Transcripts For CSPAN3 Decision To Bomb Hiroshima Nagasaki 20240712

Bomb hiroshima and nagasaki is that title of a series of American University institute of Nuclear Studies Institute Press briefings. Up next, for historians who have spent decades studying the topic summarize the findings about then take questions from journalists. The Nuclear Studies institute recorded this zoom event and provided the video. Barbara cochran, Professor Emeritus of the university of Missouri School of journalism, the world first journalism school. Andally i was a journalist news executive at the washington star, npr, bc, and cbs. I wont moderate the discussion today. And ninth, 1945, the United States dropped the only Nuclear Weapons ever used in a war on the japanese cities of hiroshima and nagasaki. 75 years later the debate continues over the decision of president Harry S Truman to use these weapons. The world still echoes with the repercussions of that act. For journalists, the anniversary of major events offer what editors love, a news peg. Anniversaries present the opportunity to commemorate the event for a new generation, to report on new and relevant material from the historic record, to take stock of the impacts of the events, at to look for parallels between those earlier events and issues that we face now. Will75th anniversary surely generate many stories for todays journalists. That is why we are fortunate to have with us today, for historians who have spent decades researching, writing and lecturing about the decision to use the atomic bomb in 1945 and the aftermath. You received their biographies with the program announcement. So i focus on the highlights as i introduce them. Sherwin,ers are martin a professor of history at George Mason University and the author of a world destroyed, hiroshima and its legacies. He is also the coauthor with another of our speakers, kai bird, of american medias, the triumph of J Robert Oppenheimer oppenheimer which won the Pulitzer Prize in 2006 for biography in september, marty will publish gaveling with armageddon, nuclear relet from hiroshima to the cuban missile crisis. Messes kai bird who i just mentioned, the executive director of Cuny Graduate Center levy center for biography. He is coeditor of hiroshimas shadow, and the author of the chairman, John J Mccloy and the making of the american establishment, in addition to coopting the Pulitzer Prizewinning book. Next is garr alper bench was atd academic positions kings college, cambridge, the institute of politics at harvard and the university of maryland. He is the author of two books on todays subject, atomic diplomacy, hiroshima and potsdam, and the decision to use the atomic bomb. He is currently a principal of the democracy collaborative in an independent Research Organization and finally we will hear from peter chris that, professor of history and director of the Nuclear Studies institute at American University. He is coauthor of rethinking the atomic bombings of hiroshima and nagasaki, japanese and american perspectives, and also coauthor with oliver stone, of than york times bestseller, the untold history of the United States. And he is author of the decision to risk the future, harry truman, the atomic bomb, and the apocalyptic narrative. So let me explain the format for our program. Our historians are going to speak first. When they have finished the presentations, we have seasoned journalists who oppose the first round of questions. Then we will who will oppose the first round of questions, then we will open it up to the audience. I will turn it over to our first speaker, martin sherwin. Martin thank you, barbara, for doing this and welcome, everyone. Certainly appreciate your interest. I was asked to provide a framework for our discussion. I will begin with what i think is a question everybody who does research should always ask. How do we know what we know . How do we know what we know . Well, if we are talking about government decisions, we know what the government tells us. Us the bombold prevented an invasion. Later, heand a half asked henry stimson, the secretary of defense who was in charge of the atomic bomb project, to write an article, and reinforce the idea that it was important to drop the bomb in order to save lives. Simpson said that in harpers magazine in february, 1947. Was, there was a choice between using the atomic bomb and invading. That, however, was not true. There were at least two other choices. The Unconditional Surrender doctrine to make it s lifehat the emperor was not in danger. And it stimson admitted that several years later when he wrote in his memoir, on page 629, of on active service in peace and war, it is possible, he wrote, in the light of the final surrender, that a clearer and earlier exposition of american willingness to retain the emperor, could have produced an earlier ending of the war. The other option was the entry of the soviet union and. Why was the entry of the soviet union going to bring the war to an end, as american intelligence confirmed . Because the japanese could not fight a two front war. The japanese were more anticommunist than the americans. The idea of a soviet occupation of japan was their worst nightmare, in addition, it was clear to the japanese, and it was true, that stalin intended to take al qaeda. So the secretary of state james byrnes made clear in an interview in 1965 intended to take hokkaido. James byrne the secretary of state may declare in an interview in 19 625 that that confirms the drop before the soviets came and he said quote. It was ever present in my mind that it was important to have an end to the war before the russians came in. All of this information has been available for 50 years. It is important to think about evidence, and why the bomb was dropped. Thank you. Marty, you have a document you wanted to show. Do you want to . Martin i think we will do that later. Barbara ok, thank you. Now we will turn to kai byrd. Kai thank you. I want to begin by asking the question about why we cannot have a National Conversation about the atomic bomb, when the country is at a point where we are having very controversial conversations about race and the and of women in our society all sorts of really tough issues but we cannot seem to confront this issue, it is verboten. We are still in love with the bomb. Me as austrating to historian that we are now having this kind of a conversation 25 years after the smithsonian controversy where the smithsonian museum, our National Museum, was compelled to censor itself under pressure, political pressure, from the American Legion, from the air force association, from congress. And they canceled a 10,000 squarefoot exhibit. That had all sorts of complicated history from both sides and grappled with some of the evidence that, for instance marty was referring to. But we are still there. We are still hearing in the a new books being published, people endorsing what is in effect the official narrative that was put out there 75 years ago. Ive never 25 years ago during the smithsonian, when the exhibit was canceled, the day the final exhibit opened, the enola gay plane. I published an oped in the Washington Post. Critiquing the exhibit and what had happened to it. Entire letterse page of the Washington Post was devoted to letters attacking it. On what . The issue was, i had sent we dropped the bomb without a warning to the japanese. All these veterans of world war ii piled on and said there were leaflets dropped and they were right, there were leaflets dropped, the day after the bombing of hiroshima. The day after nagasaki. And yet, you know, the mythology seems to be so immovable, you cannot debunk it enough. For example we recently heard in books,ss and in various the notion that a million american lives were