Transcripts For CSPAN Discussion Focuses On The Future Of North Korea 20170530

Thanks very much for coming to this event for a discussion of north korea boom or bust. Dropout, we have a 30 rate for attendance. I think today we had a 30 increase in attendance. I think that is a true to our speakers and the issue at hand, which is one of the top Security Issues facing not just the United States, but the world. Of a dialoguepart where we seek to address and shed light on the issues that come up. The dialogue is a gathering of defense ministers around the region and in other countries. There is one asian defense minister who will not be there. That is the north korean. I tried many times to get the north koreans to come and it has been a failure every time i have as an area toew improve on. Lets get serious about north korea. We have four Renowned Experts to address aspects of the north startingsue should at the sis cs is. Hes also a director of Asian Studies at georgetown university. From 20042007 he served as director for Asian Affairs at the white house. Heat is a he is a longtime member and contributor. Nationals the deputy Intelligence Officer for east asia at the National Intelligence council. Before that, she served as director for korea, japan, and Oceanic Affairs at the Security Council. Earlier, she worked at the cia. I met her at a conference in philadelphia where i was impressed with her presentation. Thanks for coming. He is a professor at the Catholic University of america. He served in several advisory positions in the korean government including communication, preparation, and the ministry of unification. We met eight years ago and our paths have crossed several times since then. Elamin basedael here in washington. Before i hired him in 2009, he spent five years supporting the previously he spent 18 months at the United Nations for weapons inspections. The event will run for an hour and a half following remarks by each of the panelists. We will have a discussion portion and then turn it over to questions for you. This event is on the record and cspan onecast by and cspan radio. Eventually a video will be posted. Because of the cspan broadcast, we have actualize here which asked to the heat in the room and unfortunately, today, the airconditioning chose to go out for the entire building in the room is packed with people so im going to encourage everyone to feel free to take off one layer of clothing. Encourage the panelists to do that as well. If you see us sweating, it is not because we are worried about north korea. Victor, lets start off with some thoughts from you. Victor it is a pleasure to be here. Mark neglected to mention how we first met. You probably dont remember. Mark i remember. Victor i was doing my phd dissertation in looking for people to interview for my thesis in when you are roaming the streets of tokyo, you are grateful and remember the ones who said yes. Mark was one of the two people who had said yes at the time and the other was bill mckinney. Im always grateful for that. Korea, a greatth bust. Boom or if any of you have been paying attention to the news, you will notice an uptick in coverage of north korea largely because of missile testing activity. Some of you may look at this and say we have seen them do this before. Cyclical coverage of every time they decide to but there is a qualitative difference today in terms of what has happened in the past. If we start from some of the basic metrics. , so for about007 17 years, north korea did 17 Ballistic Missile tests. 2008 from today, i they have done 73 or 74 for nuclearsts and tests. So there has been a change in the amount they have been doing. In the past, there was a theory callshington, d. C. And thend universities that purpose of north koreas testing was that it was essentially a desire to have negotiations with the outside world and in particular, the United States. North korea, the poor and isolated country. It has the largest country on its border, russia on its border. United States Military is in the south and directly across the border is a very successful korea. For all these reasons, the north korean regime did these tests as a way to try to draw the outside world into negotiations to get some credibility and legitimacy because it was the only currency they had. They had no other currency to trade with the outside world. I think it is safe to say that in the policymany community that still believe that is the purpose of this testing. The pace of testing clearly suggests that this is a military testing program. Help not simply a cry for or provocation disguise as an all french. This is military testing. What is the purpose of this program . Learly one purpose is survival dictatorships in particular are quite often very much focused on this. Regime put you that a that over the past 25 years has devoted a disproportionate amount of its resources to a wmd program is not doing this just for survival. Demonstrating and actively trying to test the capability of reaching the United States. Thean talk about some of obstacles that still remain. That is clearly the objective of this testing. The purpose of being able to and tohe United States all of japanreaten and south korea, the military objective is in my view they want to undercut the credibility of u. S. Deterrence guarantees to south korea. , they believeinds that if they can threaten the United States los angeles or San Francisco with a nuclear attack, it will create hesitation on the part of the United States if they were called on defending south korea. If they can threaten all u. S. Installations and cities in japan, including tokyo, they onl create some hesitation japan to allow the United States to have forces. You have to remember that north korea the world for north korea is very small. Survival, but north koreans dont really care about climate change. They dont care about global governance. They dont care about responsible overseas development and policies in africa. They dont care about conflicted states. They only care about survival and dominance of the korean peninsula. May seems idea farfetched to some of you, if you look at it from a north korean mindset, this is all that matters. Once they can create some sense of hesitation or doubt in south korean minds that the United States or japan would be there in the case of a conflict, then they will feel like they have effectives strategic bailouts. 