Transcripts For CSPAN3 The 20240704

Welcome to this session, which is a debate we think on the topic of lincoln and his generals and i am Glenn Lafantasie from Professor Emeritus from Western Kentucky University wrti and Bowling Green and we have with us this morning a distinguished panel i, i regret to say that one of our panelists took ill and lauren foote will not be joining us this morning. But shes at home recuperating fighting with many regrets that cant be here. But let me go ahead and introduce our panelists for you and you have longer biographies of these people in your packets. But i thought id go ahead and introduce people anyway. And to my immediate right is. Ken. No. He is the drawn of southern history at auburn here received his doctorate. Doctorate from, the university of illinois. His most recent book is, the howling storm, whether and the american civil war. He is currently writing about the idea and the realities of Abraham Lincoln as a commander in chief to his right Harold Holzer who all of you im sure know already and he has authored or coauthored edited 55 books on lincoln and the civil. Hes lectured throughout the country, advised and appeared on half a dozen Tv Documentaries as well, advising spielbergs lincoln and earned both the lincoln prize and the National Humanities medal. You know, you heard all this and more last night, so only add that he serves today as the Jonathan Fenton director of the roosevelt how Roosevelt House Public Policy Institute and new Yorks Hunter College and next we have Craig Symonds. Who has already been introduced to you, but for those who may have missed the program he was on. Hes a professor history emeritus. Weve got a lot of old guys. Except for except for andy down at the. Who is the future of history. But let me let me ahead anyway. Craig is professor of history at emeritus at the United States Naval Academy. A lot of emeritus high. Thats what we got where he taught for 30 years and served as Department Chair from. 2017 to 2020. He was the ernest king professor of maritime history at the u. S. Naval war college in newport, rhode island, rhode island being where i born and raised. He is the author of 17 books, the most recent of which is nimitz at war. He has been awarded the lincoln prize the roosevelt prize, the morrison prize, and brandeis prize, as well as the dudley knox medal for Lifetime Achievement and the Pritzker Military museum and library for Lifetime Achievement in military writing. And last but not least, the youngster andy lang is associate professor of history at, Mississippi State university, which, of course, as you all know, is the home of the Ulysses Grant president ial library and museum. He is the author of a contest of civilizations expose in the crisis of american exceptional wisdom in the civil war era, which was named finalist for the Gilder Lehrman lincoln prize. His book, in the wake of war military occupation. Emancipate nation and civil war america received the society of civil war historians Tom Watson Brown book award. He is now writing an intellectual cultural biography of nationalism and a study of Ulysses Grant as lincolns protege. Andy, i assume youre not going to have any problems finding grant documents on on campus. So were gathered here to discuss lincoln, his generals and i thought id just open things up with a with few remarks and try to get this debate going when. It comes to lincoln. Theres plenty argue about and historians have been doing so ever since april. Well even before april 1865 because historians were arguing during civil war itself over lincoln and, his presidency in their are plenty of topics to discuss. Taking a look lincolns relationships with his generals. Has been a perennial favorite among scholars in other writers because theres so much to say and so much to argue about. One question seems to loom above all others and that is lincolns relationship with Major General George B Mcclellan in the part of civil war. Historians never tire about about talking about mcclellan and deriding for his poor generalship. Both the army of the potomac and for the time that he was general chief of all the union armies poor. Mcclellan has been bashed around a lot. I dont know if any of us up here will take his side. We go along in this debate. I certainly wont. So you could. Mcclellan was a superior general who simply could not find a way to feel prepared enough to meet enemy. He consistently and constantly complained that he was outnumbered by Confederate Forces under Joseph Johnston and and later robert e lee and all of this was delusional or as we say today based on bad intelligence. So mcclellan certainly is at the center, at the core really of, lincoln, especially in the way that lincoln dealt with him up until the autumn of 1862, when he finally lincoln finally mcclellan. But gosh it took a long time to to reach that point. But that time, i think lincoln was learning quite a bit about being commander in chief and about his armies and also about which despite having served in the black hawk war in illinois and in the 1830s, lincoln didnt really have a firsthand knowledge of of war. And he