saved. That is not true. This figure was never given to truman. About byver bandied the war secretary stimson. , when i did my biography of bundy, i asked about this because he was the ghost writer for stimson of the harpers article that first used that term, that figure and i said where did you get it . And he sheepishly said, well the warner there were no documents. I looked to see if there were any estimates giving us an estimate of how Many American lives would have been lost if we had gone forward with an upasion and so i just picked the million casualty figure because it was a nice round figure. He pulled it out of thin air. Another story. I wrote a biography of john mccoy which came out in 1992. Theres a chapter about hiroshima and at one point mccloy, i described critical meeting on june 18, in which truman, stimson, i believe general marshall was there. All the major decisionmakers, trying to discuss whether they should give the green light to the planned invasion, which was not going to take place for months and months if not maybe a year it was going to take that long to marshal the forces for a major invasion. Atally at the end i describe the end of this meeting, truman turns to mccloy and says jack, you have not spoken up. What are your thoughts about all this . And mccloy bluntly, he was a blunt speaking commonsensical fellow at times and he says, i think we ought to have our heads examined, if we do not realize there are alternatives to what youre describing. Contemplating a full invasion. Changing,ferred to modifying the terms of some surrender but to make it clear we were not intending to hang the emperor, that we were going to have a Constitutional Monarchy put in place. , it is clear from intelligence that the japanese are on the verge of surrendering. How did he know this . Well, he was reading the magic cables, our intercepts of japanese diplomatic cable traffic. And so was truman. Truman we now know, in his own diary, refers to one of these magic cables, as the cable from emporor, asking for peace, two weeks or more before the bomb was used. They all knew that there were options. They all knew that the japanese were on the verge of surrender. Facts,istorical these pieces of evidence, have an out there for decades now. Gar wrote about them in 19 625 in his first book, and at Great Lengths in his 1995 book, the decision. And yet, here we are, we historians know this and yet most American People, if you ask them on the sidewalk about this issue, they regurgitate the official wisdom. It is very frustrating. Gar let me begin to take up kai stopped. One way to begin the context of the story is to notice that virtually every top military leader of the time, some of the joint chiefs of staff, all of the joint chiefs of staff, the heads of the air force, army, etc. , etc. , and i can give you the full listing and we will have that posted, went public after the war. Almost immediately after the war, saying that the bomb was totally unnecessary. This is truman that had just made the decision. The bomb was totally unnecessary, and the war what is been over in a couple of weeks. Or they said it later. The documentation is available in many places but it is available in my book, the decision to use the atomic bomb. Heres admiral lakey, the president s chief of staff, he presided over the joint chiefs of staff meeting and over the combined chiefs of staff meeting, quote, the use of this barbarous weapon, and he is a good friend of trumans. Barbarous use of this weapon at hiroshima and nagasaki, was of no material assistance in our war against japan. The japanese were already defeated and ready to do surrender. It,being the first to use we adopted an ethical standard, to the barbarians of the dark age. I was not taught to make war in that fashion. Words cannot be won by destroying women at children. That last line is important. Most of the young men and service were away from hiroshima, so that meant you had old folks, young people, and not many young men, women and children. He said i was not taught to make war, this is the chairman of the u. S. Joint chiefs of staff and the combined british u. K. Chief of staff. Heres another one and i will not go on, there are 40 i published in, the decision to use the atomic bomb. The famous hawk who commanded the 21st bomber command, curtis lemay, declared flatly at a press conference, the atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all. The war would have been over in two weeks without the russians entering, without the atomic bomb. Speaking publicly, critiquing president truman. And here is general to dwight d. Eisenhower. It was not necessary to hit them with that awful thing. So, on and on and on, barbara i think can post 40 b statements by virtually every Major Military leader at the time. That is not definitive proof. But it opens the door to series questions of all the military leaders in the u. S. Government, or most of them, they the thing was unnecessary and we should not have used it. The problem is you have a situation for historians, that the decisionmaking was highly concentrated, in 1945. The president of the United States was basically being advised by his very, very close friend, and a very complex washington figure named james f burns, became secretary of state at that time. Do nots view and we have records of this, they were private discussions, we have indication, bits and pieces. About how the targeting was done. But the actual decisionmaking was with burns and truman. What we know about burns attitude is he saw the atomic on dutch bomb as what he saw as major leverage against the russians and diplomatic matters and he thought maybe we could end the war early so the russians cannot get far into manchuria. Another comment we have from scientists who met with him was it was to make the russians more manageable. This would be, truman called a hammer he had over these guys. The secretary for, stimson, said this is the mastercard of diplomacy against the russians, not of the war. So we have a lot of indirect evidence, and to be clear that is indirect evidence. We do not have minutes, there are no minutes of key meetings between truman and burns. We have the simpson diary from burns. But there is mounting evidence, one, they knew the war could be ended without an invasion. I think that is very welldocumented and we can go into that evidence. That it is simply not true. We also have strong evidence, all the intelligence evidence on when thets, the russians entered and they had been asked to enter bias, it was likely to end shortly as long as they can keep the emperor. Then why did they do it . The indications were strongly it was to try to end the war before the russians got too far into manchuria, a diplomatic consideration. For the secretary of state and truman, i will have a hammer on those boys, speaking about the russians, diplomatic considerations about what to do about europe in the post yalta discussions at pottstown in 1945 in 1945 just before the bomb was used. One thing that is not complex is what the military said about it, they knew the bomb was unnecessary. The japanese were already defeated. And if they were told they could keep their emperor, the war would be over. That was the u. S. Intelligence position from april, 1945. When the russians come in, tell them they can keep the emperor. The war will stop. Not even the first landing could begin until november. The invasion itself was set for spring, 1946. We know that was what they understood at the time. Yet they want to head with the bombing, without assurances for the emperor. One last point. The proclamation issued at the joint conference, at potsdam, potsdamk. , ussr, the proclamation, warning japan to surrender, including very important paragraph, saying, you can