Transcripts For CSPAN3 Remarks By David Schenker Transatlantic Policy In Middle East Panel 20240713

Assistant secretary of state for middle Eastern Affairs discusses u. S. Middle east strategy and he talks about u. S. Relations in the region. Secretary of state, mike pompeos recent trip to italy and chinas expansion in the middle east. From earlier this week at the Atlantic Council in washington, its an hour and 50 minutes. Okay, everyone. Were ready to commence. Okay. We are joined with us here today to kick off the programming, a discussion of the u. S. Role in the middle east given all of the very exciting news that seems to happen every single day. We are here. David shanker, a good, old friend of mine will share with us his great and unmatched wisdom about the u. S. Policy in the region. Let me give you a little background on david. He was sworn in as the assistant secretary of state for near Eastern Affairs. June 14th of this year. Prior to joining the department of state, he was director of the program on arab politics at the Washington Institute for near east policy from 2000 to 2006. He served in the office of the secretary of defense as the lev okay, nt country director and in that capacity he is responsible for advising the secretary on senior and Political Affairs of syria, lebanon, jordan and israel and the palestinian territories. He was awarded the office of the secretary of defense medal for Exceptional Civilian Service in 2005. Before that period of joining government, he was a Research Fellow at Washington Institute, as well and a project coordinator of a large, centrally funded usid projects in jordan. With no further delay, please, assistant secretary shanker, welcome to the podium. [ applause ] good morning. So it says here im supposed to speak on an update on current u. S. Strategy toward the region, but i had seen that the title of this conference was Strategic Visions and power competition in the middle east. So im going to speak about china and russia today, the new threats to middle east security and stability. So thank you, will. Its a pleasure to be at the Atlantic Council today and thank you, ambassador, and our italian cohosts. Both the United States and italy share a deep interest in sustained engagement in the middle east. Italy remains one of our closest partners and events like this demonstrate our shared commitment to the future of the region. Secretary pompeo just returned from a very productive have said to italy, reinforcing our strong partnership. Ive spent time in inga discussing libya. Theyre at a crossroad from the liberation of kuwait from the campaign to defeat isis and the u. S. Has played a leading role in mobilizing the International Community to confront threats in the region. Much of the medias attention focuses on the iranian threat to peace and stability in the middle east, but ill be here today to talk to you about a challenge thats more subtle and possibly more worrying or just as worrying. Thats the incursion of autocratic regimes like china and russia into the region. While we Seek Partnership for further security and stability of the region, were keeping a watchful eye on actions to undermine this goal. So id like to begin with our vision for the region because i think it stands in sharp contrast to the transactional relationships offered by china and russia. The u. S. Has a long track record of working to bring peace, stability and prosperity to the middle east and north africa. We defend our allies. Were committed to Economic Growth that provides jobs and prosperity in the United States and around the world and we value democracy. As secretary pompeo said the United States is a force for good. We seem to being thattel the regions as we advance our own. For example, weve led and organized the Global Coalition to defeat isis on peace and security in the region. Wooe working to launch the middle east Strategic Alliance with mesa and the gulf and together with other likeminded nations, were the cornerstone of the International Maritime security construct to ensure freedom of navigation and the gulf. All of this helps the Regional Security and stability. The Global Coalition to defeat isis is a testament to what we can accomplish when we Work Together for a common goal. 76 nations and five International Organizations of the Global Coalition are and should be enormously proud that the territory isis once held was liberated. Beyond the military campaign, a real triumph of the coalitions effort has been diplomacy and organizing a Worldwide Network to stop illicit financing and ending the flow of foreign fighters and disrupting the hateful ideology and message. It includes significant humanitarian assistance. Since 2014 alone, for iraq alone the United States has contributed 2. 5 billion in humanitarian aid to the displaced iraqis in the region and 263 million destabilized areas liberated from isis and this is for a voluntary return of nearly 4 million internally displaced people. Neither russia or china nor china showed a willingness let alone a capability to organize a collective effort to defeat a global threat not to mention help the people harmed by isis and according to the u. N. Financial tracking service, chinas provided less than 1 million to china since 2013 and russias provided nothing. Instead of helping, russia and china sought to exploit openings to increase their own influence at the expense of their partners. The United States remains the indispensable partner for the majority of the region. While china and russia play both sides in the dispute, the United States offers a handson approach in solving the regions problems. Taking a Firm Position is not always the most popular thing to do, but Public Opinion sometimes like that, but its a hallmark of responsible, global leadership. Let me be clear. We have no desire to make any country choose between the u. S. And russia and china. Countries have positive u. S. Ing and russia. We simply want to ensure russia and chinas influence and activities in the middle east do not come at expense of the regions prosperity, stability, fiscal viability and longstanding relationship with the u. S. So the fact of the matter is that we have a fundamentally different approach from both russia and china to the regions most pressing problems. Lets start with iran. Iran represents the dominant challenge facing the region today. We see this in its nuclear escalations, Ballistic Missile programs and its malign regional behavior. Iran is stoking a conflict in yemen, iraq, syria, beyond, and bankrolling terrorist groups like hezbollah. Earlier this month iran staged a brazen attack on saudi oil facilities. This attack showed irans aggressiveness and fundamental lack of respect for sovereignty and security of its neighbors. It also threatened International Energy markets temporarily taking 5 of the Global Oil Supply off the market. A sizable percentage of this oil is destined for china. China is saudi arabias numberone customer. Saudi arabia is chinas leading oil supplier. Yet, where was china when its primary Energy Source was threatened . China was playing both sides. Facilitating irans destabilizing activities by propping up the Iranian Regime through continued oil purchases. These violations or sanctions give Iranian Regime crucial cash it needs to further its regional efforts to sow discord and terrorism. China also sold Weapons Technology to iran, used to threaten others in the region. Iran interfered with the shipping in the strait of hormuz, we had an effort to assemble the International Maritime security construct to protect freedom of navigation. Weve had country from around the world join us to monitor irans behavior and prevent them from seizing more ships. Wheres russia in all this . Trying to reincarnate its 20yearold construct which they dusted off to divert the attention from more effective solutionoriented efforts. It didnt work 20 years ago, and it wont help the situation today. Our presence in the gulf remains a bedrock of Regional Security and guarantees freedom of navigation for Critical Energy resources and all other shipping through the straits of hormuz, this benefits all of us in the region and around the world. Russia, china, are opportunistically seeking to increase their own returns rather than contribute to the broader goal of Regional Security and stability. The behavior is not limited to just iran. In iraq, iran has repeatedly undermined the Central Government by providing assistance to armed groups that owe more allegiance to tehran than to baghdad. So while china and russia pursue profit through heavily mercantilistic policy in iraq, u. S. Assistance is providing clean drinking wat water to citizens, jumpstarting an economy with hundreds of millions of dollars in new projects and clearing mines so that displaced religious minorities can return to their ancestral homes. The regions three ongoing conflicts in syria, yemen, libya, continue to claim lives and radiate instability. Its clear that those conflicts require Political Solutions that cannot be resolved by military force. United states will continue to support u. N. Led peace efforts throughout the region. Deeply engaged in efforts to bring relevant parties into a political process. Russia, on the other hand, is playing a spoiler to advance its own narrow interests that the people of the region suffer. In syria, russias behavior has been particularly egregious. Russia intervened to prop up the murderous assad regime. It did so under the guise of counterterrorism. Yet, russia, along with the assad regime, has not demonstrated the ability or willingness to even fight isis in syria. Rather, the regime has shown a willingness to tolerate isis and other extremists in a bid to undermine the legitimate at prags aspirations of the syrian people. Russias support for assad facilitated brutal attacks on civili civilians. Syria and russia used the u. N. s donotstrike list as a targeting list attacking civilian sites and creating refugees and displaced persons. Moscow adheres to grasni rules, raising entire cities filled with innocents to kill a handful of terrorists. The United States in contrast is scrupulous is honoring its obligation to distinguish civilians to terrorists. Russia did nothing as assad deployed chemical weapons against its own people. We have sought evidence that demonstrates its crimes. Russia has sowed doubt and misinformation, doing everything it can to protect the assad regime from accountability and frustrate