25 years ago the north korean regime realize they were never going to be able to match south , companylar for dollar for company, tank for tank, soldier for soldier, so they chose an asymmetric strategy focusing on Nuclear Weapons, Ballistic Missiles, and cyber as a way to try to asymmetrically tried to match the other side of the fence and that is essentially the strategy they have been following. ,n terms i dont know mark how long the woman to speak for question mark mark it should not be any more than 10. Victor let me make some comments about new government and south korea. Elected in south korea new government was elected in south korea. That they are going to take a very different view of policy towards north korea and create a rift in the alliance between United States and south korea. I think what we have seen thus far has shown the opposite, president moon has of course the north koreans have helped in creating this measured response because they have already done to the newtests since south korean president was elected. , think from a u. S. Perspective i think United States doesnt have a problem with engagement with north korea, but it has to be done at the right time. It has to be coordinated and done at the right time which is what the South Koreans want as well. They dont want to throw money down a black hole. Effectivegoing to be if it is not coordinated with the United States and other members who were involved in trying to do nuclear iran is denuclearize north korea. Think if you look at the president s statements they thanct the ground rather an ideology. Why dont you stop there . Mark thanks for letting out the situation which dr. Wall is going to comment on. Sue, you been looking at the north korean case for quite a number of years. Ell us sue when i used to work at the is and i will tell you what leadership,t is dynamics what the leaders are going to do. This is something that is hard to get a clarity on. As victor said, even though we , we a handle on leadership have a handle on this tactics policy. We had names for which was basically north korea would do and thereprovocative is International Condemnation and they would up the ante. Some sort of confessions made by washington to north korea. This is not exactly the pattern under tim johnson owns jonguns kim leadership. He seems really invested in a Nuclear Program. He is bent on completing it. He sees achieving this capability to be able to hit the as the final guarantee so i dont think theres any guarantee. What really concerns me is whether you are for maximum pressure or engagement and i happen to be for pressure and i happen to be in terms of maximum amount of sanctions and other measures to try to get to the regime to change, but what none of these [no audio] we do sooner or later, i think sooner rather than later north korea will achieve that capability and then i have many north koreae achieves that capability. The two main concerns i have miscalculations. You can hold u. S. Cities as hostages and then they could be and thenocative acts lead to unintended escalation and obviously a problem so that is one concern i have. The second concern and i know a lot of folks share this concern is that Nuclear Deterrence has worked thus far. Again, im not as confident on this leadership that it will work with kim jongun. Lewis wrotejeffrey a policy piece about how north even be developing. N offensive Nuclear Doctrine if there is an argument that people are making that theres a possibility that kim jongun could do that. Could use Nuclear Weapons in the u. S. Efforts in south korea could use nuclear to recoil u. S. Efforts in south korea. Mark six minutes. Chop administration recently says there is a four point strategy. One not recognizing the lou correa north korea as a Nuclear State the sounds are good, and i do think we have to be somewhat realistic. We have to be prepared for this scenario that none of these measures are going to work and what is our longterm policy . I dont know if we have that. We see regime change is off the but if this is credible than it is not going to change. This is something we have to make about. Just two points since im out of time. He sanctions it is not only to pressure north korea. I think it helps to undermining you are hoping to create instability or change. Is taking money away. I think if this information that we talk about. It is very important but i want to make the point that it should not only be targeted towards the public. I think we should try to target the elites because were trying to get to messages across. This is not going to guarantee your survival and livelihood. Andou are able to get out there was some sort of amnesty because it is the only supports that has kept the regime going. Me of what myds first one is a view from south korea, not represented south korea of course. Thank you for having me here. I was wondering about , boomle of this seminar or bust. He actually asked me to talk about the south korean perspective, but unfortunately im not the government. I know a lot of people inside the korean government. I have many friends inside. Understand about the view of the south korean government to north korean policy. That that i believe policy is different from those cabinets. S importance ofhe the interkorean relations and also the social and cultural , the government will start with the cultural or or military. It seems to me i think it is difficult to say the munging beernment would fundamentally different from the previous government. Variablesy the three politics, action and isction, and the third one alliance politics. Of course, the alliance between the u. S. And south korea. The