keep your emperor. And the osama he wants the emperor because and the u. S. Army wants the emperor because it allows them to control japan using his power his power. Essential to the japanese, the emperor was guarded as a god, that paragraph got removed, making all but impossible for the japanese to surrender, so the japanese the bombing went forward on august 6, august 9, without this explicit insurance assurance, which intelligence had made clear, along with all the intelligence intercepted messages. So that is one of the devil and painful things about this decision one of the difficult and painful things about this decision. That had a lot to do is to clemency, with diplomacy and probably less to do with the war. Barbara now for air cleanup hitter, peter cosmic. Kusnik. Reinforce points my colleagues have been making. First peter first, the joint intelligence staff reported april 11, if in any time the ussr should enter the war, all japanese will realize that absolute defeat is inevitable. They had repeated that on subsequent occasions, including on july 6. Gar made the point about all of the military leaders. In 1945, United States had a five star admirals and generals. On recordhe eight are saying that the atomic bombs were either militarily unnecessary, morally reprehensible, or both. The eighth, general marshall, said the soviet invasion would likely leverage the japanese into surrendering. So, as far as saying the military opinion was clear. Was income as gar of the military opinion was clear. In order was issued to military commanders in the field not to make public, its about the atomic bomb. He said id about it do not want macarthur and others to say the war could be one without the use of atomic bombs. What about harry truman what did harry truman know . President , became Vice President for 82 days before roosevelt died. During those 82 days he spoke to roosevelt twice, got nothing of substance. People had very low regard for harry truman. In fact he did not even know we were building an atomic bomb, until after he got sworn in, on the evening of april 12. But truman did understand a lot about what was happening. Pottstownd he want to potsdam to make sure the soviets were coming in and had lunch with stalin july 17. Afterwards he wrote in his diary, stalin will be in the pity japsy august 17, when that occurs. He wrote home to his wife best, areess, the russians coming at and we will end the war years sooner, think of all the boys will not be killed. He shared that attitude with other top leaders including burns and the others and they all acknowledged that the japanese were defeated, they understood they were defeated and they were looking for a way to get out of the war, for example, the meeting of the 16,nese war cabinet on may they issued the following document. They said, at the present moment, when japan is waging a life or death struggle against the u. S. And britain, soviet entry into the work will deal a death blow to the japanese empire and that was reality. The american leaders knew that with reality. Japanese leaders were asked afterwards why they surrendered, they said they had to do so because of the soviet invasion. The soviet invasion began at midnight, august 8. The next morning, all the diplomats met at at prime andster togos residence said we have to accept the potsdam proclamation immediately, potsdam plus the emperor. Was Prime Minister suzuki asked august 8, why they cannot delay surrender, he said i cannot do that. If we missed today, the soviet union will take not only hokkaido, korea, also and this would destroy the foundation of japan. We must and that of we must end the war. We can deal with the u. S. That understanding about the liberations is now even in the National Museum of the u. S. Navy, here in washington, d. C. Their exhibit on the atomic bomb states clearly, the vast destruction wreaked by the bombings of hiroshima and people, made,000 little impact on the japanese military. However the soviet invasion of entry of, say changed their minds. We have these documents. There are so much more if we have time. My students earned a 12 hour lecture on this because it is so important. That it is so many documents that need to be discussed. Another aspect we have not touched on yet, is what the leaders understood. And summer,inning, 1942, edward teller, was urging the top brass to not even worry about the atomic bomb. Because that was a trivial problem. And lets immediately go for the super bomb, one that could be made as powerful as the sun, unlimited power. Oppenheimerobert briefed the interim committee making decisions on the use of the bomb. He said within three years, we will likely have weapons, between 700 and 7000 times as powerful as they rush him about. Date new that. They knew that. Even president truman understood that on some level. The first day he was in office he got briefed by jimmy burns, james burns came to spartanburg, south carolina, and briefed truman about the bomb. Truman wrote in his memoirs, he said it was a weapon rate enough to destroy the whole world. Great enough to destroy the whole world. On april 25efing from groves and secretary of war stimson, and he wrote this is so powerful i could destroy the world and i thought about it and listened and agreed maybe we should not use it because it can destroy the world. On july 25, at potsdam, he got the full briefing on the test amagordo. R al he wrote in his diary, this may be the destruction prophecy in the Freddie Sally after noah and his ark, not a bigger more powerful bomb to fired instruction. The question for us at some level is why truman, who was not bloodthirsty, was not an evil figure, why he would use the bomb, in a way he had been warned was most reckless way possible, and was likely going to lead when arms race that could and destroying life on the planet . Let me touch on a couple of more aspects of that. The scientists, many scientists, have been signing petitions, and urging treatment and leaders not to use the atomic bomb. They said was going to leech when uncontrollable arms race between the u. S. And the soviets, that could be doom for everybody. Those documents do not get to trim it, but he had the basic gist did not get to truman but he had the basic just of it in his own comment. Many of the scientists knew that. Knew that. Truman leslie groves, the head of the manhattan project, he said there was never two weeks from the time i took part in this project, any illusion on my part that russia was our enemy, and the project was conducted on that basis. Joseph knocked flat, the future Nobel Prize Winner in march, 1944, over dinner, when he said, you realize the main purpose of this project is to subdue the russians . The russians understood that. The japanese had been trying to get the russians to intervene on their behalf to get better surrender terms. The russians knew better than anybody how desperate the japanese were to surrender. So when the u. S. Used the atomic bomb, that the russians near was totally unnecessary, all of the top leaders in the kremlin, interpreted if that drip bomb was dropped not on the japanese but on the soviet union, as a warning to the soviets of what would happen to them and worse if they interfered with american plans in europe or asia. Theres more to talk about. That should be plenty to start with. Then we can elaborate on those topics. Barbara thank you very much, peter. This has all been really interesting. We are getting good questions and on our chat function. So we will move to those soon. I do want to say that im going elseing up here something and i wanted to ask you, since this is a conversation aimed at journalists, i would like to ask you all about the role journalists played in immediately disseminating the news of the bombings