Indian reservation along Wounded Knee Creek were engaged in events specific to the age that resonate far beyond in the spirit of the oppression of certain peoples by federal troops. Wounded knee occurred in 1890, and the true blue saloon we will encounter today. It is the name of a particular bar at which american sailors were assaulted in the country of chile, specifically in valparaiso, chile, which is a major port along the Pacific Coast of chile. I want us to consider the ways in which the United States army and navy were envisioning their future. We were already considering over the past several presentations the ways in which the armed forces, especially certain elements of the officer corps, were anticipating great power conflict. A fair degree of anxiety infused their beliefs. Now, historians dont have any radically or persuasively clear understanding of exactly why americans of this age were so anxietyridden but at precisely the same time that there was tremendous optimism and confidence about prosperity and increasing american productivity and its concomitant benefits for american power. There were other americans who were deeply worried that the extension of american interests globally would implicate the United States in traditional rivalries among the worlds great powers and other, regional aspirants for power, such as japan. As much opportunity as presented the world at the end of the long 19th century, as its often called, or the findesiecle, it provided an opportunity, and an urgent one, for american strategists and thinkers, especially those in uniform but not exclusively so, when we consider Teddy Roosevelt or members of the navy league, to grapple with what this uncertain future really meant. That is the thrust of our presentation today. By way of navigating the images on slide one, we see buttons for the abcd ships that had been constructed in the 1880s. These were seen as the first elements of the new steel navy, as its often called. Steel hull warships, and you can get a sense that they were a blend of traditional age of sail and new steam technologies. With the rigging, as well as the smoke stacks, you can get a sense that the United States was undertaking to construct what were in many ways modern technological marvels. But if we take that young officer wililam simss critique to heart, we will appreciate that, despite the fact that the United States was modernizing, it was modernizing and building new ships without much understanding of exactly how to do it well. Sims and others would take the United States navy to task internally in forming an insurgency of sorts among Junior Officers to challenge the status quo, to challenge complacency, and also to challenge the new, and to argue that simply because it is new does not mean it is good. How would you know . Moreover, if you were a member of congress, whether on the House Armed Services committee or Naval Affairs committee or just a Voting Member of the appropriations committees, how would you know necessarily that what the navy was presenting you was either sensible or not . It is a real challenge to cultivate defense expertise in civilian legislative bodies and policymaking bodies. The United States was no exception in this era. If anything, it seems that congress was more than willing to appropriate lots of money to build things, but was less concerned with the specifics of how well things were made, how well they were trained and operated, and, frankly, the internal dynamics of Naval Administration and the School Systems that the navy would create to educate and develop proficiency in operating these complex marvels. The image to the right depicts sort of a jackinthebox like character. You turn the handcrank, like a cotton gin, perhaps, and out pops this frightening monster. It is probably hard to see, but the little diminutive fellow at the bottom has a ribbon that says egan. He was the american minister to chile, which, in this era, the United States had few embassies, so the senior ranking diplomat was not an ambassador but a minister. This is not a confessional issue, this is not a faithbased issue, this is just the title. He is not a religious man, but he is an american diplomat named egan. In this particular case, egan proves to be a firebrand and good fun in a lot of ways for the story well tell. What we see there is the fellow who has popped up, with kind of a clawlike figure and a fierce visage, is about to swing a saber that says chilean war scare. If i were to tell you that in 1891, 1892, the u. S. Came very close to warring with the country of chile in south america, you might be surprised. You might even be even more surprised if i were to tell you that, odds are, had the United States declared war on chile, it would have lost. We have to figure out how that happened. In many ways, i wish to shift our horizons beyond the boundaries of the continental United States, and also far overseas, as elements of the u. S. Army were considering the possibilities of conflict. Lets turn to slide two. A key figure in what i would categorize as the armys slow strategic reorientation was a fellow named arthur wagner. Wagner was a scholar in many respects. He was a student of war. He