first, regarding the domestic politics. It is natural to expect or view th korean policy which is known as the sunshine iticy so many people predict to be the moonshine policy. [indiscernible] the humanitarian aid to north. Orea maybe two days ago to have it is necessary humanitarian aid. Maybe most of you know the , now he is the special security advisor. Ofis a strong supporter sunshine policy. He has a book on sunshine policy and it is titled sunshine policy in defense he is also a song supporter of the sunshine policy on the korean peninsula. Not knowly, you may a director nominee, and deeply involved in relations so all of them believe sanctions are not enough to change north koreas course of action and they work to pursue a new north korea policy that changes the real nature of the north korean may be in theiety longer term perspective. However, it is somewhat difficult to pursue. It is fundamentally different even during the munging government. South koreas north koreas policy is influence by north koreas behavior as well as south koreas symmetric politics. North korea has conducted five nuclear test for the last 10 years and maybe hundreds of missile test so it is not to south koreas so innt policy then behaviornorth koreas fifthikely north korea continues provocative paper, south koreas Public Opinion is less likely to views engagement for it the munging government understands the importance of koreau. S. Alliance in. Ealing with the north korea the president also spoke about about thece and talks need to strengthen so i think keepunging government will buterating with the essays, south Korean People are concerned about the uncertainty and unpredictability in the and north korean policy. The former bush policy come istrumps policy even to me very uncertain and unpredictable which makes south Korean People concerned about the possibility of child. Northent trump says that korea has shown great disrespect for its neighbor, china. People do not understand what he means. The talked about south Korean People do not understand and so this is why the south Korean People are u. S. Chinabout issues and maybe the korean peninsula. And norththe u. S. The nuclearing necessary it is still andolve the uncertainty coordinate very closely between the two countries to let me stop here. Mark mike, i put you last the current because you would more. Ten us no even copanelistsy discussed earlier, missiles play a paramount role in north and its meansraft to ensure its survival. It is probably the preferred means for delivering a nuclear weapon. Missiles also have a conventional capability and in could be armed with chemical or biological weapons. Though, i would argue artillery is a much more effective means for delivering the two, biological or chemical agent. Seoul quitenge easily that way. I would not expect anything other than nuclear. In the headlines over the last 34 years since kim jongun has come to power, we have seen north korea conduct a large number of missile tests. I think it is somewhere in the never heard of 7578. It depends on how you count them. Some of the news reports are little ambiguous, but nonetheless there are reasons north korea would want to test its missiles. Primarily, at least under the themongun regime, we see new systems. Elop you can develop a missile without testing extensively. Years tolly takes 25 develop a new system. That includes the flight Trial Development phase. You could shorten that. Iod, but there are inherent risk to doing so. North tests provide korean means to train its launch cruise for maintaining operational readiness. Youran use them to survey stockpile terrific to make sure as they age, they still perform to specifications. This is actually an Important Role of flight testing in the in the soviet programs past. Missile tests can be performed to deter rivals. To achieve intimidation. As victor said, creating leverage for negotiations. We look back at the past regimes, we see missile testing was done primarily for political objectives as opposed to some technical imperatives such as developing new systems. It is interesting if we examine and i think previous speakers have talked about this. Under kim jongil, it was one missile per year in those came in bunches. They exception of either came in 2006 or 2009. They launched seven missiles within the best within a few hours. When kim jong on came to power, things changed dramatically. They are now averaging about 1315 test per year in this is indicative of a Missile Development program. North korea is pursuing the development of more than one system. They seem to introduce something new each day. I want to talk about their capabilities, where they are, and then project some timelines and maybe at the end offer some policy prescriptions, but some ideas of what we could and the limitations we have in trying to halt Missile Development. Dong missileso the kimablished during jongil regime. I think they conducted a handful indicativead it was of having received the technology from a foreign source. In this case it was very likely russia. Recently what we have seen north korea do is leverage that existing scud technology. They testedst year, the scud er for extended range. Ofy change the materials construction to lighten it increase the diameter from. 88 meters to one meter in this allows it to travel about thousand kilometers. It is an old soviet design. Develop itar if they themselves or if it was imported in the 1990s with all the other technologies they receive. But widely scud er . It offense essentially matches the performance of a no dong. It was aimed at messaging to south korea that we can overfly your Missile Defense battery. We have options to counter your Missile Defense capabilities and then more recently and then build it during the military parade on april 15 and tested over the weekend, is it a it with a new reentry vehicle. One that to maneuver. This could serve two purposes. Maneuvering in the atmosphere against Missile Defenses and achieve better accuracy. North korea has been