and framing the coverage as time went by, the news was a huge shock, not just to the public, but to the reporters who had to cover the story. The whole concept of a Nuclear Explosion was so new that the washington star typist who is taking dictation from the white house correspondent, wrote the. Had dropped and at some bomb, spelled adam, like the first human. Was john hersey who made his way to hiroshima and wrote the first story for american audiences in the new yorker of what really happened. So i would like to ask you all to share your thoughts on that would youd, kai, like to start us off . I am you to. Muted. That is an interesting question, the role of the early journalists in covering this, the thing i am struck by always is that if you look at the record of the early critics of the bomb, they were actually all republicans and rightwingers. Review, in thel 1950s, was a critic. Herbert hoover was a critic of the decision, saying it was unnecessary. And it was ironically left wingers and leftwing publications like the nation magazine, that defended the decision. And then, low and behold, by the 1960s and 1970s, everything slept. And it everything slept. Flipped. And it was the right wing defending the decision and the leftwing had become critics of it. This is ironic. As journalists we should be aware of the politics of this hot button issue. You included a chapter in your book, the decision, about the role of journalists. Would you like to speak to that . Gar it is an interesting question. My book, the decision, the use of the atomic bomb, is a twopart book, a part on the decision and second, the story how did the story we now have become popular . On the one hand, the bomb dropped, the war ended and the boys came home. So it seems obvious. But in fact what we now know is, i believe the story we sketched out here. Slowly, the conservative press was very much, as kai said, they did not like this at all. Herbert heuer had come to president truman privately Herbert Hoover had come to president truman privately and said tell them they can keep the emperor earlier and tell them theres no need for an invasion and spelled out. The Republican Leadership in the senate was saying the same thing. Clarify and the terms the emperor will not be harmed and that war is likely to end early and you do not need an invasion. This inorializing on april, 1945, saying the same thing in april, 1945. And after the war the conservative press, began to criticize it in line with what had been the republican position and the conservative position building over this time. , reached ando crescendo by the end of 1946, that somehow it was felt, and James B Conant led this, the eqade ic later l leader from harvard involved in the bomb said, how are we going to do something about the criticism billing up . There was building up of criticism asking questions, all the military leaders had come out after, saying it was unnecessary. So stimson was wheeled into position, and george bundy did ghostwriting for an important article published in february, 1947 in harpers. Basically, stimson was an esteemed figure, republican, conservative, and the democratic, republican roosevelt put them in the cabinet to balance a strong eminent republican. He laid out this position george bundy wrote saying the bomb was necessary, something stimson did not believe at the time. But he wrote this, propaganda piece, and it did shut down the debate. To 1966. Rom a 1947 there is an interesting story about how the press that built up the argument, and that it was squashed and cut off in 1947. And it disappeared for 20 years. That in itself is a powerful part of the hiroshima tail tale. Barbara thank you. Peter . Myer im going to yield time. Actually i think not. I would like to take issue with what kai was saying because i think a lot of people on the left were also very much opposed the atomic bombing. We have statements by norman and an cousens, editorial, august 18, modern man is obsolete, he talks about the primitive fear as a result of the bomb. There was a huge oneworld movement saying that sovereignty is now obsolete, that was largely a leftwing movement. There was also the scientists mobilizing at all the laboratories, in order to come of the opposite of a chemist in world war i, the Nuclear Physicist after world war ii, were in the forefront of the movement to ban atomic weapons. So i think the left was divided. The interesting response is the religious response. Truman was taken aback when the vatican condemned the bombing the next day. And also came out of the federal council of churches, the commonweal christian sensory, the religious community was almost unanimously against the atomic bombing. The public, however, was in support. Inup issued a poll, august, that said 85 of the American People supported the atomic bombing. In december, roper issued a 7 at said 22 point that saidd a poll, 23 which the japanese had not surrendered so quickly so we could have dropped more atomic bombs. The response the response in the media was more complicated. At nbc radio, in a news broadcast august 6 said, anglosaxon science has developed a new explosive 2000 times as destructive as any known before. For all we know, we have created a frankenstein. We must assume with the passage of only a little time, and approved form of a new weapon we used today can be turned against us. The stateless postdispatch said, science may have signed the mammalian worlds death earth inand deeded an ruins to the amp ants. You have Edward Morrow reporting on cbs a couple of days later saying, seldom if ever has a war ended, leaving a victors with such a sense of uncertainty and fear, with such a realization, that the future is obscure, and that survival is not assured. So i think initially, the media was appalled. There is article after article at what would happen if it bomb was dropped on your city . On milwaukee . On denver . On dallas . They show grids of how much destruction there would be. I think the initial response was more tempered. Which is why if we are saying compton and stimson and truman had to double down with this defense, this triumphalist narrative that this was the only way to avoid and invasion, when we know the reality was quite different. Barbara thank you. We will move onto journalist questions. Then we will get to other questions that have come in. Folks will be asked to participate who have been thinking about this for a few days, we want to get to. Also i want to mention the Contact Information for all of the speakers are posted in our chat. If you want to reach anyone later, for an interview or more discussion, you have that information. Now, im going to turn to the journalists. I will ask you each to unmute your mic. Theill begin with owen, former world news editor of usaid today and current executive editorial of usa today, and current executive editor of International Economy magazine. I want to consummate the speakers for a fascinating discussion of this really horrifying event. My question to any and all of you is, after the horrific white cost at hiroshima, the japanese did not surrender immediately . And why truman felt it necessary to drop a second bomb on nagasaki . Or whether he had already decided he was going to do that . Barbara who wants to answer . I will take first crack at that. First, there was one decision made to drop to bobs. Drop 2 bombs. There were supposed to be four \ays between, but when tibbetts came back from the hiroshima run, the scientists said we think we can do it in three days. And it was five days then four days and how about three days . Because theres bad weather coming in. The scientists said, i think we can do it, when tibbetts asked. The scientist said i think we can do it, i think we can arm that complicated plutonium