would author this particular study, the campaign of koniggratz, which was an examination of the austroprussian conflict or basically what we would call the german wars of unification in the 1860s. In the precise time as the American Civil War, i might add. Wagner would publish this volume about two decades later, in 1889. He would also write the First American military theory text, if you will, or the theory of war from an American Perspective called organization and tactics just a few years later, in 1894. Wagner is associated most often with this idea of officer education and not just about the mechanics of how you might organize your forces but really to think through the processes of strategy formulation, to harmonize policy, strategy, operations, and tactics, and the ways in which force could perhaps be optimally used. As a soldier, he was chiefly concerned with the affairs of land warfare. Much of the United States army was contented with thinking about the prospect of warfare in the future in the era of reconstruction and indian fighting on the frontier as fairly much a domestic continental emphasis. In other words, if it were to fight, it would fight on the home turf of the continental United States. The army in this era, or very few people, i should say, in the United States army, entertain the idea that the u. S. Army would be deployed along the likes of the mexicanamerican war or perhaps aboard ships to wage assaults on coastal fortress cities that dotted the confederacys coastline. The army was by and large a land force and did not think it was necessary to do much more. Wagner is one of the few individuals who really appreciated the possibility of great power conflict, and part of that study was a function of having firsthand observation of foreign militaries and their abilities. We will see a pattern here, that william sims in the navy and wagner many of his peers, henry halleck, another fellow well talk about today, John Schofield and others, in this era were tasked by their respective military departments, the war department, the Navy Department, with Foreign Military observation duties. These were accredited jobs. They did not function as illicit spies or anything of that like. They were known to their companions. In many of these foreign wars, such as the sinojapanese war or austroprussian war, the francoprussian war, choose your favorite war, americans were neutral in these conflicts, and so they had the ability often to travel to both sides of the warring lines, make notes and observations, and report back home about the stateoftheart of warfare in other lands. It was on the basis of these firsthand observations that wagner and others were able to make assessments of other countries military abilities and also, you could say, mentalities that undergirded military conscription, the power that was invested in certain countries military leaderships. And we should appreciate that, in the United States, the tradition was that military thinkers, military officers of even the highest rank were generally not considered very important in american society. They were often aristocrats, at least in the navy, and treated well in certain social circles, but beyond that they were not necessarily particularly politically influential. Certainly, at a broader societal level, very few people ever thought much about the United States navy or army. This notion of a slow strategic reorientation is one that i am making a case, an argument, that the United States army, or at least elements within the army, wagner being one of them, were arguing that, in order to prepare for the possibilities of future war, the United States army needed to be more diligent and meticulous in its study of foreign conflicts of contemporaneous concern. As much as the civil war had recently engulfed the United States, it was more tempting oftentimes to look at Foreign Military examples for shining possibilities, rapid campaigns, decisive victories, and the like. And it so happens that the germans or the prussians in these conflicts unifying germany in the 1860s, and then in the 1870s with france, was a key demonstrator of amazing abilities organizationally and on the battlefield. What becomes germany, which was then called prussia, was a force to be reckoned with. It was industrially organized, it made good use of the rails, and it displayed a host of other strategic inspirations that impressed american officers. So much so that wagner actually, if you read the text here, and i encourage you to study it, wagner was critical of this group of officers who were entranced, enchanted, if you will, by european models of recent warfare. Not so much the napoleonic, but the ones in the mid 19th century. There is a small class among professional soldiers in our country, he writes, who are wont to bestow all possible admiration upon the military operations in recent european wars. This is where he gets critical. Not because they were excellent, but because they were european. So he is making a case that the exoticism of Foreign Military example obscured what the United States in its American Civil War had actually accomplished in terms of developing military expertise, and so he makes a