was very much like most americans north and south who otherwise. May have known about or experienced the mexicanamerican war, but in lincolns case he was like everybody else, that this war suddenly came along and produced casualties in numbers that were for the american public. And for lincoln, who lamented how many soldiers were for were falling on battlefields. Well, thats probably enough of of me and in otherwise i will moderate this panel or this debate and look forward to hearing what other folks have to say. Think well start with Harold Holzer and im going to pose to him the question of whether he thinks lincoln interfered enough with his generals because im not going to argue lincoln did not interfere with his generals but harold can correct me if he thinks im wrong. So going to turn over some first remarks from Harold Holzer thank you, glenn. I thank you for setting the stage and the scene so i like this question because its of the three bears analysis was lincoln too hot too cold or just right . And im going to argue and im going to try to confine myself to the first year and a half of the war, because we have plenty of time to talk about the entire war. Im going to argue that he was more than just right, that he was actually pretty remarkable. And i say this acknowledgment of all the limited experience had, but also in recognition of the fact that there really wasnt much about much of a precedent for him to follow. When you think about it. I mean, George Washington marched off to to confront a rebellion and potentially to lead an army, was condemned for it by the democrats in washington criminally, actually, because he left washington during a congressional session. James madison ran off and abandoned washington when the british neared. Lincoln didnt that didnt do either. I mean, he said that he wanted to go into the field at one foolish moment of bravado. He didnt. He nor did he abandon nor does he abandon washington. So in a way, lincoln was all about symbolism. As a commander in chief. Again, a totally unimpressive handed situation with secession and rebellion. And i would look to something said very early in the war before bull run. He said that the federal should be committed to teaching the folly of being beginners of a war. That was a pretty tough stand to take. He left doubt at the beginning that the rebellion would be suppressed and the union would be preserved. And he really never abandoned that position in the wake of disastrous battlefield defeats. The rotation of commanders that glenn alluded to, i think at the beginning he did pretty well. He read what he could. Craig symonds talked a bit about his early reading, what he didnt read and what he did read. He read Henry Halleck, who later became his general in chief. He didnt always follow halleck, but neither halleck. So i think he did fairly well. He listened to winfield, scott and his last great strategy recommendation, which was the anaconda plan, which was pretty brilliant. When you come and think of it as much as mcclellan disparaged scott as an old fossil who had seen better days. Scotts initiative, which lincoln embraced as unlikely as it sounds, i mean, i believe naval stuff to craig, i think is a pretty commander in chief decision. But first of all, and i would add that lincoln is the first well, not counting the revolution. Hes a commander in chief who is pursuing public backing and military success in an atmosphere in which the press is active nearly every seat. A battle thats intense. Think of the coverage of the war and wars in iraq and afghan lists and the media access was complete pletely controlled. Lincoln what a commander in chief is supposed to do. He set policy and he communicated policy. And as a master communicator, think he communicated it effectively to the public, maybe not to his subordinates. I would add im going to push back at host Peter Carmichael for something he said yesterday evening, and i know i have to reframe it for the cspan audience. He pushed back a little bit on my defense of. Lincolns press censorship and most of most of the most press censorship story is 1864, when two newspapers published a proclamation that alluded to lincolns desire to raise hundreds of thousands of troops. Lincoln ordered personally ordered the closing of both newspapers. But i want to point to july 1861, a leadership decision that he asked generals, the state department and the post Office Department and the interior department to and that is with bull run, lost and 90 and 100 volunteers going home. What lincoln to do as commander in chief was raise troops really. Ideally for three years and newspapers that pushed back urged troops not to reenlist were the ones that lincoln closed down in new york city in, boston and providence. I threw that in for you. Glenn of rhode island. Thank you. In new england. And i think it was an interesting command decision and a justifiable one. But let me go back to when i said i was going to limit the to the beginning of the war and and again, Craig Symonds alluded to this yesterday. How do you draw from what we heard was the deep bench of the Union Military command or potential