bomb in three days. That is why the second bomb was dropped. The decision was made on tinian by lt. Col. And some scientists. Barbara im going to interject ofe with a question from one the people who is participating, ed fields, who asks, what the demonstration of a abomb, considered as an option to enter the war . It was discussed but set aside with the argument that if it willdemonstration, not have much of an effect, because we have been wiping out every week and japan. Why would a demonstration affect the japanese more than that instruction of these cities more than that description de struction of these cities . Barbara with firebombs, right . Firebombs and every thing else. Barbara 01 did you have a followup . Japanrification, why did not immediately surrender after hiroshima . Why it took two or three days after nagasaki for them to agree to an Unconditional Surrender . Because the bombing, the destruction of another city, was simply the destruction of another city. It was the entry of the soviets into the war, that really through the japanese into complete panic. You know, at this point, if we do not surrender to the americans quickly, we are going to lose hokkaido, and we are going to be occupied by the communist soviet union. That is what tipped the scale. Ok. Ara can i chime in . Barbara ok. Is saying, according to yugi tanakas research, the u. S. Had already firebombed 100 japanese cities, destruction had reached 99. 5 in the city of toyama. Japanese leaders accepted we could wipe at their cities. To them, hiroshima and nagasaki were more horrible but they were just two more cities. What changed the equation for them, is the soviet invasion. Ketsuko is their whole strategy, was based on waiting out the americans, having the americans invaded, and living heavy casualties on the United States, and that way Getting Better surrender terms from the americans. Once the soviets invaded that strategy was out the window. That is why they discussed that in their immediate meetings. Chief ofl kowabe staff said, the atomic bomb was bad but it was the soviet invasion that made us surrender, and we have other japanese leaders who said the same thing to american interrogators after the war. Barbara ok, thank you. For those of you keeping an eye on the clock, as we are getting close to 2 00, we have the ability to continue this conversation, until at least 2 30 p. M. , so, not to worry, we will get to questions. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2020] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] next, i would like to call on a former Washington Post reporter and columnist, now that john l and james s night chair and Public Affair journalism at the university of maryland. Dana . Thank you for having me. That has been fascinating to listen to this, not a subject i know that much about. I want to go back to something kai asked in his opening remarks. Why cant we discuss this . You 4 probably know better than anyone who because you have tried. The second part would be what if we did and came to the conclusions you all have come to . What would be the implication of that, for warmaking, bomb making, other things today . Do you want to start . My instinct is to say that the reason we find it difficult to have a conversation about this subject is, we embrace the bomb afterwards. And we built many of them. And we relied on it for our, qu ote, defense. And we are still doing so, at great cost. Billions and billions of dollars. It questions a fundamental aspect of our whole strategic position. I do not know. But marty has a brandnew book coming out next month, in september, that addresses some of, in part, this issue. I can say something, the emergence of the cold war was entered intimately connected with new claire weapons. Intimately connected with Nuclear Weapons. Soviets got the atomic andin august, 1949, [indiscernible] the idea that we had used the bomb inappropriately, that the bomb was something that should never have been used, that it was too horrible a weapon to use, became a nothing anathema, in the context of the political environment in which we lived. Remember, theres mccarthyism. In the 1950s, when all of this stone, was a politically very narrow environment for criticizing or discussing anything that touched being, doing union argumentright, and the that well, the Second World War in the pacific was ended because the soviet union entered, not because we dropped the atomic bomb, was something that the National Culture simply could not get its arms around. And we are living with that legacy. Barbara anybody else . We are, 25 years later. What would be the implication if we were able to open this up, and come to this conclusion . What you think that would mean for anything today . Thing that mayne be useful. Stimson, the secretary of war, a very conservative man, a very honored man, and a man i respect, made an attempt, with the help of mccloy, just after the bombing, to somehow say, look, and he came to truman and to a Cabinet Meeting and said, this thing is too dangerous. If they cs with this weapon, at the russians cs with this weapon, ostentatiously on our hep, hip, they will distrust us. The only way to work this out as i have learned over 70 years is to somehow be honest and straightforward with them and try to get a handle on this, and establish what we would call armscontrol or disarmament, somehow at that time. He made the talk, made the speech, went away, and that was the end of it. Burns took control of the process. Took control of truman for a year until truman fired him. But there is no interest at in armscontrol, and there were deploying tests and more bombs would be built. And the other side knew they had to build their own as well. So the story that follows through 1946 and 1947, and then, as the problem begins to be debated and discussed, as i mentioned, in the press and there was a wonderful john hersey article in the new yorker, on hiroshima, he went and interviewed a lot of people in the late summer of 1946, there was a buildup of people saying something is wrong with this. And it was shut down by stimson, who was wheeled and with george bundys help, to say look, the bomb had to be used, something stimson did not feel that strongly about during 1945. But he shut on the conversation until the 1960s when he began to slowly open. And it is still not widely open in american dialogue. Although in many parts of the world, what we are talking about today, is widely understood. I would like to take a crack at it also. A lot of it had to do with the veterans. The veterans believed the atomic bomb saved their lives. They thought they were going in, and many of them or be killed. From princeton, but a book, called thank god for the atomic bomb, saying he was one of the once was going to go in, saying we cried with joy and relief when the bomb was dropped. That idea has persisted. 