Transcripts For CSPAN2 Joint House Hearing On Biological Security 20240712

Good morning and welcome to the Foreign Affairs the Armed Services subcommittee on intelligence merging threats and capabilities but a moment the house rules and regulations fora a host other than saban put all participants are asked to not be actively engaged in the discussion. Members yield back or conclude their time speaking but do not remember to repeat themselves. The host willth do so to limit background audio and represents our response bowl for a meeting themselves. May take a few seconds so please keep that in mind. A timekeeper will monitor the times of his hearing. If youre on a computer you can view the time limits are putting your personal view in the upper right corner of t your screen to rather active speaker. You can also pen the timer by right clicking over the timer and pressing the thumb icon. With that we are ready to begint chairmanan bera please so the system displays your video and paws for fivele additional secos and then start the proceedings. Five, four, three, two, one. This joint subcommittee hearing with the house Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asiapacific and the house Armed Services onsubcommittee on intelligence d emerging threats and capabilities will come to order. Without objection the chairs authorized to declare t recess f the committee at any point at all members will have five days to send statements extraneous materials and questions for the record subject to the length, limitation and the rules. To insert something into the record please have your staff email either subcommittee producer mitre to members please keep your video function on at all times even when you are not recognized by the chair. Members are responsible for knitting in a meeting themselves and please remember to meet yourself at the finish. Consistent with a dress 965 and accompanying regulations doubtful only team witnesses appropriate to a we have a quorum and i will recognize myself for putting remarks and i will been be followed by the acting Ranking Member mr. Perry chairman langevin and Ranking Member stefanik thread i will then recognize in order of saturday alternating between fdemocrats and republicans in Foreign Affairs and Armed Services and its members. You know before we get started and before you give my Opening Statement i will think it would be good to mention the president of first lady and its for them to know they are in our thoughts and prayers and also the tens of thousands of americans that tested positive everyday for this fire is that they are in ourr thoughts and we underscore that this is a virus. This is a virus and it doesnt know if we are democrat or republican it a doesnt no will but god we worship or what our country of origin it is, its a virus and i want to underscore the importance of this topic that we are talking about today but to underscore the mrs. A naturally occurring event and what bad actors may see that have brought this entire world toea its knees and is wreaked economic havoc domestically and internationally. They i want to thank the witnesses for being here today and both having the state department underscores d the importance of this and my focus as subCommittee Chairman under the guise of we spend a lot of time talking about Nuclear Threats that we are seeing right now the real vulnerability to biologic threats and just to put that into context we have not had an Aircraft Carrier was brought to me by big kinetic force of missile or anything like that but we saw an Aircraft Carrier brought before us because of the virus and thats what i worry about. When i think about this i think about it in a couple of different ways. Its very difficult to obtain Nuclear Capabilities and Nuclear Technology and we dedicate hundreds of personnel and International Organizations like the iaea and others to reduce the nuclear threat. Thats totally appropriate. We want to make sure Nuclear Technology and weaponry doesnt happen in terms of data or spotify put my doctor and science have on the availability of technology to alter viruses and do genetic editing in the knowhow and capability are drastically increasing about something that keeps me awake at night. Again we know they are bad actors out there and certainly post9 11 many of us saw other threats and we worried about smallpox and so forth and that is something that i think in a bipartisan way congress is working with the administration should really think about what are the things that we have to do to move ahead. I look forward to the witness testimony and there are several areas that i think about and im going to be curious about from the witnesses. As we defeat covid19 and billions of dollars in building up the structure to defeat this virus i also think we should be thinking about how we use resources to also prepare for biosurveillance and to be ready for the next naturally occurring virus or biologic threat but also think about how we have capabilities as we build that infrastructure to do virus surveillance for manmade threats. I also as we move forward and we dont, we have got the biological bwc but i think we need stronger multilateral likemindeds with allies that we can work with and again id be curious how the dod and the state are thinking about creating those multilateral institutions and then lastly when i think about the ethics of gene editing and where thats going and the technology we really havent created the standards or norms that say this is appropriate for science but this really is a little bit dangerous and we probably ought not to be playing around with genes in this particular way in creating those standards and norms of what that would look like and again thats appropriate place for the Scientific Community and working with the administration ought to put the standards in place for the International Community. Again our thoughts and prayers are with the president and the a first lady and those thousands of americans and id be remiss if i didnt put my doctor have on for a minute and as we enter the fall and winter lets do a weekend to make everyone say but lets wear a Face Covering singh continued it wrecked his physical distancing and wash our hands and practice good hygiene. Lets avoid largece indoor gatherings that we have seen as super spreading of bands and the most important thing we can do right now as we enter the fall is everyone go out there and do you get your flu shot. Please get your flu shot and with that let me recognize Ranking Member perry for five minutes. Thank you chairman bera and are distinguished panel for offering your counsel today. The coronavirus pandemic has highlighted the potential for increased biosecurity threats and what can happen with the responsible actors who disregard International Agreements for the sake of self prevention but the Strong International security regime only works when its constituent members agree to make it work. We need to assess the shortcomings of the u. S. Multilateral engagements and determined where improvements need to be made. In 2005 International Healthin regulations went into force in 2007 andre called on all nations to be compliant by 2012 however bytes 2012 only 20 of all countries were compliant and even today most countries have still not complied with the 2005 regulations. This administration is taken a significant amount of criticism forst questioning u. S. Engagemet in institutions like the World Health Organization. Let me be clear about this. The World Health Organizations complicity of spreading the coronavirus should not be rewarded with the United States indifference to its failures to the w. H. O. Strong affiliation withre the Global Health and security agenda raises significant questions about the longterm efficacy. There is an obvious issue of a lack ofla enforcement in the International Community. Different levels of investment in biosecurity lends itself to a permanent condition of world hazards were select communities like the United States are compensating for the lack of assessment from other states. Despite her best efforts to stymie the threat of bio threats theres only so much we can do alone. Key programs like the state Department Biosecurity engagement programs cannot use bonds for countries like china cuba iran and north korea sudan or syria despite the fact that several of these countries have experimented with violence or go weapons and are likely ntcandidates for future offenses are countries like north korea have it clearly offensive or logical Weapons Program with no endd in sight. How we confront the fact that we have an unreliable International Biological weapons control regime more importantly in measuring success against the spread of biothreats what exactly does success look like when china dominates several key institutions . Is a stance turn is provided to give to nonstate actors that wish us harm. They havek shown us the impact f a potential buy a weapon can have on the American Economy as well as our society. Threats to our way of life have multiplied exponentially as a result of the coronavirus and this time the hearing will be confronting that uncomfortable truth. Im also grateful to have her wear this is before us today as we speak more about biology and gene manipulation. We need to find out more about the National Security implications m that synthetic while as you can pose to the United States especially in light of the fact that several countries that are working with extremely hazardous pathogens and subpar laboratory settings. With that being said i also offer my prayers and best wishes to the