ingenious and leveraging the scud. Echnology programs,of element if failed its first three or four launch attempts. It succeeded in the last two, but the object placed into orbit probably means it has not worked so they have a ways to go. The concerns is that it could be used as a stepping stone to and i will talk about that in a moment. Over the course of the last two years, we have seen several surprising developments and the one that surprised me the most was the emergence of this twostage solid propellant missile. It is launched from a submarine which provides additional retaliatory capability, but all the missiles that the north koreans had relied on in the fueled. E been liquid this is a solid fueled system. It appears these are developed indigenously. Dismissal can cover 1200 kilometers, so the submarine can patrol relative distance from north korea or from the korean peninsula. I would also argue that just a few tests does not mean they have the capability. Right now they have a single submarine. They will have to develop at least three. Theres an old saying in the , youif you have one ship have none. They will have to have a minimum three submarines, probably six to retain a reliable retaliatory capacity. They also have to do another a number of other things. Where are they going to patrol the subs . How are they going to protect them . I dont think they will patrol very far from the peninsula. They will have to develop that capacity. I dont see that emerging quickly. There is a land track version. And more Interesting Development from a longrange missile capability. It has failed six or seven times in its first eight launches. Tested twoly, they weeks ago. It is an intermediate range missile. Used isne that has been a mystery, but it is the most troubling thing i have seen come out of north korea because this is a true steppingstone tour toward an icbm. The quickest way to get to an icbm would be to convert the launcher. Very honorabled to prelaunch. It would take modifications and flight test. It could be ready for emergency use in 2018, 2019. Could rely on this hs 12 technology. They would have to prove out the intermediate range missile first before they go a step up, but we have seen them take shortcuts in the past. They could achieve a road mobile system based on these technologies sometime 20202021. The more distant prospect is the use of solid propellant that we have seen, but i would be shocked if a missile would be operational little operational by 2025. It is more likely 2030. Policy options are very limited. We treat all missile tests the same. I think that is wrong. When the test the scud, we should probably ignore for all practical purposes. The test of the intermediate range system is a big deal, but a response has been the same for every other missile and i would like to the more thought going individual tests. The development of the medium range is a lot more consequential even then the flight tests. There is a lot on the table. Theres a lot of policy options to discuss. To the abilities, intentions, which i thought it was fascinating when he talked about how it was difficult to get a track on it and then you got it and then they changed intentions. Were going to go into a q a session for about 25 minutes. State your name and affiliation and make it quick and witty if you can, but solid is more important. Here in the third row, i will call on two people at once. In the blue shirt and greg in the white shirt. Speaking to the mic. What are the prospects for the new regime in south korea to take such measures as reopening complexong industrial or any other reaching out question mark mark hold tha . You elaborate on the scenario you fear . Imagining kimuble jongun using any military force against south korea which would thousands of americans in south korea and result in his demise . Wong lets go to professor that. Ress isfessor wong right now, it to reopen the Industrial Park because i think the imaging government ging governmen the moon government will foreseeablein the future. They already talked about the thenitarian aid, but kaesong complex is a difficult issue. Than an Industrial Park, the last is political and military. Various forms of interaction with north korea talked about seem to be in direct contradiction to the u. S. Policy of isolation politically, economically. Kaesong Industrial Zone might be in violation of the Security Council resolution sanctions. Im wondering, is there any recognition in south korea that such initiatives are going to andagainst u. S. Policy be victor or soon professor wong they think about the policies so concerns about whether it will. They complicate the sanctions on north korea. Victor and then soon. Victor i think the tip of the spear by any engagement policy of the south korean government will start with food and fertilizer. That usually happens at a certain time of year. Now. Y be passed that point well, food you can kiss but fertilizer not so much. Kaesong right now is offlimits because if they were to reopen it would be a violation of sending sanctions so that is really off the table now. We collect a lot of data and for what it is worth, we predicted accurately that north korea would do kinetic provocations. No one cares later that you got it right before, but im just telling you. Our data suggest there are really driving forces coming up over the summer. Usually what happens is north korean is sort of stops around august 15 because they have to get ready to get angry at the annual u. S. Exercises that start at the end of august. Duringould be a period the summer for social and cultural things, but i think he gets i think it is harder when you Start Talking about big or diamondke kaesong mountain Diamond Mountain project. Progressives the i think even those people who are the strongest advocates of engagement understand that 2007 is a different north korea than the north korea we are dealing with today. It was a different leadership and their behavior is very different. Theres a common misperception if we just