2019, had an late oped in the New York Times and said her father was ready to go over and truman dropped the bomb and ended the war. And her father did not have to go. I think this idea is central to the whole notion of american exceptionalism. It is what marty was getting at in terms of the cold war, against the soviets. U. S. , truman dropped the atomic bomb in way that unnecessarily slaughtered hundreds of thousands of people and put the rest of humanity a distinction, what would that say about our notion of ourselves as being good and generous and benevolent, as opposed to those soviet dictators and bullies and thugs . I mean, it is central to the sense of ourselves. Kai brought up the enola gay exhibit before, and the people who mostly opposed to the enola gay exhibit where the American Legion and the air force association. Notveterans rallied, did want an honest discussion of this at this point. Because so much of their own sense of identity is tied with their service in world war ii. So anything that casts doubt upon american goodness in the good war is something people do not want to hear or think about. Peter, to jump in here, danas question is what if we had an honest reckoning today, among the American People . How would that change things today . What is the application today . The implication today . What we still rely on Nuclear Weapons would we still rely on Nuclear Weapons . We are spending trillions of dollars to modernize our Current Nuclear weaponry . It is up to 7 trillion now. Nuclearpect of our arsenal to make it more deadly or lethal. Barbara we have an audience question along those lines. How does this relate to the days to todays debate over whether the United States should spend more than one trillion on a new generation of Nuclear Weapons and deliver the systems . Hiroshima has much more to do with the future than the past. ,he issues we are now facing 1. 7 buildup of Nuclear Weapons. It will force the chinese and everyone else to build as fast as they can. We have been extremely lucky that one of these things has not gone off. Many accidental scares or pakistanties of war in and india. The reason to talk about hiroshima is to look at what we have done as a nation and to reconsider our past and to begin a new discussion of what these weapons are all about. I do not think we will be lucky for another 75 years. Turn to i would like to our next journalist questioner pincus, thewalter former Washington Post reporter and columnist and contributing Senior National security columnist. Welcome, walter. Walter. Unmute yourself. First look back at this conversation for a minute. So material i have written about in the past. That is my reading of the , going back in history and looking at things that were not available at the moment, things happen. Learned working for senator fulbright during the vietnam war when most people forget the majority of americans were in favor of the war. Startedot until nixon to back off before the public at large wanted to get out of the war. Built asc bombs were terror weapons. To theyot built were built to end the war. When the targeting committee, which included oppenheimer and simpson, sat down in the white house and decided to pick out two targets, and two was the number because they felt if we dropped one, the japanese would not think we had anymore. The idea was to drop two. Because theuseful hiroshima bomb had never been tested. Bomb dropped on nagasaki was the second type of bomb. They wanted to have two bombs. Wanted to make an impact and end the war as quickly as possible. They were terror weapons. Targets picked out, started with hiroshima. Meeting in which they decided on the target, they wanted to have a city that had a military facility that was surrounded by a civilian population. And that is what they said and that is what they did. Was always thought of as a terror weapon. Weapon,ent terror because, as you heard, we were killing civilians starting in tokyo with the firebombing. We needed something that was much more impressive. That is why they did it. All these other things were talked about and in retrospect, you can find documentation. That thessible russians entering would have done it. It is possible Something Else could have happened. They were facing a situation as they saw it at that moment. At that moment, they thought they were going to have to invade. Sayndly, i would like to that so many in the military talked about it talked against it, as did oppenheimer. That a majority of people who were in charge of the weapons, once they were tired, they will openly talk about how they were against using them. The military, in particular, because they are not useful. They do not know what is going to happen afterward. Original back to the bombs. Most people dont realize, by design, they were detonated at 1200 and 1500 feet above the blast to get the maximum and the maximum heat directly below the bomb. They were fearful, scientists were, of what would happen if the fireball hit the ground and then you would have fallout. Lout is not directly people moved back in to hiroshima and nagasaki and rebuilt the city within months. In. Moved back these days, these bombs are aimed at the ground. Targets below ground would cause fallout. It would be chernobyl. You do not go back for 30 years or 40 years. That leads to the question that i wanted to ask. It touches on what you said a minute ago. Think historians why they it has not been used again, although we have built thousands of them. I know about all of the accidents. Is, if you had not had , onceima and nagasaki they started building them, it could have been so much worse. Reason theye the are not used, have not been used, they are essentially political weapons, diplomatic weapons, is because hiroshima they are. Terrible they really are terror weapons. I would like to say something. All, i am a little stunned at walters comments. You painted the United States as a terrorist state. That maybetion is the bomb delayed the end of the war. If it was not for the bomb, existence the bombs , it is quite possible and probable that Unconditional Surrender would have been clarified much earlier. It is possible that we delayed clarifying Unconditional Surrender until the bomb was used. Noteems to me that this is an argument that holds up at all. If the bombs had never been used, if they had not been validated as weapons of war in hiroshima and nagasaki, if we had said, our values prevent us using such a horrendous terrorist weapon, there may not have been a nuclear arms race. History could have been different. I dont think you can argue about hiroshima and nagasaki prevented world war iii. [indiscernible] day, if we keep this up, it is going to happen. It is almost inevitable. Who else wants to weigh in . I would like to. Bombr, in terms of the versus the invasion, we dropped the bomb on august 6. Supposedly to prevent an invasion that was not scheduled to begin until november 1. The first thing about it is the timing. Would we push out the bomb to prevent an invasion that would not start for three months . I do not think there was ever going to be an invasion. Lahey i was unable to see any justification of a National Defense point of view for an invasion when we have already thoroughly defeated japan. That is part of the misunderstanding. So far as the bomb as a terror weapon, initially, it was conceived as a deterrent. When the u. S. Started to develop letter on july 16, 1939, two roosevelt, it was because we feared that germany was developing a common bomb and the germans were ahead of us. Maybe two years ahead of us. We wanted the bomb as a deterrent. Fore was never any thought the first few years of using the bomb against japan. We knew that japan could not develop a bomb during the war. Later, all of the other diplomatic and other considerations we are talking about come into play as tensions are emerging. Truman becomes president on april 12. He meets with molotov on april 23. Office, heys in bragged that he gave it to them 12 to the jaw. That point, positive relationship the u. S. Had with the soviets under roosevelt had eroded. It will go up and down over the next period. There were a lot of other considerations that come into play. The military one for using the bomb is hard to justify. Say what other part of the history. While they were developing the bomb, all war is terrorism. That you firebomb tokyo and killed 100,000 people and consider that not terrorism warfare war is terrorism. When they were working on the bomb, oppenheimer and i think lawrence talked about what about if we cannot make it work as a bomb, why dont we drop it just the Radioactive Material . Cityamage we