critical point of elevating the professionalism of the American Military institution. Now, wagners lament, in many ways, was that this institution had largely atrophied in the immediate aftermath of the war. The structures had been dissolved and dismantled per american demands that budgets be shrunk, the size of the military be shrunk, and sometimes the enlistments of temporary soldiers to fight in uniform during the civil war were all expired, so they all went home. So here, at the end of the second paragraph, he would argue that the art of war had reached a Higher Development in america than it attained in europe in 1866, and in some respects, higher than it reached in 1870. So he is making a case that, for all of the Amazing Things that prussia was able to accomplish on the battlefields of europe, that the United States had actually displayed far greater abilities, and so he does make a case moreover that europeans had failed to learn much, if anything, from the American Military experience, and had the austrians, for example, paid more attention to interior lines and to the effective use of defensive fortifications, such as that were erected around petersburg or fredericksburg or vicksburg, that they could have inflicted far more casualties on the prussians and perhaps have actually won the war that they lost. So wagner is a mind, an intellect in this era. I will say that he graduated 40th out of 43 cadets at west point in his graduating class, so hes kind of bottom of the barrel academically, but nevertheless one of the few who shined. There are a host of individuals like this historically who did not perform particularly well at the military academies but demonstrated through the course of their career that they were far more cerebral and far more capable than those class rosters suggested. By comparison, a class of 40 to 45 officers was the extent of a graduating class at the military academy in the late 19th century. Today, the numbers are somewhere in the realm of 900 cadets graduating from west point on an annual basis. So you have some sense of the enlargement, dramatic enlargement of the American Military in the modern age in contrast to what it was in the 19th century. Lets turn to slide three. In continuation of wagners experience, lets focus on a fellow named John Schofield. Schofield, like wagner, was a u. S. Military academy graduate. He graduated seventh out of a class of 52, so substantially better in terms of his academic performance than wagner, but his career stretched from 1853 to 1895 in lengthy, lengthy career. He was the recipient a medal of honor and had served in the civil war and attained the rank of Major General. He would subsequently be the secretary of war for president johnson, and culminate in the final position as commanding general of the u. S. Army, so he had a very distinguished military career. Near the end of this career, he was sent on a secretary of war survey of france, he went to the hawaiian islands, he traveled a good portion of the world. At west point, he was a philosophy instructor, among other topics, math and physics. In this regard, schofield demonstrated a variety of abilities. It is here, in particular in his memoir, where he emphasizes the armys role in a number of important facets in American Life. He makes an argument in the upper left paragraph about Coastal Defense and atrophying defenses of american forts designed to protect american ports, chiefly. The wooden carriages had gone to decay, the guns lying on the ground. In essence, he is making a case that naval technology, especially with metal hulled warships, the ironclad fleet, he calls them, were going to far outclass and outstrip american defenses along americas coast. He does make another case that the navy, in the second paragraph, was the aggressive arm, the offensive arm of National Military power. Not the first line of defense, the first line of offense. What is the point of the army, then . It is defense. It is a defensive orientation for the purposes of the army. And he also speaks about wounded knee in the paragraph to the right. And made a case that a fellow named nelson miles, who would have a lengthy career in the United States army in indian wars as well as in the spanishamerican war, but he would make a case that basically wounded knee was an accident, an accident. Rather than by design, it was a mistake. And that the sioux would not pursue a general war with the u. S. Army or with United States government because of the negotiations of general miles. The sioux had no general intention to go to war, he writes, if they could avoid it without starvation. Again, speaking to the problems of meeting the needs of native americans and fulfilling the treaty obligations that the u. S. Had established. Just by looking up there at schofield, of course, this was in an era when you could serve in uniform and have a beard down to your belly, sort of prespecial forces in its inspiration. If we turn to slide four, you see the cover of the particular book. He finishes as a lieutenant general, but 46 years in the army should suggest a lengthy tenure. But his suggestions, moreover, related to those of Teddy Roosevelt and mahan as well. He argues that