command. Lincoln made many have condemned as a foolhardy and highly political decision to enlist both democratic officers and immigrant officers. My feeling is that both of those moves were not only very, but perhaps union saving in many ways. He had to make sure that the the fight against rebellion and secession was not perceived exclusively as a republican war. And so recruiting people like Benjamin Butler and John Mcclellan and George Mcclellan was been the name was to unite the north against the south. As for the ethnic side of things lincoln knew that two great populations in the north that could be recruited to fight in the ranks the and the irish americans. And so he went after them and encouraged their partici. Harold im them to you know interrupt you here and turn to craig. Im sorry ken. No. Whos writing a book on lincoln as commander in and just get some his opinions as theyve been expressed already up here. Okay. Thanks, glenn. First of all, being on a panel with, my fellow panelists, is one of the most frightening things ive ever participated in. People who know a lot more about lincoln. I do. Ive been working this project fairly steadily, but only in the last couple of years. But it grows out of work that ive done. Previously on the Perryville Campaign and certainly my book on civil war, whether and im going to disagree a little bit with Harold Holzer, which is probably the scariest thing ive ever done in my career because i think i think it did interfere or sometimes perhaps when he shouldnt have, and i think that he probably did not interfere at times a firmer hand might have been welcome to hear the williams wrote before i was born that the Manassas Campaign was essentially a theorized and planned by Abraham Lincoln. It did not go well after first bull run. Lincoln what i think was a fairly consistent military vision that he hewed to until the end war protect washington. Fight the Confederate Army in virginia. Somewhere between washington and richmond because he didnt want to deal with the richmond entrenchment by the end of 1861. He certainly talking what we come to think of as concentration and time, the greater resources and numbers of the federal army in the west and on the seas. Hes also developing his own operational plans, notably the oklahoma plan of. December 1861, when hes developing own theoretical idea of to defeat the confederates at manassas. And hes often to talk to his generals about, not just winning the war, but the war in manner. So was George Mcclellan difficult deal with. Absolutely. But in some ways i think it becomes a bad marriage on both sides. Certainly if we look at what president did in 1862 during the the gunboat during that period when. He essentially restructures the army of the potomac over, mcclellan said, creating corps giving command of those corps to people who opposed the peninsula can. Yeah. Think there is a certain of interference there . No. We can ask whether that was positive or negative, but i think lincoln comes to see himself pretty early as having a good grasp of what is necessary. Win the war and when his generals disagree with him, he he pushes back somewhat, not to the point where he gives positive orders. Do what i want, but theres always tension and we see that tension not just with mcclellan, but we see it with burnside side, we see it with hooker. And although tend to gloss over it, i think we see it with grant as well. So there. Well, youve conveniently provided a segue way by mentioning grant and andy, i wonder about some of your thoughts because youre youre working on a book project that that involves lincoln and grant. Yeah. Thank you glenn. And most important i should say that this a distinct privilege to be sitting on a panel with historians who. Ive long had the great esteem for and their books have been really formative, shaping my own thinking. So this is this is a lot of fun for me. Ill start by saying the was about grant, so im going to immediately pivot to mcclellan. But ill get back to grant because i have a lot to say about grant. All of it. All of it. Good. It seems to me that we when we understand and lincolns relationship, we also have to understand lincoln and mcclellans insofar as that lincoln understood that this particular kind of war, a political war, a peoples contest, as he called it, had have corresponding military means to achieve the political end. Those military means. Mcclellan i would argue, simply did not understand. Grant understood the particular means by which to secure the particular political ends of this war. What do i mean . In his memoirs, grant said, most famously, up until battle of shiloh, i, as well as thousands of other citizens, believed that the rebellion against the government collapse suddenly and soon, if a decisive victory could be gained any of its armies. Lets put opinion that thats mcclellans philosophy there. But he continued. Granted, i gave up idea of saving the union. Except complete conquest. Thats in mind what lincoln understood from the earliest of this war. Some kind. Complete conquest. Now, does that mean destruction, violation of the laws of war . Absolutely