the u. N. Led process trying to bring an end to the conflict. Instead, russia used syria as a forum to showcase its weapons, its mercenaries and build a platform to meddle in other regional issues. In libya, russia fueled the conflict in its socalled private military force is plain to see. Its also violating the arms embargo. Where is china . Playing an unhelpful role in syria, joining russia in vetoing a call for a ceasefire. Ultimately, we want a constructive, resultoriented relationship with china that prioritizes concrete outcomes over hopeful aspirations. While we work with china on areas of futumutual interests, will push back forcefully when beijing undermines our interests and those of our allies and partners. Instead of taking a leadership role in these conflicts, chinas focused on increasing its economic and geopolitical position in the region. Unfortunately, chinas belt and road initiatives have fallen flat, both for china and for its recipients. In funding, which rarely has been efficient or marketdriven, has begun to dry up. Chi chinas projects often come with o bake tepaque terms, questionar practices, high rates of interest that do not promote shared economic prosperity, touted by the cheinese government. Chinas track record in using labor force is poor. China does not sufficiently engage local contractors, provide enough local jobs to train many local workers. Chinese practices run counter to National Policies in places like saudi arabia, bahrain, oman, designed to build the capacity of the local labor force and create jobs. U. S. And middle eastern governments both want Infrastructure Development that benefits local communities, but the promise of highquality development with low shortterm costs such as the promises china made at the recent belt road forum ring hollow when chinas track record is so poor. From burma, to malaysia, to tanzan tanzania, governments are negotiating the terms of their debt and investments from china and bri projects, nearly entirely if place entire ly in places like india. Projects dont meet the high standards set by inclusive organizations like the g20 wont produce the desired results. The mote northeatable, the disas outcomes of Chinese Investment projects in pakistan, vsri lank and ecuador. Has led to the harsh reality of debt, project failure, corruption and in some cases chinese control. In contrast, the u. S. Has enabled egypt, israel, jordan, tunisia, to access over 21 billion in boennds from international markets, preferential rates through the issuance of sovereign loan guarantees. These transparent financial mechanisms helped support key players fiscal stability while supporting Economic Reforms that encourage Sustainable Growth and foreign investment. Unlike china and russia the u. S. Offers Development Assistance designed to help people build better lives. To give one example, 2016 usaid helped eliminate polio in egypt. Today the u. S. Supports immunization campaigns to keep egypt poliofree. U. S. Programs have bougrought cn water and sanitation to over 25 Million People in egypt and at least 1. 5 million egyptian girls can read and write better thanks to u. S. Support for early grade reading. There are many more examples of u. S. Assistance programs in the region, from morocco, to the arabian peninsula, lavont in iraq, that are building capabilities and country institutions to enhance security and stability, providing essential services and Responsive Government and driving economic reform and growth. Our total foreign assistance to the region exceeds 7 billion a year. As we look ahead toward increasingly digital interconnected world economy, we need to pay more attention to the risks that comprise telecommunication that compromise telecommunication suppliers like huawei post National Security. Chinese laws, most notably, the National Intelligence law, compel its citizens businesses and other organizations to cooperate with chinese intelligence and security services. To keep such cooperations secret. That means government agencies, confidential data, and companies trade secrets could be fully available to the Chinese Government if transmitted or processed on huawei or chinesesupplied equipment. There are media reports that huawei representatives participated in spying operations on political opponents. Chinas highly repressive campaign against the uighurs and others. Since april 2017, the Chinese Government has by our estimates detained more than 1 million individuals in internment camps where theyre forced to renounce their ethnic identity through religious beliefs or culture and religious practices. Chinas highly repressive campaign extends far beyond the camps. Officials have instituted hightech surveillance measures, dramatic increases in the number of security personnel, the embedding of security personnel in peoples homes, and collection of dna and other biodata. Outside of its borders, china coerces members of the Muslim Minority groups to return to china from abroad and pressures third countries tos f forcibly return asylum seekers. Were disappointed by the large number of arab countries that signed a letter to the council praising chinas actions. We have welcomed the fact that turkey has raised concerns about situation. We especially welcome qatars decision to withdraw its signature from the letter and we hope others will follow. We have yet to see china or russia take a principled stand on human rights in the region and were not holding our breath. Remain concerned about human suffering and completely reject the rights of conscience, remain unconcerned about human suffering and completely reject the rights of conscience that we and we believe the people of the middle east and north africa region value so dearly. Our positive vision for the u. S. Is a force for good in the region. Based on a Value Proposition that Neither China or russia can match. We believe in freedom, openness, political and economic inclusion. We believe that economic dynamism and private sector growth can benefit all. Believe that fighting corruption, promoting rule of law, both of which are necessary for that growth to be sustainable, unwavering commitment has strengthened america and want it to strengthen our partners as well. Our actions ultimately seek to equip our partners to face modern challenges with a vision anchored in fundamental rights and freedoms. We also help pull people out of poverty to live more prosperous lives. We understand that a country is most successful when its people are free and prosperous. American companies can bring in the latest technology and business methods, and we want to build lasting partnerships with companies and governments of the region. Were interested not in just building physical infrastructure in the region but also in the development of human capital. Government capacity needed to power longterm growth. Creating Economic Opportunity abroad is not only in our National Security interests, it opens markets and generates revenue for u. S. Companies. Its a win win. Since 2011, the United States has contributed over 58 billion throughout the middle east and north africa working across all sectors to foster stability and prosperity while working with governments to combat common enemies seeking to sow chaos and destruction. Over that period, russia has provided less than 100 million in humanitarian aid to the middle east. In 2018, china announced billions in loans to the region but only 100 million in assi assistan assistance. Simply stated, theres no comparison. China and russia engage in the region to further their own interests often at the expense of their partners. Frustrating and disappointing history of broken commitments and violation of International Norms norms by russia, china, instead of improving worsened in recent years. Were committed to a vision of shared prosperity, regional and Global Security and stability and lasting partnership. The global context in which the middle east sits has changed in recent years. The emergence of Great Power Competition requires a new Strategic Vision. We have one that i think is compelling. Secretary pompeos articulated how the United States is and will remain a force for good in the region. As we look to the future, well need tofu the region in new light. Well look to middle eastern governments to be constructive partners on both the regional challenges and global engagements with russia and china. Its a challenge that the United States is well positioned to lead. So, thank you. Sorry to say i wont be taking any questions. Well, good morning. Im very happy to see how many of you, friends, in the audience. Thank you very much, all, for being here with us and participate in what i think is extremely interesting panel. Not to waste any more time, i will go directly to the panelists. I will introduce them one by one, at the moment they speak, then were going to have the floor to you. We wanted to limit as much as possible the remark so as to give you all the opportunities to ask all the questions you want to ask. Feel free. They are giving allday availability. So take advantage of the scholars that are here today. Id like to start with william wechsler, hes the director of the center for the middle east and middle east programs at the Atlantic Council. His most recent government position was Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for special operations in combatting terrorism. And previously, he served as Deputy Assistant secretary of defense for counternarcotics and global threats. He serves as special adviser to the secretary of treasury during the Clinton Administration and he had Previous Service as director for transnational threats on the National Security council staff. Hes a graduate of Cornell University and Columbia University school of International Public affairs. William, the floor is yours. Thank you very much, karim. My understanding is ma wewhat going to do, im going discuss the context of what we see in the middle east right now then were going to turn to my copanelists to talk about the american and european responses to those contexts. Its my belief that the most important dynamic thats driving a lot of the decisions and actions in the middle east right now and has been for some time is the widespread perception of american withdrawal. This is exacerbated today by the actions of our president , but it would be wrong to solely blame this dynamic on our current president. This has been a long time coming. Im going to give you a little bit of