could do in a or countryside affecting crops and things like that and they decided to set it aside because they were making advances and it would take longer to have an effect on the enemy. At that point, germany was a threat. Retrospect, the cold war brought on this arms race. It became a numbers game. And you have this foolishness even today in which because the butians have lower yield still five kiloton low yield city,s, could destroy a we have to build the same kind of thing even though we have thousands. Irrationality there is an irrationality. I go back to my earlier statement. T is irrational make one last comment. It would be fair to say, and walter would agree, that this argument that the bomb may have prevented another use of the bomb, that was not the purpose of it. That was not how they saw it at the time. I disagree with the argument, but nonetheless, what they thought about it at the time was not that. They certainly knew that the war could be ended without an invasion and without the atomic bomb. The joint chiefs of staff got the british chiefs of staff on the basis of joint intelligence to convince churchill to go tell truman, you have got to tell them to keep the emperor because our intelligence says that will end the war. They argued there was an alternative. The notion that 200,000 mostly women and children and old people, the japanese young men were away at war, were sacrificed as a reminder that we can use these things again, i do not think that was in anybodys mind. Let me jump in here a moment. That important to remember from the perspective of the scientists, oppenheimer and others, they were building this weapon because they feared the germans were going to build it. They knew the germans were going to build it. They knew the german scientists, and that was their greatest fear. The german scientist, whom they had studied with, were capable of doing the same thing they were doing. And they feared they would build a weapon and hand victory to hitlers. To hitler. Once they are on the verge of testing is weapon, it suddenly and into the bureaucracy having spent 2 billion, it is only human, you want to be able to demonstrate the utility of this weapon. And then we get into all these arguments. But walters perspective and question brings us back to martys Opening Statement about how do we know what we know as historians . To why cantback we have this discussion nationally . Why cant we grapple with this . If we cannot look at the andence in retrospect walter is suspicious of this the historians are finding this and that in the diaries and they are rewriting history. This is, in fact, the suspicion of the average american, that historians are rewriting the history. What do we do when Harry Trumans handwritten diary is only discovered in the late mid1970s . We find hand scribbling that the japanese are about to surrender. Put the wholes to narrative in a different context. Knowoves that we did not in 1945 what we thought we knew. Does that make sense . Walter, have i convinced you that we need to look at diaries and put them in context and look at new evidence . Spent the last 15 or 20 years writing how terrible and arguing that it ought to be debated, and it is not. People refuse to talk about it. I think it is much more important to talk about it in todays context, talk about what. Hey can do today not use them 75 years ago . You cannot close your eyes and say, we tested it and we never should have used it, and nobody else would try to make it. It is eventually going to happen. Watch what is going on with cyber, if you want to see how things develop that we cannot stop. On that provocative note, we are running short on time. Peter, can we go beyond 2 30 p. M. . We can go as long as anybody is still sitting here. Ends with new book 1962. There is a lot of focus on the cuban missile crisis. The argument that we learned from this and that is how we have avoided nuclear war since then, i think, has to be questioned because in the cuban missile crisis, as much as kennedy and chris jeff tried to tried tokhrushchev avoid going to war, once these crises develop, they are out of control. We did not survive because of statesmanship. We survived because of pure, blind luck. Do in think we need to judging truman or others at the time is look to the people who also were listening at that time who had a very different perspective. It is not just us applying our contemporary critical acumen as to what the decisionmakers decided. Many of their contemporaries were horrified by the atomic bomb. When simpson says to truman, i do not want to see us getting a reputation for outdoing hitler in atrocities, there were many who understood how wrong that was also. People were critical, who saw it very differently than truman and some of the other policymakers. Let me do one more thing, and i will quit. Marty is right. It did get partially out of hand. When they were r chris jeffs cabl of what would happen if an intermediate range missile hit the u. S. , but the fact is the lesson was learned during the cuban missile crisis and it led to the hotline. It led to both u. S. And soviets going at it, to make sure there was no direct confrontation initially between the u. S. And russian troops. Arn at the time of the abisraeli conflict. Making sure your allies did not have a direct conflict. The cuban missile crisis got as as close as we would get and that lesson was learned. Barbara thank you. We will move on to our next questioner, and that is pablo. Pablo thank you very much. Can you hear me . Perfect. Thank you so much for having me here. Chance tofor the learn so many things. Really really, really, very interesting and informative for me. And for being with these colleagues i have always read. Of flabbergasted. Thank you very much. Grill the panelists with questions and comments. Limit my turn to a couple of things. Why do you think and any of you can answer why do you Nuclear Bombs and , they belong to the realm of historians . 12,000 Nuclear Weapons in the world. In the last 25 years, we have been forgetting about them. Willurrent administration spend 1 trillion improving the u. S. Nuclear arsenal. Something that is not considered big news. Today, we talk about cyber war and other types of weapons. This has completely disappeared. Theew up in europe in 1980s and we were obsessed with. He missiles no one today thinks about that. They seem to be something that is collecting dust, never be used. I think that is a rather dangerous thought. I would like to know from the media and how can the the Academic Community raise some awareness about this . This is one of the questions. The other when i would like to ask, based on the case of nagasaki and hiroshima, the decision was taken by a small group of people, many of them civilians. So in last two decades or the west, particularly in the u. S. , we have had examples of conflicts that were started by civilians who were much more optimistic and much more triggerhappy than the military. I am talking about iraq. Riskextent this could be a with Nuclear Weapons as well . We have this idea that ok, Nuclear Weapons, any government they can only be used by rogue actors, terrorist groups. As long as Nuclear Weapons are in the hands of responsible people who are not necessarily responsible but surrounded by responsible people , there is no danger of a dr. Strangelove scenario. These are my two questions. Thank you very much. I think there is always a danger of a dr. Strangelove scenario, number one. Suggest that would dealing with Nuclear Weapons, in effect, creates a level of irresponsibility along with the responsibility and nobody can ofrantee that a series untoward events will not lead to a decision that leads to the worst decision, using Nuclear Weapons. Suggestfact that