first family, to hoe pics and anybody that has been affected by the virus whether they have contracted it or whether its occurred with family members loved ones or community. We are all t dealing with it one way or another and i certainly think the chairman for his time and i yield my balance. Thank you mr. But let me now recognize the chairman of the intelligence of emergent threats and capabilities of the Armed Services Committee Chairman langevin. Thank you and i want to begin by also acknowledging and saying that the president and first lady in the first family are in my thoughts and prayers. I know they are in all of our thoughts and prayers right now and the Current Administration affected by the virus we pray that they have a full recovery. Mr. Chairman i want to thank my colleagues the house Foreign Affairs subcommittee on asia, the pacific and nonproliferation and you chairman bera and the Ranking Member yoho and mr. Garrity the Ranking Member right now i want to thank you all for hosting this timely joint hearing on biosecurity and recognize Ranking Member stefanik as well as my colleagues on intelligence and capabilities. This is a topic that is vital to our nations security. Emerging biological techniques such as gene sequencing, gene editing and Synthetic Biology are rapidly changing the scope and scale of the biological threat and could lead to an increase in biological weapons. Adding to the challenge biological threats are easier to create and cause destruction used to concert cyberweapons and biological weapons and enable in 15 major damage on a military power purchase last month their public of georges Health Ministry suffered a cyberattack from abroad the database that stores the medical documents and his national covid19 pandemic management. We know Russian Hackers have targeted organizations involved in covid19 research and Vaccine Development including those in the u. S. , the uk and canada. So these attacks and the current Global Pandemic underscore the importance of collective Scientific Research and security across the United States with our allies and for a National Economic security. Have a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the threat of a novel highly infectious pathogen we must ensure each agency is working together to respond to the current pandemic and advance the collective efforts across the range of threats. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency or its execution and the defenses Threat Reduction biological Threat Reduction program and its technical reach back and analysis has been receiving requests for preparedness and t protection including providing biosafety, biosecurity and biosurveillance to aid in detection and diagnosis reporting related to the covid19 outbreak. There have been many good examples of trained local professionals in countries like liberia, jordan and thailand and the diagnostic confirmed the first cases of covid19 in those countries. In the face of known and emerging biological threats and the impact it could have on our National Security economy and as a pandemic that could arguably president singledigit threats to our country starting to spread across the globe. The president s budget request which went to the hill in february with a 36 cut to cooperate a Threat Reduction programs funding in last years levels at a time when the United States is struggling to respond to the spread of the highly infectious new virus. We are alarmed by the departments Threat Reduction budget request mission of detecting and confronting biological threats to the United States. The house has acted in fiscal year 2021 National Defense authorization act h. R. 95 added that 100 million to the program. 89 million of that was additional funding to the cooperative biological program. Additionally the department of defense chemical and biological Defense Program was primed to be a key partner in the fight against covid19. Its medical Program Funds and manages efforts to develop medical vaccines therapeutics and. Treatments. A physical program manages efforts to develop surveillance Inspection Technology diagnostic personal protective equipment and decontamination systems are to prepare against potential unknown threats they build expertise capabilities to address mobile pathogens making it an ideal program to deal with the novel coronavirus. We are interested in whether the Program Works quickly and efficiently to participate in the National Response to the covid19 pandemic. These are personally challenging times and we need to double down on these programs and we need to make sure we are prepared for the nextxt biological event that could affect the country in make sure we respond effectively to the country and perhaps the world. We are looking forward to hear the efforts of the department on what we can do to help ensure your organizations authority having the resources needed to deal with emerging threats today and tomorrow how we can ensure your department is ready and able to decisively address the next crisis. I think the host in i thank all of you witnesses for joining us today and i yield back to chairman bera. Thank you chairman langevin. Let me recognize the Armed Services committee Ranking Member stefanik. Thank you chairman bera that i want to echo my colleagues on behalf of the 24th Congressional District their thoughts and prayer with the white house family and staff in all people go been impacted by the covid virus but id like to give my appreciation to you chairman bera as well as chairman langevin and my colleague for hosting this nthearing and thank you for the members of the subcommittee and thank you to the witnesses from the Department Events are being here. The issue of biosecurity is one of national importance. As i they say previous two of the department of defense faces urgent challenges daily we can never afford to you cite of the critically Important Mission of countering weapons of mask destruction and in particular biological threats. Theru unpredictable nature of these threats requires that we continue to adapt our approach and iterate our response. We must learn from the Current Crisis and address our strategy to more decisively and practically detect and respond to the next event or this will surely not be the last biological threat that this world and nation faces. In particular interested in how your organization and the federal government writ large can more effectively use defense and Artificial Intelligence to truly modernize their biosurveillance efforts. We must anticipate a monitor when and where a biological event may occur in model how a pathogen either naturally occurring or manmade is like the two spread. It must be a global effort in the department of state have developed will be critical Early Warning to reform or corrective or sponsored programs like the cooperative Threat Reduction and specifically the biological Threat Reduction program are essential in maintaining our global footprint in the building of a relationship that protects our forwarddeployed servicemembers and national interests. The i current covid crisis has served as an affirmation that biological threats require a whole of government response not just the departments. T. Represented here today but inclusive of health and Human Services Homeland Security under state and local officials. The strength of a partnership between your l O Organization ad the quality of the relationships you develop which our foreign partners and domestic agencies will underpin the effectiveness of our future biosecurity efforts. Thank you again to the witnesses i would yield back to the chair. Thank you Ranking Member stefanik and therefore introduce the witnesses i askhe unanimous consent that nonCommittee Members if any be allowed to participate in todays hearing after all Committee Members have had questions. Is there objection . Without objection on committees members will be wrecked and i set appropriate time. Let me now introduce our witnesses. First as Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for counter weapons of mask destruction david lasseter. Mr. Lasseter sees all and the policy issues at the department including preventing the proliferation of wmd related materials the defense threat next we will hear from the director of defense mr. Vayl oxford. Mr. Oxfords mission to safeguard the u. S. And its allies from weapons of maxds destruction. He spearheads the Defense Departments biological Threat Reduction program. From the state department we will hear from acting assistant secretary in the bureau of oceans and International Environment on Scientific Affairs mr. Jonathan moore and finally well hear from the Deputy Assistant secretary for Nonproliferation Program at the bureau for International Security andat nonproliferation mr. Phillip doliff. He currently oversees a range of state department Nonproliferation Programs including cooperative Threat Reduction and control programs which reduces nonproliferation worldwide. There will recognize each witness for five minutes and youre prepared written statements will be made part of the record and i will first call on mr. Lasseter for five minutes. Chairman langevin and Ranking Member stefanik and perry mall Committee Members want to extend my thoughts and prayers to the president and the first lady. Is your microphone on . Can you hear me better . I want to extend my thoughtsts d prayers to the president of the first lady. Thank you for the opportunity to president him a half of the United States offense to counter biological threats wanted knowledge dod sincere appreciation for the continued supporti the