context of why i believe that and why this drives us. Im going to start with just a little anecdote. This is an anecdote back from november 1967 when britains minister of state and Foreign Commonwealth Office visited the gulf region. And he had a really Important Message to give. He said, with all sincerity and all conviction, having had all the discussions that he needed to back in london, that despite some rumors that people were hearing, despite some assessments of the current financial situation of the of britain, despite some problems that they had recently had, that there was no thought of withdrawal in their minds. That so long as was necessary, britain would remain in the gulf to ensure the peace and stability of the area. Every all the actors heard him say this. Were very much reassured. Then two months later the british Prime Minister announced that all British Forces would be leaving east of aden, east of suez, sorry. This this the founding moment for many of the countries in the gulf. They remember this very well. Theyre looking at whats happening today and theyre seeing it through this lens. Lets talk just a brief moment because theres a great irony in all of this, and the irony is that the american perceptions of our interests in the region have been actually by policymakers, by experts, have been very consistent for many decades. And the physical ramifications of that, the physical evidence of that in terms of our presence, is sized to deal with those interests and has not changed. So its very frustrating just like it was frustrating for british counterparts 50 years ago to hear constant questions from the region about american withdrawal. Look around. Look at our military. Look at our diplomacy. Look at our economic impact. Look at our intelligence resources. We are america is tremendously committed to the gulf. Why do you keep saying this . And all of us who have traveled around the world will hear this again and again. Look at our interests. Our interests are very simple and they derive, most importantly, from the regions position as a driver of Energy Resources. In addition to the Regional Focus of our global policies that we dont want anyone to have the will and the capacity to attack the United States, we dont want anyone to dominate the eurasian landmass, very specifically in the middle east, we want the energy the United States wants the energy respo resources to continue to be extracted. Wants those Energy Resources to find their way to the market unmolested especially on the maritime domain, wants general prosperity. For my entire lifetime, for most of it, that has basically described what the United States was looking for, and the United States has been generally a status quo power for most of that time. To most of our most of our military and diplomatic interventions in the region with important but minor exceptions have been to been to uphold or return to the status quo ante. That has started to change in the last three administrations. Why why is that . If our interests havent changed and our presence havent changed, what has changed . Well, its our will and our that comes from our politics. Lets talk a little bit about what has changed. First and foremost, america has a long, deep, trend of isolationism in its politics, and especially during campaigns, American People would become president reflect that. So the last four president s in a row have all campaigned saying they wanted to do less in the world and in particular in the middle east than their predecessor did. After a while, people in the region start to hear that message. Now, after bill clinton came into office, he took a year to do a review of middle east and actually came up with a dual containment policy that basically returned to the traditional american approach. To george w. Bush had it forced upon womhim with 9 11 and he decided to take a marked detour from traditional american policy and instead of acting to uphold the status quo, he went to undermine the status quo and change the status quo. Again, he while while his views about Energy Resources were in no way different from those in the region and from traditional views, that was unnerving to people in the region. President obama did not take that long time to do an assessment of the middle east but instead very quickly went to cairo and said some very powerful things about americas role relationship with muslims in the world but in a speech did not reflect these longstanding traditional views of what american interests were in the region and instaead laid out his priorities he by and large went on to fulfill about working with iran to make a nuclear deal, about deprioritizing some of the issues that the people in the region thought should be higher priorities. Even more than that, the view from the region was that there was a degree of unpredictability in the president obama prbl. Obama administration. Whether it was calling a red line in syria, use of chemical weapons then not doing it, very quickly abandoning mubarak, very quickly accepting the muslim brotherhoodled government in a way that was unnerving to them, whether it was not intervening in syria in a way that people had come to expect American Leadership to do or not intervening in iraq until until mosul had already fallen from the islamic state. Unfortunately, the region was so leaders in the region were so excited of the prospect of obama leaving office that they allowed themselves to believe that President Trump would represent a return to normalcy in american traditions. If anything, of course, he has proven far more erratic and far more willing to upend those traditional longstanding decadeslong views of american policy toward the middle east. Not going to go in every single one, but makes clear what very recently in syria, continuing the process, started in the Obama Administration of allowing russia back in, which, again, was the thing that in the carter doctrine, and in the reagan reflagging was one of the reasons why we were there was to keep russia out, as assistant secretary schenker just said. But what trump has done is something even more that cuts into the traditional view of u. S. Interests and thats questioning our commitment to traditional approaches toward energy issues. He came into office believing that that as a result of the iraq war, we should have taken the oil from iraq. He communicated it publicly and he said it privately to iraqi leaders. This is something that one could not have manaimagined for the l seven decades of american policy. More recently, he has publicly questioned whether the United States should be part of the should have as one of its core responsibilities the protection of the free flow and freedom of navigation of Energy Resources through the straits of hormuz. And, again, 20 of all the worlds Energy Resources go through the strait of hormuz. There is no other part there is no other entity, aside from the United States, that can protect that. Calls for Energy Independence sound good politically, matter when it comes to protecting the United States from another party cutting off our Energy Supplies in a time of crisis like we did to japan before world war ii but do not in any way affect the global price of oil which is what affects the American Economy and inflation. Is a good part of the reason why were doing this in the first place. And no president before President Trump has called this into question and hes done so very, very publicly. So if youre in the region, what you see is despite american interests, despite our presence, america is withdrawing. Youve heard this loud and clear. Youve seen it in our actions. What does this mean . What this means is that they have to start taking actions in response to that. That perception is driving a reality. It means that parties in the region are building their own capabilities. Building their own military capabilities. Building their own intelligence capabilities. Building their own cyber capabilities. Building their own diplomatic capabilities. It means theyre starting to use those capabilities. And, you know, the historical norm is that wisdom lags the development of new capabilities. And so the likelihood of using these capabilities in ways that turn out to be unwise goes up significantly. Theyre building new relationships across the region. Theyre hedging the decline of American Power by building out new relationships with other external powers. Assistant secretary schenker can bemoan, quitinge accurately in y cases, the implications of growing power in the region bt t doesnt change the fact, friend and foe alike, are building out those relationships. I mean, if you go to israel today, lekuds headquarters, on the front is a huge poster of president of netanyahu with President Trump. On the back is a huge poster of netanyahu with putin. Thats inconceivable a decade ago. And thats the world that were that were in today. Regionionala actors are buildint new spheres of influence not only in the middle east but in their near abroad as well. The result of all of these actions is a region that is less secure, less stable, less predictable, more prone to crises that could create interstate violence. More prone to situations that could block the movement of energy across the maritime domains, more prone to domains where energy production, itself, can break down and less likely to be highly economically advanced in the years to come. That is the opposite of all of the u. S. Interests for the last number of decades. That is all being driven by this perception of american withdrawal. Thats all. Thank you very much, william. Now, i have the pleasure to introduce and pass the floor to the ambassador barbara leaf. She has been the u. S. Ambassador to the United Arab Emirates and se senior fellow at the Washington Institute. During her diplomatic career, she has served in the highestlevel position at foggybottom. Before arriving in abu dhabi she served as Deputy Assistant secretary of state in the Bureau Ministry of affairs. And served in the Department First director of the office of iranian affairs. The most important one. Of course. Thats why we met. Remember lunch is when we were talking exactly. Freshly talking about middle eastern politics with a lot of good italian food. That was fantastic. I miss those days. Cairo, jerusalem, portauprince. Ambassador leaf. Thank you. Thank you very much, karim. Im not sure im going to strike any lighter notes than will did. I hope not to drive you into despair, but i will