talked to the north koreans maybe they will come down. What has become clear under the theent leadership is that north korean government has no interest in talking to anybody. If you look at their behavior there hasary 2008, been no interest in talking to the United States, japan, south korea, or russia. This particular period we are in now in terms of interactions between china is the lowest ever. We all know this has been a summit between we also found the reason for the low level interaction is not because the chinesei mean, they are, but tt the reason. The reason is because the north koreans do not want to talk to the chinese. The chinese have been trying very hard to talk to the north koreans and it has been the north koreans who have been denying all contact. While there are many from the previous progressive government that are in the new government, the new reality is on the ground and they also understand it is a different north korea that it was in 2004. I want to repeat gregs question because apparently the mike was not working. We will take a brief break from this for live coverage of the u. S. House. They are in for a short session day works are on a 11 district. The speaker pro tempore the house will be in order. The chair lays before the house a communication from the speaker. The clerk the speakers room, washington, d. C. , may 30, 2017. I hereby appoint the honorable andy harris to act as speaker pro tempore on this day. Signed, paul d. Ryan, speaker of the house of representatives. The speaker pro tempore the prayer will be offered by our chaplain, father conroy. Chaplain conroy let us pray. Eternal god, we give you thanks for giving us another day. We thank you once again that we have come can come before you and ask guidance for the men and women of this assembly. Send your spirit of peace, honesty and fairness during this week of constituent visits. Bless the people of this great nation with wisdom, knowledge and understanding that they might responsibly participate in our american democracy. Please keep all who work for the peoples house in good health. We thank you for their generosity and the tremendous job so many did this past weekend so millions of americans could enjoy a wonderful capitol concert celebrating memorial day. Bless us this day and every day, and may all that is done be for your honor and glory. Amen. The speaker pro tempore pursuant to section 3a of House Resolution 352, the journal of the last days proceedings is approved. The chair will lead the house in the pledge of allegiance. I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of america and to the republic for which it stands, one nation under god, indivisible, with liberty and justice for all. The chair lays before the house an enrolled bill. H. R. 657, an act to amend title 5 United States code to extend certain protections against prohibited personal practices and for other purposes. The speaker pro tempore pursuant to section 3b of House Resolution 352, the house stands adjourned until 10 30 a. M. On coverage here on cspan and we are back down to the International Institute for their Panel Discussion on military and economic developments in north korea. China factor in this north dominance in the north korean peninsula. We are taking to at once two at once. The astion is, as they build up their crews and Ballistic Missile capabilities, do they recognize it or to make that doctrine effective, they need to have isr capability and a lot of it, otherwise they will be reliant upon do they understand those kinds of intel requirements . Bob peters asked a question with some ackermans acronyms. Does to the South Koreans understand that as they develop their kill chain missiledefense system, that they will need intelligence requirements that they do not now have. Ets first go to victor relationshipdprk is quite bad right now. After normalization of relations inween china and south korea 1992, no north Korean Leader went to china for a decade because they were so upset with it all. Of aaw a reemergence renaissance in relationship between 2008 and 2009 because the chinese signed a bunch of industry contracts with north korea. This was not a relationship with a kind of like each other. They actually both hate each other. Thenorth koreans feel like chinese treat them like a poor province, which they do, and the chinese feel like north korea, everything every time to do something bad, chinas name gets dragged through the mud every time they do something bad, chinas name gets dragged through the mud. North korea leverages that greatly to their advantage. Indochina will never allow north china willey know never allow north korea to collapse. They are willing to push the envelope as well as they can. That creates problems for the United States because the United States has a policy that is aimed at treating china as part of the solution, which is that if 85 of north koreas external trade is with china, we can go after slave labor exports and all his other sorts of things, but it 85 of the traders with china, then china is part of the solution in terms of cutting that trade down and putting pressure on north korea. The problem is china is never going to put a truly pressing amount of economic squeeze on north korea because for fear that they will collapse the regime. The chinese and masseter himself had a oped ambassador himself had a oped were he essentially said that. China is willing to put some pressure on, but is afraid it will collapse the regime. That is music to north koreas ears. That is the box we are caught in, right now. Thank you, victor. I am not familiar with those and i am not an expert as fardefense policy but as i understand, the defense policy is not clear, yet, actually. There is more room for the u. S. And south korea to coordinate. Mostly, the Korean People are sure about the children capabilities. About the kill chain capabilities. The government strongly stresses understanding of security, rather than military, as opposed to the former adviser isl security while theiplomat