not. Quite the opposite. What it means is ripping out the heart of the confederacy. Its very claim to existence. The foundation on which it is built. And that foundation. Ultimately, however you get there, that foundation ultimately is some form of emancipation. Yes, the United States did not go to war to free enslaved people. That becomes a formal policy later. But we also see lincoln quietly, privately expel with these thoughts as early as the late spring 1861. Benjamin butler contraband policy on the virginia. Lincoln signing first confiscation act into law in december of 1861. These are gestures toward what grant would later recognize as complete conquest and the to the two minds. Grant and lincoln become entirely linked on this on this basis. I think that grant and lincoln also worked well together because they are not drawn from the elite aristocratic lineages that. Mcclellan came grant and lincoln understood each other as. A rough hewn midwestern loners whose rise in the world due only to their only to their strength, their character their virtue, their honesty, integrity, and having the entire deck against them. I think they both saw in each other that hard work and tenacity is what allows a free citizen to rise in a free republic. And so think about how grant rose through the ranks simply by sheer will determination and ultimately success. This is what allows for promotion. Again, in a free society, and ill conclude with this when we read grants farewell address to the United States soldiers in june of 1865, we can hear grant whether he knew it or not. We can hear him channeling the meaning of a new birth of freedom about lincoln spoke on november 19th, 1863, just down the street. Grant said to the soldiers in the United States army, you have maintained the supremacy of the union and the constitution overthrown. All opposition to the enforcement of the law and the proclamations forever abolishing slavery. The cause and the pretext of the rebellion. The very fact that grant linked union emancipate motion and most importantly, peace thats rooted in Abraham Lincoln meant by a new birth freedom. And craig you are youre bringing up the rear here. Yeah, thats my role. I notice im the only one up here without a microphone. So i stole. Andys out. Thats okay. I want to go back and pick up on something. Harold, with which i think we need to keep in mind all along. And that is the lack, any precedent for the circumstance ences that lincoln confronted in 1861. I mean the United States had been engaged in previous 1812 the war against mexico and so on. You could even count the seminole war in florida, but nothing of this character. And there was an attitude then and quite frankly, i encounter now that the responsibilities the head of government and the head of the military are that theres a bright sharp line between the two, that the government somehow makes a decision that that is the enemy and in which must defeat them, turns to the military and says, go do that. As if there were no interconnection between two. And that is simply not the way conflicts work. Wed like to think that the course that i taught the Naval War College that i actually initiated did back in the 1970s and then taught again fairly recently, is called strategy and policy. And they have to go together. I like the way andy pointed to fact that grant picked up the idea that theres a connection and, an absolute interlocking between the goals of the war and the way the war is fought. So the fact that theres no precedent for this conflict. Lincoln would have preferred ed, i believe, and im harrold, correct me on this if im wrong, because he knows more about lincoln than anybody living. But i think lincoln wanted to say, heres the objective. General scott, can you go do this for us . Well, no, general scott couldnt really do that. Whos the best guy got . Well, this young fellow, George Mcclellan hes the best guy. Okay, George Mcclellan, can you do this for me . Well, no. Mcclellan couldnt do anything unless it was clever. You know, it had to be. It cant be just. Ive got more men than you, and here i come. No, no, thats not clever enough for the likes of me. So mcclellan couldnt do it either. Well, how about. How about hooker . How about. And of we get to grant. Grant figures this out. So one of the things to keep in mind is that lincoln whether he became too or less involved or got the bowl of porridge, that was just right lincolns marriage edged toward that position a course of time, i think in a world lincoln would have said, we need to hold the union together. Im going to make a hard policy, have that happen, general, execute and he learned in the very early in 1861 and then continue usefully throughout the war that these things are inextricably. And so its strategy and policy working together and the fact that theres no for that meant that lincoln to figure it out as he went along and he did. He absolutely did better than as t Henry William is famously said better than any of his generals. I have written a book about lincoln and his relationship with his navy leaders, lincoln and the admirals. And you see it there really. Lincoln