say im going to take a sort of a closerin look at u. S. Policy and actions under the Trump Administration. So with the great historical backdrop that will provided, what i would say about the region is, you know, there is a there is a greater and greater sense of fragility. I would i would argue, perhaps, the point as to whether the u. S. Disengagement produces that or whether indeed, whether the u. S. Has ability to affect some of the events that are going on in the region. But certainly, theres a sense of lack of u. S. Leadership and a quickening sense of u. S. Disengagement. I would also go further and say theres an incoherence about the administrations essential National Security goals in the region. So as will noted, for literally for four decades, securing global Energy Supplies and deterring or contesting effort from an outside power such as soviet union or Regional Power such as iraq in 1990, dominate the region, was an under was an undergirding principle for republican and democratic administrations until the Trump Administration. This administration has rather focused its approach to the region around three essential pillars. Countering isis, countering iran, and bolstering deepening the strategic relationship with israel. You hear very little else from the administration about burning issues such as libya, only end sodically, yemen, egypt, and so on, jordan. The administrations own erratic steps, its failures to act at steps, its failures to act at the border. And, if fact, in is a deepening concern in iraq about the degree to which isis is reforming. And going beyond the sort of hitandrun insurgency phase. But in syria, that those large remnants of isis, tens of thousands of fighters across the country, remained a focal point for u. S. Efforts and, indeed, we had troops there sustaining the effort alongside Kurdish Forces to clear to clear out and to hold those territories and u. S. Forces were also there, of course, to continue to train and improve the capabilities of the Kurdish Forces to keep isis at bay. Twice in the past year, however, weve seen the president after a phone call with recep erdogan reverse this and announce that the fight against isis was over and that hed withdraw troops. Sofb ly so obviously the repercussions flow in all directions. In the first instance, its a batteri battering, destructive, blow to u. S. Credibility. Credibility in terms of sticking alongsi alongside, fighting for a force that lost upwards of 11,000 fighters and family members in the fight and which was critical to destroying the caliphate in syria. You now see the way cleared for what is can only be a highly destabilizing effort by turkey to ethnically reorder that whole band along the border and to create a belt where one doesnt exist, this will be in the throes of fighting. This will produce refugee flows and, indeed, you already heard expressions of deep concern from Iraqi Kurdish leaders about the project of refugee flows coming as a result of that fighting. Most importantly, you have the very real prospect that some 11,000 isis fighters that the sdf is holding will be released or escape as the kurds turn to defend themselves. And then youve got what i always think of as the bellows effect of this kind of instability and reforming of isis or any other terrorist elements. Bellows effect on iraq, which is, itself, in a fragile state. As we saw this past week with the protests. On the second big pillar, countering iran, i wont go into details about the what you all know very well which is the administrations approach to countering iran which has essentially been built around a crushing set of sanctions. Its a powerful tool, but its one that is certainly dont believe has had almost any any effect on irans activities in the region. Not in yemen, iraq, syria, lebanon. And even the closest allies of the u. S. Have increasingly wondered over the past year where the sanctions would go. What was what was beyond that. What was the roadmap. And there didnt really seem to be one. But i would esay the most troubling thing for me in terms of the administrations iran policy has been this last five or six months. So essentially since the administration announced in april that it would work to grind Iranian Oil Exports to zero. Tehran essentially took that as a declaration of economic war and decided to test the proposition of whether washington could be the only one with a maximum Pressure Campaign. And, indeed, over the course of the summer, especially following, i think, following the may 5th announcement by john bolton that the u. S. Would use unrelenting force to deter to respond to any attack on u. S. Interests, or those of partners, tehran immediately moved to test that proposition and it did so repeatedly throughout the summer. Attacks on tankers. Attacks on the East West Pipeline in saudi arabia. Harassment of tankers. Detention of tankers and so on. And these were, in the usual way, thinly veiled efforts by the iranians. Just below the threshold of deniability. I think where things took a particularly destructive turn was september 14th when for the first time, and i mean, i struggle to think of any other time in except back in the 1980s during the tanker wars, when you had an attack directly from iran launched on a gulf country. On in this case, saudi arabia. And it wasnt it wasnt a minor blow. It was what by any measure could be deemed a strategic attack. So, in the face of these catandmouse attacks and then following the september 14th attack, youve had real messaging incoherence. I i keep coming back to that word because youve had the president on the very day of the attacks saying, were locked and loaded, were ready to respond, depending what saudi arabia wants us to do. And then reverting hours later to public musings about the fact that fortunately, the u. S. Is no longer dependent on gulf oil, dot, dot, dot. So, to say the least, tehran could be forgiven for believing that there is, in effect, no red line for the administration. The finally, the relationship with israel id say is in a very curious place. On the one hand, the administration has demonstrated four square Political Support for the netanyahu government and over the course of time has delivered gifts of enormous importance to israel. Movement of the u. S. Embassy of the jerusalem. Recognition of israeli sovereignty over the golan. Twoplus punishing years of actions against palestinian authority. But on the other hand, where israel calculates it faces one of the most critical National Security threats, visavis iran and irans effort to essentially pass advanced Missile Technology to hezbollah, israels largely been on its own or, rather, its worked with moscow. Its not worked with washington. It has either it has worked with moscow such that it could essentially direct itself kinetically to the problem in syria and lebanon. And then in a single weekend in august, if we go by media reports, israel struck three arab countries to disrupt this same project. So then ill stop ill come back to this announcement this week. The last couple days. That by the president that he would withdraw troops from syria. That wed been there too long. That we were it was long past due time to bring them home. That decision right there undermines all three goals. Its a win for isis. Its a win for iran. Needless to say, damascus and moscow. Its deeply unnerving to u. S. Partners. Israel has made it clear it wants it doesnt care about the number of troops in syria. It wants the u. S. Flag there as an important important impediment to iran. And, of course, its deeply disturbing to the gulf allies who see further evidence of this sort of headsnapping policy veering about, reverses from the president , and clear distaste, u. S. Blood and treasure to extend any kind of security umbrella for heretofore close allies. So, no ones in charge in the region. Not that weve always been in charge as such, but we have had we have exercised when weve been successful, we have had an ability to corral countries, likeminded countries to a big effort, and the isis the counterisis campaign is only the most recent but a critical one, and i would argue that had the u. S. Not stepped forward in 2014, iraq would have fallen to isis within that first year. All the best efforts would not have been able to deliver the kind of campaign that we brought together with 70plus countries, with the air power and isr and Everything Else that we brought to the fight. Russia will not do that. China will is not do that. There is no other organizing power. So i would conclude by saying i agree very much with will that this is a disruption of four decades of at least of u. S. Leadership, even if, yes, i do take the point that the Obama Administration, too, showed a in the view of many allies showed a certain fecklessness, but but theres nothing like what we are experiencing today, and i would just note, you know, i left baghdad on last sunday. The unrest started monday tuesday. No coincidence. But it was it was bubbling and then it roared roared into life. And there has been virtually no attention by the administration to what is really seismic and hugely violent interactions by protesters and security forces. Its quite remarkable. The president is tweeting about turkey and defending what he did, and, frankly, confusing everyone with to a greater degree with every tweet. Its really, really unclear at this point what, exactly, were doing and what, exactly, we will accept in terms of turkeys moves. Theres been virtually no attention to a country which is wra racked by the most serious unrest i would say since the arab spring. And ill end there. Thank you, thank you very much. Our third speaker is dr. Halzam amirah fernadez. He has lectured at university, georgetown university, st. Louis university. And university of barcelona. Hes also worked for the United Nations in new york and for human rights in washington, d. C. International relations. Hi, halzam. Hi, thank you very much, karim. Thanks to the council for having me and to the speaker for the invitation. Ive been asked to talk about the eus Foreign Policy toward its foreign neighborhood. So im going to share with you a few ideas along with three or r four different lines. Structural limitation of eus Foreign Policy in general and especially when it comes to its southern neighborhood. Second, the paradoxes of eus foreign action and importance and relevance. Third, the current context in the region and how its viewed from the european