members of congress should have military service. In my opinion, he writes in the upper left, no man is fit for a seat in Congress Unless he has had such an education as to be in uniform. Moreover, the first thing members of congress should learn is the old and trite military maxim that the only way to carry on war economically is to make it short, sharp, and decisive. How would you do that . Well, perhaps by winning an impressive battle like austerlitz, if you were napoleon. You could hope that the results would be durable. Or perhaps like the prussians against the austrians or french in those wars, middling wars of the 1860s, 1870s. But with regard to preparation, and that is a major, major theme, preparedness for war, among those like wagner and halleck, hahn, and here to dole out military appropriations in driblets is to invite disaster and ultimate bankruptcy. No man is wise enough to tell when war will come. So this idea that, if a hundred millions are necessarily for adequate preparation for defense and youve only spent 50, when war comes, you might as will have thrown your 50 millions into the sea. And this is a demonstrable statement. There is no such thing as partial defense in modern war. Schofield is offering a powerful critique to, by this time, more than a century of American Military tradition, which was comfortable with conscripting forces and generating troops and raising the means of fighting once war began. Once war began. He is saying that this is folly, and his peers in the navy share this perspective. He will also argue that the United States ought to undertake something much like the prussians had, which was universal military training for its male population. Basically to put all men into some form of military service, and that they would drill as reservists and be led by a smaller, fulltime professional force. He thought that this was an ideal balance to ensure that there was a sufficient pool, a national pool, not just a small driblet of militia, but by and large, that half the population would have received military training, and could be called on in time of big power war. This is when, in the bottom sort of right paragraph block, schofield is critical of Abraham Lincoln. The one lesson of reason and experience that i would impress on my countrymen in every possible way is when war or insurrection comes or is threatened so in other words, when the civil war is occurring in 1860, 1861 do not invoke judicial proceedings or call for 75,000 men as lincoln did in his initial call for volunteers to fight the confederacy after the attack on fort sumter. But call for men, that is the emphasis here, and let them come as many as they will. And if the army was configured properly, it could accommodate this mass upsurge in people along the lines of the french levee en masse. This is a bid for retooling the structure and the traditions and the temper of American Life to incline it much more toward a military countenance the likes of which the prussians had been doing and were held in high esteem in the ranks of the u. S. Army and navy. Australian navy. The bottom quotation i think really struck me as i was looking at schofield some years ago for the first time. Foreign conquests and permanent occupation are not a part of the policy of this country. What a radically different world we inhabit today. One of the questions as historians that we ought to pose is, if that was the mentality, even though schofield was arguing for strategic reorientation to be prepared for great power war, hes arguing for defensive war, not to go on the march overseas, not to seize other possessions or conquer anything else exterior to the continental United States. If that is the case, and if that was the norm in the 19th century, how did it come about that the United States has become sort of habitually entrenched in other lands . It is an open question and one worthy of ongoing examination. If you are schofield, how do you win war . How do you win a war . Ideally, the war would be short and it could be won quickly by the use of overwhelming numbers of trained soldiers ready to go at a moments notice who were the beneficiaries of a large defense budget, able to fight and win. He very much looked at the prussian models of the 1860s and 1870s as examples of doing just that. What is the folly and the pain and the tragedy of the civil war in schofields mind . That it was such a long and lengthy conflict. Why . Because neither side, the seccesionists or the unionists, had really invested in adequate military preparation for the possibility of big war. Thus, it dragged out. It got bigger and bigger and bigger, but it was a bleary, bloody affair. A bleary and bloy affair. Wagner would suggest the americans learned some things are along the way and refined the art of war in so doing, but schofield is critical. Lets turn to slide five. I would like to introduce you to a figure named emery upton, another Civil War Veteran and author of several works, and perhaps this should be a theme that the vision nears visionaries and those anticipating for war and making comparisons about other countrys countriess military abilities were authors in uniform. One of the ways they