former National Security adviser was former military. I will follow up on your question to mike because in terms of technical capabilities, you mentioned one person one purpose of the longrange scud was to send a signal that thaad wont be able to deal with such a high trajectory. Does it become irrelevant . No. I should explain it more fully, but there are targets that lie south of the thaad battery that may be vulnerable if you can overfly the reach of the thaad interceptors. The maximum ceiling of engagement for the boundaries, i have heard 150 kilometers, 250 kilometers. Pusan, it would be busan, it would be vulnerable. Premise thatyour airborne isr is essential for kill chain. For those who are not aware, kill chain is the republic of koreas strategy for defeating the Ballistic Missile forces of north korea, prelaunch, free assembly. It goes from birth until it land somewhere. Lands somewhere. We have the experience from the relativein 1991, where to today, our Airborne Reconnaissance and intelligence gathering capabilities were very poor and we were unable to launchers,raqi scud even though we have air superiority. In north korea, the job is a little easier because most of the launchers cannot stray too far from the roads. There is a limited number of paved and resurface roads in north korea. Uavs,xtensive use of maybe a few manned aircraft, overhead satellites, you have a pretty decent chance of doing interdiction or disrupting operations on the ground for the north koreans, and that would be essential. The two elements that are required are the isr and communications is not a simple thing. It is what distinguish and distinguishes american missile programs from others. What does isr mean . Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. It is a catchall phrase for knowing what is happening on the ground. Im going to take the last two in the back. The gentleman and then stanley. Hear. Peak loudly so i can brian from Ohio State University and my question is for dr. Terry. Completely agree with your analysis that kim jongun is likely undeterminable in his goal to get new their capability, deliverable Capability Nuclear capability, deliverable capability. Policy is toe our tighten the screws if he really is undeterminable, and i think youre right, what do we achieve in sanctions . Is it possibly regime change or is it that we do our best to erode north korean capability . Run if he do we really is undeterminable, and sanctions wont do the job . Do we end up looking like a paper tiger . The other risk is that we are with the destabilizing the situation or are we destabilizing the situation . I will repeat that after stanley posts his question. Question onlated regime change. Im not sure if i heard you or interpreted youim not sure if r interpreted you correctly. The u. S. Policy may well fail as well as our allies policy and deterrence may not work. We are in a horrible situation in terms of threat to our security, so dont we have to think about regime change . I dont want to put those words in your mouth. If you do think that, do you believe that any country, u. S. , r. O. K. Or even china has the capacity to affect regime change . Do we have a candidate . Do we have a hope for placement . For replacement . That was great. I dont know if you coordinated those. Brian from Ohio State University asked you said kim jongun is likely undeterminable in his quest to get nuclear capability, but you said that the best policy is sanctions. If he understood you write, what is the purpose of the sanctions . Is it regime change and what are the risks in this . Do we look like a paper tiger if it fails . Stanley also asked a question about regime change. Do we have the ability to pursue regime change . Do we have somebody waiting in the closet, so to speak . Given that we cant do nothing with all of these provocations proponents of sanctions would argue that strong shanks strong sanctions have not been in place since february of last year. There are so many countries that we sanction more heavily than north korea. Sanctions have not had a real chance to succeed. Particularly, enforcement of sanctions have not been working which is why we are trying to push china to enforce sanctions. Proponents of sanctions would say lets give it a chance because it is the only option weve got in terms of pressuring the north korean regime. Given the limited options, it is the only thing we could try. Try and is, after we let say we try to do sanctions and that of this works, what are if it does do, and potentially destabilize the regime, is it the worst possible thing . It is not a popular thing to hear, but my personal view is that the north korean state has to disappear. People and5 million we are not even talking about human rights. The ultimate solution to the north korean problem is for north korean state to disappear and we have unification. Effect, thating an does not occur to me. It creates a whole lot of other problems that we need to be prepared for, but it is a separate conversation. In terms of regime change, i am not optimistic we have a new candidate and we could just make this occur. Kim jonguns regime has done an excellent job of getting ready any opposition. Even for the regime change to occur, the other measures we are talking about, whether sanctions , all of these other oxygen leading meeting to that and i think we need to be clear are contributing to that and i think we need to be clear. It is something to think about, is what i am saying. We need to face the hard truth and have it as a goal or not. It is something we need to discuss. Thank you, very much. I will go to the lady in the second row from the back and then three rows ahead of her. Diane perlman at George Mason University. There is a body of literature that is not very well known. I know you worked with Robert Jarvis and we talked about this before. He said that there are no other options and that we have to do pressure but there is evidence that coercive techniques can have the opposite effect and there is a study