side. Finally, some brief ideas about the incoming new commission that will will start operating on november 1st. So, the first question, does europe have a Strategic Vision, as the title of this conference is, streategic visions, does it have Strategic Vision toward the middle east and north africa . And my quick answer is, no, it doesnt have a Strategic Vision. There are multiple visions at different points in time and multiple visions within the eu, itself. And there is, for sure, strategic dilemma. So let me start with multiple visions. There are 28 members so far. Doesnt mean that there are 28 visions, but sometimes you have blocs, you have different groups that form or rely on certain issues. The paradox of the eu is the following. Its a heavyweight in its southern neighborhood when it comes to im going to name, like, economic relations for sure. Its the largest economic partner of its southern neighborhood by far. Resources, the history, the human tacts. The pragmatic efforts. Just kind the number of missions, diplomats, both at the european delegations and, you know, national delegations. The effort that is made and cooperation aid, et cetera, et cetera. Its a heavyweight in those domains but then you its tiny and its insufficient when it comes to other issues of trying to shape or to transform its immediate neighborhood. And transform it in a positive way. So this is the main paradox. The other paradox is, the eu as a normative power or actor trying to transform or to compare the southern neighborhood, and remember, back in 1995, the launching of the socalled barcelona process. The partnership. There was, i would say, it was less time that you had vision as such specifically for the mediterranean, for the southern mediterranean. There was a diagnosis, which i think still holds large extent until our days, but there was a paradox, and the paradox was the following. So in order to make those southern political systems, regimes, come closer and build a neighborhood that has shared prosperity, stability, and peace, it was done in a voluntary way. So all the democratic clauses that were included in the Pro Partnership agreements were never used ever with any single southern mediterranean country, which means that we, you know, europe did business as usual. There were abuses and there were excesses and violations of human rights, et cetera. But they had no cost, real cost. The discourse was supporting human rights, defending democracy, building, you know, neighborhood with shared values. No, it was not a neighborhood of shared values, for sure. So, the eus good at advancing convergence when there is political will, and the common vision, and it has proven so repeatedly, but its much less effective as a group when theres a big gap between words and deeds. And i think the mediterranean is one of those places where those gaps are really broad. Effective Foreign Policy anywhere in the world requires certain elements like capacity for decisionmaking, implementation capacity. Legitimacy, credibility. And this is a problem for the eu and its southern neighborhood. I mean, for sure the decisionmaking capacity of the eu, eu institutions, its really good when it has to do with qualified majority and decisions are made, you know, by qualified majority. Trade, for instance. Its strong in those domains. But its weak when consensus is required. Foreign and Security Policies so far have been consensusbased like basically that means common lower denominator. And ill make a reference about the Incoming Commission and this consensus or qualified majority when it comes to Foreign Policy. We see that theres a decline in europes international relevance. I think that is clear. And theres a consciousness about it in the eu, itself. Brexit is not helping, for sure. Economic decline or relative decline compared to other emerging economic powers, internal divisions among different european countries. So forming blocs and some of them basically u. S. Skeptic or antieuropean forces within some Member States and the u. S. , all of the u. S. I think the lack of coherence is something that is affecting europe when looking at the southern mediterranean, for the obvious role that the u. S. Has played for decades, but the unreliability. I think this is turned out has been more and more is the u. S. A reliable partner for europe . Some would even go further and question whether the u. S. Is an ally of europe as a group. As a project. Whether it is an ally and for sure in the mediterranean and the southern neighborhood. So, a few comments about the context in the southern neighbors of the eu. I think that eus contradictions are becoming more evident in the mediterranean due to the transformation of threats and the intensification of challenges, and will was referring to the region with the growing instability threats, confli conflicts, and fragility. I think this is a clear term, fragility. Not only state fragility but Society Cohesion fragility across the region of different degrees. So everything thats happening in the southern neighborhood of europe has an Immediate Impact on europe, itself. And sometimes this is forgotten. It has an impact, has an effect. Migration, be it economic migration or refugee flows, well, we have seen it for the past few years. How it has affected and deeply conditioned domestic politics in certain european countries. Terrorism, that is rooted or linked to the southern neighborhoods. The negative perceptions that are conditioning, that are, you know, actually that are very powerful in shaping policies and the action of governments of individual national governments, and the farright movements or national populist parties weve seen in several countries including my own in spain for the first time after the death of franco with the representation in parliament, it is those movements have Different Reasons for it to appear, but for sure, something very happening in the southern mediterranean has a very important impact for some of these regions. Very quickly, the eu after the europe awakening, whatever you want to call it, 2011, i think theres a massive strategic confusion in the eu after the 2011 period. That conclusion is clear when reading documents and official, you know, communications by the commission. When also reading the european global strategy. And, you know, going back and forth, yes, we support certain things but suddenly, no, were back to business as usual. Or to the old authoritarian stability paradigm. I think while the eu has been acting as a prostatus quo actor and has missed, in my opinion, the opportunity for building or trying to advance a new model of stability in its immediate neighborhood, i think the eu is not asking itself the question of how, what kind of neighborhood wed like to live in in the coming 5, 10, 20, years, and without having the answer to that question and without having the resources and the political will to shape the region in that direction, obviously, most likely you will end up somewhere very different from where you would like to be. Now, quickly, the eu today when dealing with the south, i think its living in denial and thats something that, you know, for whatever reason, shortterm, you know, policies or electoral calculations by european politicians, the eu may be getting a bit too late to prevent deeper shocks in the region, and with deeper shocks, deeper consequences as well for the eu, itself. One thing that is missing in a lot of analyses when looking at the north africa, the middle east, is the socioeconomic transformations that are happening and why this these are creating and what were seeing, not in iraq and egypt and, you know, jordan, algeria, you know, for 34 weeks now in a row, so theres something that i think were not paying enough attention, we talk about, you know, the big picture, geopolitics, power competition, et cetera, et cetera, but what about the hundreds of millions and most of them youth and how sustainable is the state Society Relationship . One last comment about the incoming the new commission. I was listening tomorrow sorry, i was listening yesterday morning to the hearing of the new already confirmed high representative and Vice President of the commission, at the european parliament, and this idea of having a new commission thats more geopolitical, that and he said it yesterday, that europe has to learn to use the language of power and to use it when needed. The idea of also moving toward qualified majority decisions that have to do with Foreign Policy and not only unanimity or consensus, which has been, i think, one of the main problems for eu foreign action. And the fact that the eu is f d finding itself in a new situation where there are theres competition between the u. S. , china, russia is in a way back, and suddenly the eu is not clear what role is expected from it and what is the best position that it should, you know, which position should be. We see tariffs and other things that are being imposed on eu. We see harsh language used against the european allies and just let me say allies in a strange way. And the lack of communication at and this is not from this demonstration, by the way, you have to go back maybe a few years before this administration so all this will have impact on the eus Foreign Policy and particularly the south. If the eu prefers to have the south stabilized no matter how, i think reality and events will prove that the eu will be dragged to its southern neighborhood to be forced by the events that most likely will happen, will take place, five years commission, im sure theyre going to see a lot of things happening in the southern neighborhood. So, thank you very much. Thank you, halzam. Im sure you have a lot of questions. So i will pass it to you. And barbara is there anybody . Thank you so much. Barbara slaven here at the Atlantic Council. To our european guest, you didnt mention the iran experience, and im wondering how the eu is dealing with the fact that it seems incapable of really challenging u. S. Secondary sanctions. What is the thinking now Going Forward . Is there still any hope to salvage the jcpoa . We know that president macron has been very active, but what about the eu . How are they supporting or not supporting his efforts . Thanks. Well take another question. Over there. Please, introduce yourself first. Agustus, a supporter of the president. President trump. President of the u. S. If you had the president s ear, and im addressing this to any of you who cares to answer this question, if