congress and our Threat Reduction. And counter weapons of mask destruction by the privilege to work alongside my colleagues herere today and our Strong Partnership enables the broad u. S. Government effort to reduce wmd threats including biological threats worldwide. Dods Biotech Mission aligns with the objectives of the National Security and Defense Strategy as well as secretary of spurs parties namely to increase the lethality of u. S. Military build alliances and improve dods efficiency. We also draw guidance from the strategy such as the national bioDefense Strategy and the Global Health security strategy. Dods focus on protecting the health and readiness of u. S. Forces countering destabilizing effects of outbreaks on u. S. Interest in ensuring dod remains focused on priority defense objectives to meet Emergency Needs during an outbreak as a complementary tool in the Threat Reduction arsenal. We work daily to ensure dod is positioned to address the full range of wmd threats to include the constantly changing biological threat. The shifting dynamic includes ashley kring outbreaks an accidental are delivered release of biological agents. International and domestic incident have concerns with existing and emerging technology. Covid19she global reach and destabilizing influence is further authored the Threat Landscape to translate inspiring nefarious actors to replicate covid impacts are deliveredca to use of a biological agent. My team develop strategic guidance for wmd activities spanning to prevent detect and respond content contempt to mitigate the impact of such threats regardless of origin. We work closely with other dod stakeholders to coordinate groups such as the unity of effort counsel in the covid19 task force. Dod also works with key interagency and International Partners as we develop priorities for countering biological threats. These partnerships allowing us to leverage each others capabilities and lessen the security burden on dod. Pooling resources and working towards common objectives is vital to ensuring the greatest Threat Reduction impacts. Since 2004 the biological Threat Reduction program has provided equipment and training to over 30 countries to improve their ability to detect diagnose and report via logical incidents. Owe current environment we know the partner nations have leverage previously provided cbr capabilities to bolster their capabilities to detect and diagnose covid19. In closing id like to thank the subCommittee Members again in look forward to your question. Thank you mr. Lasseter and now now recognized mr. Distinguished members of the subcommittee thank you for your continued support. Proud to update you with my colleagues from dmv as well as the state department to update you on our collective efforts to protect u. S. National interest in a rapidly evolving globalized threat environment. Its an honor to represent the Digital Workforce and its commitment to our mission and strong relationships with our partners here today that makes our organization successful. Today we find ourselves in an unprecedented time as we respond to the Global Pandemic but as we reflect on the loss of over 200,000 of our fellow citizens we must think about the future Threat Landscape for editing g a dna sequencing and offering our ever series the observed Lessons Learned from our response and they could potentially launch future attacks with little warning or attribution. As we have learned from the covid19 event we have to accept the fact that others will be learning and the Threat Landscape is changed forever. One of the lessons we have learned over the course of the last six months is that partner nations have benefited greatly by the training and equipping they receive through the dod, ctr program specifically be trb. Be trb facilitates the detection and reporting of diseases caused by dangerous pathogens whether delivered we released or naturally occurring including diseases such as covid19. We work with over 30 for partners to reduce biological threats by enhancing biosecurity biosafety and biosurveillance deploys for the ongoing covidli endemic is demonstrated to the global kinds that Health Security is a critical part of National Security or but countries need an effective biosurveillance system to detect diagnose and report out breaks of days and thats dangerous pathogens with u. S. Relies on the bio deterrence to one of an Early Warning before it reaches the homeland. Examples of success and respond to in partnership with u. S. Ait dtrt allowed local thailand to detect the first case of the coronavirus only days after its initial discovery in wuhan china. Within a month of her requests from u. S. Ambassador to morocco dtrt transfer to supply the ppe to health and hygiene to morocco bid equipment went directly to protect moroccos Frontline Health care workers in our fight against covid great ambassador fischer stated the Equipment Transfer is part of over seven years of close cooperation between dtrt in the government of morocco by the partnership book is on saving lives and mitigating threats to ensure the National Security of both countries their report today has reported 126,000 cases with 2200 deaths. And george dtrt trained scientist and the Richard Lugar sent to developing diagnostic ty for covenant is enabled george to implement extensive testing and outbreak control. The center was loved by the georgian government is being interval and controlling the covid outbreak. Within georgia they have reported 7100 cases with only 46 deaths. Dtrt receives foreign request was supported to covid and as of september 18 dtrt had fulfilled porter quest for making countries across the african union. In summary by billy partner nation capacity and capability that fills their sense of National Pride and increases their willingness to work with the u. S. In other ways. By providing partners with better salsa saying solutions u. S. Demonstrates that we are the partner of choice rather than strategic competitors. These partnerships will act as force multipliers for influence and reinforce the strategic messaging that the u. S. And other nations have in mind. Thank you for time and i look forward to your questions. Thank you mr. Oxford and i will now recognize mr. Morford for his Opening Statement. Good morning chairman bera chairman langevin the Ranking Member stefanik nother stay members of the house its an honor to be here with you today together with distinguished colleagues from the state department and the department of defense as well as the pra. I looked or two discussing our peer of the bureau of oceans and environment in environmental and Scientific Affairs plays a role in this process. From the depths of the oceans to the vastness of space. Can i have you bring the mic a little closer to you . Thank you. Ntwould also host the state Departments Office of International Health and biodefense and thats the capacity in which im here today. I w will focus my remarks on her efforts to prevent detect and respond to Infectious Disease outbreaks. Covid19 which as we see as having impacted on the president of first lady and millions of s americans and the importance of leadership to advance Global Health security and pandemic preparedness for this is crucial to solving outbreaks at their source and defending National Security interests. Our team is working through and on covid19 together with interagency partners to advance the u. S. Government priorities through diplomacy. Beyondnd covid19 oes covers helpers including ebola dengue ebola and microbrew resistance. The pandemic is a Global Challenge and the department of state remains committed to working closely with our ndpartners as part of a collecte response. We are using allin of our meanso slow and stop the pandemic Previous Health department two primary areas of efforts promoting transparent information sharing and surveillance and encouraging a multiapproach to capacity including other nations and nongovernmental organizations International Organizations and asthe private sector could we deeply appreciate congress is appropriation of over 1. 6 billion in covid19 supplemental funding to the state department u. S. Agency for national development. We have use these funds to provide a broad range of assistance specifically aimed at helping t governments International Organizations and nongovernmental organizations. The assistance is saving lives by strengthening Public Health education improving the quality and cleanliness of Health Care Facilities and increasing disease surveillance and Rapid Response capacity more than 120 countries as well as providing pphumanitarian economic supportn the pandemic traditionally the United States was given 10 million to bring safete and effective vaccines who Global Market faster. Messaging including Public Health and countering malign influence. As the first about the coronavirus attorneys come his party in and a special responsibility to inform the rest of the world about the threat. Instead they withheld information and from medical professional scientists and journalists. The ccp has since used the pandemic to further its geopolitical agenda by high living mask and distract from its role in this crisis. Both russia and the ccp have made grandiose and irresponsible claims about the creation of vaccines raising serious questions about quality and efficacy that we are addressing proactive public diplomacy. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure and it is true if we prioritize Health Security investments we can continue to operate before they become endemic and mitigate the impact. Oas includes support to the Global Health security gender. Ghsa which is a work in progress as a partnership of nearly 70 nations International Organizations and nongovernmental stakeholders that uses the whole of government to address outbreaks. We have annually coordinate it expert implementing it is super by carefully targeted programming and Party Countries make Global Health security improvements along specific metrics we took wrote approach to combating outbreaks in 2010 National Biodefense tragedy and the 2019 Global Health security strategy. L oas leadership is any gauge and coordinating interagency investments helping 19 u. S. Countries respond to a range disease threats at their source. These are just a few examples of oas wideranging gauge madonna pictures disease risks which are crucial to countering biological threats. We appreciate your interest and look forward to your questions. Thank you very much. Thank you mr. Moore and let me recognize mr. Doliff for his Opening Statement. Good morning chairman bera chairman langevin Ranking Member than honorable representatives we appreciate the leadership if shown on these important issues. Thank you for inviting me here today to share how the department of statesboro vendor National Security and nonproliferation works to address some of the most urgent and challenging biological threats to u. S. Security. Im honored to appear before you alongside my colleagues from the oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs bureau and by my colleagues from the department of defense. Your diplomatic efforts for assistance programs the International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau works to prevent terrorists another maligned actors from obtaining and using weapons of mask destruction but International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau has been working hard for nearly 20 years to address challenges proposed by the full spectrum of these threats whether they are too liberally spread accidentally released or naturally occurring. The covid19 pandemic is a grim reminder of how much damage a single pathogen can cause the u. S. National and International Security. Through diplomacy or International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau strengthens multilateral frameworks including the biological Weapons Convention and the australia group. I know that the chairman made remarks on this very issue. This year as the president of the g7 we are leading the International Community and making significant progress on biological issues including issuing g7 statements on the international covid19 pandemic in response. In the Global Partnership we have led efforts to launch a dedicated biosecurity Capacity Building initiatives. For decades i have we have invested in significant resources in the combating of all range of Delivery System threats including over 450 million over the past 15 years toward mitigating biological threats. We have a long and rich history of biosecurity Capacity Building or we have trained thousands of partners on biosecurity to over 50 countries previous wb threat atreduction investment long exceeded the pandemic and they are contributing to slowing the spread could we recognizedlo eay on the threats the pandemic posts were International Security and we began to quickly incorporate covid19 topics in our training leveraging remote in Distance Learning to deliver critically needed help in a timely manner. We are in the process of an additional 18 million through art Disarmament Fund for controlling this pandemic and preventing future catastrophic dialogical events as well as adding additional experts to her effort and examining the offices we have working on these issues. Represented terry noted moments ago there are limitations to our authority and i will note that we just proposed Broader Authority to his address these limitations. Of course we are not want and we are deeply grateful for the decades of very Close Partnership we have enjoyed with our department of defense and collies to coordinate their mutually reinforcing effort. Looking to the future we are also working hard to keep pace with the rapidly evolving changes in biotechnology and i know several members indicated concern about this very issue. Let me assure you the full range of u. S. National Security Department and the agencies are focusing on and analyzing these efforts. Our International Security and Nonproliferation Bureau is using her diplomatic and Capacity Building tools to prevent the application of dualuse technology to do harm such as the development of biological weapons. For example chairman bera noted moments ago the importance of standards and norms to address this issue and we are indeed working in this area and hope to have multilateral dialogue on this very issue. In inclusion we are very proud of the work we do to combat Infectious Disease threats using her diplomatic and foreign assistance tools in support of u. S. National security. We deeply appreciate the support of the congress to provide us with the necessary resources to carry out our Threat Reduction mission and we recognize that her work is far from over. Thank youe chairman bera chairmn langevin and members of the committee. Hegr i looked towards your questions. Thank you for your testimony mr. Doliff. I will now recognize members for five minutes each and pursuant to house rules all time yielded his pursuant to the questions bullets they are because of the hybrid format of this hearing i will recognize members by committee seniority alternating between democrats and republicans and subcommittees. The mr. Term please let our staff know and we will circle back to predict the secret mission you must a nuclear microphone address that youre verbally that but i will start by recognizing myself for five minutes. Both mr. Oxford and mr. Doliff have talked about the advances in technology and as a doctor i look at what we have been able to do with biologics and conditions with cancers that we would have to treat tally that we and now we have therapies and provision medicines that often cure these cancers and other ailments. I think the vast majority of scientists are pursuing and using these technologies for the advancement of common good but i also know those same gene editing techniques and so forth can certainly be used as well is inadvertently a scientist that may be looking for a cure may inadvertently create something that unintentionally affects us. Mr. Doliff you touched on as i said in my Opening Statement how do we create these norms and standards for ethical use of this technology in a multilateral way and then also working with our corporate sectors and obviously our pharmaceutical sectors and others looking for novel therapies and right now i get a sense that there is in the standard norm and maybe you could start off mr. Doliff from the dod perspective how we do this in a multilateral way. Thank you chairman bera for raising this important set of questions. First i take your point medical technology is advancing very quickly especially in some parts of the bio sector and we face this challenge acrosstheboard with technology. At almost all technologies have applications as you point out that can cause substantial harm. We have been working on the issues of norms and standards for over a decade and what we have done is tried to work rythrough amongst other National Academies and National Academies and other countries. We have engaged with other International Organizations to invest in subjects and we have also worked in partnership with other governments. We have included working with the corporate sector and four example we work closely with partners in india and and does our reach and trainings that we do in indio we include the government sector and the corporate sector as well as ngos as we try to build biosecurity including through building norms. I will note building norms is always challenging and its probably at least as challenging at the moment in the midst of the pandemic. I see the chairmans point that this is a particularly important area and we will continue to increase our efforts in this area. Mr. Moore touched on the billions that we have already provided in Global Health security funding and some of the covid19he supplementals and no doubt as we look to defeat this virus is domestically through Vaccine Distribution and development and also globally may be we will look at the gia dior mr. Moore if you you want to answer that as we study that how do we do that in the street just been a strategic way and that do those tools look like and maybe mr. Lasseter. I which is saddam a biotechnology front that we view itie as a promise in apparel scenario. There is a lot of peril which the u. N. Described. From a vaccine sample and its vitally important that we continue to work as an interagency together. We have also got to provide information across International Organizations those that i mentioned previously but its incumbent upon us to share the information. We work with our partners and allies and we expect dependable clear information to come back and that is vital. If we are not sharing information and not doing it effectively and clearly wely run the risk of having more severe outbreaks as Technology Advances and the globalized economy increases. Mr. Oxford. As in implementing organization we are in a position to help train and educate and enforce norms but i pointed out in todays biological threat world its really hard as a nationstate in nonnationstate in terms of who is responsible for these actions. Getting the norms is a much more complicated issue and mostly