would have liked to say, look, i know little about ships. Dont know you know pointy and front is that the way this works . Im not really sure you guys do this for me, but he learned that well. The army in, for example, in the western when the army said, dont have to ship, were not taken for the ships and the navy. Well, thats in the western theater. Our writ stops at the high tide mark. So who is going to coordinate it . The navys in the western. Abraham lincoln. It not because he wanted to do it, but because the unprecedented circumstances you faced compelled to do it. And thank god we had Abraham Lincoln, in a position to do that. So. Well, im going to add some of my own to this. While i would generally praise linc lincoln for his role as as commander in chief and. Certainly his awareness of the importance of rivers in the west which should have made him like Winfield Scotts anaconda plan for whatever faults it it ended up being exactly the strategy won the war and thats Something Else that that that grant realized that these rivers in west were important and had to be secure and had be opened so that there was no confederate interference. While i give lincoln a great deal of credit. I fall into the school of thought that he probably interfere too much with generals and against the grain of among most historians. I think he he actually with grant though grant his memoirs claimed upon their first meeting lincoln and grant lincoln gave him carte to do whatever you want. I do not believe that lincoln gave grant Carte Blanche. I think thats something that was sort of an elaboration made by grant as he wrote his his memoirs. But in any event, i do agree with with most of the panelists here which is making this a very sorry debate. And that makes things a a little hard. One thing ill emphasize and i cant remember who said this from my notes but grants. Craig i guess you said this. Grants learning that complete conquest was necessary to win the war is is a key in all of this. And lincolns acceptance grant particularly after vicksburg, when lincoln writes a letter to his his general ulysses as grant and says, you know what, you were right about vicksburg and i was wrong. Well, when do we ever hear of a president saying that to one of his generals . I just think thats an an exquisite moment in the relationship between between lincoln and grant. Other thoughts gentlemen, may i respond. To a few. Sure. A few comments have been made. Im not sure i agree hundred percent that lincoln is be credited or blamed as. The author of the bull run campaign. I think he what certainly bought into the one battle and wipe it out theory one of the people he was compelled listen to on that was greeley, the editor of the new york tribune. I know lincoln more said, id like to have god on my side, but i must have kentucky. But he also needed to have Horace Greeley. And Horace Greeley led the newspaper every day for days and weeks to richmond. On to richmond. So i think lincoln faced a great deal of political pressure and press pressure, which we sometimes overlook to march on richmond. Or toward richmond military means to secure political ends. I absolutely agree. And i hate to be a person who defends George Mcclellan about anything but the political ends were a little bit different in mcclellan one than they were in mcclellan and mcclellan one. He still still felt rightly he wasnt privy to all of the private hints and act maybe, but the goal at that moment, as far as mcclellan could rationally infer, was to restore the country to the status antebellum before the proclamation was was released. I take lincoln at his word. By the way in terms of the hugeness of the war i take him at his word at what he said in the second inaugural that all knew that a war would come. No one knew of the duration or the consequence. And i dont think he could foresee casualties, devastation and duration as. We can. Looking back at the events we know took place from 61 to 65. By the way grant of course, is one of his great recruits. He was kind of a democrat. I mean grant says in his memoirs, i didnt in 1860, but if i had voted, i would have voted for stephen douglass. So there you go. Hes embracing this wide array of staff people. Can i say brief remark about mcclellan, the herald made me think of im not sympathetic to George Mcclellan and im about to start defending him. I think thats why we also have the word empathy. Right. Im empathetic. Mcclellan and become increasingly so recently, when we think of mcclellan, we immediately of the mcclellan of 1861, in 1862. Well, he wasnt born in 1861 in 62. He lived life prior to that. Right. And in 1855, he was part of a u. S. Military delegation that traveled to the crimea, where he, i think, was very deeply, profoundly shaped by by the war that he. He he had witnessed the siege of. And writes these heartrending letters to his his wife, talking about the desolation, the death, the destruction on both sides. And when you compare his letters from 1855 to his letters in immediate wake of the peninsula campaign, they sound almost identical. And i think what mcclellan is trying to do is, figure out what modern