you had the president s ear in light of your world view or specifically in the middle east, what would you advise him to do . At this point in time, Going Forward. Very good. Any other . Yeah. Another one here. Im a european Intelligence Analyst and a former diplomat. Normally when this sort of thing happens, theres there is an in covert operation capability, as a sort of a slight offset for the damage thats being done by the withdrawal. Do you feel that trump is so bent on this that he might not allow even that, that there might want be no offset increase in covert capabilities simultaneously, ambassador, i think . Do you mean with specific regard to iran and syria . Im thinking syria. They are dlietsed elighted to d because they can kull more ipg. Ill start with a couple of thoughts with that and bear with me, i got in this morning at 3 00 a. M. My time from california, and so i was in california for a couple of days as all of this was unrolling, unraveling, and i think there is great nonclarity within government as to where the president wants to go on this issue. It was a surprise to erdogan when the president announced that he was going to pull all of the troops home and then hes not and then he is or hes moving a hundred out of the way out of the way so that turkey can move in. Its quite confused. I suspect given the uproar on the hill and the strong pushback, Expert Council from dod and others in state and the cia, i suspect that there will be a stepping back from this posture of taking everybody out, but it remains very unclear what turkey intends to do, and turkeys been full miminating a the ypg and so on, and i see no evidence i see no evidence that that has been at this point, corio choreographed in any special way and essentially, theyre going after our allies, so its very confused. To the gentlemans question about what would i tell the president . Advised yeah. No, no, no. You know, as a diplomat i would tell the secretary of state or tell any number of my bosses my thinking, but, look, i would say slow down, get a grip on your messaging. The public messaging is itself so destructive right now. It iss injuryious. Somebody mentioned this issue of is the u. S. Reliable . Thats a profound question. If were not reliable for our friends, not reliable for people who fought side by side with us, i mean, it is so destructive. If isis resurges, whos going to join that coalition with us . We could not even get a maritime operation under way this summer in in the clear face of iranian attacks on international shipping. We could not get people to join our effort. So slow down and formulate and this is the stuff he doesnt really like to do, but formulate an approach that works with partners and that would be europeans and that would be gulf partners. I mean, we should have been able to essentially, following september 14th, we should have been able to briskly isolate iran, privately, politically, diplomatically which is not to say steady on, carry on with sanctions like, you know, there were a whole series of things that he should have done and that was begun in the u. N. And its been herded away, and my fear is why did iran do this . As a number of qatari officials who dealt with iran for years, look, its like a dying man. He can go quietly or he can do one big kick ask struggle before and maybe delay death, et cetera, divert. If we dont do anything else on iran but steady as she goes on sanctions, were going to have another go like this, and it could because the own us is on iran to keep disrupting this. Sure, and then you can answer the question specifically about europe, but the about the covert action question. It is my experience that successful covert action programs require two things. Require long term planning in order to put them into place and require a partner that has the deep trust that the United States is going to be there for a long period of time. Neither of those are evident at all in the current circumstances. So i cant i would be shocked that even if the president wanted to, if he would be successful at balancing a withdrawal of military by increasing our covert action and much less the platforms that the military provides in order for covert action to be successful. I wish that was a good, potential solution, but i dont see it. As far as things to recommend to the president , and this isnt necessarily im not going to say just change all of your policies because i disagree with all of them, but if i was an adviser to the president , there are basically three things that really need to change. First, decide what your goals are of your iran policy. Is it is it to have regime change . Is it just to increase the pain that the iranians are perceiving . Is it to advance the probability of successful negotiations for a better deal . If it is the latter, both the diplomacy and the structure of the maximum Pressure Campaign have not been designed towards that end. So it is not clear to me that the Trump Administration and President Trump himself have actually concluded what the goal of their campaign is. Secondly, decide what your red lines are with iran, you know. The basic essence of deterrence is that you want to get your adversary to understand that you have both the will and the capacity to enforce your own red lines. During the cold war at any given moment there were literally thousands of people that were working on that part of the equation of deterrence. Do the soviets really believe that we would trade new york for berlin. Were not at that point with iran because they dont even know what our red lines are and the represent they dont know where the red lines are is because we dont know where the red lines are. In the aftermath of the recent attacks, both on taking down our Unmanned Aerial Vehicle and then President Trump has twice tried to publicly describe what red lines were. The first time he said a red line would be if iran kills any american and thelg are thn if i anything american. And so surprise, surprise, after a given period of time the iranians decided okay, well attack something thats not american. What they are doing is slowly and methodically and with, again, the flim siest of deniablity, moving up the escalation ladder to try to identify where the american red lines might be and to create a norm of operating right below those red lines. Its a very dangerous situation because we dont know them in the first place, and the third thing i would say is in order to answer both of these questions is the president needs to have a processin pernl process internally that helps him tldeliberate and what are t pros and cons and the advantages of each and one of the common stories throughout this administration is that this president , unlike virtually all of his predecessors just simply does not have that kind of process. It makes it extremely difficult to understand what the second and Third Order Effects of every decision that you make. Yes. Iran and the nuclear deal. For the european diplomacy it was success in the sense that it proved that multilateralism and dip legal see works at that moment to deal with one of the more pressing issues with the International Scene at the time. The fact that only one of the signatories that the jcpoa decided to withdraw unilaterally has put the eu in a very difficult position. The eu as a group, but also those members more involved in the agreement and obviously president macron of france has been trying to save whatever possible, may be changing the jcpoa and the j part with the t and the trump comprehensive action has worked among other things. So why not try and obviously, and that is what we are saying, if there is no clarity, those are the masters of escalation and we know what the cards say even for the weak ones. For europe its a big dilemma and its a big problem. I think europe is waiting for november 2020 trying to have, you know, the least damage possible or trying to save as much as possible of that nuclear deal. Trying to maintain channels open with the i rainian regime in order to stay there and try to do certain things and it cannot alienate the u. S. For obvious reasons. Iran is not that relevant and important in economic terms and weve seen all of the sanctions and the tariffs and all those things and obviously there are other dimensions that have to do with the gulf and with the iranian pep ins la, as well. The conference, was there a reference to it earlier. And look at what it sent to the conference. It tells you when friends see that, thats not the way to do it so who is the u. S. Left with with this whole nuclear deal and whats the alternative again . So maximum pressure, fine. Maximum resistance and the alternative is maximum war. For europe that would be catastrophic for you. Thank you. One here. And then there. Intra introduce yourself, please. Listening to what you said this morning and your presentation, i can come with two points. One is the United States is withdrawing from the region. It doesnt want to be involved in the original issues and at the same time we are having the complaint about the presence of china and russia. The withdrawal would create a gap and this gap has to be fulled so what would the american policy and the russians, would be more inroled and relation lais lagzs in the region. Thank you very much. There is one there. Thank you so much. Im the ambassador of the arab league in washington. My question to the ambassador and im just talking about what we have just heard about withdrawing the american troops from northern syria. Is the president serious about destroying the turkish economy if the turkey attacks and theyre going to destroy the economy . Is it that type of deterrence or assuring the kurds about that . Thank you so much. One there and then george mickelson, for Global Forces foundation. You alluded to trust and mcraven is one of the finest special commanders that said you can surge forces, but you cant surge trust and just like ambassador ryan crocker said, look what we did in pakistan and convincing the pakistani government to support operations against the russians and afghanistan and when we left we pulled the plug on 18year sales and we kecked their officers out. . Look what we did to the shaw of iran. When he came down with cancer, remember the flu that went on. And then we dropped are drop kicked him down and even other examples, going back to vietnam, okay, well leave, but well provide you all of this military assistance and trust. Two years later we changed our