nationstates are worried about this but now we have a much bigger Playing Field to try to. Igure out not only norms and standards that cant dash cam will be dashed complicates accountability so i think its a noble goal that is much more complicated in the world we are facing now. I c. My time is up at let me recognize the act in Ranking Member mr. Perry. Thanks again mr. Chairman to our panel thank you. My question is for mr. Oxford who does mention the nonstate actors in them i want to talk about the nonstate and state actors producing on 20 teen russian agents used the soviet developed nova chuck nerve agent in attempted assassination of tformer russian spy in the unid kingdom and it was used again against opposition figure alexei navalny. I wonder and its hard to prove. We are pretty sure but its hard to prove kind of like the coronavirus and the Wuhan Institute of virology. We have some pretty strong opinions but its hard to prove them. How can the International Community enforce accountability for state actors who do such things . Mr. Perry thats a really tough question as you know and getting to the accountability on this case and thats why i mention accountability my previous comments. A lot ofme this can be denied ad the actual Scientific Evidence wasnt necessarily shared immediately with us. We have people in this country that have provided some of the sample so we are able to get in there and do some of the assessments that is mr. Lasseter said a lot of it is about information sharing and coming together as allies to put the blame where its necessary but its a very hard problem given that we havent enough time and effort in this country. We spent years on nuclear attribution but wewe havent any time on bioattribution. An ally. I find that exceptionally concerning. Im sure youre thinking about it i just dont get any interest in or had something to do to add their. So i would just say that the further the chemical weapons of the use and seemingly acceptability across the world has to be confronted. As director oxford said, the significant effort being put into this particular incident at across the u. S. Government and across international communities. Efforts are being underway to at least work on the international norms. I would say, you mentioned threats from the biologicalor threat perspective although, much information would be required at a higher level. We can say an unclassified level, russia, with the state department is said there is no way to confirm their adherence to the violence Weapons Convention. Were. Certain thatt china is nt hearing to it. But from article one and article two perspective, it grows and grows in concern. The health with th help with coo get after these threats. Look i know it is difficult. That is why we are here. Thats what we appreciate your efforts and any help that we can offer. Do you have anything from recently arrested a canadian woman crossing into the United States and mailing the president of the United States a letter containing toxic things. Weve also seen i think there was a mustard gas attack in Northern Iraq in 2015 and 2016. When i was in a wreck, the stuff was fairly prevalent. So should be no surprise i found that. But in those two instances. And wondering what the status of the illicit chemicals womens trade with availability of things like ricin and how you guys are working with either overseas counterparts, each other. Maybe not even overseas but across the border. So revise doing with those types of things and what is the status of the trade. Mr. Perry, policing and the Counter Terrorism w activity, mt of the chemical expertise off the battlefield so to speak. They try to resurrect periodically but theyve not been successful. So that manner of the expertise ricin has been attempted any times. Maybe we have dodged a bullet. But there is a need to look more into this. They just havent had the expertise we need to make sure that they dont get that expertise. Phillip doliff if i could add to that point on the diplomatic side, we have worked very closely with International Partners against this particular threats. We also have problematic elements working in key statese to address the specific state. And nonstate threats. When diplomatic efforts that weve integrated our concerns and into broader International Diplomatic discussions about counterterrorism. With regard to your question egdeabout training, we do strenn International Control on chemical and biological precursors. But i will say that in general, i believe theer evidence is that much of these efforts uses chemicals and precursors that are procured within theed state. So we will continue to tighten up in that area. Most of it appears to be homegrown. Thank you. Statement recognize the chairman. Thank you mr. Chairman. He can you hear me okay. Yes we can. Were good printable thank you. Want to think are witnesses again for the testimonies in the important work that youre doing. Only go back and my Opening Statement i talked about what i had concerns with the significant Reduction Program. In the 2020 level, corporation has been a Reduction Program which cut by 135 million the president s budget this year. Within the program, the threat biological engagement effort was cut most by over 55 million. And given the pandemic. Were armed by the department of defense significant cuts to this mission of detecting and confronting biological threats to the United States. So i want to begin, just a Program Congress clearly support, one additional work would you be able to perform if congress is in fact able to mr. The funding. And especially what of the work would you be able to do under the bio Threat Reduction program which was cut the p most. And i want to know how the departments perspective of the importance of the biological Reduction Program evolves over the next six months of the pandemic and how the department serves to support the covid19. Vayl oxford thank you mr. Chairman. It weve looked at the programs and we would be able to restore activities in 22 countries with entire in addition 15 of those would be within the program that we can provide the committee with the specific examplesfi of what countries would be restored and also we would be able to restore activities on a regional basis as well as others. So would be able to restore original emphasis in this area which gives us broader coverage in question. We would be able to restore activitieses in 15 countries. Very good. And also president also dealing with the desired intent to restore that funding. And the question in six months of the pandemic and how this evolved. Yes sir mr. Chairman. If i could add, we do want to give appreciation to the witnesses. It for the long standing support this committee these committees part of me, both sides of the hill are ill have given towards proper Threat Reduction program. And i would say in the biological program, you know iti was in operating for over 16 years number 30 countries doing great work. And as far as last 16 months so the dodfo efforts, obviously the International Efforts is led by her colleague. And yes her. From a dod perspective, managed instability and humanitarian office. And so they manage it over the course of the last six months. Nearly about hundred Million Dollars in the support to over 100 countries as it relates to specifically as you note, most of the support is historical in nature. So a lot of the training in the lab support has been over the course of the 16 years. Todays willing partners, so that work and that information is what is most vital. And i can say specifically for direct funding to and in response, it is around 7 million. And much of it is a lot of training. And it goes back to the historical relationships with these countries and where we provide robust training and information flowing. So that is been the focus. Is making sure that these partner countries no they have a Rich Resource and that we can provide that information to those partner nations. Let me go back to you. We appreciate to lean forward on the covid19. Can you tell us about the work that you been doing to help for that bio defense funding. And they were using it with are indeed planning to meet the challenges of the crisis. Can you describe what you been able to do. And that lack of the ability. s mr. Chairman, i think when people make comparisons versus ebola versus the covid19 threat. As a threat pathogen by the cdc to allow to extend its resources against these threats and covid19s can send her date pandemic and prevented us from using bio Defense Program money that we have used our expertise in several ways, the cares act money we have benefited from that Waiver Program underway that is looking at the Rapid Assessment off environments. In this case using technologies. We are looking at identifying the onset of symptoms and illnesses, not specifically covid19 but would give us an advance notice 48 hours earlier than so our expertise. My time is expired but we obviously have work to do. You should be able to use this funding at a time like this. And we will work to make sure this happens. And i yelled back rated. Thank you mr. Chairman and let me now recognize my good friend from washington. Thank you. The first question i think is probably for mr. Oxford. I was just wondering if you can help us understand with regards to the biological threat. Kind of what that role is for response. And what that role is in terms of contributing to the future thinking about what to do. Are you strictly responding to requests when you have a role in planning ahead and giving that information about what to do. It. Thank