mid19th century wars of nationalism are all about. These are very bloody, destructive, even revolutionary affairs. And as a west point trained general, he only know based on what his educational experience was. Maybe this is a war that is new that i was not taught about and not unique in that regard. Right. Lincoln has to teach generals about wars now being fought as a peoples contest. Thats not thats not taught at west point. Right. So i think that a degree of understanding from where mcclellan is is coming, is is warranted to understand both he and lincoln. Let me add some points. Sure. Sure. I really want to bounce off your comments, grant, but ill respond to andy first. I never thought i would say this, especially in public, but i think i have become a bit sympathetic to mcclellan, at least at times. Last night on this stage, i talked about how viewing the civil war environmentally through a weather standpoint had changed my view of the war. And one of the things i think i learned in research was how physically difficult it was to. Move a massive army up the virginia in all of that rain and that red mud. In 1862 it was not a question of will. It was a question of logistics. In reality, it a hard thing to do. And im not sure that president lincoln or others understood difficulty that was involved in that operation. Think for the president absolute. It was a question of will. The wonderful environmental historian mark feigin, who has written that lincoln embodied what called a whig mentality. Its a mid19th century mentality of progress. Its a mentality that says that man can nature. And i think president consistently expected mcclellan later to conquer nature as well as the confederates. I think it was a difficult task. So, yeah, i am a sympathetic to mcclellan now, which is something that gets me in trouble every time. Give a talk on howling storm. Folks want to challenge on that, which is great. I just want to say, excuse me, glenn. The shadow of T Harry Williams hangs like an incubus over this whole conversation. Terry williamson, 54, set up the parameter of the Lincoln Mcclellan conversation and is just absolutely horrifying in that book. I assigned it to my students at the Naval Academy. They loved to hate mcclellan. Yes. Its easy to do. I mean, west education. Need i say. But its important to get beyond that a little bit. Remember, this is the decade in which the rifle musket and the mini ball to the first battlefield use mcclellans smart enough to figure that out he knows. Yes, i have more guys. Yes, i could go straight, like the fullback going through the line. But thats not the clever way to things. But there are two clever ways. One is to use a tactical and run, which is the kind of thing. Stonewall jackson did a chancellorsville. The other is to do the strategic and run which is going all are out into the Chesapeake Bay landing the virginia peninsula and coming up between new york and the james rivers. Its the same idea, avoiding the frontal charge of the light brigade, kind of a confrontation. And its not dumb. Its not wrong, but it is largest difficult move. 100,000 men by sea down. The Chesapeake Bay, amphibia operations are the single most difficult to undertake in war. Still and and he was undertaking this on a scale never before attempted the 10,000 men that went down to mexico, veracruz in 1846 to begin the Mexico Campaign was unprecedented. This is ten times larger than. So its a difficult thing and mcclellan wanted to do was use his brains use his cleverness to avoid the cash that would inevitably result from a formal a frontal and and for his wanting to do that we should him. But there are problems with mcclellan craig. Craig, youre absolutely right about. Terry williams. I was in baton rouge last week going through the two Harry Williams papers because really interested in this this, this idea of, lincoln, as our greatest commander in and mcclellan is complete idiot. And i think its sort of its it finally gels with Harry Williams i think he gets it from from previous historians. A couple other points ill just throw in really quickly. Glenn was talking grants assertion in the memoirs that he received Carte Blanche from lincoln. He does say that. And then he says almost immediately in the next paragraph, the president pulled out map and showed me an operation and he said, you take it or leave it. But i think this would be useful to you and grant sort of pooh pooh it in the memoirs and says, well, president didnt see all the problems would have gotten his army destroyed. And we actually did that, actually done that. So immediately after that, i trust you. Its your army. Go do what you want. Oh, by the way, have you considered this . So. And i think there are moments like that throughout the grant lincoln relationship, although most certainly becomes a close, a very good relationship. They work together. The other point would raise about grant and i think it hes wonderfully and just something that that craig just said. When grant becomes or is about to general in chief the writing is on the wall early in 1864 theres an interest correspondence that takes place Henry Halleck