mind and cut it off, basically give back the concept if we dont have trust how can we expect in the future that well get anybody out there that believes what well do . Thank you. Im representing kurdistan in washington. I have a question of ambassador leaf and the other guests. While we see the iran aggression in saudi arabia, how much vulnerable saudi arabia and the gulf country. Saudi arabia cannot defeat insurgency in four years. So what would be the wise and reasonable response to the iran . How politically and military will be calculated, because obviously, a military strike, you know, can help iran as youve been discussing in the media. Thank you. Soy to your question i can say it never should have come to this that iran skipped up several wrungs of the escalatory ladder and it skipped most country, saudi arabia most of all. I wouldnt suggest a military response, least of all by the saudis. They would get themselves into a mess rather rapidly and they understand that. As much as it was an act of role, it will not do sawed rabe wra or partners any good. It requires a whole set of steps that the u. S. Should, if not lead, do very in very close coordination with the saudis and the emiratis and you have to widen it out because that strike was also a Strategic Strike on Global Energy supply. So it is inherently of interest to the International Community. I would have liked to have seen the administration very aggressively to undertake diplomatic efforts with beijing, with tokyo, with other Key Countries in europe. Again, to isolate, put heat on iran. We certainly have a menu of covert options that we could exercise. Im not suggesting getting into a shooting conflict between washington and tehran. There are a mapall of cove ertd things we can do to pressure the machine and have the game to pivot in negotiations. You have to be thinking about that. You shouldnt come a with no options at play. I think that was fulminating by the president. I dont think he has any intention of wrecking turkeys economy and im not sure that we could as such. In analyzing my own side i think the president was trying to defend against criticism that he had caved to erdogan and sold out this ally and this ally which had been so critical for the defeat of isis had been the most important factor that we were about to sell them out or that we would sell them out and theyd been slaughtered and that was his effort to deflect that. There was another question. The trust issue, fully agree where the notion that you dont surge trust. You have to have a good reservoir of trust in order to do whether its covert actions or a coalition effort. Fortunately and yes, u. S. Mystery is littered with many examples of when we let partners down. Frankly, every country has that history. Unfortunately, people forget and when the crisis comes they manage to come together. Your question about isnt it sort of fair enough if saudi arabia or other gulf countries look to better partners. You didnt say that, but you were suggesting it. Good luck with that is all i can say. Russia stands by its friend, Bashar Al Assad and he wrecked one of the most glorious arab countries in the region. Great, great loyalty to bashar, but at the cost of half a million syrian dead and millions of lives uprooted. So if you think swapping in moscow for washington is a good bet i just i wouldnt suggest it and for china, you know, china chinas rise is giving us all a lot of sleepless nights. Washington hasnt figured it out, friend or faux, competitor, rival, enemy. Well figure it down the years, and they have to understand what is pushing a series of president s to think the way they do which is more ware wariness on the part of americans, but kwu all have pull become, but give us awe reason, and i would hope there would be more leadership on the region and less reliance on external powers. A couple of thoughts on one of the questions and first on the trust question. If its critical for all of american Foreign Policy and diplomacy, but its particularly critical when it comes to the Counter Terrorism policies because anyone who has worked on Counter Terrorism for a long time knows that the answer is in direct action. The answer is not ok paegz of a foreign kubt rae and im through the local partners so that the local problems can solve your mutual terrorist parties. The only way that works is if we have longstanding persistence trust building with these kinds of partners whether they beel ems of a state or nonstate actors depending on the environment. It is the case that they make assessments of the trustworthiness of the United States not only because of the way the United States treats them, but because of what they observe the United States treating others and so the kurds around the world and maybe the colombians have a better track record and its very, very few. The kurds have a tremendously strong track record of working with the United States to effectively accomplish our mutual Counter Terrorism goals now in multiple countries and we are potentially leaving them to die, and that will resonate long and wide and well beyond the kurdish experience. The russia and china just to go when i laid out what our interests are in the middle east, i dont really believe that russia shares any of them. When you look at whats in it for russian interests. Thats the reason why one of the great accomplishments in my life time in the middle east was the United States of playing a role of getting russia out of the middle east. Thats all been reversed and this is not good for the region. Its not good for the United States interests. China has a more complicated question and china does not have a history in the middle east the way that russia does. China shares some of our interests at some level in terms of energy in a way russia doesnt as a consumer and thats very well influenced by Global Energy prices and at the same time there are other things that cut the other way that i think the fundamental question is there are some parts in the world where its hard to imagine over the next couple of decades and the u. S. And china not being an area of geopolitical competition and confrontation in southeasting asia and elsewhere. Its not clear that the middle east can be that way and i can certainly paint you a picture over the last 20 years and that is the future of the middle east and i can also imagine situations where it requires the United States and china to be talking about the middle east which we are not doing right now. And one last thing just about china is that, you know, china in the middle eastern leaders, china presents an alternative model in the u. S. And you can get everything you can get from the United States in terms of economic technological benefits without human rights and democrat see and more than that, china is perfecting the use of technology to retrain their own populations and at some point in the future that technology will be exported and there will be many parties in the middle east who will find that to be who will find themselves to be very active buyers and thats a whole other set of problems that we can anticipate in the future and the last thing about what to do with iran, quickly, four things. You have to reestablish d deterrents and there is a role of action given where we have been and given where we might be, it is a very minor role and a proportionate role and we have to understand for all of the things that iran did, and i completely agree with you about what they did in saudi arabia, it is also important to understand what they didnt do. Upon they did they took out facilities that were capable of being fixed and there were other facilities that would be much more difficult to be fixed and they didnt kill people and it actually took effort, i suspect not to kill people in what they did. They are trying to march up this escalation and figure out where the levels are. So if we were to do, for instance, the proposal that mindbogglingly got to the president s desk after the shootdown of the uav and attack them in their homeland, that from their perspective will be a vast escalation of killing individuals. So we have to be very, very careful in the military actions that we do that its perceived to be proportionate, but i do think we need to reestablish deterrents because its lost right now. At the same time, we have to figure out a process to deescalate and deescalation involves the third thing and it involves the saudi arabia and the uae and others that are starting their own efforts toward deescalation and we need much more wide diplomacy about bringing it to a global context and none of these i actually see happening rid now. The deterrence and the escalation and the wider d diplomacy. This is what youd want to do and you want to reaffirm all of our basic interests about the free flow of oil and everything which are now up in the air and being questioned. If i may add one more thing to what he just said about iran and they stated if they were not allowed to export their oil and nobody else would be allowed to do it. So the question is how much time do they still have the pain thats being felt by the iranian population and im want talking about the regime here will lead to an escalation with the corner and they lost everything and dont forget another point here that were approaching a moment of change in leadership and they were saying this forever, and iran at some point and the leadership will have to change and it is not clear with the system, and the window of opportunity for dialogue, for negotiating and for using the good, you know, some neighboring who see the danger of the escalation and who feel the destruction ask command of other neighbors. If there is a need to use them and also to deescalate and were seeing the uae concretely. They are also trying to do something, but i think time is running very quickly without seeing the exit and that can put iranians in a much more aggressive position. Thank you very much. One last question. Two last questions. [ laughter ] that lady over there and the gentleman over there. Can you keep your hands up . Good morning. I am the executive director of the American Islamic congress. My question is for ambassador leaf about what is your take about whats happening now in iraq and what do you think our government will do in reaction to whats happening right now . Thank you. Do you want to do the second question . Yeah. Well have time for more. Yes . Go ahead. John anderson, policy analyst for foreign service. A