you. We actually play two roles in this program. We are actually are in a response role but in the covid19 environment, years worth of market we have done to prepare some of those nations. There were able to rapidly respond. They needed some capabilities, ppe desk is in those kinds of things. There were 199 Trained Laboratory technicians. We trained for this program. So with 100,000, where the ppe we were able to get them in a situation where they could start doing a response. Were not really Response Program in that regard. We are able to benefit from what we have done over the last decade or so. And we are actually on the cutting edge of research and development and looking forward make reference to things like synthetic bile. We fully understand. The Technical Expertise in various ways it can be used. On the flipside were also looking for the offensive advantage by understanding the synthetic bio but became this better and resulting faster. So we do have that forward looking to the Technology Program is make move forward. So on that point, one is i know that in your testimony, your written testimony. You talk about how your organized and your role in cooperation with the department of defense, are any in research and engineering. Can you discuss a little bit and second, the combination i think that was the written testimony especially in the growing technology in the determination of biological agents. Maybe contention that what we ought to be thinking about in the future. We are spending quite a bit of time and resources across the department. So i mentioned it Research Engineering they are vital to the efforts to ensure we have going forward, what we need and what our war fighters need to fight when a contaminated environment is vital in that. With respect to some of this technologies, they are concerning. The department though is right sized infinity respond to them. So the way we are organized across the cw md enterprise, quite robust, a number of organizations as you can imagine from the joint staff and our policy perspective, the combatant and command services. We come together fairly regularly in an effort i think that would be highlighted and its important for you to know about his that the effort counsel, and director oxford and knight participate in that. And in that forum, we are able to flow these issues up for discussion. It is an area that we cant get full information across the department and make decisions at the highest level. So we think that is vital to some of these issues that you highlight. T. And obviously, in the setting a little harder to get into some of those issues. I know you recognize that. But we are resourced properly and we are right sized. If i could just followup on part of that. Obviously, you do not run these research in the engineering. Vincent another division. In this. High up in the org chart in the pentagon. Do you have or has already come to recognize this is a higher priority now in order to have to battle out the Research Engineering and their lesser priorities that theyve already had. I speak fairly regularly with doctor rosa who covers down on this issues. As you recognize, a lot of tremendous talent across the Intelligence Community. That flows us information. On a daily basis, if not an hourly basis. If we need to flex and that is one thing that mr. Oxford organization, theyre very agile. We need to adjust to go after threat. We can do it. We do welcome the interest in support of congress in doing so. It. We giving give the sport and more importantly interest in doing so. Excellent. Thank you and let me recognize gentlemen from the commonwealth of massachusetts. Thank you mr. Chairman. I think our witnesses. As a member of both Foreign Affairs and services, want to thank you both for having this joint hearing. So i want to address how the sharing this information is critical. So i want to ask as the covid19 pandemic progressed, the military intelligence followed it. And saw that escalation. Just from a timeframe, what kinds of levels of alert occurred in january and february during that period. Was there a change in the level of alert that the military intelligence during thery time. And did occur in january and february or february. Thank you sir for that question. What i can tell you is that in february, secretary identified three priorities to combat covid19. First thing to protect our people, second to maintain Mission Readiness and three to ensure that we are supporting the whole government effort. Now with that came this internally within the deity different production levels. So. Early, as you will probably recall in march the voice of the department of defense we were put in situation that reduced the numbern of folks present at their jobs. So with that information flow. It did happen and does happen. I think we pointed out all of us here today and information flow is vital. Esile the intelligence can collect and does collect information. Analyzes it and get sent out to the policymakers and to include congress. There must be flow of information across the entire globe. And it must happen from all parties and all countries. We cannot expect. Get to the point. Yes sir. What is the level of alert change. To correspond that. As early as february. Will serve, as early as february. His march is when i believe thec have to go back to the exact date. But that is when they changed and obviously over the course of those months before the information was continuing to yzow and the proper resources applied to analyze. But was there a change to a level one alert in february. That wouldve been the first time in history that a pandemic based itself to that level. Did that occur. Sir, i cannot tell you the exact date. Have to go back in order to provide that information to you and the committee please. Lets assume that it might have. When you transfer that information immediately to our state agencies and agencies of state and state department and congress. Sir, and you know the Intelligence Community is quite large. So all of the organizations today have an intelligence portion to them. And so that information is shared across the Intelligence Committee that inch in information is generally shared across that community. We doda that on a daily basis tt might that information back and forth. So my concern is that congress was not notified in a timely fashion. For those changes so if you could give back to the respective committees. And tied on a date. And what the significance was because my understanding in terms of what was publicly acceptable was that there was a change in is myy understanding that historically in terms of a pandemic was addressed for that level of change and i am concerned about the sharing of information which was slow to congress. Whether it was a flow to the other state Department Agencies or the other agencies in the agencies appearing before the committee here today. Because indeed, if we are going to do this. What you said is the witnesses is focuses on sharing that information. It is critical is my concern that that was not being done in a timely fashion. So get back to us, i would appreciate that. Thank you and let me recognize my good friend from the state of california. Thank you. There has been discussion i believe by the first Ranking Members to the complicity of the who. Who is a coordinating Organization Party does not an intel organization. It has no way to know whether what china is saying is completed through an transparence or not. You know who does have an intel organization. The United States government. And our intelligence is designed to know when china is not telling the truth. In fact the president was informed that this was breaking out of wuhan far more than the Chinese Government indicated. And he chose to ignore that intelligence. Just as he seems to have ignored much to the unfortunate harm to himself and his wife, ignored the best advice on how to avoid getting this disease unfortunately, misled millions of americans as well. In not wearing a mask. We spend any hundreds of billions of dollars defending ourselves from threats and very little on defending ourselves from anything else. We did not have Civil Defense designed for either a deliberate or naturally occurring plague. We did not have stockpiles of ppe, we did not have the education, we did not have ventilators though we quickly made some. We did notot have the capacity o do tracing. This all in spite of the fact that the National Security strategy recognize the biological incidents that this was in 2017. The potential to cause catastrophic loss of life and threats are growing. Whether as a result of deliberate attack, accident or natural outbreak. Which raises the question and i know were not in the classified setting. What is the administrations asoperating assumptions for likelihood or how would we assign likelihoods to the four possibilities as to how this plague began. We are told perhaps it came from the wet market. And it may have come from the wuhan lab which mightve been entirely peaceful activities. And headed tragic release. It could come from a wuhan lab that was engaged in the military cactivities in most likely of all, could come deliberately from the wuhan lab. We have operating assumptions or are all of this possible. In deliberate releases probably and highly unlikely. What you thank you so the cause of this. From the administration. Thank you congressman sherman. That is an important question. I think we as an International Community but obviously the u. Sv government, we are still one that we are working right now presently to respond to this crisis. So youre