and grant halleck of course had dismissed grant in many ways earlier in the war but now its becoming apparent that grants about to become halleck boss. So halleck is writing him about. Lets talk about strategy, talk about operational strategy. What would do. And theres a point where halleck, i really invite your ideas. What would you do to win war in virginia. Grants response is essentially is mcclellans Peninsular Campaign on steroids because grant proposed was taking most the army of the potomac and landing it not at fort monroe but at suffolk, virginia, and then marching it inland through north carolina, cutting railroads and supplies into richmond. Thats what grant really wanted to do. And halleck wrote him back and said, that will not fly. It flies in the face of military doctrine. It uncovers washing ington and president will never allow it, and that its backed. By that time, grant becomes general in chief, and only then after that notion has been rejected does grant develop. The overland campaign. Thats straight ahead. Washington, richmond plan, which fit perfectly into the president s view of warfare. Joe harsh said years ago that part of lees brilliance was learning how to manage jefferson davis. I think part of grants is learning how to manage the expectations and the needs of Abraham Lincoln. So i we make us i think we make a somewhat of a mistake to limit the discussion to and grant when we assess lincoln as commander in chief. Not not that i disagree with you said but but since was kind of running out of time already i want to throw in a bit about lincoln the communicator and lincoln the the policy maker and were all dancing around the triumph, the transformation in the war that takes place on january one, 1863. But lincolns greatest act as a commander in chief has act for all of the modern complaints that it was and limited and inelegant and prosaic is the emancipation proclamation issued not out of bosom of philanthropy as the New York Times put it, but as commander in chief of the army and navy, as a war measure . And i dont lincoln wrote that because only because he didnt have the civil powers issue an executive order, because he was always nervous about the legality of the order and the possible that it might be challenged in the federal courts. Later, i it was his greatest as commander in chief to not only go at souths greatest human, but also to bring a new body of warriors, the war. And i always point out when, i talk about the proclamation that in a way its it theres one part of it thats the most thing that lincoln ever wrote, because he says, i urge i dont know who advised him to write this or whether it came out of his head. He advises the the slave not to be violent. And then the very next sentence, he says i urge the enslaved to enlist in the army and kill everyone they can find. But i just need to i needed to throw emancipation into story. Its bigger than almost. Well, he probably is bigger than the relationship with any individual commanders. Jump in here for a second. I think there are a couple of things that lincoln does have overarching views the way the war needs to be fought. One of them you mentioned quite clearly, which keep the army between the enemy army and washington, d. C. Weve got cover the capital. We lose the capital internationally, catastrophic, but also he appreciated that the enemy army was the heart of the rebellion, capturing wont end the rebellion, destroying rebel army will end the rebellion. There, he argues, and he emphasizes with all of his generals that that is your objective. Im the famous one, of course, is with hooker where hooker says, hey, lees going north. I can go get richmond. No, no, no, no. Thats not the objective here. Lees not richmond is your true objective. I think thats actually a direct quote. But the other thing is that this concept of concentration in time that Jim Mcpherson really developed and i think is really useful to keep in mind, dont attack the enemy army just that army attacks places at the same time which will compel enemy either to concentrate at one and let the others or spread out as army lose piecemeal all the way down. Lincoln sees this early on and his generals until grant comes up the plan after the suffolk plan is deep sixed by saying that, you know, were going to have sherman this way and im going to go this way and were going to take the Red River Campaign and butler, all of us at the same time. And lincoln writes him and says, i begin to see it. Those not skinning can hold a leg. Well, thats generous of lincoln to give grant credit for that. Hed been saying that since 1862. So one of the character risks of the relationship between lincoln and his generals is, his letting them think, oh, how clever you are to come up with that general. Thank you. I want to disagree. Disagree. But if lincolns so clever. But you just said that he had the power to orchestrate his armies, then why he use it . I mean, on the one hand, you say, oh, wait, hes got to be founded. Grant but he had that authority before, if that was his vision, then he had a responsibility to bring that kind of coordination amongst his own