of 100 cases of sanctions and they worked 14 times and failed 86 times. It is likely to produce the sometimesffect and people talk about when you behave according to deterrence or dynamics, you could trigger spiral theory and that we need to do more attention in tension reduction intention reduction. Could you talk about some of the literature . And then three rows ahead . Almost it subside to what was said before, there was an article in the oped, and the outlook section of the Washington Post about three weeks ago by a person who was advertised to have been a Chinese Investment banker, but it couldve been Henry Kissinger in disguise, suggesting that the deal we need to make is no regime chains and no regime change and a freeze on the Nuclear Program. Is there any future in that because so far, from everything ive heard today, it has been an inadvertent advertisement for strategic patience what some people say is not doing much of anything. Is even this possibility that is even this avenue a possibility . Diane perlman from George Mason University mentioned literature in the 80s which reach the conclusion that the techniques can have the opposite impact and in 14 of 100 cases of sanctions, they actually worked, meaning 86 did not work. And then mike asked a question about basically the freeze. One variation of a freeze option , a freezing on the Nuclear Program, and exchange for clarity, but no regime change, which sounds like the strategic patience policy, which has been disavowed. I guess this is this first question is more to victor or sue. She asked for victor. Victor it is a debate. There are people who say, in terms of sanctions, sanctions dont work until they do. You look at any sanctions case and people will say they dont work, they dont work and then all of a sudden the target state does what you want and they say oh it does work, but they have some other cause, some alternative explanation. The thing about sanctions is they dont work until they do. The other thing is in the minds of many in the policy community, as a result of the Obama Administration policy, there is the model of iran and the view that sanctions appear to have worked, whether you agree with it or not. That is a view out there committed multilateral sanctions worked to bring iran to the table and maybe Something Like that could happen with north korea. This coincided with a number of studies that were done by think tanks in washington and south korea that compared the scope and breadth of sanctions in iran to north korea. North korean sanctions were so minimal compared to what has been done on iran. Debateer side of the which is this is 14 out of 100 cases that have worked. In addition to that, we will soon have two aircraft carriers off the coast of the korean peninsula. We are in a sanctioning mode and north korea is on a missile testing warpath. No dialogue taking place. Historians will write about how this was a path to war. There are two debates here and there is no right or wrong, but that is what we are in the middle of in terms of policy. Thanks, victor. Sanctions,y on the sanctions is a leverage effect. Once you have heavy sanctions, you have something to give away. In terms of the freeze question, this is so unpalatable, but we live with Nuclear Russia and live with china, just live with north Korea Nuclear north korea. It is not a goal, that this is my this is what we might end up with. Both have a lot of problems. Freezing has a lot of problems. We dont know where all the things are. Similar over, but there are a lot of covert facilities. Some are over, that there are a lot of covert facilities. We have many deals with north korea. There is a lot of consensus with both options. We obviously need to go for another hour, but we only have five minutes. Lets take three 22nd questions. Three 20 second questions. Is there a way to take the strategic importance of north korea away from china so it is devalued in the eyes of chinas own agreement could come forward as of china, so an agreement could come forward . Right in the back. Withe question i have is regards to a possible regime change or collapse of the regime , nobody predicted the soviet union would collapse. Should we be putting in plans or thinking about how to secure the Nuclear Program elements that are there, loose materials, missiles, command and control in terms of a collapse in case of a collapse . My question regards their ability to use chemical and biological weapons and i wanted to know to what extent they have worked to develop those two types of weapons and with with with which countries they might work in the future if they cannot do it on their own. We have three quick questions. Take away they to strategic leverage that north korea provides to china so as to take that out of the equation . The second question was if there is a regime change or collapses, plans for securing the Nuclear Program and lastly, a question about chemical weapons capabilities. With whom might north korea be working in the future, and how is that Program Going . Anybody want to address any one of those questions . They are not exactly in each persons specialty persons specialty. Mike on securing the Nuclear Weapons and other wmd Missile Technology in north korea, yes, there are elements within the department of defense that look at this seriously. Whether we have the capability argument. A matter of i have long argued that you need a group of experts in various fields. The key is to wrap up the argum. Peoplelong and document the program and then go after the assets. It is the op. Cit. Of what we did with the iraq it is the opposite of what we did with the iraq survey group. I have confidence we would succeed in securing the nuclear materials. On cw people and bw. Ment the north korea is a very opaque target. We dont know what is going on. We believe they have the capacity to develop chemical weapons. I would argue that chemical weapons are not that effective battlefield weapon not an effective battlefield whatcom weapon if your opponent is one that