saying anyone of those possibilities is possible in the u. S. Government does not have much of an opinion on which is the cause. Do the other witnesses agree to that. Congressman sherman thank you for the question. D uve mentioned for possible scenarios and certainly in discussions in an open forum. There are varying levels of plausibility but we do know is that the virus described as covid19 was described in academic research. It was published several years ago including in china identified as existing in animals. It is a disease of a zoo zoo no idi will quickly ask, normaly when theres a catastrophe, the first thing that anybody does you close the barn door. China has said that this is come from a wet market. In the wet markets all over the china. Has there been a massive change in how exotic animals are sold for human consumption throughout china. It. Thats extremely important rvint in something that with the state wildlife trafficking is a huge problem they continued to be the largest market. Has there been a big change fromn early 2019 to now and how these markets theres not been a fundamental permanent change in blocking including the sale in the wet market spreads a practice which does exist inin other countries as well and we are working to end it. Thank you. That may now recognize the gentleman from michigan. Thank you so much mr. Chairman for convening the super important hearing. It is no secret that trend 20 pandemic. [inaudible conversations]. By the months ago, the New York Times at around this time is when new york city cases which skyrocketed way back in march. The whole world can see this happening including those who wish to do harm to our country. So let me clos poses question. Do you believe there to be state and nonstate actors. [inaudible]. And if yes, how are they respectively prepared for that possibility. I apologize. The the transmission was a littlee imprecise. What question would you like me to respond to serve. Sorry about that. It my question is, do you think there will be a tightened interest on the part of. [inaudible]. In developing weapons against americans. In if yes how will the stated defense prepare for thess possibility. With regard to the development of biological weapons, think it would be better addressed to my colleague from the ism bureau. Okay. This is a difficult question to address an unclassified context. I guess what i can say is that we continually review these issues. We had a discussion todays ago with her colleagues who are experts on these issues. I take your point that the pandemic as i testified to, hoses a substantial, and normas challenge to International Security and must inherently be the case that our adversary whether they are terrorists will take thatta into account in considering how to evolve their weapons. Let me ask another question. In january of 2017. Cc presence in china increased from about 47 personnel to only 14. With some getting cut during the National Federation also close their offices during this time. And on top of that, the department of agriculture transferred that manager of these monitoring programs out of china in 2018. So the past four years with gotten rid of a bunch of people who it seems to me wouldve been helpful to have in place a covid19 wasas emerging. At the very least, i would think it would be helpful to have reliable sources but informatiow about what was really happening on the ground. Mr. Oxford, mr. Moore. In general what is the u. S. Have epidemiologists stationed in other countries and how does this help defend us against biological threats. So from the Defense Department perspective. We are not responsible for the cdc and others operate overseas. So i would have i to yield to te state department are go back to the others in the department that does these kind of things. All right lets hear the state prospective. Thank you sir. Who would be pleased to offer more detail timeline of whone ws assigned under the authority of the chief admission in beijing and atar what time did i think e context for individual agencies sending staff there are reducing their staff there has a lot to do with what their needs in the budgets and of course the viability of the work they can actually do. One of the constraints we faced with regard to peoples republic of china is that we still have not received all of the data with the need to receive initial samples. Of the virus thatre have been sought since the beginning of the pandemic even at the end of thst year. That is extremely problematic as is the work of the peoples republic of china at the World Health Organization from declaring covid19 a Publice Health and when it came up for discussion of the who in geneva with regarding to the specific agencies with apologies i would have to take that question. Let me say that i think it is extremely problematic for us to talk about with the who shouldro do and then withdraw from it. I think its extremely problematic for us to reduce our capabilities of scientific and diplomatic andat Public Health experts in china and around the world during a Global Pandemic. With that, and great thanks, i yield back mr. Chairman. Thank you. [inaudible]. I think there are some technical issues. I am told there other members in the room right now so i would suggest when you come back, and should we recess right now. We are waiting to hear back from some staff. This is larson. Im only only member in the room right now. Will try to get staff to answer your question about this return. Perhaps just give us a few minutes. Onsite will do know. Ill ask another question that i have. Get in the second round. When she comes back i will certainly yield her but in the meantime let me go to mr. Oxford. So we could, mightve been in a direction to not spend the Program Funding on the covid19 crisis which troubles me to be true. Even though the program specializes in developing measures and vaccines and therapeutics and pretreatment. What do you need from us to ensure that you have the ability and t resources needed if it isn fact rosen to the challenge of emerging and trend emerging threats. And is the work that you could be doing now to help the country in the covid19 crisis that you dont currently have the authority to have the t permissn to do. Thank you mr. Chairman. For your first question. If there is no department for inclusion and i will say that the Defense Program primary focus under the statutory requirements to deliver the capabilities but ensure the war fighters to fight and win biological contaminated environment bright and that trend 20 support provided the services inner agencies is a combination of subject matter expertise. In leveraging existing contracts and that delivery of capabilities as an example of assisting the testing evaluation. And from helping create detection, diagnostics and treatment. And methods to investigate the vaccines and the Program Continues to collaborate with the whole of government partners and industry and academia. It is important to note that the Defense Program is a Research Development and acquisition aogram and not necessarily response capability. But i will say to your followup questions are. The congress has been exceptionally helpful to the Reduction Program. Historically as i referenced earlier. In the last number of years in this part is really continued support for the program. We appreciate the information flow between Power Department and maybe i can say the same for the state department. Between our staff, it is exceptional. We look forward to continuing medication. Sera think at the moment, we are good. I know that our staff and had communicated historically and i hope they can continue to do that. And if we do identify an issue or an authority than is necessary, will be absolutely certainly to bring itil to you d your team. Thank you. That concludes my questions for right now. And for the minority, as she returns. Okay. Mr. Chairman this is rick larson again. Soso only the only member in ths room. Thank you mr. Larson. I wheeled now to her if she has returned. Okay. I understand that she is not on. Can you hear me now. Yes. I have been out for any goahead you are recognized for five minutes. Excellence. So thank you very much to the oneness is for being here. I appreciate your time and your presence. I have a question about related issues. As a former officer i am aware of the importance of detecting threats before they actually harm the americans and that the approach when it comes to biological security as well. We have to get in front of biological and Health Security risk before they can do significant damage. Like what we have seen for covid19. We have to work with our partners because no matter where threatat arises, we can contain it. And if the office is w w in chae of responding to these threats are understaffed, it is hard for us to get ahead of the problem. Sorry open this up to all members of the panel. You have National Security agencies, have long suffered from vacancies in the past two years. Given how often the hiring can take on the likely to see Ripple Effect for this for years. As the limited staffing affecting your work timely in an interview how will you ramp up to the needed capacity more quickly. In a specific call up on their. Your offices have trouble finding and recruiting staff with the specialized skills that are needed to focus on reducing biological security threats. They open that up to the panelists. Thank you congresswoman is a great question in an age old issue employing the right staff. I can say from our perspective, we have immensely talented team and follow professionals from career