commanders. Thats a great fact. Well talk to peter with that. Well the talk. Okay. I couldnt help myself. Well, one of lincolns problems was he give a direct order, and that was a lesson he didnt learn for too long a time during the civil war. So thats my answer to you, peter. Yeah. Lets open it up to some questions. I know were running late, but questions. Standing here in gettysburg, i have to and note that the conversation didnt really include anything. Mead and i think some what dr. Noah said is relevant as as lincolns not understanding the challenges of the weather, but why does mead get overlooked so much . Thats my question. I dont know. I dont know if he gets overlooked. Abe lincoln. Lincoln overlook criticism. When he wrote the famous letter to me saying that you you drive the enemy from our soil. Its all our soil. Im so disappointed we could have won this war, but then showing his ability, a commander in chief as a leader in the long term, he, of course, writes on the bottom, never sign, never something we should all do with email when were angry. Put in the reserve or whatever you call it. The draft file. Dont send it. Wait 24 hours. Thats part of genius. So thats thats favorite command story with made i think you only knew me for a few minutes before gettysburg. Ill give full credit to gene murray on this. She wrote a fabulous essay in a book that i coedited, which helped me really understand meads command decision in the wake of gettysburg and. And the bottom line is lincoln completely misunderstood the limits with which meat. Mead had to work. I mean, he he had an army that was very battered and very bloodied. And the idea that mead can just gallivant across southern pennsylvania maryland and virginia and follow up on on on this kind of bloodletting with such ease, i really reveals a misunderstanding at that moment. And also meads great understanding of the moment. And think about it i mean, major campaigns are not going to resume in the Virginia Theater for what, another nine months . I mean, in ten months. Yeah, i cant i cant do math. I do history. Instead. Look, let me follow up on that briefly. Again, regarding mead, its interesting that the criticism the most pointed criticism comes with july the 12th, when he didnt prevail to leave from getting across the river when it was rain swollen and you didnt have a pontoon bridge yet. And he let them sit there for 24, 36 hours and then escape. But in mind, one of the things me did who spit in command for five days was called all his corps commanders and asked them, what should we do . And they voted not to do it. Now, he could have said, im overruling you. Were going to do this. But thats one of the things that both mead and for that matter, lincoln had deal with. You cant just say, you know, i put maps on the screens with my students. Theres a little blue box and a little red box here. And they say, well, why didnt they just do this some . Sometimes there are things that inhibit your ability to just do that. One of them is having five of your corps commanders say. No, im against doing that. So we should keep that in mind in and then forgiving mead a little bit in. Fact those corps commanders told me that fortifications that lee built on the potomac were worse. Fredericksburg. And if im the army of the potomac, the last thing im going to do is launch another fredericksburg. Lets have an other question, a comment. I would like to thank you for sharing insight and your thoughtful comments. It was very enlightening as a west pointer and a i will say i regret to share those traits with mcclellan as a west point and i will say i also regret that the Naval Academy wasnt founded sooner. So mcclellan have gone there and. Well, the Naval Academy graduates first class on this date in history. So im but speaking about unprecedented things that lincoln had to deal with as commander in chief, he also had the ability to deal with his commanders all over the as no president before him had had like polk might have wanted to interfere with winfield. Scott lot because they couldnt stand him in mexico but he didnt have the Communications Technology at all to do that because you just comment very briefly about that ability of lincoln to have that instant quote unquote communication with his commanders, not only using the telegraph to to widen the net, his observation and ability to redirect people, but also the proximity of the war, i mean, he goes to the peninsula, goes to antietam. He he he sees the troops and his generals often in the field, which is, you know, its hard to do it very close. But youre absolutely right proximity and Technology Make lincolns interference more likely. And consequential. I cant resist telling the story that is that in the late 19th century when a telegraph line finally laid from continental United States to hawaii to asia the commander of the asian squadron was horrified by this because, of course, prior to that the commander of a squadron on distant station patrol was virtually sovereign and now he said, now i began nothing. An errand boy at the end of a telegraph. Thats going to have to it. Folks, thank you very much. This