we that people are not thinking seriously about the danger of Nuclear Weapons now, as they did back in the 1980s when the ss 20 was such an issue, in my mind, it increases the danger of the possibility that one thing or another could lead us down the wrong path to a disaster that nobody wants. That is the great danger. I see the risk now as very, very high. Expertsry of 2018, the moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock two minutes before midnight. That was in the aftermath of nearly going to war with north korea. Richard haass said it was a 5050 chance. U. S. Russia, u. S. China relationships are in terrible shape. In 2019, they moved the hands of the Doomsday Clock to 100 seconds before midnight, the closest it has been since they started the Doomsday Clock in 1947. But we also know, which is also ominous, the latest studies about Nuclear Winter show what sagan said in the 1980s was underestimating the threat of Nuclear Winter. The estimate that is a limited nuclear war between india and partial could create , block the suns rays from reaching the earth. The earth would plummet to freezing. Agriculture would be wiped out. Limited nuclear war could lead to up to 2 million deaths. There are close to 14,000 Nuclear Weapons. They are not here a shemasized. Hiroshimasized. The chances of what we are talking about are not so abstract and irrational. People on thehave planet that have veto power over the future existence of our species donald trump and vladimir putin. I do not think anybody should have veto power over the future existence of life on our planet. Barbara peter, i will chime in here from with a question 1. Ssias channel she was not able to get in electronically. She sent some questions in writing. How did the nuclear use of a Nuclear Weapon influence soviet policy . Another member of the audience says russians have made very clear that there Nuclear Policy is defensive is that their Nuclear Policy is defensive only. How has it evolved since 1945 . Russias Nuclear Policy has been largely reactive. When they knew the u. S. Was going to use the bomb, instead of their own bomb research, they saw themselves of being the target of the american bomb. The americans dropped the bomb in august of 1945. The soviets test their first atomic bomb of august of 1949. The americans test the Hydrogen Bomb in 1952. The soviets test prototypical Hydrogen Bomb in 1953. They closed the gap. Hadr sputnik, the soviets Ballistic Missiles and the u. S. Officials started exaggerating by magnitude of 100 times how ballisticnental missiles and bombs the soviets actually had. The soviets were playing catch up. After the cuban missile crisis, they vow that they would never be forced to back down again because they were so far behind. And then they Start Building up their nuclear personal nuclear arsenal. I find myself year after year writing down the same statistics and by 1985, the world had accumulated the equivalent of 1. 4 7 million hiroshima bombs. I could not get over it. How many times do we need to be able to kill everybody on earth over again before we are satisfied . Trump has gotten rid of the iran nuclear deal, the inf treaty, the open skies treaty, and he says he does not like the new start treaty. If we do away with the new start treaty and that is expires in february of 2021, we could go back to the 1980 style nuclear arms race. Trump says he welcomes a nuclear arms race. Fortunately, he will not be in office long enough to carry that out. Precarious a very situation. Russians as playing the same game the u. S. Is playing. Whereas china has sharply limited the size of their nuclear arsenal. You do not need 7000 Nuclear Weapons in order to pose that kind of threat. Even a couple of hundred Nuclear Weapons is enough to wipe out the United States. They have limited it. Barbara marty or kai, or gar, do you want to weigh in on this question . Marty one of the interesting historical incidents that relates to what we have been talking about is the insane accumulation of Nuclear Weapons during the cold war and the numbers you wrote down, peter. One of the triggers from that 1950 when truman made this decision that the u. S. Would respond to the soviets with a Crash Program to build a Hydrogen Bomb. He told the chairman of the Atomic Energy commission, secretary of defense and the secretary of state that he was program approve a crash not because he intended to use Nuclear Weapons, but because they were very good instruments for dealing with the soviet union. We had to have more than them in order to negotiate with them successfully. We lost the sense that these weapons were strictly for deterrence. They were for diplomacy and negotiations. Therefore, there was no limit to the number of weapons that would be good for increasing our negotiation power. There we were. By 1960, let me step back, when eisenhower came in office, there were about 1200 Nuclear Weapons in the american arsenal. Somewhere around that number. When he left office, there were about 22,000 Nuclear Weapons. They had become the foundation for American Foreign policy and american diplomacy and that was what the soviets were reacting to, as peter the point that peter made. Let me jump in with a brief comment. I think what it opens up is Something Like the questions we are beginning to discuss right now, their fragility, the ease with which they are made for the wrong reason. Hiroshima was unnecessary according to every military leader in the u. S. At that time. The war was over. The invasion was not coming until spring. Very little fighting going on. The reason to go back to this are in the midst of a massive arms race. One day, one of these is going to go off. It is not beyond american politics to elect people who are dangerous. Discuss getting control on this destructive possibility. Random events are likely to lead to more explosions. These things are too dangerous to allow for that. That is the question. How do we begin to reassess decisions how decisions are made and the emerging dangers and the deafening quiet about Nuclear Weapons all over the world . Kai, would you like to make another comment . I think this will be the end of the program for now. Would you like to make a comment on this or things in general . I guess i would like to end on the notion that maybe someday we can have a National Conversation about this difficult subject. Question,k to the what difference would it make for us today . I think we have kotten some answers i think we have gotten some answers. One point 7 trillion Modernization Program on Nuclear Point 7 trillion Modernization Program on Nuclear Weapons is very dangerous. Fear is the use of a dirty bomb in the middle east. Waste, which would be very easy technically speaking. Mentioned india and easily bethere could an exchange. That there is no concern about this, no discussion. , as peter says, and as marty has emphasized, that makes it even more dangerous. Morning withp one terrible news and we will all be discussing this terrible issue. Barbara that seems like a very good point at which to and todays program. With any luck, todays program will have perhaps helped to spark some more thinking and discussion of it. Thank you to the audience. Most of the questions you posted were answered along the way. I was able to work in some of the questions. I appreciate all that. With that, i would like to say a hearty thank you to our speakers, to the journalists who led the questioning, i would like to thank say a special thank you for peter to peter for getting this organized and using the facilities of American University to make all this possible for us technically, and , a pbs executive and documentary producer who assisted in pulling all of us together. 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