influenced their peers in uniform as well as interested observers in military affairs was through writing. In this case, infantry tactics double and single rank in 1875 was published by a commercial publisher. It was not published by the likes of the army general Staff College or Calvary School such as wagner. Upton pursued a commercial publisher. Nothing he is writing about is classified necessarily, but it suggests that commercial publishers found military science and art of profound importance worthwhile of investigation. Upton himself was a bit of a civil war phenom. He had achieved the rank of Major General and remained in uniform for a good many years after the civil war. He ultimately committed suicide in 1881. In that regard, he also follows in the steps, tragically, of someone else who could not adjust to retirement. Upton, by all accounts might have had a brain tumor, and was exhibiting a variety of signs of neurosis and cognitive difficulties that were inexplicable. There are some ideas that his mind was not quite right owing to medical maladies. Nevertheless. Upton had studied the civil war firsthand and he would write about it and basically develop his recommendations on how to improve upon the fighting, the infantry fighting on the battlefield. The proficiency of soldiers was vital to victory. Not just a conscript of volunteers or parttimers the likes of which Abraham Lincoln was one, and a local militia during the blackhawk wars. He is making a case for bona fide, professional soldiers who train and drill and understand how to use weapons, follow orders, and understand the purposes for which they are fighting. Lets turn to slide six. To get a sense of some of uptons International Experiences in the aftermath of the u. S. Civil war. Here i include the cover for his book that is published by the same commercial publisher, appleton and company, in 1878. In 1877, he had been given orders from the secretary of war and chief of staff, general sherman, to basically examine a variety of things. The secretary of war had encouraged him to travel through germany to Pay Attention to their schools for the instruction of officers and strategy, apply tactics in higher duties in the art of war, etc. Sherman said if youre going that far, go all the way to asia before you come home. Spend as much time as you can in calcutta in india. Yet familiar with british officers, learn how they do imperial duties to govern 200 million people, at the time. Notice how they quarter, feed and transport men in peace and war. All of these things encapsulated in this volume all of these books are online through an organization, and also google books. If youre interested, you can pursue them readily. It is a fascinating insight into contemporary military life in a number of countries. But having seen firsthand the parallel developments in other industrial nations, upton became of the conviction that the u. S. Was woefully backwards, and shared these perspectives. So they are contemporaneous commentators about the dereliction of duty at a National Level they believe the u. S. Government was failing to provide national security. That it was failing to anticipate the threats of Foreign Military and changes in in the age. Lets turn to slide seven. You see the cover for what is called the military policy in the u. S. Uptons volume, ultimately printed and looks like this, was a volume that circulated among his officer peers in the ranks of the army and he called it audaciously the military policy of the United States. Was it the military policy . By no means. But this was his vision statement for what the u. S. Military should be. He was convinced that the American People were deceiving themselves. What he was arguing was that there needed to be a fundamental strategic reformulation and how the u. S. Thought about war, how it prepared for, and he articulates some of the reasons. In the upper excerpt from military policy, with the greater mass of people who have neither the time or inclination to study military science, no error is more common then to mystic military resources for military strength to mistake military resources for military strength. In other words, you could have point 5000 have 25,000 soldiers, but perhaps they were not well developed, trained, maintained and in fighting form. The idea that simple numbers meant something by way of power, upton is trying to challenge. He will also argue in the second snippet that all of our wars have been prolonged for want of judicious preparation ,in other words, the u. S. Revolution, the civil war, had taken far longer than they ought to because the u. S. Was not prepared for those conflicts. He would make a case that the cause is obvious to the soldier and should no less obvious to the statesman. If you are in uniform you should receive these things, but if you are a civilian, perhaps you should not. Why had the u. S. Not cared . He argued the legacy of fear of standing armies since the days of the british colonies, there had been, as we discussed, a fear of a large military establishment. A traditional source of insecurity and tyranny. This was an englishspeaking peopless concern. He was making the case that the reason the u. S. People