question on longer term u. S. Mideast relations and potential future conflicts. In the aftermath of netanyahus declaration of annexation of golan and the sovereignty of occupied golan. There was obviously quite a reverberation in the arab press and statements to the effect that nothing so sure to guarantee is the next hundred years war or the 500 years war is really action that was arab and not just syrian, but in any case, the question of the formalization of what so far as i understand, at least was a policy declaration by President Trump. The future of u. S. Foreign policy and the likelihood of bipartisan policy consensus in the u. S. On recognizing formally the annexation and two, what about the policy councils in washington, particularly perhaps also europe and the reaction . I may have missed something, but id like to know if there has been any statement on the part of the Atlantic Council, and i see that Washington Institute is rather well represented on the panels today. What about these policy circles . Has there been any kind of statement with regard to recognition of and support for the israeli annexation . Thanks much. So to the question about iraq. So the protesters, there were sort of sitin protests when i was there ten days ago that were not really spreading or growing and so forth. What seems and they were protesting about the classic trifecta of issues in iraq, and jobs, services or lack of jobs and services and deepening, deepening corruption and what seemed to cause this slow burning fuse to flare up was the abrupt dismissal effectively of a senior Counter Terrorism Service Commander who was the hero of mosul and one of the most decorated and bravest commanders in the counter isis fight and it created an uproar immediately because he was not only, you know, a much lauded, beloved hero of this national effort, but he had rigorously set himself up to cleaning up corruption in the cts and this is the midwest elite fighting force in the Iraqi Security forces and they had a lot of corruption. So there was deep suspicion immediately that it was two elements pushing him out or pushing the Prime Minister to push him out, one general officers or others who found their rice bowls destroyed by his House Cleaning efforts, but also it was believed that this was pressure coming from the proiranian militias. So instantly this agitated and caused protests to really begin in force in baghdad, and what really set things going further was the immediate and heavyhanded response of security forces. So you had casualties from the first day. It wasnt just use of tear gas and it was live ammo from the first day and it got worse and worse every day and you had this extraordinary i think it was thursday this extraordinary attack on the iraqi media centers. Masked men and bala clafa, and it was just extraordinary. I havent been able to watch a lot of the videos streaming in because its really graphic and horrify, and it really has looked like the Prime Minister is not in control, and its not clear who these forces are, but theres great suspicion that there are different hashed forces, and the proiranian ones and on the one hand in the beginning of this week you had a couple of real missed opportunities and a National Speech by the Prime Minister which just fell flat. An effort by the speaker of the parliament to sort of get protests calmed by inviting them to send in a delegation, but youve had also at the same time, people like the National Security adviser to inject a beautiful conspire see because they were rife and this is an attack on the state and so north whether they are unemployed or severely underemployed. Those doing the defts were University Graduates and unemployed youth. And so the center of a lot of turmoil of violence has been sadr city. You had people, militias and others saying its baathists. Baathists are not running around in sadr city. So its calming down a little bit because you had this really good set of remarks by the president and youve had some sort of emergency offers of public works and so forth, but suffice to say its a very volatile situation and the economic drivers of this are acute, but the overlay and the flash point is this unconstrained activity of these militias who are themselves seen as very corrupt entities feeding at the public trough. I just have one more thing to say about iraq very quickly and then you can talk about golan. Most of the people that were protesting at least as far as you can see by watching the videos were children when the iraq when the United States invaded and occupied. This is all they have known during this during this period. They dont seem to be at least initially driven by some of the issues that the older generation were driven by, and driven by much more basic issues about their lives and their future. Thats the first thing. The second thing is amongst the big problems is the way that the United States and the west in general thinks about iraq which is first and foremost, do not think about iraq. We are all sick in general of iraq and people are trying desperately just like syria, unfortunately, you think about anything else, but this sb jek because its a real mistake, the future of theon looks very, very different ask if its minimally successful at having a government and having a democracy and a sectarian way of doing politics than otherwise and thats going to have ramifications throughout the entire region for decades to come and the second thing is when we are in washington engaged in iraq, we tend to be engaged by Something Else and we tend to be engaged with iraqis and we talk about terrorism and we talk about iran or the fact that we want to win an argument that weve been having for decades and whether its the argument that the iraq war was a mistake in the first place or an argument that the surge was correct and obamas decision to withdraw was wrong and those are the argument instead of looking forward with the future of iraq and it is these amazing events have been going on and absolutely horrifying in so many respects and the United States is basically absent at this point. Iraq and what you just mentioned and the demands of the populations and young people who were children when not only invasion of iraq 2003, but even the arab spring happened, were seeing it in egypt, as well, they were children and they were not allowed to go out in the restaurants to participate in demonstrations and they are teenagers and they can go out and they dont have the memory or that ideological background that their patients and grandparents used to have and whoever realizes this with foreign powers and talking about the power of competition and whoever manages to have a vision, and a clear Strategic Vision that this is a key and central element that will shape the future of the entire region i think well be better prepared to deal with the challenges that arise from the region and also to be prepared and ready to take advantage of the opportunities, as well. Im thinking north africa, countries that tunisia is transitioning and it is a process and it is important to have the process and it is good to have clear the rules of the game and algeria which we have not mentioned, very briefly, but the there are 45 Million People asking to have a new social contract, a new deal and a new republic and theyre basically asking for a second republic and whoever has that vision and whoever is able to connect with these forces and to try to help shape the future and positive in a constructive way will have the advantage in the future. Thank you very much. Please join me in thanking them. Thank you very much. Thank you. Enjoy your coffee break. You deserve it. [ applause ] later today the group new america holds a discussion on rank choice voting, a system in which voters rank candidates by preference. The candidate with the most firstpreference votes is then declared the winner. Watch that live today at 6 00 p. M. Eastern over on cspan. President trump has a Campaign Rally in minneapolis this evening. Well have that live at 8 00 p. M. Eastern and also on cspan, online at cspan. Org or listen live on the free cspan radio app. This week were featuring American History tv programs as a preview of whats available on cspan3. Tonight, the focus is the 1864 civil war battle of fort stephens fought in washington, d. C. When Confederate Forces tested the capital citys defenses before turning back. Watch that tonight beginning at 8 00 eastern on cspan3. This week were also showing you booktv in prime time. Tonight the theme is history, and authors include duncan white who looks at how cold war prap ganda was disseminated in the United States. Later, books on the womans Suffrage Movement and nazis efforts to repress artistic work they deemed challenging. That is at 8 00 eastern on cspan2. This columbus day weekend on American History tv, saturday at 10 00 p. M. Eastern on real america, the filmet who the who world is watching about the antivietnam war demonstrations in washington which resulted in the largest mass arrest in u. S. History. A thousand swarmed on to washington circle. Over a thousand more hit georgetown. Sunday at 2 00 p. M. Eastern artist harvey pratt shares his vision to the native American Veterans memorial on the national mall. In the middle is a 12foot stainless steel circle and at the base of that is a fire, and so you can use that fire to light your sweet grass and sage and things that you use and you can touch the water and use the fire. We call that the drum. Monday, columbus day at noon, Supreme Court justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Sonia Sotomayor discuss the judicial impact of the first woman on the u. S. Supreme court, sandra day oconnor. Sandra, if you read between the lines, what shes saying is if you want to improve the status of women in the nursing profession the best way to do it is to get men to want to do the job because the pay inevitably will go up. Explore our nations past on American History tv every weekend on cspan3. Next, the house energy and commerce subcommittee health holds a feel heading to learn about gun violence and its impact on public health. Lawmakers hear from doctors, a funeral homeowner and a woman who lost her son and brother to gun violence. This is just shy of two and a half hours. Good morning, everyone. Good morning, everyone. It will now come to order. Before we begin, an agreement between the majority and the minority, i would like to ask for unanimous consent for the house members