cannot be detected. Rok forces and u. S. Forces would have that capacity. Against cities and such, it could be rather disastrous, and because seoul is within artillery range, you could deliver a lot of agent over the area to saturate it and kill large numbers of people. That is a major concern. Who is helping them . I think they have the capacity themselves to do these things. They may rely on certain chemicals that probably come over the border with china because it is to even say it is leaky is a generous description. It is as porous as a screen door. I dont have a lot of confidence that it could be stopped. We will just go down the row. Im going to respond to the question on north korea and china. North korea is not only an asset china is abut ,trategic asset for north korea so they need each other, thats not and enforce the uns sanctions, because the chinese prefer the status quo of. Orth korea to regime collapse korea has some reservations about china, inause china is not cooperation with north korea. There are policy limitations. They are moving between these two, and so maybe they are trying to maximize their own strategy. Toht now, it is difficult distinguish completely, the chinese benefit from north korea. Sue say north korea has enough biological weapons. They do cooperate with countries like syria on chemical weapons. The arsenal, that is our number one concern. The problem is while there are plans to try to secure this, there are a lot of problems. Out, to lot of them reach the places to secure it, if we do not go through the United Nations, it could be very protracted. The problem is, our u. S. Soldiers going to run up to north korea and how is china going to perceive that . There have been challenges in trying to secure all the debbie m. D. Wmds. Is up to china to change when it comes to north korea. When there is an actual war, the threat of war, it would be very hard, and it will be a challenge for all of us to get to change its thinking to think that its interests will be better served. The gallery is a north korea missile. Iraq, buto sell to Saddam Hussein wanted to pay on credit. So they have sold every system they ever developed. In the containment scenario i would be worried about horizontal proliferation. We did ang survey where we asked experts what is the number one issue in terms of the cross between prior to how much we knew. Are whereind spots you have high priority and no knowledge. Those are the blind spots. What we found was the number one issue was not wmd. It was domestic stabilization in north korea, not because we cared about the nuclear issue, but we feel we need know more about the wmd situation than domestic stabilization in then north. It was interesting based on this data, surveying 100 experts. Mr. Fitzpatrick thanks very much. I thought they were great hesitations, very good questions, good answers. This has been the most over for we haveverflow crowd ever had here, the most heated discussion, and join me in thanking the panelists. Come again. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] Congress Continues on a work period. Here is what some members are doing. Jody errington is in brownfield, texas, talking about the 2018 farm bill. Roger wiki talking to a boys state state today. A symposium exploring Educational Opportunity in the u. S. Since brown v. Board of education. The decision declared state law establishing separate schools for white and laxatives to be unconstitutional white and black students to be unconstitutional. Tonight, economists discuss Government Programs on the poor. Took part and talked about Social Security. We ran some of the numbers. We just ran these with the actuaries of the Social Security administration. Instead of having the taxes taken from the paychecks of workers every week, what if we 10 of the set paycheck go to an ira account and they just accumulate the interest over the 45 years we work. 10 ofif you did that comparedo Social Security and assume an average rate of return, the average poor person would not benefit fromgher having this individual account, but they would be able to leave a Million Dollars for their kids. Has robbedecurity every lowincome family of a Million Dollars. That is not something you will hear a lot, but it happens to be true. You can see the entire discussion looking at the impact of Government Programs on the poor tonight at 8 00 eastern here on cspan. It, oregon missed cbotor ron widen on the score. En what is still in tact is over 800 billion in medicaid cuts, and they will hit American Communities like a wrecking ball. And the pain is going to be felt throughout the ages. And mick sanders mulvaney on the proposed 2018 budget. Senator sanders why does a billionaire family get a text cut . We think it is wrong that everyday folks lose coverage senator sanders ordinary people. Are the Walton Family and ordinary family . Because we repealed obamacare. Future kelly on manchesterstyle terrorist attacks. Menkelly these are kids, and women, that were born and raised in france, germany. They have legal passports. They have left to go fight in the caliphate. Many cases their countries do not know they have left, and then the comeback so their countries do not know they were ever gone, and now they are hardened warriors that will do what they did in manchester. As herbal as manchester was, my expectation is we are going to see a lot more of that kind of attack. On hiswoodward impressions of president trump. Mr. Woodward we asked him about the kind of power, what is power, and quoted some things comesbama said that power to the United States because of its humility and restraint. And then he said and it is one of those moments where he i hate tower is use the word but real power is fear. Cspan programs are available on ourcspan. Org, homepage, and by searching the video library. Doctor ondemand took a part in a Panel Discussion on how technology can improve the health care system. The remarks were part of a symposium hosted by Pepperdine University Business School and management