had been oblivious and opposed the preparation was because they have been overly fearful of a standing army. He writes in the bottom of the middle paragraph, he writes that i am aware i tread on delicate ground and every militia man who has patriotically responded to the call of his country in his hour of danger may regard himself as unjustly attacked. So upton is not trying to undermine the military art or passion or even contributions of parttimers, but he wishes america would wake up to the necessity he feels is urgent to get ready for real or and real war, and needs professionals to do that. Lets turn to slide eight. Lets look at how close the u. S. And chile came to war. You see some images of an American Naval officer, his nickname was fighting bob. And a couple of other images that relate to the scenes i would like to suggest. One of these is the drawing of a chilean warship called the esper alda. It was british manufactured and chile purchased it outright. Here we see from the bbc in 2014, a report of turkish sailors attacking u. S. Soldiers who were on leave in istanbul. I have called this scandal the baltimore incident and that is how it is often referred to in history books. If it is in a book, it is usually a footnote. This particular possibility of war is what i will call a near war with withchile. There was no fighting but it came close. The near war or baltimore incident are customarily the names we can attach to this almost war. In 1891, chile had undergone a civil war. There were two main factions the president and his supporters versus members of congress. The members of congress were the congressional section and were seeking to overthrow an individual they believed was a dictator. In order to arm an equip their insurrection and attempted overthrow, successful overthrow the president , they even purchased guns on the open market in the u. S. They sailed a ship to San Francisco and bought a cache of arms, back when you could buy guns in San Francisco. At this particular moment when congressional ists were trying to overthrow this dictator, the United States government elated lee belatedly and spasmodically reacted and was afraid that american neutrality would be compromised if chilean civil war belligerents acquired guns from the United States. U. S. Navy warship was tasked to intercept this ship laden with guns bound for chile. It failed, and once it arrived in chilean waters, the congressionalists, once they were informed the u. S. Government had pursued them, were rather incensed and angered the u. S. Government was attempting to interfere in the outcome of a war they believed was just. Strike one for the reputation of the u. S. And in particular the u. S. Navy in the esteem of congressional supporters. Strike two is because of egan from the initial slide we looked at with the jack in a box. He was a bit of a firebrand, a trash talker, and some of the impolitic things he said about chileans leaked in the press and helped inflame things. It seemed the u. S. Government preferred the status quo in chile. Why . Its minister was in favor of the president and moreover, the u. S. Navy was tasked with trying to prevent congressionalists from equipping themselves. So we have what you could call strike two and the reputation of the United States and its emissaries and chile. At this time, the american warship observing military slugging it out along the coastline of chile. Also apparently some german ships and french and british were periodically observing military operations during the civil war. It was routine but the attention of the American Ship or the presence of the American Ship, called the baltimore, caught the attention of the congressionalists. They felt they were leaking information to the president. Unaware of the depth of brewing hostility, perhaps blissfully unaware of it was the commander of the baltimore, a fellow who we already encountered in his choice comments about the greeley expedition. He allowed part of the ships crew to go on shore leave. To allow unauthorized shore leave in the middle of a civil war seems lunacy. You would not wish to authorize shore leave in syria, for example. Here you see the attack on american sailors and in istanbul which is a far more serene country in a lot of ways than perhaps see you. But he authorized his sailors to go on leave, and where did they end up . Predictably a bar. Sailors in this era were known for inebriation and frequenting bars and bar life. There was a violent reaction among local chileans who basically orchestrated an attack on the american sailors at the bar. It was called the trueblue saloon. At the trueblue saloon, several dozen american sailors were roughed up, physically assaulted, and two of them killed. The local police, the chilean police, assisted apparently in some of the brutality, participating in mob violence and certainly not protecting inebriated american sailors. Some made it back to the ship and reported to their commander what had occurred. The commander corresponded with the american minister and collectively they wired back to shehlay committed a major faux pas when he wired back to washington, he lied. He said my sailors were not drunk, they were good