civilians to uniformed personnel into government contractors. It would be hard to speak acros the entire department me personally doing that but i can tell you that we are right sized. We obviously are always looking are on the lookout for talents. And so we continue to do that and continue if we can find talent to bring them in the doors. I refer to my other colleagues. From a district point of view we operate a highly Technical Organization similar to what youre referring to. A recruitment strategy is healthy. Retention rates are healthy. We continue to look for ssditional talent as necessary but so far, our rates going steady. So i think and a bio defense air that we operate as well as the rest of our r d organization, our health ando welfare of the community is very sound. Thank you. On behalf of the bureau with the state department. Very pleased to report that we have an outstanding and very active and extremely expert team about Civil Service and longterm collington Foreign Service colleagues unusually to your assignments. I am pleased to say that inn recent months of been able to add to our staffing and bring on permanently number of colleagues including fellows from the American Association for the advancement of science in this department has a longstanding cooperation with aaa aspirated so that we benefit from their technical and professional expertise the team is doing a nice outstanding job of dealing with covid19 on the homefront and working on it professionally. This is from the state. So i think i cannot of the remarks of my colleagues pray to think that vacancies have not been a substantial challenge and are part of the department on this issue. As i testified, we have also been increasing our staff. We have added experts using a special authority said the department has providing in this regard and we batted to the staffing of the offices and deal with biological issues. So i think in general, we do not have staffing challenges. We too have a Great Partnership rated end in fellowships that bring us Technical Expertise. I think recruiting technical specialists is sometimes a challenge. That is probablyy the one area where at times and has been a bit of a challenge for us. Thank you very much for sharing that. And i have the committee can be involved to whatever it is appropriate into ensuring that you all can into the future recruit the Staffing Levels that are necessary. I will ask for the next portion if youll indulge me. Because it will direct for my followup question is parted by show of hands, do your teams participate in a war game to train and prepare potential biological Security Risk for easing this awkward circumstance with virtual. If you could just raise your hand if you do. Because my followup question depends very much on if its divided. So i see two and two from here. Okay. So im curious then, with the majority of you participating in wargames, do you and your colleagues draw upon the modeling in the simulation analysis to stay true, but quickly changing threats could look like it hadnt responded. Are you using this for biological threats. And what have you learned from these tabletop exercises. More recently as it relates to covid19. In my time is limited. So if one of you want to take this one. I welcome you all to choose who goes next. So congresswoman. Thithis is mr. Oxford. We sustain capabilities oversee the people we have trained over time. We do exercises periodically to make sure the maintain readiness and the standards that they have been trying to. One of the ways that we start to transfer the response ability of that programs is to those nations. They exercise in the training and one of the key aspects of us to understanding the retention is there. Thank you very much. And mr. Chairman thank you for the extra time and i yelled back. Thank you. Saying that there are no additional members who have questions. Its always difficult for the most virtual highbred in person format. And then on top of that. I will make a closing statement. And seem another like to make a statement as well. But actually maybe a closing question. The issue of virus surveillance. Its something that i have thought a lot about. Thinking about how we use some of the natural occurring technologies, the social media and search words and google etc. All of a. Sudden you see jeff ad people searching incidences a fever or flulike symptoms. And some of that can be Early Warning systems for us to pay close attention. And i know we were thinking about how both amidst the pandemic but that also what are the Early Warning systems. That are already there and likely in use. Maybe they have perhaps maybe comment on how we are looking at that. Is an exceptional question. In its in all above approach. We have all talk today about information sharing. Thats absolutely vital and fundamental if we are going to ensure that we are detecting and specifically on this issue, detecting threats and flowing that information relevant this point globally. So it is working with our colleagues like we do on a daily basis here. Its also working with our International Friends and partners. And also mentioned by philip, the Global Partnership for spread against weapons and that destruction. This perfect organization. As s Global Health security ag, another effort to providean information flow and to dozens of countries around the world. So of the all above approach is necessary. It has to acquire the information flow read. Mr. Chairman as you recall attacked by the regionall approach. We started this program, is specifically. Tate the regional allows this kind of information sharing across regional boundaries but enhances the overall protections within the regions as opposed to just looking at the slowly five country. So it reallyoned does help in te broader understanding. I think the chairman raises a very good point that we have a whole set of emerging tools that can greatly added to inmate and trent information sharing and bio surveillance. Were wondering during this pandemic lsw to expand the toolset that we have two additional tools. For example, in uganda and africa, their whole sense of cell phone based tools that we have not previously used to the degree be used now. So we t are trying to take advantage of the whole new tools that is out there. I think thatlo the Global Pandemic, the chairman noted that theres quite infrastructure being built to deal with this pandemic. There is new technologies that are being integrated into the bio surveillance. And this is a good example of how we need to build our capabilities and our data flows to capture all of the information that is available read. Bright, and i certainly want to thank all former witnesses their services to our country. Again make sure that everyone is safe. And we will get through this. Lets get through this in a more resilient way in a stronger way. And in the way that we can protect against the next pandemic our future bio threats. The chairman. I know you are still on if you want to add closing statements. I am here in thank you. Thank you for your joint collaboration and putting the steering together. Its an important hearing and very timely right now. I do want to thank our witnesses. And obviously the work in the portfolios, whether it is weapons of mass destruction. And that i want to think are other witnesses. Obviously, a potential capability that you bring to the table. So we will continue the work and to theak proper resources. And to respond effectively. And we can rest assured that will have to confront in the future and we want to make sure that we are as prepared as possible. In the respond the majority, as necessary to save lives. To keep people healthy protect the country. With that, thank you for what youre doing. And if the members have additional questions. I asked to respond in writing. Expeditiously freighted with that have no further questions. I yelled back to the chairman. Thank you chairman. And again, our thoughts and prayers are with every buddy around the world who has been impacted by covid19 and sunlight with the president and the first family and for study. With that, and i want to thank witnesses rain here this morning. In the hearing isne adjourned. [silence]. [background sounds]. [background sounds]. Class [background sounds]. [background sounds]. [inaudible] [background sounds]. [background sounds]. [background sounds]. I honestly full tell you, i dont think when the dust settles in this election but it will be whether america becomes more republican or more democratic or more liberal or more conservative or more rather more blue. I think the choice in this election is whether america remains america. Is joe biden has said, from the moment he entered this race, it is about the souls of our nation. Who we are. What we stand for. And maybe, most importantly, who we want to beat. Watch the Vice President ial debate between Vice President mike pence and senator, harris. Live on wednesday at 9 00 p. M. Eastern. And the university of utah in salt lake city. Much of the debate, live on cspan. Listen live in the cspan radio app. And when cspan. Org debate. For a live to date coverage. 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Welcome to those of you are joining us on zoom, and also through viewers are watching us on cspan. This is to say the least, no ordinary election year. In october is already proven to be in calendar of surprises. As a reminder as we countdown to election day, their facing record levels and male in voting. Concerns about the United States Postal Services and confusion about top boxes. Polling places, limited capacity