hundred thousand respectively. Book stores continue to provide Remote Services for their customers, through online sales and virtual author events and ann patchet, in nashville, described how her book store has tried to adapt, saying we make our plans work change our plans and make other plans. The new world order. And publisher weekly conducted a survey of independent book stores, according to the report on average and minimum of 35 of sales in march were online, and over half of the responding become stores had to let go 50 to 100 of their employee. In more npd book scan reports despite the effect of the coronavirus, become sales were down only 1. 3 compared to last year. March sales dipped 7 from the year prior. Publishers ton to make changes to their publication schedules and many announces layoffs in the closures of distribution centers. Recently one of the countrys largest book printers filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy. Genetic festivals and conferences can solder reschedule. The American Library association can center field conference this summer in chicago. While the citys printers row litfest in june will now take place in september. The Los Angeles Times festival of books has also decided to push back theyre festival to the fall. Booktv will continue to bring you new programs and publishing news. You can also watch our ored programs our archives programs also any time at booktv. Org. Tonight at 9 00 eastern, square co founderric mckellly authors thoughts on innovation competition for start yulup businesses in this book, the innovation stack. Interviewed by weapons weapons policy reporter cat. Theres this thing that happens. This process that can happen when you start to solve a perfect problem, something that has not been solve before. The future of genetic engineering. They discuss whether it can be used in the fight against covid19. And now with the rapid sequencing that george innovating we are ae

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