and noble and respectable people. No selfrespecting Navy Department official or member of the executive branch could appreciate that sailors on shore leave during this era would not be drunk. So he shot himself in the foot of his credibility, so to speak, by a sickly misleading or trying to mislead the events, or mischaracterizing the events. He is recalled because of his untrustworthiness and bad decisionmaking. The fellow tasked with replacing him on the baltimore was named evans, depicted here. He arrived on a warship called the yorktown. The next few months, this crisis enlarged and radiated in intensity across the United States. American Public Opinion got more tenacious and angry as the press manipulated and toyed with american sentiments. There is certainly nothing wrong with emphasizing the death of american sailors as a source of agitation, but there were certainly calls for war and teaching the chileans a lesson and demanding the chileans respect the power of the United States. This chorus of voices from washington, d. C. To the west coast, it seemed the American People were inclined to fight chile to force it to apologize. We could call this an affair of honor. Does one have to fight for honor . Can one win . Most americans were brimming confident that chile must be a backwards country economically and militarily, they considered the decrepit vestiges of the spanish empire. Most americans through uninformed and racist lenses, described chileans in all kinds of unsavory ways. But americans were confident that should they be called the fight, they could destroy chile. They demanded an apology. Demandingproblem with an apology from the congressional list faction that has taken over was that no selfrespecting congressional list leader would ever apologize it was anted states affair of honor. It was also a matter of consolidating chilean popular politics behind the victory over the president. Chilean congressional list would not apologize to the americans or be forced to bow to the americans and did not feel the need to do so. Especially when the american minister was irresponsible, the other American Naval commander was a fool they believed. Why would you apologize to fools . For all parties involved including the United States, evans, despite his nickname was a very practical individual, they called him the pragmatist. He had earned his stripes and was a combat veteran of Amphibious Assault in the civil war and was a seasoned longtime naval officer. Quickly he took estimation of the situation where he lay and anchor. Quickly that very the coastal guns of the chileans that were maintained and so maintained in some batteries were of german recent manufacture and if well trained those crews could be directed to blast apart his warship which was a metal hold ship that was not armored with armor plate. He had a newer warship that was highly vulnerable to stateoftheart coastal batteries. Ship was anda example of the chilean investment in modern technology. Evans appreciated individually could destroy and sink every american warship even if they all scattered or gathered in one mighty armada. Had the firepower and defenses evans appreciated this firsthand andouring the ship ingratiating himself with chilean hosts. He was careful not to step any toes. Evans recognized that if war were to come he would die. Simply put. He was not afraid of dying necessarily, he figured if it was going to come bring it on. He did not want to die on the count of miscommunication. His estimation of chilean defenses were some of the things americaned to moderate National Policy towards chile. Fortunately for all parties concerned the chilean government subsidedou months thanks in parts to evans diplomatic initiatives and confidence building relationships. The chileans were willing to apologize to pay restitution to the families of dead sailors. Making amends and soon this became a footnote. Lets turn to slide nine and look at some of the newspaper clippings i have acquired out of various newspapers from 1891. In october from chicago and kentucky and different cities. Chile was often spelled outrage was not due to mob violence. Incidenta manufactured entries, onethese chili, is called saucy implying that the chileans were fiery and playing with the food. The United States is preparing for or without a clear understanding of what the implications may be. We learned subsequently that evans people for all their bluster and bellicose never appreciated nor did the National Command authority or the president or the department thatvy fully appreciate the United States was preparing to march to war without the means to conducted. Felt . Uld schofield have how would anybody have felt if the United States marched to war witnessing the death and destruction of the entire u. S. Navy. Would have been difficult to transport an army without a navy. 10 to see to slide some of the other statements. From were witness reports american sailors who were survivors of this incident, pretty ugly stuff, could you imagine the panic of being caught up in this mob violence if you were a sailor. In slide 11 we see the images of those sailors. One fellow died instantly and the other died h of these sailors this was a moment of great opportunities to commemorate the dead and to valorize Naval Service in distant lands. In efforts of these people 1890 to write and influence the 1880s, the naval renaissance idea and the increasing emphasis paid on the American Military activity and naval act cavity is starting to pay dividends in the writhing rising esteem of American Armed forces and the american public. To give you a sense of the trajectory lets turn this 12 where evans describes in a sailors log he would say it is extraordinary to send a naval officer to find out the sentiment of the company. The responsibility of the position almost frightens me. I could wire back a message tomorrow that would cause decoration for 24 hours. , perhapsllicose sailor , i might have perceived some of the antagonisms the chileans direct as necessitating , backing down for the sake of discretion and survival. And for the sake of maintaining american honor even though it does not realize it was endangered. Resolves evan sales home and the American People were full of confidence that they had forced the chileans to back down. Nevertheless the crisis of return andas evans it rose in increasing rank he was the commander of the great white lead and his global circumnavigation to the area of the roosevelt administration. Evans opinion of this critical moment of naval vulnerability is something that helps to accelerate the conviction of his peers in uniform and their supporters in congress of the thent necessity to improve fighting capabilities of american versus so they would not be bested by a regional powers such as chile. Lets turn to slide 13. In the schofield memoir he reveals a striking dream that he had about the way in which chile into thissis as splendid animal. Were strong and more powerful than ever. Slidel skip forward on 14. Roomecretary of the navys or to Congress Advanced deployment of American Ships the baltimore would be if you are present on the scene of hostilities watching other countries go to war, and a accident happens where your ship is attacked or your sailors are implicated in some internal effect onhat is the American Foreign policy . Most americans did not contemplate that, even those supporting the idea of expanding the navy. If you expand the navy, youre going to send ships into difficult waters and who knows what will happen . You might be at greater risk if you build a bigger fleet. 15 in the second memoir he reflects back on what a different welcome he had about at valparaiso. Strength and full steaming inrence with the envy of the worlds navies. Evans comments on that and you can read that. The final slide i have is some of the ways in which this new institution established in 1884 would try and interpret the lessons of recent conflicts. Whether america was a direct participant or observing such as war between china and russia im sorry, china and japan or any number of conflicts around the world. American observers in the navy and Army Uniforms went abroad. The naval war called an undertaking the initial gaming activity to rehearse in the big board, literally, how you might play battleship. To anticipate the movements and requirements of modern industrial warfare, if your ships are going to steam away, where do they resupply . How do they get coal . How did they get freshwater . How did they get food . Where are alan bases or friendly allied basis or friendly facilities . This became a power projection force. How do do it, how do you sustain forces, how do you repair them if they are damaged . All of these questions were vital to the operation of efficiency of a fleet in time of war or individual ships in a time of war. It became part and parcel of increasing study by officers in both services to try and appreciate what are the ingredients of waging industrial war . It is not just heroism, not just that you are order to fight. They do not expect to receive volunteers or conscripts or militia instantaneously. What are the professional forces you have to fight at a moments notice . How welltrained are they . How familiar with american Strategic Principles . How familiar are they with interoperability . What are the doctrines upon which they will fight such as nelsons band of brothers . Do they work well . All of these are the concerns that are manifesting in the ranks of the United States armed forces at the end of the 19th century. 2027488003 announcer listen to lectures on history on cspan3. Announcer you are watching cspan three. All weekend, every weekend on cspan3. Announcer next on American History tv. Retired colonel thomas holden, a former marine corps pilot, talks about his participation in operation frequent wind. The evacuation of americans and south vietnamese allies saigon. The National World war i museum and memorial provided this january 2020 video. I would like to introduce retired marine colonel colonel holden. He was a Second Lieutenant during his College Graduation and proceeded directly to pensacola where he was trained as a marine pilot. He was designated a naval aviator in december 1968 and received further training in the at the marineer base in california. He was deployed to vietnam in april 1969 and on his second southeast asia